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he background to this study is the establishment of the single 
payment scheme (SPS), providing decoupled support to farmers, 
which was the central element of the 2003 reform of the common 
agricultural policy (CAP). The member states of the EU-15 had to 
implement the SPS at the latest by 2007, but had some flexibility in the way 
they did so. Member states could opt to apply payment entitlements based 
on historical, individual reference amounts (the ‘historical model’) or 
alternatively, payment entitlements calculated as averages of the historical 
reference amounts of the region concerned (the ‘regional model’) or a mix 
of the two approaches, in either a static or dynamic form (the ‘hybrid 
model’).  
Economic theory, as well as empirical findings, suggests that the way 
in which agricultural support is provided has an influence on land markets, 
because payments capitalise to some degree into land values, affecting both 
the sales and rental prices of land. These effects would in turn have a 
bearing on the transfer efficiency of support, on structural change and so 
forth. Yet, the kind of agricultural support given is not the only factor 
influencing land markets. The profitability of production, user competition 
(driven by environmental concerns and demographic changes), ownership 
and production structures, and the institutional setting of land markets are 
other factors that need to be taken into account. Many of these conditions 
vary greatly among and within the EU member states. 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate whether and to 
what extent the different means of implementation of the SPS have affected 
i) the capitalisation of support into land values (sales and rental prices); ii) 
the distribution of this capitalisation to the different owners; iii) the effect 
of the SPS, in combination with the institutional setting of land markets, on 
structural change in agriculture; and iv) the reaction of land markets and 
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asset values to changes in policy. In contrast to previous simulation 
exercises, the focus of this study is on providing an empirical underpinning 
of policy influences on the land market.  
To guide our analysis, the empirical and theoretical literature in this 
field has been analysed in detail and a theoretical framework has been 
developed to study the impact of direct payments and the SPS on land 
market values under a range of conditions (as presented in the appendices). 
The insights from this literature review and from theoretical analysis have 
been used in the interpretation of the empirical findings from this study.  
The empirical analysis in this study is based on a combination of data 
sources. In particular, we combine insights from comparative data analyses 
based on data from Eurostat and the Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) with data analyses and information collected from a series of 
country and regional (sub-country) studies. More specifically, as part of the 
overall study, 11 country studies and 18 regional studies have been 
undertaken. An important criterion in the selection of countries and regions 
has been the coverage of different implementation models of the SPS. The 
countries covered are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain and the UK, two or more regional studies have been conducted.  
The results from our study are subject to certain analytical 
limitations, however. First is the scarc i t y  o f  d a t a  o n  l a n d  v a l u e s  a n d  
transactions since the SPS was launched. The short time span since 
implementation of the SPS, combined with the varying quality of the 
available data, do not allow econometric analysis. Second, although we 
have systematically verified our data sources and our findings draw on 
several sources of information, the qualitative analysis in the present study 
does not allow us to assess confidence intervals nor does it allow us to 
perform sensitivity analyses or to check the statistical robustness of the 
results. Third, land regulations and long-term contracts may delay the 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values beyond what can currently be 
observed in the data. Fourth, global food markets have experienced major 
changes over the past few years, making it complicated to isolate the effect 
of the SPS on agricultural land markets. The results reported here should 
thus be interpreted keeping these limitations in mind. 
Despite these limitations, the study offers interesting hypotheses and 
preliminary evidence on land market developments in the EU study 
countries (EUSCs) and the effects of the SPS. The role of the SPS in EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | v 
 
influencing land values and the operation of land markets is analysed 
under the following themes: land market developments, drivers of land 
values, the impact of changes in the SPS on land values, the distribution of 
direct payments and the effects on structural change. 
Land market developments in the EUSCs 
The amount of rented land and the volumes of rental transactions differ greatly 
among the EUSCs. Farms in Belgium, France, Northern Ireland and 
Germany are more likely to rent land (more than 65% of the land used). In 
Sweden, farms rent approximately 50% of the agricultural land used. In 
contrast, the prevalence of land renting is lowest (17%) in Ireland. In the 
rest of the countries covered by this study, farms rent between 34% and 
43% of the land used. The share of rented farmland of the total UAA is 
increasing in most of the EUSCs.  
Agricultural land prices also vary widely across the EUSCs. In the peak 
years, differentials between the most and least expensive countries 
exceeded 2,000% – ranging from around €2,000/ha in parts of Sweden to 
over €40,000/ha in parts of the Netherlands. These figures imply that 
awarding the same amount of subsidy per hectare of agricultural land 
would have quite diverse impacts on land prices.  
The variation in rental prices is somewhat lower than in sales prices but 
large differences are likewise apparent. The difference in rental prices between 
the lowest and highest country was around six to one in 1992 and more 
than seven to one in 2006. 
Changes in agricultural land prices over the past decade have been diverse as 
well. Over the period from 1992 to the present, real farmland sales prices 
have decreased by around 25% in Greece, while increasing by around 250% 
in Ireland. Developments in rental prices since 1992 range from a decline of 
around 25% in Finland to a rise of around 55% in Spain. 
This cross-country heterogeneity in agricultural land markets 
suggests that farmers and landowners in these various land markets may 
be affected differently by (changes in) the CAP. 
Drivers of land values 
Agricultural commodity prices and productivity, infrastructural expansion and 
urban pressures have marked influences on land markets, but their relative 
importance differs for rental and sales markets. First, agricultural commodity 
prices and productivity are significant drivers of agricultural land prices, vi | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
but their effects seem to be more striking for rental markets than for sales 
markets. Second, urban pressures – such as growing housing demand – 
have pronounced effects on agricultural land prices, especially in densely 
populated EUSCs (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands) and faster growing 
economies (e.g. Ireland and Spain). The same applies to the role of 
infrastructural expansion in driving up land prices. The latter two factors in 
particular influence sales prices. 
Land market regulations affect land prices and exchanges – especially land 
rentals. Rental prices for agricultural land tend to be more regulated by 
governments than sales prices. In one-third of the EUSCs, the maximum 
rental prices are set by the government.  
The duration of rental contracts is regulated in some of the EUSCs, which 
influences the responsiveness of the rental market to agricultural policy changes. 
The length of rental contracts is regulated by the government in Belgium 
and France (with a contract duration of nine years minimum), the 
Netherlands (six years minimum) and Spain (five years minimum). In 
several EUSCs (e.g. France), the renewal/inheritance of rental contracts is 
also regulated. In these countries, formal rental markets are stickier and the 
time lag is longer in adjusting to policy changes. The prevalence of land 
renting is typically higher in countries with strict rental market regulations, 
such as Belgium and France. These two countries have the highest 
minimum lengths of rental contracts (nine years) and the highest shares of 
rented area (77% and 75% in 2006, respectively) among all the EUSCs. 
Land taxes differ significantly across the EUSCs. Three kinds of tax 
regulations that affect market participants’ decisions to buy, own or sell 
agricultural land have been studied: sales taxes, purchase taxes and 
ownership taxes. Tax rates for land transactions are heterogeneous across 
the EUSCs, spanning from 1% for low-value land in the UK to 18% for 
high-value farmland in Italy. The same applies to ownership taxes, ranging 
from a 0% tax rate on farmland in Finland to over 15% in the southern EU 
countries. 
Neither low taxes for farmland ownership and transactions nor entitlements 
constrain structural change, but they do expose farmland to non-agricultural 
investors. Low transaction taxes for farmland and SPS entitlements facilitate 
structural change through the reallocation of agricultural land and 
entitlements from less productive to more productive farms (e.g. 
Germany). On the other hand, agricultural land markets in countries with 
low transaction taxes are more exposed to speculative farmland purchases EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | vii 
 
(and sales) by non-agricultural investors (e.g. Finland). Differentiated 
farmland ownership taxes for farmers and non-farmers reduce the 
incentives for long-term, speculative farmland purchases (and sales) by 
non-agricultural investors, but hinder structural change (e.g. Greece). 
CAP subsidies have an impact on land values, but the impact varies 
substantially across countries and appears relatively modest compared with other 
factors, especially where land prices are high. CAP subsidies appear to affect 
land sales prices in the EUSCs. Still, their relative importance seems limited 
compared with other drivers. Generally, the lower the land price, the 
higher is the impact of CAP policies in this respect (e.g. in the Nordic 
regions in Finland and Sweden). In countries such as the Netherlands and 
Ireland, where land prices are very high or are rapidly increasing, factors 
other than CAP policies appear to have a greater bearing.  
Implementation of the SPS 
The EU member states could choose among three SPS implementation 
models: the historical, regional and hybrid model. Under the historical 
model, the SPS payment is farm-specific and equals the support the farm 
received in the reference period. This is the most common SPS model in the 
EUSCs. Under the regional model, an equal per-hectare payment is granted 
to all farms in the region. 
Concerns about the redistribution of subsidies were by far the most 
compelling factor for the EUSCs that selected the historical model over the 
regional one. A major motivation for England, Finland and Germany in 
deciding to apply the dynamic hybrid model instead of directly 
implementing the regional one was to smooth the adjustment of the 
farming sector over time. In all cases, receipt of the full SPS support is 
conditioned on the fulfilment of cross-compliance requirements. More 
precisely, a farmer receiving SPS support must respect statutory 
management requirements and maintain land in good agricultural and 
environmental condition.  
None of the EUSCs implemented the purely regional model. The 
comparative insights are therefore based on contrasting the implications of 
the historical model with the hybrid model. 
Entitlements: Activation, trade and valuation 
The share of non-activated entitlements of the total distributed entitlements is low. 
For most EUSCs, it is less than 3%. The value of non-activated entitlements viii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
tends to be lower than the value of activated ones. Non-activated 
entitlements mainly stem from the absence of eligible area and 
administrative burdens. 
The share of activated entitlements tends to be somewhat higher in countries 
using the hybrid model than in those using the historical one. We find that this 
might be owing to specific criteria relating to the implementation of the 
hybrid model. 
There is a wide variation in the face value of entitlements among and within 
the EUSCs. This variation seems to be determined by the commodity 
structure, the level of support provided in the reference period, the SPS 
model applied and implementation details. 
There are large differences among the EUSCs in the restrictions on trading 
entitlements. EU regulations allow entitlements to be tradable but certain 
constraints are imposed by the EU. Member states have some flexibility in 
introducing additional country-specific limitations on entitlement 
tradability. Spain, Italy and France have the tightest restrictions on 
entitlement trading.  
The trade of entitlements is most often conducted directly among farmers, 
although sometimes market agents or farm organisations play a role. Spain 
appears to have the most developed entitlement trading system, similar to 
an auction. 
There is no informal trading in entitlements, except among family members. 
An informal entitlement market was not found in any of the EUSCs, 
because in order to receive payments, entitlement holders need to be 
identifiable. Unofficial ‘trade’ may occur among members of the same 
family, however. 
The entitlement market tends to be smaller in regions under the hybrid 
model compared with the historical model. Under the historical model, trade is 
likely to be driven by structural change – because the SPS was 
implemented in 2005–07, but the SPS entitlements were distributed based 
on land use in 2000–02. With the hybrid model, entitlement trading is 
driven by a combination of decoupling and the fact that relatively more 
entitlements were allocated than with the historical model. Structural 
change is less of an influential factor in the entitlement market under the 
hybrid model, as entitlements were distributed based on the area used in 
the first year of the SPS application. Differences in the implementation 
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with the historical model than with the hybrid one. This is chiefly evident 
in the short run, which is investigated in this study. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that the trade in entitlements is also 
affected by the functioning of land markets, restrictions on the tradability 
of entitlements, the availability of an opportunity to consolidate 
entitlements and the amount of naked land.  
Entitlements are most often traded with land. Evidence from the EUSCs 
shows that with few exceptions, entitlement trades are usually 
accompanied by land. 
Our data show that the market price for entitlements in most EUSCs is 
between one and three times the annual face value of the entitlement. A simple 
calculation would indicate that with perfect markets and without 
uncertainty, the entitlement price would  b e  i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  f o u r  t o  f i v e  
times the face value if the SPS were to run until 2013 or in the range of ten 
to twenty if the SPS were to run indefinitely.  
Several factors may explain the observed gap in the entitlement price 
between theoretical expectations and empirical evidence: i) uncertainty 
about the future of the SPS (e.g. modulation and the health check), ii) the 
additional costs of the SPS (e.g. administrative costs), iii) the taxes and fees 
imposed on transactions and iv) credit market imperfections. The low 
market price of the entitlements may also reflect the capitalisation of the 
SPS into farmland values. 
Impact of SPS implementation 
Our theoretical framework and empirical evidence in the literature suggest that the 
impact of the SPS on land markets depends on several factors, including the SPS 
model applied and specific implementation features, market imperfections, 
transaction costs, market structure and other policies. 
On average, the impact on land markets of the switch to the SPS appears to 
have been weak and it has not led to lower capitalisation than under coupled 
policies, although there has been variation among the EUSCs and regions. 
Preliminary evidence presented in this study indicates that on average the 
impact has been limited. We do not observe major declines in land prices 
with the shift to decoupled policies, which implies that there are no 
significant reductions in the capitalisation of support.  
The introduction of the SPS appears to have had a larger impact on land 
rents than on farmland sales prices. The net effect on land values also depends 
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significance of the SPS compared with other drivers of land values. The 
empirical evidence from this study implies that the relative weight of the 
SPS in determining farmland prices against that of other drivers of land 
values is higher for rents than for sales prices. 
Preliminary evidence reveals that the historical model leads to lower 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values than the regional or hybrid models. In 
countries with the hybrid model, capitalisation appears to be driven by the 
low amount of naked land. In countries with the historical model, the 
impact of the SPS appears to be substantially weaker. Where SPS land 
capitalisation occurs, the most influential factor tends to be structural 
change combined with constrained entitlement trading (most notably in 
Belgium). In countries such as Greece, there is little activity on the land 
market and hence there is little capitalisation of the SPS. In Ireland, the 
possibility to consolidate entitlements has reduced the pressure of the SPS 
on land markets and SPS land capitalisation appears to be minimal. 
We also find that instead of reducing capitalisation, introduction of the SPS 
appears to have increased capitalisation in the least productive countries. The SPS 
seems to have put a floor on land values in less productive regions (e.g. in 
Sweden and parts of the UK). The clearest evidence of the influence of the 
SPS on land values is higher land values for less fertile land (e.g. 
grassland). But this finding could also be rooted in the redistribution that 
came with the hybrid model. 
In countries with regulated rental prices, implementation of the SPS seems 
mainly to affect unofficial markets. In these member states, there is little effect 
on official prices (since these are regulated), but where regulations lead to 
the existence of unofficial markets for agricultural land, the SPS tends to 
increase both rental prices (e.g. Belgium) and volumes on the unofficial 
market (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
Distribution of SPS benefits 
Landowners tend to benefit more from the hybrid model than from the historical 
model. More specifically, landowners benefit more under the hybrid model 
through two channels. The first is the capitalisation of the SPS into land 
values. This is mostly the case where low amounts of naked land drive up 
land values. The second channel concerns the implementation features of 
the hybrid model. Under the hybrid model, the number of entitlements that 
farmers receive is equal to the total eligible area in the first year of the SPS 
application. This has enabled some non-farming landowners to obtain EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | xi 
 
entitlements either by cancelling the existing rental contracts and applying 
for entitlements themselves or by adjusting rental contracts to ensure that 
entitlements return to them after the contract expires, or by undertaking 
other similar arrangements. 
The distribution of the SPS payments to landowners appears to differ 
markedly among the EUSCs. From our country studies, it seems that 
landowners benefit most from the SPS in Finland and Sweden (60-100% of 
the value of the entitlement) and least in Greece and Ireland (0-10%). In the 
rest of the countries, the benefits that accrue to landowners from the SPS 
are in the low to medium range (10-60%). 
The distribution of the SPS additionally depends on whether landowners are 
also farmers, which varies among the EUSCs. As mentioned above, the 
prevalence of renting land differs greatly among the EUSCs. The evidence 
in this study suggests that in Germany, Northern Ireland and Sweden, a 
substantial share of SPS benefits will be channelled to non-farming 
landowners. This finding also holds (but to a lesser extent) for England, 
Finland and Scotland. In the rest of the EUSCs, a lower share of the SPS will 
go to non-farming landowners, either because renting land is less common 
or because there is little capitalisation of the SPS into land values (or both). 
In these countries, farmers appear to gain the largest proportion of the SPS. 
Effects on structural change 
It is too early to observe significant effects of the SPS on structural change in 
agriculture.  Structural change is a long-term process, and it is therefore 
premature to assess the developments observed one or two years since the 
SPS was introduced. Meanwhile, substantial structural changes related to 
factors other than the SPS have occurred in agriculture in the last few years. 
Still, the decoupling of subsidies with the introduction of the SPS has been 
identified by most country studies as having had a major impact on 
structural change in agriculture. 
The SPS seems to constrain farm exit and increase part-time farming. 
Evidence from several countries, e.g. Belgium, Finland, Sweden and the 
UK, suggests that the SPS constrains farm exit. The SPS also appears to 
increase part-time farming – an effect that seems more pronounced in 
marginal areas. Part-time farming allow s  f a r m e r s  t o  r e d u c e  u n p r o fit a b l e 
farm activities while still benefiting from the SPS. No significant difference 
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The impact of the SPS on hired labour appears small. There is 
insufficient evidence to identify the effects of the SPS on other agricultural 
labour developments.  
The hybrid model has stimulated (formal) farm entry, unlike the historical 
model, although it has also given rise to uncertainty on the rental markets. This is 
because under the hybrid model, the allocation of entitlements is based on 
land use when the SPS was introduced and not on land use in the reference 
period. We find some evidence that landowners have started farming in 
order to gain access to the entitlements. The long-term net impact of these 
rent-seeking activities on farm structures is unclear. Nevertheless, it has 
affected the distribution of SPS rents and the market in entitlements in 
ways that are different from the historical model, where such activities do 
not appear to have occurred.  
The introduction of the SPS has reduced farm credit constraints, especially 
for short-term credit. An interesting and potentially significant side effect of 
the SPS has emerged in rural credit markets. Several country studies (e.g. 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) confirm that the SPS affects farms’ 
access to credit. If farms receive the subsidies at the beginning of the 
season, they can use the SPS to pay for inputs directly. If farms receive SPS 
payments at the end of the season, the SPS subsidies can be used as 
collateral for bank credit. Because of uncertainty about the future of the 
SPS, however, it appears that the SPS has no influence on long-term credit. 
Lenders are not willing to provide longer-term loans by accepting future 
SPS payments as collateral. 
Effects of changes in the SPS models on land values 
None of the EUSCs implemented a purely regional model. Most of the 
EUSCs have applied the historical model and some the dynamic hybrid 
model, which will gradually be replaced by the regional model. 
The key characteristic of the regional model is that it equalises the 
face value of all entitlements. The effect of the shift to the regional model 
will be determined by three critical features: i) whether new entitlements 
are allocated, ii) the redistribution of subsidies among regions and iii) how 
landowners are treated with respect to access to the entitlements. 
The  regional model may lead to changes in relative land prices among 
regions. The regional model redistributes subsidies among regions, which is 
expected to lead to higher prices in less productive regions and lower 
prices in more productive ones. The effect is expected to be more marked in EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | xiii 
 
those regions currently applying the historical model. Under the hybrid 
model, a share of the payments has already been redistributed. 
The implementation details of the regional model will largely determine 
whether the shift to the regional model will increase the capitalisation of the SPS 
compared with current SPS models. Among other things, this will depend on 
whether the number of entitlements increase or stay at the present level 
and how much non-farming landowners’ access to entitlements is 
regulated and the rules enforced.  
Yet if the total number of entitlements allocated is affected by the 
policy changes, the upward pressure on land prices will continue to be 
stronger in those countries that have implemented the hybrid model.  
Frictions between farmers and landowners are expected to intensify with the 
shift to the regional model. The chief factors in this regard will be the extent to 
which the access to entitlements of non-farming landowners is regulated 
and enforced, and the extent to which newly allocated entitlements (if any) 
are based on current or past land use. 
The change in models may have an impact on the levels of uncertainty and 
transparency in the entitlement market. If the shift to the regional model 
provokes uncertainty among farmers, it will constrain entitlement markets 
and may induce more land capitalisation. On the other hand, the shift to 
the regional model may increase transparency in the entitlement market, as 
all entitlements will have the same face value. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
he establishment of the single payment scheme (SPS), providing 
decoupled support to farmers, was the central element of the 2003 
reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The member states 
of the EU-15 had to implement the SPS by 2007, with some flexibility as to 
the model used for implementation. 
Member states could opt to base payment entitlements on historical 
reference amounts (the ‘historical model’), the calculated averages of the 
historical reference amounts of the region concerned (the ‘regional model’) 
or a mix of the two approaches, in either a static or a dynamic form (the 
‘hybrid model’). 
Economic theory, as well as empirical findings, suggests that the way 
in which agricultural support is provided has an influence on land markets, 
because payments become capitalised to some degree into land values, 
affecting both the sales and rental prices of land. This tendency would also 
have ramifications on the transfer efficiency of support and structural 
change, among other things. This study investigates whether and to what 
extent the different methods used to implement the SPS have led to its 
capitalisation into land values in the EU. 
The kind of agricultural support provided is not the only factor 
influencing land markets, however: the profitability of production, user 
competition (driven by environmental concerns and demographic 
changes), ownership and production structures, and not least the 
institutional setting of land markets are among the other characteristics that 
need to be taken into account when analysing land markets. Many of these 
conditions differ greatly among and within the EU member states. 
To guide the empirical analysis, the empirical and theoretical 
literature in this field has been analysed in detail and a theoretical 
framework has been developed on the impact of direct payments and the 
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SPS on land market values under diverse conditions. The insights from 
these review and theoretical exercises are used in the interpretation of the 
empirical findings in this study. The detailed literature review and the 
extensive theoretical framework are contained in the appendices to the 
main report.  
The empirical analysis in this study draws from a combination of 
data sources. In particular, we combine insights from comparative data 
analysis based on data from Eurostat and the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN), with data analysis and information collected in a series 
of country and regional (sub-country) studies. More specifically, as part of 
the overall study, 11 country studies and 18 regional studies have been 
conducted. An important criterion in the selection of countries and regions 
has been the coverage of different implementation models of the SPS. The 
countries covered are  Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Finland, France 
(Centre and Bretagne), Germany (Weser-Ems in Lower Saxony, Sächsisches 
Lößgebiet (the ‘Saxonian Loess area’) in Saxony and south-east Upper 
Bavaria in Bavaria), Greece, Ireland, Italy (Emilia Romagna and Puglia), the 
Netherlands, Spain (Andalucia and Aragon), Sweden and the UK (England, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland). 
The results presented from this study are subject to certain analytical 
limitations. First, data on land values and transactions are scarce for the 
period following the launch of the SPS. The rather short time span since 
SPS implementation, combined with the varying quality of the available 
data, prevents econometric analysis. Second, although we have 
systematically verified our data sources and our findings draw on several 
sources of information, the qualitative analysis in the present study does 
not allow us to assess confidence intervals nor does it allow us to perform 
sensitivity analysis or check the statistical robustness of the results 
presented. Third, land regulations and long-term contracts may delay the 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values beyond what can currently be 
observed in the data. Fourth, global food markets have experienced major 
changes over the past two or three years, which complicate isolating the 
effects of the SPS on agricultural land markets. The results should thus be 
interpreted with these limitations in mind. 
Despite these limitations, the study offers some interesting 
hypotheses and preliminary evidence on land market developments in the 
EU and the impact of the SPS.  
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2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
ince the focus of the study is on examining what has happened to land 
markets since the SPS was introduced, we need to understand the 
impact of policies generally before and after its launch. For this 
reason, we look at the effects of both coupled and decoupled subsidies. 
2.1  The basic model 
2.1.1 Coupled  subsidies 
For reasons of exposition, we start with a simple model of the agricultural 
sector, in which we consider two factors used to produce one agricultural 
good  ) , ( K A f Q = . Land (A) and the composite of labour and capital (K) 
are combined in a constant returns-to-scale production function. Output 
market clearing and input market clearing conditions determine the output 
and input prices. We begin with the assumption of constant elasticities of 
factor supply and the elasticity of demand. 
The capitalisation of agricultural support payments into land values 
depends largely on the land supply, the input substitution elasticities and 
whether subsidies are linked to land (for more details, see appendix 1). The 
more inelastic the land supply, the more subsidies are capitalised into land 
values. Everything else being equal, subsidies linked to land (area 
payments) are more capitalised into land values than other coupled 
subsidies are (Floyd, 1965; Gardner, 1983; Alston and James, 2002). 
If the land supply is fixed, then area payments are fully capitalised 
into land values. Coupled production subsidies are fully capitalised into 
land values if in addition to a land supply elasticity of zero either the 
supply elasticity of non-land inputs is perfectly elastic or the factor 
proportions are fixed. In other situations, the benefits from coupled 
subsidies are shared between land and other production factors. If demand 
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elasticity is not perfectly elastic, then consumers benefit as well from 
coupled subsidies. Theoretically, the impact of the agricultural policy on 
land values may be very large (e.g. fully capturing the subsidies). 
In empirical studies, land supply elasticity is usually found to be 
rather low, mostly owing to natural constraints. For example, based on an 
extensive literature review, Salhofer (2001) concludes that a plausible range 
of land supply elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. Similarly, Abler 
(2001) finds a plausible range between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US, Canada and 
Mexico. 
Input substitution elasticities are a further crucial factor determining 
the distributional consequences of agricultural policies.1 With area 
payments, farms have an incentive to substitute other inputs for land, 
which increases land demand and leads to the capitalisation of subsidies 
into land values. Where there is high elasticity of substitution between land 
and other inputs, the impact of an area subsidy on land values that is 
induced will be large, as high elasticity of substitution indicates close 
substitutability between land and other farm inputs in the production 
process. Subsidies that are not targeted at land have the opposite effect. A 
high elasticity of substitution between land and other farm inputs reduces 
the impact of these subsidies on land values (Floyd, 1965; Gardner, 1983; 
Alston and James, 2002). Based on 32 studies, Salhofer (2001) reports 
average elasticities of substitution between land and labour of 0.5, between 
land and capital of 0.2, and between land and variable inputs of 1.4 for 
Europe. Similar values are reported in Abler (2001) for the US and Canada. 
2.1.2 Decoupled  subsidies 
The capitalisation of decoupled subsidies depends on the way in which the 
policy is implemented, i.e. whether the subsidies are decoupled from 
sectoral choice, from land or from both. 
The SPS is decoupled from production but land is needed to be able 
to activate SPS entitlements. Capitalisation of the SPS into land values 
depends on the number of entitlements distributed to farmers relative to 
the total eligible area (Ciaian et al., 2008; Courleux et al., 2008; Kilian and 
Salhofer, 2008).  
                                                      
1 Substitution elasticity measures how easy it is to substitute one input for another 
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If the number of entitlements is larger than the total eligible area, then 
the SPS is capitalised into land values. With fixed land supply, the SPS is 
fully capitalised into land values. Otherwise, the capitalisation of the SPS is 
partial and it decreases as land supply elasticity increases. The 
capitalisation of the SPS also depends on the SPS model implemented. 
If, however, the number of entitlements is smaller than the total 
eligible area, then the SPS is not capitalised into land values. The benefits of 
the SPS accrue to farmers. This result is general – it does not depend on the 
degree of land supply elasticity or the SPS model (for more details see 
appendix 2). 
2.2  Insights from empirical studies 
The empirical attempts to estimate the impact of agricultural support 
policies on land rents and land prices can be grouped into two broad 
categories: land value/price studies and land rent studies. Whereas the 
former examine the effects of policies on farmland prices, the latter 
investigate the policy impacts on farmland rental rates. The main reason 
authors use one approach over another is usually data: the availability of 
either land value (typically from regional datasets) or rental data (typically 
from farm-level surveys) commonly determines the choice of model. 
It is important to point out that virtually all of the existing studies are 
on North America (the US and Canada). To our knowledge, only three 
cover EU countries (Traill, 1980; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; 
Duvivier et al., 2005). Moreover, none of these measures the impact of the 
SPS (Table 35).2 
In comparison with the hypotheses of theoretical models, several 
conclusions follow from the empirical studies (for more details see 
appendix 1). 
First, coupled agricultural support policies do increase land rents and land 
prices, albeit less than theory predicts. Land rents/prices do not appear to 
capture the full value of coupled subsidies, at least in the short to medium 
                                                      
2 The large majority of empirical studies performed to date have estimated the 
present value of land as a function of government payments and other explanatory 
variables. The main reason for the relative dominance of land price studies is data 
availability – usually regional data are more broadly available (typically used in 
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run, but they do capture a substantive share of subsidy payments (most 
studies report 20-80%). The reviewed literature on land values and the 
determination of land rental rates suggests that land prices and land rental 
rates are guided by a large number of factors, such as policy support, land-
use alternatives, competition on the land market and inflation, which may 
explain these discrepancies between theory and empirical evidence. 
Second, decoupled policy payments do affect land rents and land prices.3 
One way to interpret these results is that in the real world there are no truly 
decoupled subsidies. All decoupled subsidies applied in the EU or the US 
impose certain restrictions on farms or are accompanied by other 
measures.4 Therefore, it is rather difficult to compare the empirically 
estimated impact of decoupled and coupled policies. Perhaps the subsidy 
that most closely resembles the decoupled subsidy definition is the 
production flexibility contract (PFC) payments introduced in 1996 by the 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in the US. The 
Act decoupled subsidies from contemporaneous production and removed 
all planting restrictions, including set-aside requirements. With the 
exception of certain fruits and vegetables, producers were given complete 
planting flexibility, while they still received subsidies based on their 1985 
programme yield and their 1995 acreage base.  
Third, landowners benefit from all support programmes, both coupled and 
decoupled. All the reviewed studies find that one additional unit of payment 
results in an increase of less than one land price unit. While these findings 
are not surprising in relation to decoupled subsidies, most of the empirical 
literature relates to coupled subsidies, which would be expected to have  
 
                                                      
3 The theoretical literature on decoupled subsidies shows that fully decoupled 
agricultural-support policies have no effect on land values, if markets are 
competitive and transaction costs are not prohibitive. It also shows that decoupled 
policies may affect land values only in the presence of some market imperfections. 
4 For example, in the case of the SPS, the payments have to be activated with land. 
To receive the decoupled subsidies, farmers must have a corresponding amount of 
land at their disposal. Hence, the total subsidies a farm can receive are constrained 
by the amount of subsidies received and land used in the reference period. The SPS 
is not conditional on cultivating the land, however. Thus, the SPS is still connected 
to land in some way although it is decoupled from contemporaneous production.  EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 7 
 
most (if not all) of their final effects on land. Nevertheless, the reviewed 
studies have found a surprisingly small share of coupled subsidy benefits 
going to landowners. 
Fourth, the difference between the estimated impact of coupled and decoupled 
subsidies is not statistically significant. Comparing the empirical results from 
various studies, we find evidence that coupled payments do not have a 
significantly different impact on land values from that of decoupled 
payments. For example, Duvivier et al. (2005) find that the elasticity of 
Belgian land values with respect to partially coupled support 
(compensatory payments) is between 0.12 and 0.47. Kirwan (2005) 
estimates that the marginal effect of all government subsidies on farmland 
rental rates in the US is between 0.2 and 0.4. In contrast, Taylor and Brester 
(2005) find that the elasticity of land value with respect to market price 
support is between 0.16 and 0.32. 
There are only a few studies that compare how the subsidy 
capitalisation differs between decoupled and coupled subsidies. Goodwin 
et al. (2003) find that, as predicted by the theory, coupled subsidies (LDPs) 
have a higher impact on land values than decoupled subsidies (PFC 
payments). The estimated marginal effect on land value is 6.6 for LDPs and 
4.9 for PFC payments. In contrast, the results of Lence and Mishra (2003) 
suggest that decoupled payments (PFC and MLA payments) have a greater 
bearing on rents than coupled ones (LDPs). Moreover, the coupled 
subsidies are found to decrease rents. These estimates imply that rents rise 
by around $0.85 for each $1.00 paid per hectare under the PFC and MLA 
programmes. In the case of LDPs, land rent is estimated to fall by around 
$0.24 per $1.00 of subsidy. 
2.3  Implementation of the SPS and implications 
From the previous analysis, we can conclude that the decoupled subsidies 
may still have an important impact on land values and that the 
implementation details of the policy matter considerably in this respect.  
Therefore, we now turn to discuss some of the SPS implementation 
details and we present a series of hypotheses on how these may affect EU 
land markets. Note that the arguments in this section are solely based on 
the theoretical analysis. In the following sections, the theoretical hypotheses 
derived here are compared with empirical evidence from selected member 
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2.3.1  The historical versus regional model 
The regional model is expected to lead to greater capitalisation than the 
historical model because, for a given land base, under the regional model 
more entitlements are allocated than under the historical model. A similar 
result holds for the hybrid model because the allocation of entitlements is 
grounded on the same principles as those of the regional model. 
At the same time, even if under both models (historical and regional) 
the number of entitlements exceeds the eligible area, the regional model 
still leads to greater capitalisation of the SPS into land values than the 
historical model does. This is because under the historical model the 
entitlement value differs among farms, which induces partial capitalisation 
of the SPS into land values as farms with low-value entitlements cannot bid 
up land values higher than the value of their entitlements. Farms with 
higher-value entitlements partially benefit from the SPS. This is because 
when farms own more entitlements than the eligible area, they want to 
acquire additional land in order to be able to activate all the entitlements. 
This intensifies competition for land and exerts upward pressure on land 
prices. But farms with higher-value entitlements do not have to use the 
value of entitlements fully to out compete farms with lower-value 
entitlements. On the other hand, farms with lower-value entitlements must 
fully use their entitlement value to maintain the amount of land or to 
minimise the land-use losses. Hence, farms with higher-value entitlements 
partially use the value of entitlements to compete for land and thus 
partially benefit from the SPS. In contrast, the farms with lower-value 
entitlements need to use the full value of entitlements to compete for land 
and consequently do not benefit from the SPS. 
2.3.2 Entitlement  tradability 
Tradability matters under some conditions. If the eligible area is larger than 
the total number of entitlements, then with full tradability of entitlements 
there is no capitalisation of the SPS into land values. The less tradable 
entitlements are, the more the SPS becomes capitalised into land values. A 
low tradability of entitlements reduces the incentive of farmers who may 
want to sell entitlements actually to do so because they cannot obtain the 
desired entitlement price. With low tradability, these farmers prefer to keep 
their entitlements and to use them to compete for land, which exerts an 
upward pressure on land prices. If the eligible area is smaller than the total 
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values and the lower is the market price for entitlements. With full 
capitalisation of the SPS, the market price for entitlements is zero. 
2.3.3  New entrants’ eligibility for entitlements 
The capitalisation of the SPS additionally depends on the level of new farm 
access to entitlements. The more eligible that new farms are for 
entitlements, the greater is the capitalisation of the SPS into land values. If 
the newly entering farms are eligible for SPS entitlements from the national 
reserve, then the SPS will be capitalised into land values. The eligibility of 
new farms for entitlements increases the competition for land. The 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values also depends on the value of new 
farms’ entitlements relative to the value of pre-existing entitlements. 
2.3.4  Conditional SPS payments  
Depending on the nature of the conditions, farm gains from the SPS may be 
reduced. If the additional requirements imposed by the SPS were not 
present before implementation of the SPS and are not required for non-
participating farms, then net benefits from the SPS may be squeezed by the 
implementation costs of the additional requirements. Although conditional 
SPS payments may diminish farm benefits from the SPS, depending on the 
nature of the conditions, they do not affect land capitalisation (which is 
equal to zero). 
2.4  Static versus dynamic effects 
The impact of the SPS is different in the short-term (static) relative to the 
long-term (dynamic) perspective (see appendix 2 for details).  
Structural changes are likely to be more significant in the long run 
than in the short run. Structural changes may be the result of, for example, 
technological or institutional innovations, or vertical coordination. In the 
presence of imperfect rural credit markets, the SPS itself may reduce farms’ 
credit constraints and thereby have an impact on land markets (see Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2009). In combination with structural changes, the SPS may 
be capitalised into land values and may affect the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector. This outcome is conditional, however, on whether 
entitlements are tradable. 
At the same time, structural change will induce the trading of 
entitlements. Entitlement trading will be driven by the reallocation of land 
among farms. If the reallocated land is used to activate entitlements, then 10 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
an equivalent number of entitlements will be traded. That being stated, 
trade in entitlements will depend on the development of the entitlement 
market and entitlement trade restrictions. 
In the short run, the SPS will likely have a limited impact on land 
markets and capitalisation of the SPS into land values because structural 
changes are expected to be minor. That is the view taken by this study, as 
there are relatively few observations available since the SPS was 
implemented. 
Nevertheless, there is a difference between the historical model and 
the regional (or hybrid) model. Depending on the country, the SPS was 
implemented between 2005 and 2007, but the allocation of entitlements 
under the historical model was based on the eligible area that farms 
operated in the reference period 2000–02. Under the regional (or hybrid) 
model, the allocation of entitlements was based on the total eligible area in 
the first year the SPS applied. As a result, if structural changes occurred 
between the periods 2000–02 and 2005–07, then in the short run one would 
expect a larger impact of the SPS on land markets with the historical model 
than with the regional (hybrid) model. 
In the long run, the SPS will have a more pronounced impact on land 
markets under all three of the SPS implementation models. In combination 
with structural changes, the SPS may be capitalised into land values and 
may affect the restructuring of the agricultural sector. The level of the 
capitalisation of the SPS and the impact on restructuring depends on the 
tradability of entitlements. The lower the tradability of entitlements, the 
more the SPS will be capitalised into land values and the more it will 
constrain restructuring. The historical and hybrid models may or may not 
have a greater effect on capitalisation and restructuring than the regional 
model does.  
2.5  Empirical considerations for measuring the impact of the 
SPS 
The appropriate empirical methodology is obviously contingent on 
whether land rent or land price data are available; the same applies with 
respect to the availability of regional or farm-level data. 
From a statistical perspective, the most valuable data would be farm-
specific time series. But in view of the poor quality of the available policy 
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impossible to collect a full range of data required for a formal econometric 
analysis within the present study. 
Therefore, a more pragmatic approach, which allows us to combine 
both qualitative and quantitative information, is used in the empirical 
analysis of the present study. For example, where the required statistical 
data are not available, the analysis draws on qualitative data (for more 
details, see appendices 4 and 5).  
Still, to measure the impact of the SPS on land values, one must 
identify all the drivers of land values. By ignoring some drivers, the effect 
of the SPS would be underestimated or overestimated, depending on the 
driver and associated changes to it. Therefore, we identify other key drivers 
of land values in the rest of this section (for more details, see appendix 1).  
Prices and agricultural productivity 
Agricultural commodity prices, productivity and input prices are expected 
to affect land values substantially. Agricultural income is the main source 
of return from agricultural land. In competitive markets, the price of 
agricultural land is determined by the amount of agricultural income that 
land can generate.  
In the last few years, agricultural commodity prices have risen 
significantly. This development has coincided with the introduction of the 
SPS, which complicates the identification of the pure SPS impact on land 
values. 
Land-use alternatives 
Usually, land can be used for purposes other than agricultural ones. If there 
is such an opportunity, the value of the land will reflect this potential, 
alternative land use. In a competitive market, land value is indicative of the 
returns from the most profitable use of land. If the most profitable use of 
land is outside of agriculture (e.g. urban housing), then the land value will 
be determined by the profitability of the urban housing sector. But if the 
non-agricultural use of land is expected to become the most profitable in 
the future, then the current land price will reflect the sum of the discounted 
s t r e a m  o f  r e n t s  f r o m  a g r i c u l t u r e  u p  t o  t h e  t i m e  o f  c o n v e r s i o n  p l u s  t h e  
discounted stream of expected rents from non-agricultural use from that 
time onward (Plantinga et al., 2002). 
Market imperfections and transaction costs 
In the presence of market imperfections, the policy impact realised might 
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Indeed, several studies find that decoupled payments affect farm behaviour 
differently in the presence of market imperfections from a situation with 
perfect competition (e.g. Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Hennessy, 1998). 
Generally, land transaction costs related to land withdrawal from 
corporate farms in transition countries do not affect the overall result that 
area payments increase land rents and benefit landowners instead of 
farmers (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). Yet, transaction costs depress land 
prices both with and without area payments. Transaction costs and area 
payments have the opposite effect on land rents. Transaction costs reduce 
land rents, while area payments are capitalised into land rents. If the effects 
are equal then they cancel each other out. 
Also, credit market imperfections have important implications for the 
distribution of area payments (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). In a model with 
land as a fixed factor and credit market imperfections, area payments 
increase land rents more than subsidies do. On aggregate, farms may 
actually lose rather than benefit from the subsidy – only the most credit-
constrained farms may gain from the subsidy. 
Land market institutions and regulations 
The effect of subsidies on land value in competitive markets can be 
influenced by land market regulations. The most obvious regulations that 
will affect the land market are those concerning land prices (e.g. fixed) or 
that facilitate the prevalence of long-term rental contracts (or both) 
(Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). With fixed land prices and long-term rental 
contracts, one will not observe the capitalisation of subsidies into land 
values, at least not in the short run. 
Various formal and informal land market institutions will similarly 
affect the subsidy–land value relationship. For example, if a rental 
agreement is for a purely ‘cash’ arrangement, then the farm programme 
payments must go entirely to the farm operator; the landowner is not 
eligible to receive any payments. Otherwise, under a share rental 
arrangement, the same subsidy payments may have to be divided between 
the landowner and the tenant. With crop-sharing contracts, the issue is 
more complicated if subsidies have to b e  s h a r e d  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  c r o p  
shares. If the terms of such leases are not adjusted, the landowner will not 
reap the full benefits. Thus, if subsidy payments increase unexpectedly in 
the presence of pre-existing leases, tenants holding a cash rental 
arrangement will capture a significant share of the benefits from the EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 13 
 
subsidies, whereas tenants holding a share rental arrangement will share 
the benefits with their landowners. 
Clearly, these regulations govern only the initial distribution of 
subsidy payments between landowners and tenants, which is usually 
different from the outcome after markets have adjusted to the new 
equilibrium with subsidies. Other things being equal, one would expect 
that the cash rental rates would adjust to equivalence with the 
corresponding share rental rates, reflecting the subsidies and other 
determinants of income. 
Social capital 
Farmers are working and living not only in an economic but also in a social 
and cultural context. Therefore, the actual decisions a farmer takes in a 
given market are influenced by the intensity and kinds of social 
relationships that exist among the parties involved in a transaction and by 
the societal norms and cultural setting (Robinson and Flora, 2003). Studies 
for the US show that social capital is a pivotal factor in the land market, 
influencing the kind of transaction (e.g. Rainey et al., 2005), the price of the 
land (Robison et al., 2002) and the parties involved (Siles et al., 2000). Thus, 
the extent to which subsidies are incorporated into farmland values and 
therefore transferred from the farmer to the landowner also depends on the 
local cultural and social background. 
In many regions, land transactions occur mainly between relatives or 
friendly neighbours (Siles et al., 2000). These groups receive a rebate on the 
land price ranging from 10% (Robison et al., 2002) to 43% (Tsoodle et al., 
2006) compared with total strangers. According to Tsoodle et al. (2006), the 
influence of social capital has grown over the last few years. With respect to 
rental contracts, social capital influences the form of the contract while the 
rental price is inversely correlated to the duration of the relationship 
between the landowner and tenant (Rainey et al., 2005). 
Time scale and dynamics 
The impact of both coupled and decoupled policies varies over time. For 
example, formal and informal land rental contracts imply that the 
transmission of changes in policy into rental prices and asset prices for land 
is not instantaneous. The sluggish adjustment of rental rates suggests that 
the short- and intermediate-term results of policies will be different from 
the long-term outcome with complete adjustment. Moreover, even without 
contracting, land markets involve lags and dynamics, uncertainty and 14 | CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
expectations. For example, rental arrangements are typically multiyear and 
often reflect long-term personal relationships, sometimes among members 
of the same family. Competitive pressures might not take full and 
immediate effect in such a setting (Gardner, 2002).  
Furthermore, data on land rents and land values are often based on 
expert assessments rather than direct evidence from market transactions. 
These assessments are likely to understate the true movements in rental 
prices associated with year-to-year variations in income stemming from the 
market or from transfers. Because contracts are established well in advance 
of market outcomes, they do not precisely correspond to the observed 
outcomes. For instance, land rents are set ex ante whereas subsidy 
payments can only be observed ex post. 
All these factors imply that short-term movements in rental prices 
will be different (lower) from the long-term impact of permanent changes 
in subsidies. 
Expectations about future policies 
The capitalisation of subsidies into land values depends somewhat on 
expectations about the future continuation of subsidies. If market 
participants do not expect that policies will continue in the future, then the 
subsidy capitalisation into land values is limited. Full capitalisation of 
subsidies occurs only when the expectation of the market participants 
about the continuation of the policy is the same as the true duration of 
subsidies. 
Another reason the effects of decoupled subsidies on farm behaviour 
– particularly on land markets and the land capitalisation of subsidies – 
may diverge from what theory predicts is that future subsidies may be 
dependent on current farm decisions. Because future policies may be based 
on present production levels, farmers may consider this factor and thus 
react differently to policies than expected (OECD, 2001). 
2.6  Summary: Key hypotheses on the effects of the SPS on 
subsidy capitalisation into land values 
The reform of the CAP mostly represents a shift from area payments and 
animal payments to the SPS. Therefore, both coupled and decoupled 
payments need to be considered. The following hypotheses follow from the 
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1.  The impact of the pre-reform (before the shift to the SPS) CAP 
subsidies on land values depends on whether the payment concerned 
is related to area or to animals. Area-based payments are partially 
capitalised into land values and it appears that they have more 
bearing on land values than animal-based payments do. 
2.  The impact of the SPS depends on the ratio between the eligible area 
and the total number of entitlements. If the number of entitlements is 
larger than the total eligible area, then the SPS is capitalised into land 
values. 
3.  The regional (and hybrid) model is expected to lead to greater 
capitalisation than the historical model because, for a given land base, 
under the regional model more entitlements are allocated than under 
the historical one.  
4.  A shift from the coupled subsidy system to the SPS should reduce 
land values in the short run. In the long run, the effect on land values 
depends on the tradability of entitlements, but one should expect 
lower capitalisation with the SPS than with the previous subsidy 
system.  
5.  If the SPS is capitalised into land values, then the effect of the SPS is 
expected to be more pronounced for less fertile land. This is because 
the previous subsidy system had a weaker effect on the price of less 
fertile land, as the level of subsidies was linked to productivity and 
thus less fertile land received less support. Under the SPS, less fertile 
land can be used to activate entitlements. At the same time, 
agricultural and non-agricultural drivers of land values are not as 
influential for less fertile land. This enables easier identification of the 
impact of the SPS on the value of less fertile land than on the value of 
more fertile land.  
6.  If the SPS is capitalised into land values, then the SPS may lead to 
changes in relative land prices for different types of land, and the 
regional and hybrid models may change the relative prices of land 
among regions. The first effect stems from the ability of the SPS 
entitlement to be activated for various land types, and thus the 
ramifications of the SPS are expected to be uniform across all eligible 
land. The second effect is owing to the possible redistribution of 
subsidies among regions by the regional and hybrid models, and 
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consequently an increase in land values by the SPS in regions that 
obtain more subsidies through the SPS relative to the previous 
subsidy system.  
7.  Fallow land maintained with little or no agricultural management 
under the previous subsidy system could be recultivated or brought 
into use – while keeping it in good agricultural and environmental 
condition (GAEC) – with the introduction of the SPS if the previous 
maintenance did not respect these conditions. Under the SPS, all land 
used by a farm must be kept in GAEC in order to be entitled to the 
full amount of the SPS payment. The effect may be stronger under the 
regional and hybrid models than under the historical model. This 
effect occurs only in cases where the SPS stimulates land transactions 
(rental or land acquisition) and where it induces farmers to use fallow 
land not previously used in farming in order to activate entitlements. 
Regional and hybrid models are expected to stimulate land 
transactions more than the historical model.  
8.  The decoupling that accompanied the introduction of the SPS may 
lead to structural changes in agriculture, particularly in terms of 
production structure and input reallocation, including land. These 
structural changes induced by decoupling may lead to capitalisation 
of the SPS into land values. Still, the capitalisation of the SPS into 
land values is conditional on the extent to which the entitlements are 
tradable. 
9.  At the same time, the decoupling per se may lead to higher land 
prices. Decoupling subsidies from production allows farms to 
respond to market signals better by, for example, adjusting the farm 
production structure, which may increase farm profitability. Higher 
farm profits would increase competition for land and lead to higher 
land prices. This effect is independent of the SPS payments. 
10.  The SPS may facilitate an easier intergenerational transfer of land 
than the previous subsidy system. Under the decoupled SPS, the 
entitlements are not attached to specific land, which enables exiting 
older farmers to sell entitlements (if entitlements are tradable) or 
transfer subsidies from the SPS through informal, within-family 
transactions, thus allowing older farmers to benefit from the SPS even 
when they have exited farming, while the successor farmers gain 
access to land. The previous subsidy system, which was linked to 
certain farm activities, required farming to benefit from subsidies. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 17 
 
Under the previous subsidy system, the farmer lost all subsidy 
benefits when (s)he left agriculture. But this depends on the extent to 
which the previous subsidy system is capitalised into land values 
along with the extent to which farmers are also landowners.  
11.  If the SPS is capitalised into land values, however, while at the same 
time new entrants or expanding farms do not obtain entitlements, 
then their access to land is constrained by the higher land price. 
Under the previous subsidy system, farms received subsidies if the 
farm was involved in agricultural production. Under the SPS, farmers 
receive subsidies only if the farm owns entitlements. On the other 
hand, if the SPS is not capitalised into land values then the new 
entrants or expanding farms that do not obtain entitlements are not 
constrained in having access to land. 18 | 
 
 
3.  DATA SOURCES 
o study the impact of policies on agricultural land values, two kinds 
of data can be used: farm-level micro data and regional- or country- 
level macro data. Farm-specific time series are the most preferred 
data, as the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is minimised. 
Undoubtedly, however, farm-specific time series are among the least 
available data in the EUSCs and hence for this study. 
Alternatively, the impact of policies on farmland rental rates and 
prices can be studied using either aggregate time series data (where the 
unit of analysis is a region or country) or disaggregated cross-sectional data 
(where the unit of analysis is a farm). Although both kinds of data involve 
more statistical problems compared with farm-specific time series, these 
data are more widely available for the countries in this study. Therefore, 
we base the empirical analysis on time series macro data at the country 
level and for selected regions. 
T h e  m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  d a t a  f o r  t h i s  study is Eurostat. Unfortunately, 
even at the aggregate level the available Eurostat data are not without gaps. 
Three forms of data paucity are particularly evident for the countries in our 
sample: i) almost no data are available for the two most recent years after 
SPS implementation (2006 and 2007); ii) rental data are only partially 
covered by Eurostat and iii) land transaction data (for both the sales and 
rental markets) are not recorded at all by Eurostat. 
To deal with the issues of missing data, in this study we complement 
the Eurostat data with that from four additional sources: FADN, the 
European Commission (DG AGRI), national statistics and national surveys. 
3.1  Eurostat 
The Eurostat data provide time series for two key variables: land values 
and macroeconomic data. Land values are extracted from the Eurostat 
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website.5 The Eurostat series on land prices and rents (annual data) provide 
data on agricultural land prices and rents for each year since 1973 for all the 
EUSCs.6 
Data on agricultural land prices in most member states ultimately 
come from administrative sources, having been recorded by the land 
registration or tax authorities. The amount of editing, adjustment and 
correction of the basic sales records varies from country to country, as in 
some countries the average purchase price is covered in national statistics, 
whereas in others the market value of land is estimated. 
Data on agricultural land rents are collected in most countries by 
means of special surveys. The level of agricultural rents is of interest as an 
indicator of the return to land. Renting, which takes place in a different 
legal framework in each country, permits a flexible and thus more 
productive use of land. 
In addition to the land value data, we also use Eurostat for extracting 
macro data. All the key macroeconomic indicators, such as interest rate, 
inflation, GDP and growth are extracted from the Eurostat (2008) 
publication, Europe in figures – Eurostat yearbook 2008. 
3.2  Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development 
The second main source of information is the European Commission, DG 
AGRI. From DG AGRI, Unit G.1 (Agricultural Policy Analysis and 
Perspectives), we received policy data on SPS implementation as well as on 
related policy measures, such as coupled agricultural policies, 
environmental and rural development policies. 
DG AGRI Unit G.1 also provided general and basic information and 
data for the principal agricultural indicators. Among other variables, the 
data provided contains information for the EUSCs on the market value of 
agricultural land (parcels), rents for agricultural land and the main crops in 
each EUSC. The data provided by DG AGRI covers the period 1995–2006.  
 
                                                      
5 More specifically, the Eurostat website data is drawn from “Theme: Agriculture 
and fisheries” (Table: APRI_AP_ALAND, Land prices and rents – annual data). 
6 Some of these data are available from the annual report by the European 
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Although the geographical coverage of member states is different between 
years, all the countries included in our study are covered for the full 
period. 
3.3  National statistics 
The third major source of information comes from national statistical 
offices. The national statistical sources complement the European data on a 
more detailed scale and on many occasions provide information for the 
missing times series. In addition, data from national and regional statistical 
offices, national land registries and national tax authorities have been used 
to obtained detailed information on land market regulations. 
In Belgium, the basic land price information concerning all land 
transactions are collected through a specific standardised form for 
purchases by the Dienst van de Registratie. These forms are then transferred 
to the Nationaal Instituut voor de Statistik, which publishes the land value 
information. Additional information is available on the type of land (arable 
and meadows) and region. The price for a given type of land and region 
can be obtained through the division of the total value by the total area 
sold. 
The data collection for rental prices for Belgium differs somewhat 
from that concerning sales prices. Every year, in or around December, some 
400 agricultural correspondents report on agricultural rents in their 
respective sector.7 The sectors belong to 27 designated areas, each of which 
is supervised by a state agricultural engineer. The latter verifies, and where 
necessary, corrects the data supplied by the correspondents before 
forwarding them to the national statistical institute. The unweighted 
arithmetical average of all recorded farm rents is deemed the average 
agricultural rent. The results are obtained at the national and provincial 
levels and for each of Belgium’s 13 agricultural districts. 
In Finland, the transfers of real estate are recorded by the Kiinteistöjen 
kauppahintarekisteri i n  a  p u b l i c  r e g i s t e r  ( t h e  national land survey by the 
ministry of agriculture). This register forms the basis for information on 
                                                      
7 Each sector comprises one or more of Belgium’s 596 municipalities. The 
correspondent is required to base returns on as many observations as possible of 
holdings of at least 1 hectare and on which crop or livestock farming is chiefly 
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agricultural land prices in Finland. The data include the price, area, type 
(the agricultural/forestland), region and presence of buildings. Based on 
the register, the national land survey calculates an average land price 
(median price) for purchases of over 2 hectares of agriculture land. Sales of 
entire farms – entailing both the land and buildings – are excluded. 
For rental prices, a small survey of agricultural land rents is 
conducted annually by the Finnish Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute. The data include the total agricultural area of the farm, the rented 
area and the total rent. Based on this survey, the institute annually 
calculates the average agricultural rent. 
In France, the market value for agricultural land is collected by the 
Sociétés d’Aménagement Foncier et d’Etablissement Rural (SAFER) and the 
agricultural statistics services of the Directorate of Agriculture and 
Forestry.8 In this study, we use the information from SAFER, according to 
which land prices are market prices of all transactions of more than 0.5 
hectares (the yearly averages are calculated by excluding the 10% most and 
10% least expensive transactions). 
The values for rents per hectare are derived from irregular surveys 
conducted by the central statistical studies and surveys service of the 
French ministry of agriculture. The results of these surveys are updated 
annually based on indicators. 
In Germany, average land prices are calculated based on the prices 
recorded for each individual transaction. The prices per transaction 
include, in addition to the monetary amount paid, the value of all the 
advantages contractually granted by the purchaser to the seller in relation 
to the land (the value of outstanding mortgages or the value of any land 
given in part-exchange). In the case of regular payments (pensions, farm 
annuities, payments for right of occupation, etc.), their capital value is 
taken into account. The price data do not include any taxes or dues, for 
example, that are payable in respect of the area sold unless the purchaser 
                                                      
8 The methodology of the survey on the market value of agricultural land in France 
takes account of indicators from various sources. The price recorded is the selling 
price, excluding taxes and legal expenses, but including the ‘under the table’ (tax 
evasion) component. On the other hand, the price does not include the pas de porte 
or chapeau or droit de bail (the sum of which the purchaser gives to the local farmer 
or owner to cultivate the land). 22 | DATA SOURCES 
 
has taken over the responsibility for paying any arrears of such payments. 
Ancillary costs such as land transfer duty, surveying costs, permit fees and 
estate agents’ fees are not included in the price data for these statistics. 
The rental data for agricultural land is less detailed in Germany. The 
published farm rents are average values that are not differentiated 
according to the date the contract was signed, length of lease, soil quality, 
area of land, use as arable land/pasture or similar price-determining 
criteria. Therefore, they are not used to calculate indices.  
In addition to the results of the Federal Statistical Office, the federal 
ministry for food, agriculture and forestry (BML) publishes average farm 
rents paid by full-time agricultural holdings. The results are for crop years 
and are compiled from data generated by the BML test farm network, 
which currently comprises around 11,200 agricultural and horticultural 
holdings.9  
In Greece, agricultural land values are estimated based on all 
agricultural land that is not covered by trees or vineyards, and which does 
not have a construction (urban) value. The procedure for calculating value 
per  stremma (0.1 hectare) is as follows: the prefecture directorates of 
agriculture, which are attached to the ministry of rural development and 
food, collect data on the land sold per category from the local agricultural 
development offices. Staff from the latter offices (agronomists) collect 
statistical information on all of the agricultural sector’s economic 
parameters at regular intervals from the municipalities and rural districts. 
These data are gathered from sources such as the Agricultural Bank of 
Greece (from the loans it grants), cooperatives, experts and producers. The 
information collected refers to the number of plots sold in stremma and the 
weighted mean value in GRD/€ per category (1 GRD = €0.00293). These 
data are forwarded to the departmental directorate of the ministry in the 
capital of the department (Nomos) and are processed at this level. More 
specifically, the weighted mean value in GRD/€ per stremma and category 
is calculated using the number of plots (in stremma) sold and the average 
values in GRD/€ from the local offices for agricultural development. These 
data, at the departmental level, are sent to the central service of the 
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ministry to obtain the results at the national level, having been checked and 
processed by computer. The reference period is six months and the data 
processing is annual. 
The rental prices for agricultural land are distinguished by the type of 
establishment suitable for certain cultivation and the area of the 
establishment; a farm sample of the principal cultivations and from several 
areas of the country is being collected. 
In Ireland, the official series of land price statistics begins in 1990. For 
the earlier period, several unofficial series have been published. The official 
series from 1990 onwards are calculated by the central statistics office based 
on data received from the revenue commissioners. 
The rental data for agricultural land is rather limited in Ireland, 
because much of land is rented based on the 11-month ‘conacre’10 system, 
and thus falls outside the Community definition, which specifies a 
minimum of 12 months. 
In Italy, the market value of agricultural land is based on surveys 
conducted by the National Institute of Agricultural Economics (INEA). The 
main results are published in the Yearbook of Italian Agriculture. The results 
of the annual surveys and updates of time series have also been published 
on INEA’s website.11 There have been some major changes to the survey 
methodology since 1993, although the objective remains the same: to 
provide a detailed summary of changes in the market for land and 
estimates of land stocks. 
The survey procedure entails identifying the average prices of agro-
forestry land sold in the course of the year. This involves valuing the land 
by means of direct estimates, i.e. by comparing it with the most plausible 
market values. Where possible, an effort is made to eliminate the obvious 
impact of non-agricultural uses (especially in areas near urban centres). To 
simplify and harmonise the questionnaire as much as possible, with a view 
to enhancing their reliability, some of the values accounted for by land 
improvement (infrastructure) are stripped out, which means that the values 
                                                      
10 In Ireland, conacre (a corruption of corn-acre) is a system of letting land, mostly 
in small patches, and usually for the growth of potatoes as a kind of return instead 
of wages. One-third of agricultural land in Northern Ireland is let as conacre. 
11 For details, see the INEA website (http://www.inea.it/prog/mfondiario/ 
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surveyed relate exclusively to the land as such. To account for the wide 
fluctuations to which land prices are susceptible, the average values are 
broken down into kinds of crop and fairly small areas. Italy is divided into 
767 agricultural regions that are homogeneous in terms of their physical 
and productive characteristics. They can be grouped into inland mountains, 
coastal mountains, inland hills, coastal hills and plains. The size of 
individual regions varies from a few hundred hectares on the plains to 
several thousand in certain mountain areas. 
Agricultural rents in Italy are covered in the same survey as land 
prices. Maximum and minimum rents per survey region are collected, not 
average rents. In the absence of reliable information on rented land by kind 
of contract and crop, it is not possible to survey average rents 
systematically per ‘agricultural region’. The annual survey is confined to 
the main trends in the market for rented land. 
In the Netherlands, the property and the transfers of property or real 
estate are recorded by the Netherlands’ cadastre, land registry and 
mapping agency (Kadaster) in a public register. All information on the 
transfers of agricultural land and the price of this land is directly derived 
from this registry. The data include the price, type (arable land, meadows 
and so on), exact location and information on the trading parties. This 
dataset is unique in its level of detail and its sheer size, as it encompasses 
the entire population of land sales. 
Until 1995, all lease contracts were registered with the Dutch rental 
registries. In contrast to land sales, this information is not public in the 
Netherlands. We have therefore had to use aggregated information 
provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and 
Eurostat. 
Legal rental prices in the Netherlands change every three years. In 
general, rental agreements also change every three years. When the 
agreement changes (for the most part, only the rental price), data are 
passed from the Grondkamer [land control boards] to the CBS. As a new 
agreement mostly follows the termination of a former agreement and the 
duration of an agreement is as a rule a multiple of three years, every year 
on average one-third of the total rented area is recorded. This information 
is analysed to provide the weighted average rent prices for the 
Netherlands, provinces and agricultural regions. 
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In Spain, the ‘theoretical sales value’ in pesetas/€ per hectare is 
estimated from the figures for actual transactions or from purchase/sales 
calculations. If the price has been influenced more or less fundamentally by 
special circumstances that prevent such a price from being taken as 
representative, in such cases estimates of the theoretical sales value are 
obtained from experts who know the special circumstances that may 
eventually have an effect.  
The respondent provides the average or most frequent price, as well 
as a maximum and minimum.12 For the entire national territory, the overall 
index and the indices broken down for unirrigated/irrigated land and 
crops/grassland are compiled. The overall land-value index, which reflects 
the general trend in the prices for agricultural land studied in the survey 
(the land included in the ‘effective’ population and located within the 
geographical area concerned), is calculated for each of the autonomous 
communities (ACs). An appropriate weighting system is used for 
calculating these indices. The average agricultural land price in Spain is 
published by the MAPA Technical General Secretariat. 
In Sweden, the degree to which agricultural land prices are 
representative is limited, as comparatively few sales of exclusively 
agricultural land occur each year. Most sales of whole or parts of 
agricultural enterprises also include buildings and other kinds of land. 
Estimates of agricultural land prices in Sweden are based on 
information collected by Statistics Sweden from most sales of whole or 
parts of agricultural enterprises and information from the taxation register 
for real estate. Similar to Finland, in the estimation of the land price, only 
sales of at least 2 hectares of land or sales with a taxation value of at least 
1,000 SEK are included. Furthermore, only such sales are included as are 
considered representative for market values according to the law of estate 
taxation. This means that sales involving a community of interests, sales to 
near relatives or sales with values less than half or more than six times the 
taxation values are not used in the estimations. In recent years, the 
estimations have been based on 1,500–1,800 sales and 20,000–25,000 
hectares of land, less than 1% of the total agricultural land in Sweden. 
                                                      
12 The maximum and minimum may not be the absolute extremes for the area 
concerned, but rather the normal range limits for the most common prices, and 
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The estimates of average rents in Sweden are based on sample 
surveys with postal enquiries. Over the past few years, about 600 farmers 
have been included in the samples, which are stratified. The questionnaires 
are designed so that it is possible to estimate the rented values of only the 
agricultural land, which means that rented values of dwelling houses or 
other buildings are not included in the estimates of agricultural rents. 
In the UK, the information on all land and property transactions is 
collected under the authority of the Finance Act. In England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland this is done by means of a ‘particulars delivered’ form, 
which is returned by the purchasers’ solicitors to the tax authorities (Inland 
Revenue). Land transfers in Scotland are recorded in the Register of Sasines 
and the particulars delivered. Under the provisions of the Act, the data are 
passed by the keeper of the register to Inland Revenue. A land price series 
for each region is derived from this information but the series vary slightly 
because of the different land transfer and recording procedures. The land 
sales data gathered from information collected by the Valuation Office 
Agency are directly supplied to the UK Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (Defra).13 
In England and Wales, data for periods from 1993 is not directly 
comparable with figures for earlier years. A major change in the post-1993 
series is that sales are now analysed based on the period during which the 
transactions actually took place. They should therefore more accurately 
reflect the position at a given time than the previous series, which collated 
data based on the date on which figures were validated by the Inland 
Revenue. Both the new and previous series cover all sales of agricultural 
land of 5 hectares and over except land sold for development or other non-
agricultural purposes, gifts and inheritances. The new series also excludes 
some other transfers to enable it to come closer to estimates of market-
determined prices, but it is not designed to represent exactly the 
competitive, open-market values. It provides information on the number of 
transactions, area sold and average prices by area size group and by type of 
property (land only or land with buildings) and by kind of tenure (owner-
occupied or tenanted). 
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In Scotland, the original source of land price information is the 
Valuation Office Agency.14 The Scottish Government Agriculture and Rural 
Development Directorate receives data on the area, price and location of 
the sites transacted and the area office officials collect further information. 
The data are compiled to produce statistics on the total number of 
transactions, aggregate areas and average price per hectare for sales within 
the required categories. These data are based on the date of sale, defined as 
the date of completion of the deed transferring the property. Therefore, 
there are substantial time lags between this and the date when the 
information on the sale becomes available. The categories used for the land 
price series are all sales of more than 5 hectares with vacant possession and 
all sales of more than 5 hectares without vacant possession (for both 
equipped and unequipped farms). 
Two sets of agricultural land price statistics are published in 
Northern Ireland. One shows the average price of all land sold and the 
other is an index of the average land value, based on weighted sales prices 
for different size bands. The latter series removes the effect of price 
fluctuations caused by differing size band distributions of land sales 
between years. Both sets of statistics are published by the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development, in its annual publication, Statistical 
Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture.15 
3.4  Farm Accountancy Data Network 
The fourth source of data is FADN. Although (as detailed below) the 
FADN data are subject to certain limitations compared with the Eurostat 
and national statistics data, because of data paucity we have relied upon 
FADN data. In particular, the rental data coverage in the Eurostat and 
national statistics data is patchy. In contrast, the FADN data provides a 
complete set of internationally comparable, agricultural survey data for all 
countries in our sample. 
 
                                                      
14 See the Valuation Office Agency website (http://www.voa.gov.uk/). 
15 See the website of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(http://www.dardni.gov.uk/the-statistical-reveiw-of-northern-ireland-
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In the context of the present study, three FADN series are of special 
interest: total utilised agricultural area (UAA) (SE025), rented UAA (SE030) 
and rent paid (SE375). The fourth variable – rent per hectare – has been 
constructed by dividing the total rent paid by the rented area 
(SE375/SE030). 
For this study, the FADN data has some outstanding features that are 
conceptually different from the Eurostat data. The key advantages of the 
FADN data are representativeness (sample data are weighted according to 
the population they represent), the large sample size of the underlying 
farm-level data and the cross-country comparability of the data. The FADN 
sample size is huge compared with other farm surveys. For example, in 
2005 it covered more than 50,000 farms in the 11 countries studied: 1,209 in 
Belgium, 7,046 in Germany, 886 in Finland, 7,352 in France, 4,125 in Greece, 
1,193 in Ireland, 14,538 in Italy, 1,450 in the Netherlands, 9,024 in Spain, 933 
in Sweden and 2,936 in the UK. In addition, because exactly the same 
information is collected in different countries and exactly the same 
techniques are used to determine the validity, reliability and statistical 
significance of the data, the FADN data are comparable across countries. 
The downside of the FADN data is that the lower threshold on farm 
size for inclusion in the survey is rather high. This has consequences for the 
number of farms and the area that the FADN data represent. For example, 
for the year 2005 the FADN data represented 43% of agricultural holdings 
and 92% of the UAA of the EU-25. Thus, by definition, the smallest farms, 
which also participate in the agricultural land market, are not as well 
represented in the FADN data. This suggests that the FADN has an 
upward bias in terms of farm size. Still, given that the smallest farms 
receive proportionally less in CAP payments than other farms, the change 
in agricultural payment policy affects more large holdings than small ones. 
Moreover, agricultural land is well represented in the FADN data, and it 
thus serves as a good basis for analysing the general functioning of 
agricultural land markets. 
3.5  Interviews with local land-market experts 
Finally, given the paucity of statistical data for the period since the 
implementation of the SPS, the scarcely available statistical data has been 
complemented with survey data obtained from interviews with national 
experts. More precisely, a number of local experts have been consulted in 
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property departments, farm union representatives, lawyers, local 
government officials, etc. Alongside the general assessment of land market 
development in each country, interviews with national experts provide 
qualitative data on the drivers of land sales and rental prices, along with 
SPS implementation and its impact on land values. 
Hence, the information presented relating to the functioning of land 
markets in the EUSCs is the result of weighting statistical data, which is 
precise but sometimes of limited significance, against ‘expert opinions’, 
which are often fragmented and imperfect. It must be borne in mind that 
the results presented, especially for the two most recent years and at the 
regional level, are to a large degree merely an indication. 
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4.  SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
4.1  Unemployment and GDP 
If we look at some general economic indicators, we see that unemployment 
levels converged among the EUSCs in 2007 in comparison with 2000. In 
2007, the unemployment rate varied between around 3% in the 
Netherlands and around 9% in Germany, while in 2000 the variation was 
between 3% in the Netherlands and 14% in Spain. Several countries such as 
Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain, where the unemployment rate was high in 
2000, had experienced a large decline in unemployment (larger than for the 
EU-27) by 2007 compared with 2000. On the other hand, several countries 
saw unemployment increase (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Sweden), which is the opposite of the trend observed for the EU as a 
whole (Figure 7).  
There is less variation in the change in GDP per capita over the 
period than in unemployment rates in the EUSCs. GDP grew in most 
countries between 2000 and 2006 at similar rates to the EU as a whole. Only 
in Ireland, Spain and Greece was the growth rate significantly higher than 
the EU average (Figure 8). 
4.2  Share of agriculture in employment and gross value added 
The share of agriculture in total employment and in total gross value added 
of the economy has fallen in the EUSCs over the last decade (Figure 9 and 
Figure 10). There were steeper declines in agricultural gross value added 
than in agricultural employment. 
All of the countries covered in this study, except for Greece, had a 
lower share of agriculture in total employment than the EU-27 average of 
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6.2% in 2007. In France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, Belgium and 
the UK, agricultural labour as a proportion of total employment was also 
lower than the average for the EU-15, which was 3.5% in 2007. In Greece, 
the share of agricultural employment was significantly higher compared 
with other countries, at around 11% in 2007. At the same time, Greece 
experienced the largest drop in agricultural labour: from 17% in 2000 to 
11% in 2007 (Figure 9). 
Similar developments took place in the share of gross value added of 
agriculture, hunting and fishing in total gross value added. In all of the 
countries covered by this study, the share of agriculture in gross value 
added was less than 4% in 2007 and in Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, Germany 
and the UK it was less than 2%. Compared with 2000, there had been a 
considerable reduction in the relative share of agriculture in gross value 
added by 2007, notably in Greece, Ireland, Belgium and Spain (Figure 10). 
4.3  Farm structure 
Average farm size varies widely in the EUSCs. The largest farms are in the 
UK (56 hectares per holding in 2005) and the smallest in Greece (5 hectares 
per holding). In Italy, farms are also small, with an average size of less than 
10 hectares in 2005. In the rest of the countries studied, farm size ranges 
from 20 to 50 hectares. There is an upward trend in farm size in most 
countries. This trend is driven by labour outflows from agriculture, 
increasing efficiency and rising opportunity costs of farmers. The only 
exception is the UK, where farm size decreased from 68 hectares per 
holding in 1990 to 56 hectares in 2005 (Figure 11). 
4.4  Agricultural output and labour productivity  
The development of total agricultural output in the EUSCs is shown in 
Figure 12. Production rose only slightly in the period between 1993 and 
2007. Total output was up by around 4% in 2007 compared with the level in 
1993. Up to 2004, output grew and thereafter it declined, probably owing to 
unfavourable weather conditions and falling prices for milk and dairy 
products in 2005 and 2006. With some exceptions, this pattern is quite 
consistent among all countries, although the extent of the change varies 
significantly (Figure 13).  
In contrast to agricultural output, agricultural labour productivity 
surged in the EUSCs (Figure 14). This was caused by marked outflows of 
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agricultural sector had increased by around 42% compared with the level in 
1993. The highest rises occurred in Ireland, Finland and Spain (more than 
75%), while the lowest were in Belgium and Greece (at less than 20%). In 
the rest of the countries, labour output productivity grew between 30% and 
45% (Figure 14). 
4.5  Output and input prices  
There has been a steep increase in the output prices of key agricultural 
commodities in recent years. These price increases coincide with the 
introduction of the SPS. According to the FAO (2008), world agricultural 
commodity prices rose sharply in 2006 and continued to rise even more 
sharply in 2007. The FAO food price index rose on average by 9% in 2006 
compared with the previous year; in 2007, it increased by 23% compared 
with 2006. The output price hikes were driven by dairy, which on average 
grew by around 80%, then by oils (50%) and grains (42%). The only 
exception was the price of sugar, which declined by 32%, after having risen 
by over 20% during the 2005–06 period. 
The main factors leading to agricultural price increases were the 
following: 
•  low production levels, stemming from bad weather conditions in 
several world agricultural regions;  
•  the gradual reduction in the level of stocks, mainly of cereals;  
•  increasing fuel costs;  
•  the changing structure of demand (the income growth in emerging 
countries – especially in China and India – has led to changes in diets, 
with consumption moving away from starchy foods and towards 
more meat and dairy products);  
•  expansion of the biofuels sector; and  
•  operations in financial markets (FAO, 2008). 
In the EU, output prices have shown a strong upward trend for major 
crop commodities in recent years, especially for grains and oilseeds. The 
trend for price increases for animal products has been weaker and for some 
sectors prices have even fallen in recent years (e.g. for cattle and pigs) 
(Table 7, Figure 17 and Figure 18). The input price increase in the EU was 
especially high for fuels. The prices of fertilisers grew less (Table 7). CAP 
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appreciation of the euro against the US dollar have limited the extent to 
which world price increases have fed through to the EU market. 
4.6  Yields  
The development of yields in the EUSCs is reported in Figure 19. The 
numbers in the figure summarise the evolution of yields for selected 
commodities: grains, sugar beet, potatoes and milk. In general, there is an 
upward trend in yields with the largest increases in milk and maize yields. 
The lowest increase is for wheat. As noted earlier, the decline in crop yields 
in 2005–07 could have been the result of unfavourable weather conditions. 
Country data show substantial differences in the level of yields. 
Figure 20 shows relative yields calculated by dividing the country yield by 
the average yield of all the EUSCs. In terms of the level of yields, the most 
productive countries appear to be the Netherlands, France, Belgium, 
Germany and the UK. The least productive are Finland and Greece. 
4.7  Agricultural income 
Figure 21 shows the development of real income from agricultural factors 
per annual work unit (AWU) in the EU. On average, incomes have been 
rising over time in the EUSCs as well as in the EU as a whole. This has been 
underpinned by rising productivity and an outflow of labour from 
agriculture. There is a high degree of variation in the income development, 
which is likely influenced by volatile yields and output prices. The 
development of real income in the EUSCs grew at a lower rate than the 
income growth for the EU as a whole. Figure 22 presents the variation in 
income change by country. Half of the countries have experienced a fall in 
incomes, while in the other countries income was higher in 2007 compared 
with 2000. Particularly in Ireland, Belgium, Greece and Italy, income 
decreased because of a combination of two factors: lower outflows of 
labour from agriculture and more sluggish rises in output compared with 
the rest of the countries (Figure 22).  34 | 
 
 
5.  LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
5.1  Sales market regulations 
As in all factor and commodity markets, the EU markets for agricultural 
land are subject to certain institutional regulations. The regulations 
pertaining to the farmland sales market that are of particular interest to this 
study are price regulations, tax regulations and quantitative restrictions on 
the sale, purchase and use of agricultural land. The primary regulations on 
agricultural land sales in the EUSCs are discussed below and summarised 
in Table 1. 
5.1.1  Price restrictions for agricultural land 
Farmland sales markets are especially vulnerable to price regulations. In all 
of the sample countries except France (and in selected circumstances in East 
Germany), sales prices are not regulated by the government – they are 
determined by a mutual interaction of market forces. This helps to explain 
why no impact (or only a negligible one) of the SPS has been found on the 
formal land sales market in France. 
The two most important sales price regulations for agricultural land 
are minimum and maximum sales prices. Their implications on seller and 
buyer behaviour are rather different. A minimum price reduces land 
demand, if the ‘unregulated’ market price is lower than the regulated price. 
In contrast, a maximum price reduces land supply, if the unregulated 
market price is higher than the price ceiling imposed. In both cases, a black 
market for agricultural land sales may arise, where in addition to the 
regulated sales market price, the difference between the equilibrium price 
and the regulated sales price is paid under the table. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 35 
 
Countries with regulated sales prices for agricultural land 
The sales prices for agricultural land are regulated in France and for 
selected areas in East Germany (see column 2 in Table 1). In both countries, 
the sales price regulations are implemented through state agencies 
specially created for this purpose. 
In France, the sales market for agricultural land is regulated by the 
SAFER. In addition to collecting information about land sales, it also has 
negotiating power and a pre-emptive right to buy land. The SAFER 
negotiates with a seller and a buyer to achieve a mutual agreement for a 
land sales transaction. If the SAFER cannot facilitate a mutual agreement 
satisfying all the parties involved, it may propose a new buyer who better 
fits the SAFER’s objectives or another price that is considered more in line 
with the observed market price. The most powerful intervention 
instrument of the SAFER is its pre-emptive right, which is used if a mutual 
agreement between the seller, the buyer and the SAFER cannot be reached. 
This right allows the SAFER to acquire the agricultural land being offered 
for sale. The SAFER then tries to find an arrangement that better fits the 
SAFER’s goals, e.g. to sell the land at another price, to another buyer or to 
rent it out for a while. SAFER’s activity on the sales market for agricultural 
land may partially explain the relatively low sales prices of agricultural 
land in France compared with other countries in our study (see Figure 1). 
In East Germany, the maximum sales price solely applies to former 
landowners, who lost their agricultural land due to collectivisation in the 
1950s and 1960s. To enable those former landowners, along with current 
tenants who did not have the possibility to buy land in the former GDR, to 
buy land at a reduced market price, in 1994 and 1995 the German 
parliament passed the Compensation and Indemnity Act and the 
Regulation on Acquisition of Agricultural Areas. The Compensation and 
Indemnity Act gives the former landowners (and current tenants) an 
opportunity to buy land at a lower price – 65% of the current market price. 
Among other factors, the amount of agricultural land that the former 
landowners can buy at a lower price depends on the soil quality of the 
land. For example, tenants can buy approximately 120 hectares of land of a 
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agriculturally for a period of at least 20 years; otherwise, the state trust-
holding institution, BVVG,16 may cancel the contract. 
Countries with ‘free’ sales markets 
The sales price for agricultural land can be freely negotiated between 
sellers and buyers in all of the other EUSCs: Belgium, Finland, West 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK (see column 2 in Table 1). 
In competitive land markets with free sales prices for agricultural 
land, buyers and sellers mutually interact and bargain over the terms of the 
sale with each other. Applying the bargaining literature (e.g. Nash, 1950) to 
agriculture, buyers and sellers bargain over the price of a given quantity 
and quality of farmland. If they reach an agreement on a price, the 
transaction is completed. If they do not, the buyer resumes the search for a 
property or drops out of the market, and the seller resumes the search for a 
buyer or removes his/her property from the market. 
Given that different land sales markets are spatially segmented from 
each other, often the market power and the negotiation power are 
asymmetric between the seller and buyer (King and Sinden, 1994). 
Especially for agricultural land markets with family-type farms, the market 
power and thus the bargaining strength is usually on the landowner’s side 
(King and Sinden, 1994). In addition, the relative bargaining strength of the 
seller and buyer in agriculture is heavily affected by rather high 
transportation costs, which segment the land markets spatially. 
Siegel and Fouraker (1960) show that the relative bargaining strength 
indeed affects market outcomes. Their findings suggest that even in 
markets with free sales prices for agricultural land, the observed price (and 
quantity of land sold) may ‘deviate’ from competitive market outcomes. As 
such, ‘free sales markets’ for agricultural land do not necessarily imply free 
and competitive prices. This is particularly notable when considering land 
markets with few transactions. 
 
                                                      
16 The BVVG (Bodenverwertungs- und -verwaltungs GmbH) is a state-owned, limited 
company in charge of the privatisation of agricultural and forestry land. For 
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Hence, the more that sales markets of agricultural land are segmented 
spatially (the plots offered for sale are far from each other) and temporally 
(few land market transactions occurring in a given area), the higher is the 
probability that the observed sales price is not representative of the 
equilibrium price of perfect and competitive markets. 
Sales price building and the capitalisation of subsidies 
Among other factors, the impact of subsidies on agricultural land sales 
prices depends on the mechanism of price formation. Because the sales 
price for agricultural land is partially regulated by the state in France, we 
would expect that in France agricultural subsidies would have less effect on 
the land sales price. But price regulations may facilitate the emergence of a 
black market for agricultural land, where an additional amount of money is 
paid ‘in an envelope’. Yet, owing to the lack of reliable data, the existence of 
a black market for agricultural land can neither be proven nor its size 
assessed. 
In East Germany, the effective price that a buyer pays for land is 
affected, because the reduced price is calculated as a percentage (currently 
65%) of the market price. Therefore, if subsidies affect the market price, the 
effective price that buyers pay is affected too. 
Among the other EUSCs, because the sales price for agricultural land 
can be freely negotiated between sellers and buyers, if other things were 
equal we would expect that agricultural subsidies would influence 
farmland sales prices more in Belgium, Finland, West Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK than in France.  
As outlined above, however, usually other things are not equal. For 
example, the sales price may not be a bargaining outcome between a buyer 
and seller. Instead, it may be set by a landowner having a 
monopolistic/oligopolistic market power over the land supply in a 
spatially (and temporally) segmented agricultural land market.17 This 
implies that the impact of subsidies on monopolistic/oligopolistic land 
prices will be different from the impact on competitive market prices. 
Kilian and Salhofer (2008) find that “ultimately, it is the number of 
suppliers and demanders on the market that will determine the outcome”. 
                                                      
17 This kind of price building for agricultural land transactions is frequently 
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More precisely, they mean that the greater the seller market power, the 
greater is the share of the SPS that will be capitalised into land values 
(Kilian and Salhofer, 2008). 
5.1.2  Sales/purchase taxes and transaction costs 
In addition to the sales price regulations, land taxes also play an important 
role in a market participant’s decisions to sell, buy and own agricultural 
land. This section examines the key sales/purchase taxes and the related 
transaction costs for agricultural land. 
Three types of land taxes are of interest to this study: land sales tax 
(capital gains tax or CGT), purchase (registration) tax and usage (real 
estate) tax. Usually, land sales taxes are devised to discourage land price 
inflation by absorbing land sales profits. In contrast, purchase and usage 
taxes affect the behaviour of buyers of agricultural land. 
According to Table 1, land transaction (sales/purchase) tax rates are 
heterogeneous across the EUSCs, ranging from 1% for low-value land in 
the UK to 18% for high-value farmland in Italy. The ownership taxes for 
agricultural land are similarly diverse across the EUSCs, ranging from a 0% 
tax rate on farmland in Finland to over 15% in the southern EU countries. 
Low taxes for sales transactions of agricultural land and SPS 
entitlements facilitate structural change in agriculture through the 
reallocation of agricultural land and entitlements from less productive to 
more productive farms (e.g. Germany). On the other hand, agricultural 
land markets in low-tax countries are more exposed to speculative 
farmland purchases (and sales) by non-agricultural investors (e.g. Finland). 
Differentiated farmland ownership taxes for farmers and non-farmers 
reduce the incentives for long-term, speculative farmland purchases (and 
sales) by non-agricultural investors, but hinder structural change (e.g. 
Greece). 
Countries with low sales/purchase taxes for agricultural land18 
In Finland, there is a land purchase tax of 4% of the sales price. It is not 
collected from intergenerational transfers or from transactions leveraged by 
                                                      
18 The grouping of the EUSCs into high- and low-tax economies is highly arbitrary. 
It is nonetheless helpful for drawing implications/expectations about the subsidy 
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the Finnish government. The tax rate on the proceeds from land sales is 
28%.19 Active farmers who are selling farmland they are currently farming 
are not obliged to pay tax on the proceeds of an agricultural land sale. 
At present, there is no real estate tax on agricultural land in Finland. 
Generally, landowners do not consider selling land an attractive option, 
despite current policy measures designed to stimulate land sales, such as 
the temporary relaxation of taxes on capital gains or property. 
In France, owners of land must pay a real estate tax on their property. 
The value on which the tax rate is applied is the estimated value of the 
property based on its characteristics and an index created in 1970 (the 
valeur locative cadastrale), reduced by 50% for built land and 20% for non-
built land. The total tax includes several tax rates, which are set at the 
NUTS 2, NUTS 3 and municipality levels. The municipality tax rate is the 
highest: for example, the tax rate for built land in Bretagne is 2.97% at the 
NUTS 2 level, between 8.98% and 11.67% at the NUTS 3 level (depending 
on the NUTS 3 region) and on average 20.17% at the municipality level. As 
for non-built land, staying with the example of Bretagne, the tax rates are 
4.13% at the NUTS 2 level, between 17.74% and 38.61% at the NUTS 3 level 
(depending on the NUTS 3 region) and on average 48.16% at the 
municipality level. Farmers’ residences are taxed, but other agricultural 
buildings are exempt. As for non-built land, agricultural land is only taxed 
at the municipal rate (before 1997, the NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 tax rates were 
also applied). There are some further tax reductions or exemptions, e.g. for 
young farmers or farms located in Corsica. In general, owners of non-built 
land must also pay an additional tax, for the chambers of agriculture. 
In France, the transfer of land or property is subject to a total tax of 
5.09%, paid by the buyer. The total tax rate includes a state tax, NUTS 3 tax 
and municipality tax of, respectively, 0.2%, 3.60% and 1.20% of the land 
price, and a state tax of 2.50% on the total tax paid at the NUTS 3 level. The 
5.09% tax is applied to all built and non-built land; however, the tax is 
reduced (the NUTS 3 rate is 0.6% and the state tax is 0.1% of the price) for 
non-built agricultural land. The total tax applied to young farmers is 
0.715% of the land price. Transactions done by or through the SAFERs are 
exempt. 
                                                      
19 This tax rate applies to all capital gains, for example capital gains from home 
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The inheritance laws in France stipulate a mandatory transfer to 
rightful heirs. This means that, in contrast to full testamentary freedom 
whereby the owner can draft a will, in France heirs are designated by law 
as well as the share of the property and other assets to which they are 
entitled. Consequently, the landowner is not free to choose her/his heirs, 
nor their respective shares of the inheritance. Regarding the inheritance tax 
system, the tax is between 5% and 60% of the bequest value, depending on 
the relationship of the heir and on the value of the bequest. There are some 
tax reductions when the value of the bequest does not exceed specific 
thresholds, depending on the relationship of the heir. 
In Germany, taxes incurred through land sales transactions are 
regulated in §11 of the Purchase Tax Law and amount to 3.5% of the 
purchase price. As a rule, the taxes are paid by the buyer (§13 of the same 
law), but in some cases the seller or both contract parties can be liable for 
the purchase tax. No purchase tax is levied if the purchase price is €2,500 or 
less (§3 no. 1 of the same law). Additional sales/purchase costs include fees 
for a public notary, cadastral, land registry and – if needed – a fee for an 
official expert’s land survey. If the agricultural land is traded as a current 
asset, i.e. a purchase and sale of land within a speculative period, the profit 
realised is subject to the capital gains (speculation) tax. The tax on capital 
gains must be paid if the total profit in the legal year exceeds €600 (§23(3) of 
Income Tax Act). According to §23(1) no. 2(2) of the same law, the 
speculative period for agricultural land is 10 years. 
Furthermore, a real estate tax must be paid by the real property 
owners. Nationally registered real estate is liable for taxation. The legal 
basis for real estate taxation is the Real Estate Law of 7 August 1973 (Federal 
Law Gazette, BGBl I, p. 965) and its latest amendments. Real estate tax 
applies to any kind of real estate including agricultural land and buildings. 
The basis of taxation depends on i) where the property is registered (West 
or East Germany) and ii) the nature/purpose of the property (e.g. 
developed land, a rented apartment or agricultural land). Thus, there are 
four different tax bases (rateable values). 
In Germany, the real estate tax is levied by municipalities and it 
accrues solely to them. Tax rates are municipality-specific and are 
calculated in two steps. In the first step, the local tax office fixes the base 
value for tax purposes, which is derived from the rateable value of the real 
estate. In the second step, municipalities apply their specific collection rate 
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In Greece, tax rates depend on the location of the property and the 
nature or purpose of its use. Each year, the ministry of finance and 
economics specifies the so-called ‘objective’ values of the land or property, 
based on which the tax rates are applied. The real sales price is usually 
higher, although the price mentioned in the official contracts of each 
transaction is the ‘objective’ value. For agricultural land in particular, these 
minimum values are estimated for each municipality based on the initial 
basic value or the special basic value. These two values measure the value 
of agricultural land depending on its exact location and especially on 
whether the land is irrigated and on its distance from coastal areas. 
Since 2004, a complete tax exemption has applied to transactions of 
agricultural land made by farmers (natural persons) in Greece.20 An 
exemption of 50% also applies to legal farmers. Finally, farmers are granted 
tax exemptions for inheritance or intergenerational transfers of agricultural 
land under certain conditions. The complete tax exemption of agricultural 
land transactions, under the condition that it is used for agricultural 
production, aims at the maintenance of cultivated land and the level of 
employment in rural areas (see Box 1). 
 
Box 1. Transaction costs owing to land fragmentation in Greece 
The agricultural reforms of 1919–23 induced the fragmentation of agricultural 
land in Greece. Land was distributed by allocating on average seven parcels to 
each farmer. The institution of dowries (proika), continuous succession by 
inheritance as well as the absence of any institutions that prohibit further 
segmentation also contributed to this phenomenon. After the Second World 
War, scattered land constituted one of the main structural features (apart from 




                                                      
20 More precisely, the tax exemption applies under the following conditions: i) the 
main activity of the buyer is an agricultural activity and ii) the buyer uses the land 
that (s)he buys for agricultural production for a period of 15 years. If during this 
period the use of the purchased land changes or remains uncultivated for two 
years (except for set-aside land), the tax exemption is removed. 42 | LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
 
Box 1. cont’d  
The continual division of agricultural land into smaller and smaller 
parcels increases the cost of production and decreases the value of 
agricultural land. To initiate the consolidation of small, scattered plots, in 
1952 the constitution established an institution and provisions facilitating 
land redistribution for the first time. Yet there was no significant progress in 
the following decades, although the state continued promoting land 
redistribution at an annual average rate of about 7,000 hectares during the 
period 1996–2003. In 2006, there were still about 750,000 hectares to be 
redistributed, and it is essential that new farmers acquire sufficient land. 
To hinder the further scattering of plots and to contribute to the 
structural improvement of agricultural land, in 1957 the ATE Bank 
(Agricultural Bank of Greece) started granting loans under special 
conditions for the purchase of agricultural land. It also provided the 
opportunity for young farmers to buy land. This decreased the transaction 
costs associated with the purchase of agricultural land. Nevertheless, there is 
some evidence that these loans did not contribute significantly to the 
development of the agricultural land market in Greece. A substantial share 
of agricultural land is still mortgaged, since it has very often been used as 
collateral for the owners to take such loans from the ATE Bank (and later on 
from many other cooperative banks). Currently, farmers can still have easier 
access to credit, as the entitlements can be considered a fixed income that can 
be used to pay the instalments. 
In addition to the high degree of land segmentation, an important 
issue for the agricultural land market in Greece is the fact that one-third of 
the land is still owned by the state. The Orthodox Greek Church also 
possesses a significant share of agricultural land. 
Source: Ministry of rural development and food (2008). 
 
In the Netherlands, a land transaction tax of 6% of the purchase price 
must be paid by the buyer. The buyer can apply for a tax exemption if the 
land remains in agricultural use for at least 10 years. 
In Sweden, the land market has been affected by changes in the 
taxation system for agricultural land. Several taxes have recently been 
abolished for agricultural land – inheritance tax in December 2004 and 
wealth tax in 2007. Also, changes to inheritance taxes in general in Sweden 
have had subsequent impacts on the land market. More specifically, the 
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payment of the tax was not due until the estate was divided among the 
heirs. Currently, the same inheritance rules apply to agricultural land as to 
any other property, that is, inheritance is equally divided among the direct 
heirs. Exemption from the wealth tax makes agricultural estates attractive 
investments for wealthy investors. Acquiring farm properties is becoming 
ever more popular among the heads of large companies for tax reasons. 
The UK’s stamp duty is a tax on transactions involving heritable 
property, including farmland (more correctly, it is a tax due on the 
registration of transfer). Although the stamp duty has been payable for a 
number of years, the zero-rated threshold has recently changed. 
The tax on capital gains (or CGT) is a tax on the increase in the value 
of certain assets that are sold or given away in a lifetime and applies to 
assets such as land and other capital assets (it does not apply to cash 
transfers or to the disposal of trading stock). CGT rollover relief allows 
business assets (e.g. farmland) that have been sold at a gain to avoid CGT if 
the whole of the sale proceeds are reinvested in other assets to be used by 
that business, provided it is reinvested between 12 months prior to and up 
to 3 years after the sale of the asset. Recent changes to the CGT rules (in 
2007) mean that those with longstanding land holdings may face a 
significant increase in tax liability on the disposal of either part of or an 
entire farm, although since 5 April 2008 the maximum rate of CGT has been 
18%. 
In the UK, inheritance tax is only chargeable at death and lifetime 
transfers (gifts) are known as potentially exempt transfers (PETs). When the 
donor dies within seven years of making a PET, the transfer is taxed on the 
value at the time of the gift, using a sliding scale. In 2007–08, the rate of 
inheritance tax was 40% on transfers higher than £300,000 in value made 
within seven years of death and property passing on death. All other 
chargeable transfers are taxed at 20%. For the purpose of calculating the 
inheritance tax, farm assets include any woodland and associated farm 
buildings, cottages and farmhouses. Currently, owners of farmland are 
offered two types of relief from inheritance tax, subject to certain 
ownership conditions, effectively removing much farmland from 
inheritance tax charges. 
Countries with high sales/purchase taxes for agricultural land 
The highest land purchase/registration taxes are in Belgium (10-12.5%), 
Italy (11-18%) and Ireland (9%). In Belgium, there are three different kinds 
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namely the registration costs, the fee for the notary and other 
administrative costs (see Box 2). The registration costs differ among the 
regions, ranging from 10% in Flanders to 12.5% in Wallonia.21 
 
Box 2. The black market and payments ‘under the table’ in Belgium 
The registration costs associated with the purchase of a plot and the fact that 
the seller and the buyer make mutual agreements, create an incentive for 
farmers to pay part of the purchase price to the landowner under the table 
without reporting it to the government (and without paying any taxes on 
this amount), which is quite common in Belgium. Approximately 20% of the 
purchase price is paid as black money (Van Herck, 2008). 
By comparing the data from auctions and private sales in the period 
1990–2004 (provided by FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie), 
one can roughly estimate the additional black money, since the price in an 
auction is publicly known, which is not the case in a private sale. When 
dropping the 25% highest and 25% lowest numbers, we roughly estimate 
that approximately 20% of the purchase price is paid ‘in an envelope’, which 
according to experts is a plausible range. It should be emphasised that 
although we exclude the extreme values it is still a very rough estimate as 
we find a large variation in percentages (without excluding the extreme 
values a variation between 1% and 70%). There is no change over time in the 
amount of black money paid under the table, corresponding to the views of 
experts that this amount has been more or less stable over time. 
Source: FOD Economie (2008). 
 
The owner of the land also has to pay annual taxes on land – the 
advance levy on real estate.22 This levy consists of three parts. The first is 
the base levy for the regional government. On this base levy, the provinces 
are then allowed to tax some extra payments (provinciale opcentiemen). 
                                                      
21 In the case of an auction, the registration costs differ among territorial 
jurisdictions, but as a rough-and-ready-rule, 20% of the purchase price is used. 
22 If the land is rented for a very long period, the tenant farmer will need to pay the 
advance levy on real estate (in the case of erfpacht or recht van postal – see section 
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Finally, the communities are also allowed to tax some extra payments on 
the base levy (gemeentelijke opcentiemen). 
The base levy is derived from the indexed cadastral income that was 
attributed to each plot of land. The cadastral income was set on 1 January 
1975 and represents the net rental income that the farmer could gain from it 
in 1975, depending on the characteristics of the plot (e.g. soil characteristics 
or situated on a slope). The average cadastral income in Belgium in 2006 
was €51.40/ha and €50.20/ha for arable land and permanent grassland 
respectively. There are nonetheless some large differences among the 
provinces, which reflected the 1975 differences in productivity. At present, 
the cadastral income is no longer related to the income that a farmer could 
earn from cultivating the plot, as production no longer solely relates to the 
soil conditions (e.g. intensive animal breeding). Theoretically, every 10 
years the value of all properties should be reassessed (perequatie), but since 
1975, this has not occurred. Therefore, the cadastral income is indexed to 
the taxation year 1991 in most of the regulations. 
In addition, when a farmer receives a donation or an inheritance (s)he 
needs to pay regional taxes, which depend on the relationship of the 
deceased (donor) to the beneficiary and the amount of the inheritance. For 
example, if a farmer living in Flanders dies and leaves an inheritance of 
€120,000 to two children, they both inherit €60,000. On the first €50,000, 
they will have to pay 3% or €1,500 and on the next €10,000 9% or €900. In 
total, they will each pay €2,400 in taxes. 
In Ireland, the relevant taxes and transaction charges in the sale and 
purchase of agricultural land include stamp duty, CGT, capital acquisitions 
tax and sales fees. There is a stamp duty (transactions tax) charge on 
agricultural land sales, which is payable by the buyer. The rates applied are 
those for non-residential property, with the top rate being 9% for land 
valued in excess of €150,000. (Lower rates apply at different bands under 
that threshold but once the band is breached, the next higher rate applies to 
the entire amount of the transaction.) CGT is payable by the seller at a rate 
of 20%. There is no capital acquisitions tax on agricultural land sales; 
however, it does apply to land transferred by gift or inheritance. The 
current rate is 20%. Land sales fees are not regulated but are usually paid 
by the seller. 
The Italian Law 694/96 specifies the rate of compulsory fees charged 
for the purchase of land. This rate is between 11% and 18% of the ‘stated 
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entire transaction. The stated value and price of the transaction are 
different. The stated value cannot be lower than an amount resulting from 
a calculation between the landowner’s income entered in the cadastre 
(moltiplica-tore catastale) and a landlord’s income in updated values. These 
last items are frequently reviewed by the ministry of finance. 
The tax rate of 11% to 18% is a sum of three different fees: imposta di 
registro, imposta catastale and imposta ipotecaria. The imposta di registro can be 
applied at 8% if the buyer is a full-time farmer or 15% in other cases. The 
rates for the imposte catastale and ipotecaria  are fixed at 2% and 1% 
respectively.  
In the case of hereditary succession, the tax varies between 4% and 
8% depending on the relationship. 
5.1.3  Land use and other quantitative restrictions 
In addition to the sales price regulations, sales taxes and other transaction 
costs, different restrictions on agricultural land sales, purchases and use 
have been implemented in EU member states. 
For example, in Belgium, zoning regulation is a regional competence 
and therefore land-use planning differs between Flanders and Wallonia. In 
Flanders, the objectives of the regional, spatial structure plan are to reduce 
the area of agricultural land (-56,000 hectares) in favour of woodland and 
nature reserves (+48,000 hectares), industrial land (+7,000 hectares) and 
recreational areas (+1,000 hectares). Between 1994 and 2005, 11,600 hectares 
of agricultural land disappeared and 13,400 hectares of woodland and 
nature reserves were created (Joly, 2003; Gellynck et al., 2006–07). 
In Wallonia, zoning regulation aims at increasing the zone designated 
for economic activity at the expense of the agricultural zone (Grandjean et 
al., 2006). Between 1986 and 2005, the urbanised zone increased by 2,950 
hectares. Yet, these modifications in the sector plan do not reflect the 
changes in the occupation of the land. The agricultural zone of the sector 
plan is not entirely occupied by agricultural plots – these coexist with 
woodland, public infrastructure and housing. Similarly, not all agricultural 
plots are situated in the agricultural zone: in 2001, 54,773 hectares of 
agricultural land were located in the housing zone. These plots are 
particularly under pressure and subject to speculation. 
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In Finland, the ownership of land is not restricted. At the same time, 
it is said that one could become a landowner only by marrying or 
inheriting.23 All children are treated equally under the rules for land 
inheritance.24 
As noted earlier, in France the main institution of land sales 
regulation is the SAFER. SAFERs are local authorities (one general 
authority is located in Paris). Their specific missions are to support the 
settlement of farmers, especially young farmers, to support land and farm 
consolidation, and to favour the transparency and functioning of rural land 
markets.25 
Each sale of agricultural land has to be notified to the local SAFER by 
the notaries legalising the transactions. When the SAFER receives the 
notification, an initial agreement has been reached between the seller and 
buyer at a given price. The SAFER then has two months to accept or to 
refuse the transaction. When market forces lead to a transaction that is in 
line with the objectives of the SAFER and the transaction cannot be 
suspected of being speculative, then the latter accepts the transaction. 
When these conditions are not met, the SAFER can refuse the transaction.26 
The other two market intervention instruments of the SAFER are price-
related and are explained in the subsequent section. 
                                                      
23 This tendency is driven by the conservative attitude of landowners towards the 
sale of land, especially those of baby boom generation, which represents one of the 
most important land-owning groups in Finland. Even if there are no successors, 
they prefer to keep the land and rent it out. This behaviour reduces the supply of 
land on the sales market, with access often occurring through inheritance. 
24 And according to the country report on Finland (prepared as part of this project), 
there were no major changes in the land transfer legislation between 1990 and 
2007. 
25 The missions of the SAFERs have progressively been extended to rural 
development support and environmental protection. The 1999 LOA (Loi 
d’Orientation Agricole) gave them the ability to use their pre-emptive right to fulfil 
objectives of environmental protection. 
26 Examples include a sale implying the dismantling of a farm, a sale allowing a 
settled farmer to enlarge his/her farm to the detriment of a young farmer who 
would have been able to settle thanks to the land for sale or an agreed price that is 
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Regarding zoning regulations, all land in France is categorised 
according to its use by development planning provisions, and thus land 
devoted to agriculture is officially registered as agricultural land. 
Converting agricultural land into another use (for housing, industries, 
recreational areas, etc.) is subject to approval by the state or its local 
administration. The Plans Locaux d’Urbanisme (PLU) divide municipal land 
into several zones according to their use: urban zones, zones to be 
urbanised, agricultural zones, natural and forest zones. A PLU protects 
agricultural land from conversion into development. In theory, it is very 
difficult for landowners to change the use of their land if the change does 
not comply with the municipal map. Building permission is given to 
projects that are in accordance with the PLU; when a municipality has no 
PLU, projects can be refused if they are deemed to threaten agricultural 
activities or land consolidation. Despite these provisions, PLUs can be and 
often are modified, which puts the existence of agricultural land at risk. 
Especially small municipalities are interested in industrial development 
(for example to obtain more financial resources) and in housing 
development (inhabitants being voters for the local representatives). Such 
pressures on agricultural land are especially felt in tourist areas or around 
urban centres. Moreover, it is not only that municipalities happen to show 
laxity when giving building permission, but also that they themselves have 
urban pre-emptive rights (droits de pré-emption urbains). This means that 
they can confiscate any land in their area, against compensation, in order to 
build roads, railways, recreational activities, etc. Agricultural land is ever 
more impinged upon by this right. 
In Germany, the Law on the Sale of Agricultural Land regulates 
procedures for land sales. Thereafter, every sale of agricultural land that is 
larger than a certain minimum size requires a permit by a regulatory 
authority (Genehmigungsbehörde) according to §9 of this law. The minimum 
size is set by each federal state (e.g. 2 hectares in Bavaria). The regulatory 
authority examines whether there are pre-emptive rights on the given land 
and can refuse the transaction during the first month after the sale 
announcement. Justifications for the refusal can include an inefficient 
allocation of agricultural land, an uneconomical reduction of land or a sales 
price that is significantly higher or lower than the value of the given plot. 
In Germany, the procedural regulations of the main legal bodies 
governing German land law in Bavaria are somewhat less strict compared 
with other federal states. For example, the minimum size requiring a 
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Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz is 2 hectares in the federal state of Bavaria 
compared with 1 hectare in Lower Saxony and 0.5 hectares in the federal 
state of Saxony. 
In the German region of Saxony, as in the whole of East Germany, 
agricultural land regulations are more complex than in West Germany. 
Additional land sale regulations concern the ongoing privatisation of land 
formerly owned by the state (GDR) being carried out by the BVVG. The 
relevant laws are the Compensation and Indemnity Act and the Regulation 
on Acquisition of Agricultural Areas. 
Three key factors are particularly relevant for the land sales market in 
East Germany: i) the privatisation of former state-owned land that had 
been confiscated in 1946; ii) the transformation of large collective farms and 
state-owned farms into smaller private farms, partnerships or corporations; 
and iii) the reduction of old debts from the Communist system. 
The transformation of the agricultural sector, especially the 
restructuring of cooperatives and the demand from farmers from West 
Germany and the Netherlands, provoked strong fluctuations in the land 
market. For example, in West Germany only 0.4% of the agricultural area is 
sold annually, whereas in East Germany this figure is 1.5%. Farm 
restructuring is also affected by the privatisation of farmland. Farmers, 
whose rental contracts with the BVVG end, can be threatened by the loss of 
land, because this land should be sold and might be bought by other 
farmers. 
The reduction of old debts inherited from the Communist era had 
played a role in the land market, as immediately after the reunification, 
farmers in East Germany could not afford to buy land because of these 
debts. Now the financial situation of the farms has improved, and the 
problem of old debts has been resolved. Thus, farmers are beginning to 
consolidate their enterprises and are trying to increase their share of owned 
land. Consequently, the demand for agricultural land is increasing. 
In Ireland, all contracts for agricultural land sales must be delivered 
to the Irish government’s Valuation Office in a ‘particulars delivered’ form. 
Transactions under €500 and over €35,000/ha are classified as non-
agricultural, as are plots of less than 2 hectares and sales of agricultural 
land in Dublin County. 
There is no statutory requirement to register purchased land but it is 
prudent to do so and is the norm. The Property Registration Authority has 
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In the Netherlands, land sales transactions – in contrast to the rental 
market – have always been relatively free. Neither prices nor other 
contractual terms have been prescribed. Each sale needs to be recorded by a 
notary, however, and transmitted to the central land registry. All sales 
records are public information in the Netherlands. 
In 2007, the Spanish Land Regulation 8/2007 of 28 May was 
published. This regulation affects town and city planning, expropriation, 
sales or unavoidable substitution and the public administration’s 
patrimonial responsibility. This regulation has brought about an important 
novelty in terms of rural land valuation. Rural land will be valued for its 
true value given its situation and not for its expectations, which 
discourages the purely speculative practices of land classification.  
In Sweden, the agricultural land market is regulated by the Land 
Acquisition Law. In the late 1980s, the agricultural land market was 
deregulated and now only a few restrictions remain. Generally, natural 
persons are allowed to purchase agricultural land without any restrictions 
such as educational requirements or evidence of previous agricultural 
experience. Nevertheless, there is an exception for land in sparsely 
populated regions; in these areas, a permit is required.27 The county 
administrative board identifies the municipalities in which the permit is 
required. For legal persons a permit is always required, which limits the 
possibility for such persons to acquire land. 
In the UK, there are numerous regulations that affect the land market, 
including development restrictions on greenbelt areas around urban 
centres, on agricultural land that is qualified as ‘Grade I’ (of historical or 
cultural significance) and on land with tied housing for agricultural 
workers, as well as development zones and planning regulations. In 
addition, in Scotland there is the right of crofting communities to buy land 
and the pre-emptive right to buy land afforded to rural communities and 
tenant farmers. 
5.2  Development of the land sales markets 
To obtain a clear picture of the reaction of land values to recent CAP 
changes, agricultural land values have been studied from two different 
                                                      
27 There may even be a requirement that the owner is living on the property in 
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perspectives – the development of sales prices and that of rental prices. In 
this respect, two measures have been used, real price development and 
price indices, which capture annual changes. 
Theoretically, if markets are perfect and transaction costs are 
insignificant, then agricultural land prices and rents are expected to change 
in parallel. Although this is sometimes observed in the EUSCs, as later 
discussed, there are quite a few exceptions. The period studied, 1992–2006, 
covers three major CAP reforms, capturing both coupled and decoupled 
policy instruments. The development of the sales market is analysed using 
sales prices and the size of the sales market for agricultural land. The 
development of the land sales market in the EUSCs is summarised in Table 
3. 
5.2.1 Sales  price  development  for agricultural land 
Land prices vary greatly, even when sales of land for non-agricultural uses 
and sales between relatives are excluded. Indeed, Eurostat data for land 
prices suggest that agricultural land prices are strikingly heterogeneous 
across the EUSCs. In the peak years, the land price difference between the 
most expensive country and the least expensive country exceeded 2,000%, 
ranging from some €2,000/ha in Sweden to over €40,000/ha in the 
Netherlands. These figures suggest that awarding the same amount of 
subsidy per hectare of agricultural land in different EUSCs would have 
rather different impacts on land prices. More precisely, a subsidy of 
€500/ha would have a considerably larger impact on land prices valued at 
€2,000/ha than on land prices valued at €40,000/ha, because the subsidy 
share of the total land value is substantially higher (25% compared with 
5%). 
Studying annual price changes for agricultural land, we again found 
a heterogeneous pattern in land price development. The farmland price 
evolution ranges from a decline of almost 50% in Germany to an increase of 
over 250% in Ireland compared with the reference period 1992 (see Figure 
2). 
Countries with decreasing sales prices for agricultural land 
Real sales prices for agricultural land have been decreasing in just two 
countries – Germany and Greece. The causes of the observed price falls are 
different in the two countries. 52 | LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
 
In Germany, real sales prices for agricultural land have declined most 
significantly since 1992. The nominal land sales market has remained 
relatively stable over the last five years. The total amount of land sold at 
market value annually has remained almost unchanged since 2005. 
Although land prices have been relatively constant on the aggregate level, 
in East Germany they have moved slightly upwards, while in the western 
regions they have edged downwards. 
Land prices on the sales market are affected not only by location and 
soil quality but also by the purpose of use. The highest prices were realised 
in Bavaria (especially in Upper Bavaria) and in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(especially in the Düsseldorf district), in both cases largely owing to the 
high demand for agricultural land for urban or industrial usage. 
In the German region of Bavaria, the main characteristic of the land 
market as well as that for the whole of West Germany is the relatively high 
land price. In 2006, the land price was at €24,294/ha, which equates to the 
second highest value among federal states in Germany. In terms of low 
prices, the German region of Lower Saxony is atypical for the federal states 
in West Germany. The land price in Lower Saxony averages €13,170/ha, 
which is less than West Germany’s average price of €15,941/ha. 
In the German region of Saxony, the Compensation and Indemnity 
Act was enacted in December 1994, while the Land Purchase Regulation 
(Flächenerwerbsverordnung) came into force in December 1995. Thus, 
purchases in the frame of the Compensation and Indemnity Act started in 
1996. In 1998, they were stopped by the European Commission, because the 
Compensation and Indemnity Act had not been confirmed as being within 
the EU regulations. In 2000, the German parliament changed the law and 
land purchases started again. 
For land sales that do not fall under the conditions of the 
Compensation and Indemnity Act (approximately 375,000 hectares in the 
former GDR), the BVVG has worked out a new concept to accelerate 
privatisation. The main idea is that land under contracts with a remaining 
duration of two years has to be publicly offered for sale and for rent. 
Thereby, the farmer with the highest bid will receive the land. Thus, on the 
one hand the former tenant must buy the land if (s)he does not wish to lose 
it, and on the other hand, prices for land sold by the BVVG are rising. The 
experts interviewed criticised this practice and are afraid that prices for 
land sold by private persons will also increase in the future. Until 2006, 
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contrast, even after 1994 they were on their way down rather than rising. 
During the first years after reunification, land sales prices were higher 
b e c a u s e  p e o p l e  f r o m  W e s t  G e r m a n y  w e n t  e a s t  w i t h  t h e i r  i d e a s  o f  l a n d  
prices; in West Germany at that time, farmers paid an average of 
€14,000/ha for agricultural land. 
In Greece, the nominal sales prices for agricultural land have been 
falling less than in Germany and have stabilised since implementation of 
the SPS. The average sales price varies between €4,500 and €18,000/ha. The 
sales price of agricultural land is much higher than the expected value of 
rents capitalisation, affecting the number of transactions. According to 
unofficial information provided by Agrogi, there seems to be no linear 
relation or even regularity between the availability of agricultural land for 
sale and its price. 
Countries with stable sales prices for agricultural land 
The real sales prices for agricultural land have stayed relatively stable 
(changes of <10%) in two large EUSCs – France and Italy. Whereas in 
France the relative price stickiness is caused by rigid land-market 
institutions, in Italy the price decline for agricultural land is mainly driven 
by demand factors. 
In France, real prices for agricultural land have continually moved 
upwards since 1995 (Figure  2). The same trend can be seen in nominal 
prices (Figure 43). The increase is very pronounced: with a base of 100 in 
1994, the index of the average price was 208 in 2004. Even so, prices were 
much higher before the 1990s, and the 2004 level did not reach that seen in 
the 1980s. In 2004, the average price was €9,341/ha, with the highest prices 
in France in the NUTS 2 regions Corsica and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur 
(respectively €17,530 and €14,290 per hectare), suggesting pressures from 
urbanisation and tourism. These pressures are less of an issue in both of the 
NUTS 2 regions studied here, Bretagne and Centre. Price differences at the 
NUTS 3 level can also be attributed to price differences among assorted 
kinds of land (e.g. with vineyards being sold for a much higher price than 
other land).  
For France, the evolution of average sales prices for agricultural land 
and other indicators (indices with a base of 100 in 1994) are reported for the 
period 1994 to 2004 in Figure 44. While agricultural output per hectare and 
soft wheat prices do not follow the same increasing trend as the land sales 
price, population density and to a larger extent public subsidies do, in 
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Based on 1994–2004 data, it seems that prices started rising more 
rapidly in 1996, but there is no shock over the period, rather a general 
upward price trend in France. From 1997, the global boom in real estate 
(stemming from low interest rates) resulted in more transactions and 
higher prices. Three more factors may have contributed to the increase of 
transactions and prices in the second half of the 1990s – the pre-retirement 
scheme, environmental regulations and changes in the rental index 
calculations, as discussed below.  
i)  Introduced with the 1992 CAP reform, the pre-retirement scheme 
applied to farmers aged at least 55, and included the obligation to first 
rent out the land during three years before selling it and exiting the 
farming sector. The period 1996–97 thus corresponds to the first sales 
after these three years.  
ii)  Regarding the environmental regulations, following the 1991 
European Nitrates Directive, since 1993 livestock farms have had to 
conform to pollution standards (Programme de Maîtrise des Pollutions 
d’Origine Agricole). Farms that implemented changes to comply with 
the standards became more expensive; farms that did not conform 
became unusable for agriculture and were sold as residences. 
Moreover, the environmental regulations required livestock 
producers to set aside a minimum area for manure spreading – 
increasing the competition for land and prices. Using data on 
individual agricultural land transactions in Bretagne between 1994 
and 2000, Le Goffe and Salanié (2005) showed that the spreading 
‘quota’ has been capitalised into land prices, pushing them up.  
iii)  Another reason that may explain such an increase is the introduction 
in 1995 of a new way to calculate land rentals. Indeed, prior to 1995 
rentals were based on the theoretical potential of land production (in 
quintals per hectare). These (rather low) forecasts did not reflect the 
exact evolution of the market or its components. Therefore, an index-
based rentals calculation was introduced from 1995. That led to a 
surge in rental prices and it may have resulted in higher land sales 
prices (the increase being attenuated by the intervention power of 
SAFER). 
In Italy, the real sales prices for agricultural land have slightly 
declined over the last 15 years (see Figure 2). Meanwhile, trends in nominal 
land prices show a clear long-term increase in values since at least the 
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stability in real values. Agricultural land prices have continually increased, 
in nominal values;28 but in 2004–06, the value was stable or slightly 
decreasing, because of low agricultural product prices and low 
profitability.29 In 2006, the average national price of land in Italy was 
€15,900/ha. Higher prices were reported in the north (the north-west hill 
littoral and the north-east plain being the highest). The lowest prices were 
reported for the south and the isles (with those for the inland mountain 
areas being lowest). Land prices reflect the regional variety of conditions. 
Prices of agricultural land by location are reported in Table 26. The 
variation in sales prices captures a broad average of very diverse 
categories. Among the reported values by land-use type, extremes range 
from €1,000/ha for southern grazing land, to up to €516,000/ha for 
vineyards (DOC) in Veneto (north). 
The long-term average of land values tends to follow national 
inflation closely. Yet shorter-term trends can be also recognised. Of interest 
for policy analysis is the stability of prices in the period just around major 
policy reforms (1992 and 2005). Although there can be different causes, this 
is mostly interpreted as reflecting a perception of uncertainty among the 
participants, translated into a reduction in the number of transactions and 
stability in prices. 
Looking at the Italian regions, land sales prices in Emilia Romagna 
differ by altimetrical zone and land use. In mountainous areas, arable land 
prices are about €6,000/ha, whereas land prices for other crops are about 
€4,000/ha. In hilly areas, arable land prices are in the range of €18,000-
22,000/ha, whereas those for other crops are about €20,000-36,000/ha. In 
the plains, arable land prices are in the region of €30,000/ha, whereas those 
for other crops are about €34,000/ha. Since 1990, land sales prices have 
increased by 50% (INEA). 
In Puglia, average land prices are about €8,000/ha for arable crops – 
around 50% of the Italian average. The region is characterised by low 
competition for urban uses, except in some small areas. The agricultural 
land market is deeply segmented, depending on water availability and 
land-use specialisation. Irrigated land costs as much as 60% more than 
unirrigated land. Land uses other than for arable crops are often associated 
                                                      
28 Data derived from INEA, Banca dati dei valori fondiari. 
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with vegetables, and more frequently with olive production, for which 
prices are on average around 10-15% higher than for arable crops. 
Differences among altimetrical areas are not as significant as in other 
regions; however, the price of land for arable crops is 40% higher in the 
plains than it is in mountain areas. In the plains, the cost of land for other 
uses is about four times that of similar land in mountain areas. Among all 
Italian regions, the land market in Puglia is characterised by one of the 
lowest increases in prices during the last 15 years. The prices of arable land 
rose by a mere 15% between 1992 and 2006. This price trend was the 
opposite of that for irrigated, arable land in the coastal hills, which fell by 
30% at the beginning of the 1990s and then was primarily stable afterwards. 
The slight increase was a regular trend during the 1990s, and then prices 
were roughly constant from 2000 to 2005. In 2006, prices were either the 
same as they were in 2005 or slightly lower. Since 1990, prices have 
increased about 5%, which means that they decreased in real terms (INEA, 
2008). 
Countries with increasing sales prices for agricultural land 
In the rest of the countries – Belgium, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and the UK – real sales prices for agricultural land have 
been increasing since 1992. 
In Belgium, sales prices for agricultural land have been growing 
steadily since the middle of the 1990s. Still, the development of sales prices 
for agricultural land has varied widely across the regions (Figure 37). In 
Flanders, the average real prices for arable land and permanent grassland 
were relatively stable at the beginning of the 1990s, but since 1996, the 
average real prices for these types of land among all plots have risen each 
year on average by 2% and 3% respectively. The real price of permanent 
grassland among all plots in Wallonia also increased each year on average 
by 3%. In contrast, the average real prices of arable land in Wallonia show a 
disparate evolution. From 1996 to 2004, the prices of all plots increased 
(yearly average +1%). Subsequently, prices have remained constant since 
2006.30 Due to the break in the series, it is impossible to relate this relative 
land price decline to the introduction of the SPS or to the extensification of 
production, which had been predicted by the OECD (OECD, 2003). 
                                                      
30 In 2005, prices suddenly dropped. The sudden drop may be caused by a break in 
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In Finland, real land sales prices have been steadily increasing since 
1995, but there do not seem to be any unusual changes in land prices since 
the introduction of the SPS. As noted in the section below, most of the 
impact of the SPS on the agricultural land market in Finland is through its 
influence on the number of transactions and not through land prices. 
There is nonetheless a significant degree of uncertainty in the Finnish 
land price data from 2007 onwards, because land transaction data bundle 
together land and entitlements. Land buyers, if farmers, can include as 
farming expenses the proportion of the total land price agreed that is 
attributable to the entitlement, and thereby decrease the amount of tax due. 
In Ireland, the sales price of agricultural land has grown dramatically 
since 1990. The average price per hectare in 2005 was over 214% higher 
than the price in 1990. In the last five years for which annual data are 
available (2001–05), the price of agricultural land rose by almost 17% 
(Figure 50). The factors behind the robust growth in land prices are largely 
unrelated to the agricultural market or agricultural policy developments.  
It is notable that there has been a sharp divergence in the path of 
agricultural land sales prices and agricultural land rental prices in the last 
10 years (Figure 50). This is chiefly a feature of agricultural land near cities 
and towns with potential for re-zoning for non-agricultural uses.  
Ireland has a highly dispersed rural population. Unlike elsewhere in 
the EUSCs, rural dwellers are not concentrated in towns and villages and 
there is a keen desire to build so-called ‘one-off’ houses (individual houses 
typically on plots of up to 0.25 hectares) in the countryside. Where farms 
have access to public roadways, it has not been uncommon for a farmer to 
sell several such plots over the last 10 years.  
Ireland is experiencing a surge in population growth, largely owing 
to returning nationals who had immigrated to other English-speaking 
countries (e.g. the UK, the US and Australia) and immigration from other 
EU member states. This has created pressures on housing and other 
facilities, which have also contributed to increased land prices. 
In the Netherlands, the land price dynamics for the last 15 years are 
characterised by three major developments. First, prices display a notable 
upward trend in combination with pronounced cycles. Second, huge price 
differences related to location can be observed. Third, the liquidity of 
potential buyers has been very volatile over time. 
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During the 1990s, prices for agricultural land doubled, shooting up 
from €17,000/ha in 1993 to €36,500/ha in 2001 at the national level. The 
growth rate of average prices in these years was 10% annually. From 2001 
to 2005, prices fell by 17%, before a strong recovery ensued in the last two 
years. The value of all agricultural land in 2006 was €65 billion, which is 
about 10% of Dutch GDP. To put these growth figures into a different 
perspective, a comparison with the Dutch stock exchange is illuminating. 
The return on the Amsterdam stock index (AEX) was twice as large in 
magnitude. In the first eight years after 1993, the AEX gained on average 
20% per year, but lost 40% from 2001–05.  
Prices for arable land exceed prices for grassland, but the deviations 
are never large enough to allow for substantial gains from arbitrage. In the 
period 1993–2000, the difference was on average €1,400/ha. In the years 
2001 through 2007, the gap between the indices widened to €3,200/ha on 
average. Since grassland was converted on a large scale into arable land 
throughout the entire period, the rising price difference indicates that either 
the cost of converting grassland into arable land has increased or the 
quality of grassland on the market has declined. Probably, meadows in 
favourable farming locations were bought and ploughed up first, 
decreasing the average quality of the remaining plots. 
In the Netherlands, location is one of the key determinants of 
variations in land prices. In Table 31 and Figure 52, we observe very 
diverse land prices across regions and distinct regional price dynamics. The 
IJsselmeerpolders, for instance – with their very fertile soil, large plot sizes 
and highly specialised agricultural production – had the largest increase of 
all regions, especially in recent years. There were relatively few but 
extremely large transactions, complicating the comparison with other 
regions. Land in the specialised livestock production region Zuidelijk 
Veehouderijgebied, on the other hand, had a higher price initially, but 
experienced only half the price growth in subsequent years.  
A general trend of regional price catch-up can be observed in the 
Netherlands. Prices in regions with relatively low land prices in 1993 grew 
more than did those with initially high prices. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
a trickle-down explanation for this phenomenon: farmers from areas with 
high prices sell their land and move to larger farms in less pricey regions, 
driving prices up at their destinations.  
Figure 52 plots land price developments for selected Dutch regions. 
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driven in large part by the starch potato industry (an industry heavily 
reliant on EU subsidies) and not so much by the implicit call option. Values 
in Westelijk Holland are driven by high-value horticulture and outside 
land possibilities and urban pressure. The two other regions follow the 
Veenkolonien price but at a higher level, because the soils allow for better 
returns in these areas.  
According to Figure 53, the tails of the transaction price distribution 
are becoming wider over time. In 1993, the range from the 10th to the 90th 
percentiles was 1.5 times the median, while the range was about three 
times the median in 2007. We interpret this trend towards a higher share of 
very expensive plots as an indicator that the competition for land has 
increased. The positive outliers are probably areas with a high probability 
of being transformed into uses that are more profitable, such as property 
development. 
In Spain, three clearly distinct periods of land price evolution can be 
distinguished in the last 25 years. The first stage, from 1983 to 1989, was 
characterised by a moderate rise in prices. In the second stage, from 1989 to 
1992, land prices dropped for all crops. The third stage, from 1992 to the 
present, has been characterised by a sharp rise in land prices, especially in 
recent years. 
In 1992, a steep inflection in market land prices took place, as land 
prices that had been falling rose with the introduction of the CAP. As 
support payments were linked to productivity, land market prices went up. 
In the period 1997–99, land prices increased the most because of the 
EU payments. For that period, the average increase was about 13.95%, 
although this increase was not homogenous across either the ACs or land 
uses. Once again, in the two-year period 2005–06, land prices escalated 
owing to urban pressure and the spectacular increase in housing prices in 
Spain. Overall, figures since 1990 indicate that the average annual increase 
in nominal values to 2006 has been 5.47%.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the main characteristic of the land 
market in Spain in recent years has been the constant rise of its market 
value. On the one hand, this has been the result of rising productivity and 
the higher number of supports, and on the other hand, of land being 
converted for alternative uses. 
If we analyse the different ACs, in 1997–99, an increase of 10.3% was 
noted in the Canaries followed by the Basque country with 8.91% and 
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relevant crops (banana plantations in the Canaries and olive groves in 
Andalucia), as opposed to those in Cantabria, Galicia, Asturias and Aragon, 
which only saw increases in the period 1990–2006 of 1.69%, 2.09%, 2.33% 
and 3.21%, respectively. 
The price of land for unirrigated olives grown for processing 
increased the most, by an average of 9.43% in the period 1990–2006, and in 
general terms, the opposite occurred for meadowlands, which registered 
only a slight rise of 1.67%. 
As for land prices by AC, the highest prices were found in the 
Canaries, for banana plantations, followed by the Valencian Community, 
for orange groves (and because of the influence of tourism), which were 
followed by the Balearics and Andalucia, whose values in the year 2006 
were €73,902, €31,635, €20,736 and €20,536/ha, respectively. Conversely, 
the lowest prices were in Aragon, Extremadura and Castille-Leon, at 
€3,786, €4,419 and €4,554/ha, respectively. 
If we analyse prices by crop use, the highest price was for irrigated 
orange groves, €70,385/ha in 2006 – not because of their profitability as a 
crop, but because they are located in the Valencian Community and part of 
Andalucia, where the pressure for land created by tourism is immense. The 
price of land for unirrigated olives for processing, mainly located in 
Andalucia, differed greatly at €21,229/ha, while pastureland obtained the 
lowest price in the entire period considered, at just €2,883/ha. 
In Sweden, prices for the most common sales of agricultural land – 
arable land and grazing land – have been increasing. The price of arable 
land was around €2,000/ha on average during 1990–2005 and the price of 
grazing land was on average around €700/ha. Figure 29 plots the 
development of land sales prices since 1990. It clearly shows that prices of 
grassland have increased at a faster rate than prices of arable land. This 
trend has been striking during the last couple of years. The robust growth 
in prices of semi-natural grazing land in recent years is most probably 
explained by the introduction of the SPS, since this type of land was not 
previously eligible for direct payments. Semi-natural grazing land is also 
eligible to receive payments associated with environmental support. 
Environmental support amounts to €263 per hectare on average, which was 
nearly 20% of the sales price in 2005. 
In Sweden, agricultural land is often sold as a part of agricultural 
property, which also includes other assets (e.g. buildings and forestland). 
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agricultural land to the value of the property. In 2005, a new method was 
introduced to calculate how much of the value of an agricultural property 
is attributable to agricultural land, which makes it difficult to compare the 
recent years with earlier years. There are two different estimates of land 
prices available for 2005. Furthermore, land prices are considered 
underestimated for the period 1999–2004 according to the National Board 
of Agriculture. 
In Table 32, the prices of agricultural land are shown using the new 
valuation method. Prices are somewhat higher than with the old method. 
Prices were also higher in 2006 compared with those in 2005. The increase 
in agricultural land prices in 2006 was a little more than 10%. Grazing land 
prices grew more than those for arable land (20%). 
A close look at the yearly fluctuations in land prices reveals 
substantial variations in arable land prices at the beginning of the 1990s 
(see Figure 64). They increased more than average in 1996, 2000 and 2006. 
The changes at the beginning of the 1990s could be attributed to the 
agricultural reform that was introduced before Sweden joined the EU in 
1995. In 1994, efforts to implement this reform were discontinued and land 
sales prices have increased most years since 1995. 
The prices of grazing land differ more than do those of arable land, 
although both prices seem to display a similar pattern. The price increases 
for grazing land were significant in 2004 and 2005.  
Given the diversity of land quality across different parts of the 
country, it is interesting to look at the regional movements in land sales 
prices. Figure 65 plots land prices in six regions and the average land price 
of these regions during three periods: 1990–99, 2000–04 and 2005–06. 
The most fertile land in southern Götaland is sold at much higher 
prices than land in the northern part of the country or land in the forest 
districts. For example, prices in the plain districts in southern Götaland 
were 12 times higher than in the upper parts of Norrland in 2005–06.  
The change in land prices seems to be in the same direction across the 
country. The plain districts in Svealand and in southern Götaland, 
however, saw the highest rises in prices. In these two areas, land price 
increases were above the national average during the period 1990–2005. 
The central and forest districts of Götaland, in the south, likewise saw 
strong growth in land prices. In the forest districts further north, in central 
Sweden and in Norrland, prices did not rise at the same rate as in other 
parts of the country. 62 | LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
 
In the UK, in recent years there has been a considerable increase in 
land values. This has been particularly true for Northern Ireland, where, 
according to figures published by Defra, up until 1996 land values were at a 
similar level to those in England, at around £6,000/ha (Figure 70). Since 
then, there has been an unprecedented annual increase in the value of 
agricultural land in Northern Ireland, rising to over £20,000/ha. This is in 
part caused by the dearth of land available to purchase. According to Defra 
figures, land values in Scotland, Wales and England slumped in the early 
1990s, before embarking on an upward trend until 2001. That being stated, 
these figures do not appear to show the stagnating market of the late 1990s, 
as reported by most of the land agency firms. 
Up until the 1990s, there appeared to be a close link between land 
values and farm profitability, but that appears to have changed, with the 
emergence of buyers purchasing farmland for investment and lifestyle 
reasons. The emergence of these buyers has been incredibly significant in 
stimulating demand; Savills Research suggests that in recent years around 
40% of all buyers have been lifestyle purchasers.  
Figure 72 shows how the supply of farmland in England is low in 
comparison with pre-2000. Yet since 2004, land sales growth has soared 
(63%) and the amount of land being marketed has increased from its low of 
only 35,337 hectares in 2003 (60% less than the amount sold in 1998). 
Although the publicly marketed land does not account for all land traded 
in England (there are many private sales), it is indicative of the prevailing 
market conditions and the total amount of land being sold. Clearly, 2001 
sales of land were badly affected by the foot-and-mouth disease crisis in the 
UK, meaning very little land was put forward for sale. In 2003 and 2004, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that there was considerable uncertainty 
surrounding the mid-term review of the CAP and the proposals for the 
introduction of the SPS.  
Figure 72 shows that English land values fell by 10% between 1999 
and 2003 before making a dramatic recovery to an average of €13,259/ha in 
2007. This dramatic recovery reveals the average value of different land 
types in England since 1993. It is interesting to note that in the early 1990s, 
dairy land had the highest value; but it was quickly overtaken by prime 
arable land, which by 1997 was €1,650/ha more expensive than dairy land 
(reflecting the margins that were being made from the different kinds of 
farming). As expressed above, the land values in England saw stagnation 
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2003 to reach record levels. Since 2004, better quality arable and livestock 
land has not grown at such rapid rates as poorer quality livestock and 
arable farmland, as shown in Table 34. This is attributed by some 
commentators to two factors. The first of these is an increase in demand by 
lifestyle buyers for poorer quality land (which tends to be located in areas 
that are more scenic). The second factor entails some effects of the shift to 
the SPS flat-rate scheme, making marginal land more attractive as an 
investment because the entitlement value is growing relatively faster than 
that for the better quality land, which had higher historical payments. 
The regional variation in ‘average’ farmland values across England 
shows that land values in the east of England are consistently above those 
in other regions, being €3,364/ha higher in 2007 than in the West Midlands. 
The variance in regional prices can be traced to the quality of the farmland 
(production potential) in each region and the level of demand for land by 
lifestyle purchasers. 
Figure 75 shows the rapid growth in farmland values in Northern 
Ireland over the last 10 years – with an average increase of 14% per annum 
since 1993, a 45% increase between 1996 and 1997, and a 25% increase 
between 2001 and 2002. The rate of increase in land values appeared to 
slow between 2003 and 2004, falling to just 8% growth during the year 
(perhaps because of the uncertainty surrounding SPS implementation). 
Between 1994 and 1997, there was significant growth in the value of 
all types of Scottish farmland, largely because of increased profitability in 
the farm sector and the expanding interest in farmland by lifestyle buyers. 
These values largely stagnated in the late 1990s as farming incomes were 
suppressed, which continued until 2004 and the pick-up in the fortunes of 
agricultural commodity prices. Between 1993 and 2007, arable land values 
(~75%) and better quality grazing land values (77%) did not grow as 
quickly as dairy values (93%) or poor livestock land (104%). 
5.2.2  Number/share of land sales transactions 
The volume of activity in the land sales market gives an indication of the 
reaction of market participants (buyers and sellers) to changes in the 
external environment, such as implementation of the SPS, an increase in 
food prices or changes in opportunity profits for alternative land use. 
The national statistical data for land market transactions suggest that 
the share of agricultural land sold on markets has stayed rather stable in 
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agricultural policies do not affect the amount of land sales transactions. 
Only in three countries – Finland, the Netherlands and the UK – has the 
farmland market been more dynamic in terms of transacted area. In these 
three countries, the share of agricultural land sold of the total UAA is 
higher, and it is fluctuating more significantly year on year than in other 
countries in our sample. Even in these countries, however, changes in the 
volume of land sales transactions cannot be straightforwardly attributed to 
changes in agricultural policy.  
Countries with a fluctuating share of agricultural land sold 
In Finland, the average size of the area owned is very small (5.5 ha), but the 
concentration of land ownership is high. About one-fifth of owners own 
more than 60% of all arable land. Typically, these landowners with larger 
areas are farmers. That notwithstanding, the majority (54%) of landowners 
do not receive income from agriculture. About 24% of all agricultural land 
is owned by these passive landowners who do not take part in commercial 
production or land leasing. 
In Finland, the number of land sales transactions has been fluctuating 
between 4,500 and 6,500 per year over the last 10 years. The year 2005 was 
exceptional, when almost twice as many land sales transactions were 
registered as in 2004. This exceptional year could be related to changes in 
investment support programmes, regulations on intergenerational transfers 
and farmers’ predictions about changes, as well as doubts about the 
continuation of the temporary early-retirement programme.31 Uncertainty 
about future support has encouraged farmers to exit before the expiry of 
the programmes. This uncertainty has been an important factor for land 
markets because the large baby-boom generation first began to reach early 
retirement age at this time. In 2005, start-up support grants for new farmers 
were introduced and these were valued at €25,000 for crop farms and 
€55,000 for livestock and dairy farms. This policy boosted intergenerational 
land transfers remarkably in 2005. 
 
                                                      
31 The early retirement system was supposed to be renewed at the beginning of 
2007. But the renewal of the system was open and especially the age limit in farm 
succession was questioned. The minimum age was raised from 55 to 56 in 2005 and 
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The number of land sales transactions has been steadily decreasing 
since 2005. On the one hand, the number of intergenerational transactions 
has declined. On the other hand, the SPS has been implemented. Because of 
the future prospects of an SPS payment stream, some potential sellers have 
opted to hold on to their land. 
The number of sales transactions is strongly correlated with the 
average transacted area per year. In Finland, the average area transacted 
annually was 47,000 hectares over the period 1998–2007. There were 
nonetheless some years with exceptionally high volumes of transactions, 
such as 2005 and 2006, and some low volume years, such as 2000. While the 
total agricultural area transacted on the markets was 2.3 million hectares, 
the length of rotation in land ownership is almost 50 years. The evolution 
of the transacted area of agricultural land is reported in Figure 40. 
In the Netherlands, the extent of the market is subject to large 
variation across time and is correlated with the price of land (see Figure 55). 
In the boom period of 2000, 5% of the total agricultural area was traded, 
compared with only 2.5% during the price dip three years later. This 
pattern is shared across the regions, but large regional differences exist. For 
instance, in the northern provinces of Groningen, Friesland and Flevoland, 
a higher share of the agricultural area is traded than in the rest of the 
Netherlands, making it easier for a farmer (or an investor) to buy or sell 
land if needed. The regional land markets became more harmonised in 
2002, with the regional shares of transacted area moving towards a 
common range of 2-4%. 
In Great Britain (England, Wales and Scotland), around 1.6% of land 
was turned over in sales per annum in the 1960s, but this has since fallen to 
about 0.6%. Savills Research estimates that private transactions account for 
about 15% of land market transactions with the remainder sold through 
public means, and as such, the use of publicly marketed land as a proxy for 
area sold is sufficient to give an accurate picture of trends. Figure 71 shows 
the average number of hectares publicly marketed in Scotland, England 
and in Great Britain from 1998 to 2007, and the reported price per hectare. 
The figure also shows that the land market in Great Britain is closely tied to 
the value of English farmland, despite significant areas being sold in Wales 
and Scotland (particularly pre-2000). Figure 71 clearly highlights how the 
supply of land in Scotland has been especially stifled in recent years, and 
how land supply in England has partially recovered since the very low 
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Great Britain as a whole have increased significantly since 2003, although 
Scottish values have lagged somewhat behind (e.g. Scottish land values 
were 75% of English values in 1988, whereas they are now only two-thirds 
of the English values). 
In Northern Ireland, many farmers increase the size of their farm 
business by taking land in the conacre system.32 Notably, in the new era of 
decoupled support, some of the reasons for taking conacre land have 
changed as, for example, extensification payments and livestock numbers 
no longer affect the amount of subsidy received by a farm business. Despite 
the expected reduction in demand for conacre land to meet extensification 
requirements, according to commentators the limited supply of it each year 
rarely matches demand levels.33 
Figure 75 highlights how little land is sold annually in Northern 
Ireland. In 1993, 4,721 hectares were sold in 467 transactions (of small plot 
sizes on average) and the supply to the land market continued to fall to a 
low of just a mere 520 hectares in 2003 from 44 transactions.34 Clearly, this 
constricted supply of land to the market is one of the key factors driving 
land values up. Despite the supply of land doubling in 2007, average prices 
still increased by 25% to €36,480/ha, as demand continued to outstrip 
supply considerably. Moreover, because Northern Ireland is geographically 
remote from the rest of the UK, it means that land values have little 
relationship to the other regions (which do follow similar trends and 
influences). Notwithstanding the high sales values of farmland in Northern 
Ireland in recent years, many landowners choose not to sell land because of 
their desire to carry on a family tradition, where land is passed down from 
one generation to another.  
Figure 77 shows how the supply of farmland in Scotland is very low 
in comparison with the pre-2000 levels, despite the significant growth 
(76%) in land sales since 2004. Although the publicly marketed land does 
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not account for all land traded in Scotland (there are many private sales), it 
is indicative of the prevailing market conditions and the total amount of 
land being sold.  
In 2000, some 46,579 hectares were marketed compared with only 
35% of that in 2007 (16,152 hectares). There was a significant decline in the 
marketed area for sale in 2004, perhaps stemming from uncertainty about 
the rules relating to SPS implementation. 
Countries with a stable share of agricultural land sold 
In most of the countries in our sample, the agricultural area sold has been 
pretty stable (and low) during the last 15 years. Although there are no 
significant differences among countries in the shares of farmland sold (see 
Figure 3), the factors driving the sales market differs not only among 
countries, but also among regions within countries. 
In Belgium, the number of sales transactions for arable land and 
permanent grassland has steadily decreased over the last 20 years (see 
Figure 36). The dwindling number of land sales transactions could be 
explained by the increasing number of informal/illegal tenancy contracts 
and ‘seasonal tenancy contracts’ between pensioners and young farmers. 
This implies that instead of selling their land, the retiring farmers tend to 
rent the land out, which decreases sales supply but increases the supply of 
informal/illegal tenancy contracts. The number of transactions seems to 
have stabilised since 2005.35 
In France, the number of sales transactions for agricultural land has 
followed a general stagnating trend over the period 1994–2004, with a 
slight rise in 1997–99 but a dip in 2001 (Figure 41). The number of sales 
transactions is around 80,000 per year. 
Regarding the evolution of the area transacted, 274,271 hectares were 
sold in 2004, which is equal to 0.93% of the total UAA. As shown in Figure 
42, despite an increase in 1994, the fall in 2001 in the number of transactions 
is confirmed by a fall in the number of hectares transacted. These decreases 
in 2001 may have been prompted by expectations related to the 
implementation of the SPS on a historical basis: sales were kept to a 
minimum in order to retain a reference area as large as possible during the 
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period 2000–02. Expectations may have similarly played a role in 2004, 
when farmers waited for the modalities of the single farm payment to be 
decided. 
In Germany, the sales market has remained relatively stable during 
the last five years. Despite the rapid structural changes in the agricultural 
sector, there have hardly been any sales transactions for arable land or 
grassland. In 2005, only 0.6% of agricultural land was sold (58,200 hectares 
in East and 38,500 hectares in West Germany). The main characteristic of 
the German agricultural sector, its dual nature, has been enhanced in the 
last few years. An overview of transactions on the sales market in 2006 is 
given in Table 22. 
In East Germany, there is pressure on farms to buy land, which is 
mostly caused by i) the ongoing privatisation of land managed by the state 
trust-holding BVVG, and ii) the selling of land by owners or heirs who are 
not active farmers. Nevertheless, the total amount of land sold at market 
value annually has remained almost unchanged since 2005. During the 
same period, the number of areas sold at reduced prices in accordance 
with the Compensation and Indemnity Act (Entschädigungs- und 
Ausgleichsleistungsgesetzt) has dropped significantly, which has led to the 
overall decline in areas transacted on the sales market. 
Hence, in Germany, with the present share of 40% of owned 
farmland and 0.6% of new sales transactions per year, sales play a 
secondary role in the German land market.  
In the German region of Bavaria, the main characteristic of the land 
market as well as the land market of the whole of West Germany is the 
small number of transactions in comparison with East Germany. In 2006, 
only 5,569 hectares of UAA were sold in Bavaria – equating to 0.16% of the 
total UAA in Bavaria. This is the lowest share of sales of all federal states in 
Germany. For 2006, the average share of sales adds up to 0.31% in West 
Germany and 0.94% in East Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). 
The German region of Lower Saxony is atypical for the federal states 
in West Germany. In 2006, 14,783 hectares of UAA were sold, equating to 
0.52% of the total UAA in Lower Saxony. It is the highest share of sales of 
all federal states in West Germany, approximately as high as in Saxony in 
East Germany (0.54%).  
In Greece, most of the land for sale belongs to those who have moved 
to urban areas. This confirms that the residents of rural areas are not 
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problems. Landowners who live in towns also resist selling their property 
not only for sentimental reasons, but also because they plan to use their 
land when they retire and move back to rural areas. Moreover, the limited 
number of transactions in (semi-)mountainous areas, combined with the 
large share of abandoned land, indicates the lack of interest by potential 
buyers in investing in such holdings, as they cannot exploit them for non-
agricultural activities. Transactions are mainly reported for plots that are 
located next to those currently owned by the buyers, with the latter 
wanting to increase their property or avoid any frictions or litigation with 
their neighbours. Consequently, sales transactions for agricultural land are 
very few and involve holdings located in the plains, near towns and with 
certain prospects of future use as housing sites. It should be noted, finally, 
that if some part of the state-owned land is sold, then the sales price is 
relatively low. 
Thus, in the majority of rural regions, there is no land available for 
sale – which in itself also reaffirms that investors are not interested in 
buying agricultural land if it cannot be used for activities other than 
agriculture. If land is located close to towns, seaside tourist resorts or 
regions of agro-tourism, then its use will change if it is sold. This affects the 
level of demand that is unrelated to agricultural investment as well as sales 
prices, distorting the agricultural land market. In addition, the availability 
of land for sale is non-existent in regions with low prices, whereas there is 
land available in regions with higher prices. It should be noted that land 
coming under these two categories does not differ in terms of productivity. 
Still, perhaps the greatest distortion in the availability of agricultural 
land for sale is caused by landowners’ preferences with respect to 
exploiting their land agriculturally. The latter prefer to either rent out their 
holdings (particularly when these entail arable land) or exploit their land 
only occasionally, especially when it encompasses permanent plantations 
(e.g. olive groves). The income earned from this additional activity 
increases their family income. This situation affects the level of land for 
sale, however, provided non-farmers retain agricultural land and under-
exploit it, often leading to ecological degradation and a reduction in land 
productivity. 
Overall, agricultural land for sale in Greece is rather limited and 
various non-economic factors affect the level of sales prices. 
In Ireland, land sales transactions have consistently been low 
(generally well under 1% of the UAA) across all regions over the last two 70 | LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
 
decades. There was an increase in the volume of land transacted in 2004 
relative to earlier years, but it is not clear that this can be attributed to any 
policy changes. The land sales market is often affected by the demand for 
construction in the countryside. Where farms have access to public 
roadways, it has been common to sell such plots to build one-off houses 
(individual houses typically on plots of up to 0.25 hectares). 
In Italy, land sales transactions account for about 1-2% of the total 
available UAA each year, although precise information about sales market 
transactions is not available (Gallerani et al., 2004). Moreover, a large 
number of agricultural land transactions are actually driven by non-
agricultural use, e.g. the prospect of building. Given that land is usually 
sold together with related assets (such as farm buildings), it is difficult to 
discern a clear picture of land prices alone. In addition, in most cases, the 
subsequent use of land is not known, so the role of non-agricultural drivers 
is very hard to determine. 
In Spain, the land property market lacks transparency. But it seems 
highly active, as we can deduce from the 200,000 sales transactions of rural 
properties, and the 50,000 mortgages that have been set up on average in 
Spain in the years 2004–07. 
This lack of transparency in the land market is partly rooted in the 
paucity of detailed information; also, statistics become available only after a 
time lag – for example in May 2008, the values for the ACs and the large 
crop groups for the year 2007 were still to be published. At the autonomic 
level, the data are somewhat more detailed since the 17 ACs are 
disaggregated into 48 provinces. Yet, direct access to these data, which 
have been broken down, is not automatic since some communities have not 
supplied their data.  
Meanwhile, the average value of mortgage debt has grown more 
rapidly in recent years to an average of 12.8% in the period 1990–2007 and 
27.9% in the period 2003–06, than has the price of land, which rose at an 
average rate of 5.47% in the period 1990–2006. This indicates that land is 
becoming concentrated, and therefore the rural properties that have been 
bought or mortgaged have become progressively more expensive. 
A slight dip in the volume of sales transactions was noted in 2007, 
which went from 218,787 sales and 53,590 mortgages in 2006 to 189,785 
sales and 47,910 mortgages in 2007. The reasons for this decrease are 
multiple: uncertainty perceived about the future of the SPS, the expected 
capital gains through urban development, the recent real estate crisis EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 71 
 
(which reduced incentives to sell land) and the emergence of new, 
alternative land uses (biofuels production and the installation of solar 
energy plants). 
In Sweden, only a small proportion of the total utilised agricultural 
land is being sold (Figure 61). The share does not seem to have changed 
much over recent years. In 1999, an unusually large amount of land was 
sold compared with other years. The reason may be that in 1998 property 
was given new taxation values, which probably inspired more sales than 
usual in 1999. Since then, the share of sales has been stable at around 0.6% 
of the total utilised area. While land sales have involved a somewhat 
smaller share of the total UAA, the volume of transactions has increased. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, there were around 2,000 transactions per 
year compared with about 2,500 in 2006. 
5.2.3  Average size of transacted plots 
This section describes the development of the average plot size of sale 
transactions, which is a further indicator of the behaviour of land market 
participants. 
In Belgium, the average size of a transacted area has more or less 
been stable over the years at around 0.9-1.0 hectares. The figure is larger for 
Wallonia than for Flanders, which could be explained by the average farm 
size in Wallonia being 2.4 times that in Flanders and the region being less 
densely populated. Given that the average area sold has remained roughly 
the same over time, while the number of transactions has decreased, the 
transacted area has fallen during the period 1990–2007.36 
In France, the average amount of land sold has been fairly stable over 
the last 15 years, at around 3.3 hectares. The relative stability in the 
observed pattern is likely to stem from the rigid sales-market regulations in 
France. 
In Germany, there are significant differences in the average size of 
transacted plots across regions. Generally, in East Germany the average 
size of agricultural land sold is considerably higher than in West Germany. 
In the German region of Lower Saxony, the average has fluctuated between 
2.4 and 2.7 hectares in the recent past. 
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In the Netherlands, the distribution of plot sizes for transacted land is 
highly concentrated around small plots of up to two hectares. At the 
national level, 50% of all areas sold are smaller than 2.7 hectares. Again, 
large differences prevail across regions (Figure 54). The relatively young 
agricultural areas located in the IJselmeerpolders in the Province of 
Flevoland have plot sizes more than eight times the national average. The 
agricultural areas in the centre and the south of the country, however, have 
smaller plots because of their different topographic situation and limited 
consolidation of land holdings (so-called kavelruil). 
In Sweden, the average plot size of transacted area has decreased 
(Figure 62). The average plot size sold was less than 8 hectares in 2006 – a 
decrease from around 14 hectares at the beginning of the 1990s. Most of the 
registered transactions are for smallholdings. For example, in 2005, 85% of 
traded plots were smaller than 10 hectares. These small plots are normally 
bought to enlarge holdings. The increased sales of small plots could thus be 
part of the structural change of the sector; farms are becoming larger over 
time. At a regional level, the plots sold are smaller in northern Sweden and 
larger in the Stockholm area, the south-east and the south. 
5.3  Drivers of sales prices for agricultural land 
Land values are driven by economic factors that can be classified as 
demand, competing uses for land, agricultural productivity, hedging 
against inflation and amenities. Supply also plays a role in terms of the 
quantity of land placed on the market relative to demand. Land values are 
especially sensitive to spatial characteristics, since access to markets is as 
important for farmers as access to urban goods and services for consumers. 
Other factors known to influence sales prices include the presence or 
absence of buildings, access to roads and other features such as whether the 
land is arable or meadowland, irrigated or unirrigated, suitable for the use 
of machinery, and if it offers immediate possession or is tenanted. Small 
areas of land have often been found to command a higher price per hectare 
than large areas, especially where farm buildings and dwellings are 
included in the sale. It is not usually known in the statistics whether an area 
of land sold has a milk quota attached. Information on the effect of a quota 
on land price is incomplete. Land is highly diverse and average land-price 
series that reflect the varying proportions of different kinds of land through 
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The distance to towns and cities can have several influences on 
agricultural land prices. First, as pointed out by J.H. von Thünen in 1826, 
farmland nearer markets would tend to fetch higher prices because the 
transport of products to market would be shorter, and hence easier and 
cheaper. Second, the price of agricultural land near urban centres might be 
influenced by aspects unrelated to agricultural value, such as access to 
schools or sources of employment for farmers’ children, or access to urban 
amenities. Third, such land might command a higher price because of 
expectations that the land will be re-zoned as building land. Even when 
known sources of differences are taken into account, much variation 
remains in the price of agricultural land.  
Regarding supply and demand on the land market, a certain amount 
of land comes on the market every year for reasons such as the retirement 
or death of the owner, although only a small proportion of land is sold in 
any year. High land prices have been reported to attract more land onto the 
market, increasing supply. In addition to being a factor of production, land 
is a store of value. There may be additional demand in times of high 
inflation or economic uncertainty. 
In this section, we discuss the key drivers of agricultural land values 
in the EUSCs. Given that data paucity does not allow us to perform a 
quantitative analysis, the findings presented in this section are based on a 
survey of national land-market experts. This qualitative data allows us to 
derive rather detailed insights about the relative importance of different 
elements underpinning land values within countries.37 
The main drivers of prices in the agricultural land markets of the 
EUSCs are reported in Table 5. The first column lists the primary 
determinants of land market prices, according to land market theory and 
national experts. Columns 2-12 indicate their relative significance in each 
country. 
The results reported in Table 5 suggest that the factors underpinning 
farmland sales prices are highly heterogeneous across countries. The most 
common ones are agricultural commodity prices, infrastructural expansion, 
urban pressures, the SPS, farm size and coupled subsidies. 
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5.3.1  Agricultural commodity prices 
As suggested by land market theory and in line with previous studies, we 
found that agricultural commodity prices are one of the most significant 
drivers of agricultural land prices (see Table 5). Yet in France, where 
agricultural land prices are heavily regulated, there is practically no 
commodity price impact on agricultural land values. 
Prices of agricultural outputs, i.e. of the commodities produced, can 
change farmers’ decisions about whether to invest in more land. Rising 
commodity prices can make farms more profitable and the general opinion 
of the experts interviewed is that commodity prices have a marked 
influence on land prices. 
Turning to country-specific results, we found that in Belgium, both 
input and output prices are decreasing in agriculture (Figure 38). During 
the period 1990–2005, real output prices dropped by 33%, whereas input 
prices only fell by 12%. Since 2005, both input and output prices have been 
on the rise and in 2007 they again reached the level of 2001. 
Prices for arable crop products increased more than did those for 
livestock products or fruit and vegetables. More precisely, in 2006 the crop 
and milk product prices began an upward trend and by the end of 2007 
they reached the level of the early 1990s. The prices for meat products did 
not follow this upward price trend. 
In France, the revenue from farming has fluctuated considerably over 
time. As shown in Figure 45, despite the CAP 1992 reform (which reduced 
institutional prices for cereals and beef meat), real farm incomes per worker 
grew between 1991 and 1998 mainly as an outcome of the compensation for 
price support cuts by direct payments and high productivity gains (see for 
example Boussemart et al., 2007). 
Off-farm employment is increasing among French farms. In 2003, 
part-time farms accounted for 32% of French farms, against only 25% in 
1997. The share of non-agricultural income in the total household income of 
farms climbed from 25% in 1997 to 40% in 2003. 
The German data show that prices for agricultural commodities fell 
continually between 1991 and 2005 and then rose sharply, among other 
reasons, because of the soaring worldwide demand for agricultural 
commodities. According to the experts interviewed, the increases in 
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notwithstanding, the effect of agricultural commodity prices on land prices 
was assessed as rather weak (although positive). 
The national experts surveyed maintained that in 2005–06, the 
decisions of land market participants in Italy were heavily affected by the 
persistent low prices for agricultural products, which reduced agricultural 
profitability. The relative importance of agricultural commodity prices had 
diminished by 2007 and 2008, when the world market prices for food 
products rose substantially. 
In Emilia Romagna, however, the surge of agricultural commodity 
prices in 2007 boosted land prices, although the low commodity prices in 
earlier years (2004–05) had not had the analogous effect of reducing land 
prices. 
In the Netherlands, agricultural production accounted for 77% of 
arable farm income in 2007.38 Expectations about the profits from farming 
crops should therefore be critical to farmers’ investment decisions. Figure 
58 shows the dynamics of prices for all crops and cereals compared with 
land prices. In the 1990s, land values appreciated much faster than crop 
prices did, suggesting that land prices were dominated by other factors 
such as the general pace of the economy, and not so much by revenues 
from agriculture. But the most recent evidence suggests that the 2007 surge 
in land prices was largely caused by high current and expected future 
commodity prices. 
In Sweden, the three most influential factors are farmers’ 
expectations, increasing agricultural commodity prices and the question of 
whether it will be profitable to increase farm size. These factors had a 
positive impact on Swedish agricultural land prices during 2003–07, 
according to the experts surveyed (Figure 67). 
The sharp cut in incomes in agriculture at the beginning of the 1990s 
owing to the reform of the agricultural policy as well as uncertainty about 
the future contributed to reductions in land prices. The increase in incomes 
immediately after accession to the EU contributed to rising land prices. 
Entrepreneurial income has not changed much during the last decade. 
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In Sweden, prices for most cereal and milk products have been 
decreasing during the period studied. According to the experts 
interviewed, the observed increase in commodity prices in 2006 and 2007 
accelerated the upward trend in farmland prices in Sweden. 
5.3.2 Agricultural  productivity 
According to expert assessments, the role of agricultural productivity in 
agricultural land prices is weaker than that of commodity prices (Table 5). 
On average, the impact of agricultural productivity on land values is 
negligible to weak. Only in Spain does the impact seem to be more 
pronounced, which is mainly caused by the relatively low productivity 
levels in the base period and hence higher technological progress. 
In addition to farm characteristics, the two key determinants of 
agricultural productivity are the available technology and soil quality. Soil 
quality has a direct influence on the productivity of farmland and 
consequently is an important determinant of farmland prices. Since the soil 
conditions required for the production of food crops may be different from 
those required for other crops or livestock, they are embedded in a farmer’s 
decision on what, and to what extent, should be produced on the land. In 
turn, soil productivity is affected by farming intensity. Owing to historical 
land use and the geographical situation, agricultural farms are not always 
located in areas where benefits in terms of yield would be high. Yet, despite 
major changes in land use, the clear link between land use and soil type 
seems to continue. 
Turning to country-specific results, we found that in Belgium yields 
increased steadily until 1996, with an average yearly rate of 3-4% for all the 
main crop products (wheat, barley and grain maize).39 Technological 
progress, which had been among the main drivers of productivity growth, 
slowed after 1996. 
In France, real farm incomes per worker decreased between 1999 and 
2005, because of lower productivity gains, output supply stagnation, higher 
intermediate consumption prices and an unfavourable development of 
direct aids relative to product prices.  
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In Germany, changes in agricultural productivity have had a greater 
effect on land rental prices than on land values. But compared with the 
influence of commodity prices, that of productivity growth is less notable. 
In Sweden, there is a strong connection between the profitability of 
agriculture – especially expectations about future profitability – and land 
prices from a longer-term perspective. Profitability is related to 
productivity: the more each input can produce the larger is the output per 
input and thus profits. Agricultural productivity can be measured as 
agricultural output per hectare or agricultural output per labour input. 
High productivity encourages farmers to invest in additional land. 
Falling productivity at the start of the 1990s was related to the reform 
of 1990, which also led to falling land prices. Output in values per hectare 
diminished as did output values per labour input. In the mid-1990s, 
productivity measured as output per hectare rose again and remained 
relatively stable between 1997 and 2004. Yet land values, which did not 
show an increasing trend, did not track this measure of productivity. 
In Sweden, output value per worker has been moving alongside land 
prices except for a decrease in 2005 that was not likewise observed in land 
prices. The year when the SPS was implemented shows a fall in both 
measures of agricultural productivity, but by 2007, this seemed to have 
changed again. 
5.3.3 The  CAP 
We find that the CAP in both coupled and decoupled forms has affected 
land values in the EUSCs. Whereas for coupled payments this outcome is in 
line with the underlying land-market theory, the positive relationship 
between the SPS and farmland prices is counterintuitive. These results 
support the idea that market imperfections and transaction costs play a 
role, as suggested by Ciaian and Swinnen (2006 and 2007). Even so, data 
limitations do not allow us to prove this hypothesis formally in the present 
study. 
Turning to country-specific results, we note that the relationship is 
more heterogeneous across countries compared with other drivers. 
Compared with 1994, the total income from subsidies received by farmers 
had decreased in real terms by approximately 40% in 2007. This decrease is 
rooted in the sharp fall of ‘other subsidies’, mainly intervention prices 
(which had plunged by 80% compared with 1994), which was partially 
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development funds. After the introduction of the SPS in 2005, the total level 
of subsidies decreased by 6% in 2006. In 2007, there was a further cut in the 
total level owing to a reduction in the ‘other payments’ (lower outflows of 
intervention payments because of high market prices), which was larger 
than the increase in ‘direct payments’. 
Besides the income effect of direct payments, which may increase 
farm’s willingness to bid for land, the introduction of the SPS also had an 
effect on the market supply of plots. The experts interviewed consider the 
impact on the sales markets less important than on the rental markets. 
Because of the minimum land maintenance requirements, retired farmers 
have an incentive to keep their land and to hire workers to perform the 
minimum maintenance, or to rent the land out by using a seasonal or an 
informal contract and collect the SPS payments. 
Based on the assessments of the experts surveyed, the main impact of 
the SPS on the land markets has been the emergence of two markets for 
land: land that is eligible for the SPS and land that is not. Differences are 
apparent in price and attractiveness (ineligible land being cheaper, but of 
course that depends on the land type; for example, vineyards are much 
more expensive than any other type of land even though they are not 
eligible). Moreover, this difference should fade in the future as 
progressively more land becomes eligible for the SPS. 
Germany decided to decouple all direct payments completely except 
for those pertaining to tobacco and hops; thus, there are almost no coupled 
payments that can influence land values. Experts maintain that payments 
for less favoured areas and environmental payments have no impact on 
land values. 
The new support mechanism of decoupled payments is intended to 
break the links between the amounts paid to farmers, their level of 
production and market prices. In 2007, €5.7 billion was transferred as 
decoupled direct payments to eligible producers. The average value of the 
entitlements distributed (circa 17 million) amounted to €335 per 
entitlement. The average market price of the entitlements transferred was 
€425. Only the transfer of 200,000 entitlements could not be linked to farm 
succession or changes in the farmed area. Only 22% of all 1,006,000 
transferred entitlements were traded within market transactions. 
According to the experts interviewed, land sales prices have not been 
affected by decoupling. One explanation might be that for land purchase 
decisions, long-term developments (such as hedging against economic risks EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 79 
 
or speculative aspects) are more important than the value of direct 
payments. In addition, it is also expected that the rising need for building 
land will entail the shortage of agricultural land and consequently an 
additional rise in demand for eligible land. Given a projected surplus of 
entitlements, farmers with more payment entitlements than eligible areas 
will be willing to pay higher rents or sales prices in order to activate their 
entitlements.40 The land requirement for activation of entitlements is 
expected to keep land prices at a high level. 
Based on these results, it may be concluded that in Germany land 
sales prices are not affected by changes in the SPS. Qualitative assessments, 
collected by surveys of experts, suggest that the implementation of the SPS 
initially resulted in uncertainty on the land market, but did not entail any 
discernible effect on land values. Nevertheless, experts also emphasised 
that due to data limitations the impact of changes in the SPS could neither 
be isolated nor estimated at present. 
In Italy, the experts interviewed believed that any evaluation of the 
effect of the SPS should be taken with some caution. Owing to the late 
assignments (at the end of 2005) and the increase in world food prices in 
2007, only data for 2006 provide observations in a context similar to the 
pre-reform period. Compared with other drivers, the SPS appears to have 
had a minor role in determining the land values. Table 29 reports the effects 
of the SPS on land sales markets in Italy. 
The most pronounced effect brought by the policy reform was some 
reduction in market activities because of uncertainty about policy. This 
seems to have been associated with stable prices, but the judgement of the 
experts interviewed was that this effect was not particularly relevant. 
During the transition phase, the shift to the SPS brought different 
reactions in terms of normative and institutional arrangements, mostly 
aimed at maintaining previous commitments. More specifically, 
entitlements are normally sold with land. The requirement of having land 
in order to benefit from payments gave rise to some additional market 
activity, although this trend looks transitory. 
                                                      
40 At present, the entitlements allotted to farmers tend to exceed the number of 
eligible hectares. In Germany, their current surplus is estimated to amount to 
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In Italy, uncertainty about future policy developments tends to make 
participants cautious and conservative with respect to land purchases. A 
number of related results of the reform, which are not primarily concerned 
with the land market, include extensification in some areas or a reduction 
of cultivation in marginal areas (but with good practices); additional effects 
can be discerned from decoupling on livestock, tomato and fruit farming. 
The shift to the SPS changed approaches to the land market, because 
of the background of uncertainty about policy. It is difficult to estimate the 
profitability of a land investment in the long run and hence the number of 
transactions remained stable, as did agricultural land prices for the most 
part. What has emerged, however, is segmentation in the market for land 
with and without entitlements (INEA, 2008). 
Compared with Emilia Romagna, in Puglia the land market seems 
more clearly influenced by agricultural factors, including policy, rather 
than non-agricultural ones. The shift to the SPS has had a marked but 
vague impact: the experts tended to note the importance of the payments 
for land profitability, rather than a specific, isolated effect of the SPS on 
increasing land prices. The connection between the SPS and land varies 
widely for cereals, vegetables and olive production. In most cases, the SPS 
causes small changes in transactions and the farm production structure; 
entitlements are connected to land property ownership or rental, and farm 
strategies are mostly oriented towards keeping the property and using 
related assets. In the case of tomatoes and vegetables, the situation is 
different, with significant changes brought by the SPS leading to 
entitlements becoming detached from land property and rental. 
In the Netherlands, the effect of introducing the SPS is difficult to 
quantify as other factors dominate land prices. The real option value, for 
instance, accounts for at least half of the extremely high (in the European 
comparison) Dutch land prices. Robust growth in the prices for agricultural 
outputs and the pressure caused by high revenues from receiving manure 
have further reduced the share of land values related to subsidies. The 
implementation of the European Nitrates Directive has probably had a 
higher impact on Dutch farmland prices than the move towards SPS, as it 
created a new source of cash flows for both landowners and renters. 
Still, because of data limitations it is impossible to conclude that there 
has been no effect of the SPS on land values. Further research based on 
micro data is needed to discern the exact impact. Aggregated data cannot 
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Furthermore, the historical model implemented has the goal of avoiding 
disruptions to farmers’ income – and thus the possible effects on land 
markets will only be observable several years from now. Generally, market 
participants confirmed that the new CAP has not left a large mark on prices 
in the Netherlands. 
In Sweden, the SPS had a slightly positive impact on the development 
of agricultural land prices in 2003–07 (Figure 68). At the same time, the SPS 
seems to be one of the most controversial elements over which the experts 
interviewed disagreed most in their judgement of the impact.41 
5.3.4 Other  policies  42 
The data from expert interviews, which are summarised in Table 5, suggest 
that other policies, such as rural development and environmental policies, 
affect agricultural land prices only in selected countries. An example in this 
respect is Finland, where the less favoured area and environmental 
payments that are coupled to the land, the requirements for manure 
spreading area and investment subsidies drive up land prices significantly. 
In Belgium, the European Nitrates Directive was implemented in 
1991 with the objective of reducing and stopping the pollution of surface 
and groundwater with nitrates from agriculture (European Council, 1991). 
According to the Directive, the level of nitrates must not be higher than 50 
mg of nitrates/l, otherwise the area must be treated as a vulnerable zone 
and only 170  kg of nitrates/year (including the direct excretion of nitrates) 
can be applied per hectare of land. Each member state needed to develop 
an action plan and implement the Code of Good Agricultural Practices in 
the vulnerable zones. 
                                                      
41 Because the views about the impact of the SPS varied so greatly among those 
surveyed – more than the judgements made about any other driver – it is difficult 
to draw a clear conclusion on the influence the SPS has had. Other drivers on 
which the respondents strongly disagreed were the effects of public opinion and 
profitability in livestock production. The responses to questions regarding 
livestock profitability ranged from 2 (a medium decrease) to 7 (a sharp increase). 
42 Strictly speaking, several policies discussed in this section, e.g. rural 
development policies, are part of the CAP. Yet, in order to decompose the 
aggregate impact of agricultural policies on land values, we separate them into 
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The region of Flanders is the largest manure producer in Belgium, as 
95% and 85% of the total pig and poultry production respectively is located 
there. The first ‘manure action plan’ (MAP I) in Flanders was implemented 
in 1995. In the third manure decree of 22 December 2006 (MAP III), the 
entire area of Flanders was declared a vulnerable zone and hence, the 
corresponding manure norm of a maximum of 170 kg of nitrates per hectare 
per year was introduced. 
The manure action policies forced the intensive, animal-producing 
farmers without (or with insufficient) land to develop arrangements with 
landowners to internalise the environmental costs they incur. Owing to the 
manure spreading policy, which was the crucial approach of MAP I and 
which remained a key element in the other MAPs, intensive animal 
breeding profits were captured in farmland prices (Le Goffe and Salanié, 
2005). 
Intensive animal farms, which traditionally accrue higher incomes 
compared with other agricultural activities in Belgium, bought land 
specifically for spreading manure in order to avoid the levies or the 
processing duty. The impact of increasing land demand is not limited to the 
price of land in the granivore-breeding regions, it exerts upward pressure 
on agricultural land prices throughout Flanders. 
In Finland, changes in investment support programmes, regulations 
on intergenerational transfers and farmers’ predictions about changes as 
well as uncertainty over the continuation of the temporary early-retirement 
programme led to an increasing number of land sales in 2005. Doubts about 
future policies have encouraged farmers to exit farming and sell their 
agricultural land before the expiry of the current programmes. This might 
have exerted a downward pressure on agricultural land prices in Finland. 
In 2005, Finland introduced start-up support grants for new farmers: 
€25,000 for crop farms and €55,000 for livestock and dairy farms. The grants 
boosted intergenerational transfers that year. Because land transactions 
related to intergenerational transfers are typically larger in hectares than 
those of other land sales, the average transacted area also peaked in 2005. 
Environmental regulations are a critical factor in farmland prices in 
France. They are a strong a driver of land prices. Using data on individual 
agricultural land transactions in Bretagne for the period 1994–2000, Le 
Goffe and Salanié (2005) found that the manure spreading ‘quota’ has been 
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In East Germany and notably in Saxony, sales market dynamics are 
still largely influenced by the active role of the BVVG. For example, on 1 
January 2007, the BVVG changed the procedures by which they award 
land. This means that rental contracts expiring within two years cannot be 
renewed; instead, the land is put up for sale or exceptionally for rent by 
public announcement. This practice creates an additional incentive for 
farms to buy land. 
Another regulation that in some areas has an impact on rental prices 
is the Harz IV law, which regulates aid for unemployed persons. A key part 
of this law is that unemployed individuals receive no aid as long as they 
own any property. In regions with a high unemployment rate, this law 
leads to a situation in which the unemployed must sell their land. The 
prices that such individuals receive for their land are very often low, 
because they cannot wait for a better offer. 
In East Germany, the stocking densities are very low compared with 
West Germany. Therefore, compliance with the Nitrates Directive is a 
larger issue in the western half of the country. 
In the Netherlands, despite implementation of the third European 
Nitrates Directive, the production of manure by Dutch livestock farms 
increased to 69.4 million tonnes in 2007, putting pressure on the market for 
manure disposal. According to the experts interviewed, prices shot up to 
€20/tonne of manure in 2007–08. 
There is a significant regional variation in the amount of manure 
produced per area suitable for disposal. Because of the limited own-
disposal area and substantial transportation costs, regions specialised in 
livestock production like Brabant and Twente face large costs for disposal. 
Bio-energy 
With the exception of the Netherlands, parts of Germany and Spain, bio-
energy does not seem to have significantly affected agricultural land prices 
in the sample countries over the last 20 years (Table 5). Nonetheless, 
because of comparably high (and still rising) energy prices, the situation 
may change in the future. More precisely, in the period of the analysis, 
world market prices for crude oil fluctuated between $15 and $25 per 
barrel. In June 2008, the world market price for crude oil reached $140 per 
barrel. This makes bio-energy production much more profitable (even 
without any subsidies). As a result, rising demand for energy cropland may 
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Turning to country-specific results, we find that in Germany a major 
determinant of current land values is the steadily increasing competition 
for agricultural land, which in turn is correlated with increasing worldwide 
demand for food and energy. Competition in land markets is especially 
high in areas with high stocking densities, notably in West Germany. 
The impact of advanced bio-energy production on land sales prices 
and rents was assessed as substantial in West Germany but as very minor 
in East Germany. This disparity is mostly related to the different average 
farm size in the two halves of the country. Biogas producers in East 
Germany obtained the required amount of substrate by renting or buying 
large land tracts or by undertaking supply contracts with farmers (or both). 
In contrast, West German bio-energy producers have been forced to rent or 
buy additional land, which makes them influential actors on the land 
market. 
An example of the impact of non-agricultural sectors is the growing 
competition for agricultural land between food and energy crop producers. 
While in 2004 energy crops covered 890,000 hectares of agricultural land, 
two years later that number amounted to 1.5 million. Although this still 
makes up only about 9% of the UAA, the increase in areas under energy 
crops had expanded by over 40% during this short period. 
The influence of non-agricultural investors, for example from the bio-
energy sector, is less significant in the Saxonian Loess region than in West 
Germany or the rest of East Germany, because the agricultural ministry of 
Saxony is very active (and restrictive) in its application of the Law on the 
Sale of Agricultural Land (Grundstücksverkehrsgesetz). The aim of this law is 
to support existing agricultural structures and it is possible to prohibit land 
sales to non-agricultural investors if a farmer is interested in the same land. 
But this special situation may change in future: because of administrative 
reforms, the agricultural ministry will lose its responsibility for overseeing 
land sales. 
Urban and infrastructural pressures 
Urban pressures, such as growing housing demand, are another 
determinant of agricultural land prices, especially in densely populated 
EUSCs (Belgium and the Netherlands) and fast-growing economies 
(Ireland and Spain) (Table 5). The same applies to the role of infrastructural 
expansion in driving up land prices. Generally, infrastructural expansion is 
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Turning to country-specific results, we find that in France 
demographic pressure in terms of urbanisation and tourism has a large 
influence on land prices. Prices of agricultural land in coastal areas and 
around large towns are much higher compared with the rural inland. 
In Bretagne, land prices are closely linked to demographic pressure 
(urbanisation and tourism along the coast, besides environmental 
regulations), due to its large coastal area, although the extent of 
urbanisation is less critical than in other French coastal areas. 
In Germany, the impact of infrastructural expansion and urban 
pressure is high in regions with high population densities and good 
economic conditions. This is especially the case for regions in West 
Germany. Yet, it is impossible to draw a conclusion on the aggregate level, 
as these factors are region-specific. 
In contrast to the agricultural demand for land, the demand for 
construction sites is independent of soil quality. Since conversion of 
agricultural areas reduces the available supply of land for agriculture, this 
non-agricultural demand influences the value of agricultural land. 
Therefore, one can see that the sales prices of land are more strongly 
correlated with the degree of urbanisation of a given area than average soil 
quality. 
In Ireland, the main determinants of agricultural land prices over the 
last decade have been related to the rapid surge in house building observed 
over the period along with the large increase in public infrastructure 
projects, particularly motorway and other road building programmes. 
In Italy, the factors most pertinent for land values are not tied to 
agriculture or policy. Here again, infrastructure and urban development 
have a pronounced influence on the land market, mainly at the local level. 
In the case study region of Emilia Romagna, these factors are perceived as 
pivotal, although localised to areas where the expansion takes place (urban 
expansion involves a large share of Emilia Romagna’s territory). 
The Netherlands is a highly urbanised country and extremely densely 
populated. As a result, land prices are greatly influenced by the implicit 
call option that is embedded in the land price: the option to develop 
agricultural land outside agriculture. It is therefore not surprising that 
urban pressures push land prices in the Netherlands higher than in any 
other country of the EU, with the exceptions of Malta (€128,116/ha) and 
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The value of the embedded option depends on the probability that 
transformation is possible. Land close to urban centres should carry a 
higher premium than peripheral land. Dutch zoning regulations classify 
land into sectors with regard to future land use, ranging from land ready 
for development (red label) to regular agricultural land not marked for 
development (green label). According to the experts interviewed, the 
option value follows along these lines of classification. 
Estimates of the real option value suggest that it is more than 50% of 
the total land value, implying that urban pressure is the single most 
important driver of land values in the Netherlands.43 
In Spain, the chief drivers of farmland prices are the pressures of 
tourism and urban development. While the former is confined to tourist 
areas, the latter affects the whole of Spain. Pressure from tourism has a 
significant and positive impact on both sales prices and rental rates. In 
contrast, urban pressure solely affects sales prices. 
Indeed, land values have followed the same trend in recent years as 
housing values, except for a slight time lag. It is possible that the present 
supply in the housing market will affect the land market in future years, 
depending on the degree to which other market drivers offset this effect. 
Interest rates, inflation and the macro economy 
According to Table 5, the impact of interest rates, inflation and other 
macroeconomic factors on agricultural land prices is highly heterogeneous 
across the EUSCs – there is no common pattern. That notwithstanding, on 
average the impact is rather weak compared with other drivers of farmland 
prices. 
We start the discussion on country-specific results with Belgium. The 
evolution of interest rates for land purchases in Belgium is reported in 
                                                      
43 The option value is estimated by assuming the average value of rental contracts 
(e.g. €466 in 2006), discounted by the risk-free rate (~3.8% in 2006) plus a credit 
spread of at least 100 basis points, adjusted for inflation (~1.8% in 2006). Plugging 
in average land prices (€31,000 in 2006) on the left-hand side of the net present 
value equation, the option value can be solved (for at least €15,500). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 87 
 
Figure 39.44 Interest rates over the period studied were at historical lows, 
declining from approximately 8% in 1993 to 5% by 2008. 
In Finland, an important determinant of land prices is 
macroeconomic development. Between 1991 and 1994, Finland faced 
economic recession, which contributed to declining real land values. 
Macroeconomic factors also shaped agricultural land prices in Ireland: 
growth in the wider Irish economy drove land prices upwards. In Italy, 
non-agricultural and non-policy factors are likewise among those having 
the most impact on land values, especially interest rates and market trends. 
In the Netherlands, the return on capital fell dramatically in the 
period 1990 to 2007 (Figure 60) putting an upward pressure on land prices 
and most other asset classes. The lower cost of financing and the perceived 
low inherent risk of the investment were reflected in falling discount rates 
when calculating present values of expected future cash flows. 
Traditionally, land purchases are financed by bank mortgages. The 
largest provider of agricultural mortgages in the Netherlands is Rabobank, 
with a market share of approximately 85%. In addition, sale–leaseback 
contracts have become more popular, in which a financial institution buys 
the land and rents it out to farmers. At the end of the contract term, the 
farmer has the option to buy back the land. For farmers this type of 
financing makes it possible to increase the amount of cultivated land, while 
keeping debt services at relatively low levels in the first years of the 
contract. Regular mortgages usually have a constant or decreasing debt 
service over time, which leaves less room for investments in the first years. 
New mortgage forms are evolving, however.  
For financial institutions, the sale–leaseback contract is attractive, as it 
offers exposure to agricultural land returns. From an investor’s point of 
view, land as an asset can serve as a diversifier in a mixed asset portfolio 
                                                      
44 Data from 1993–2003 were available from the RIR (retail interest rates) survey 
undertaken by the National Bank of Belgium (variable hypothecaire kredieten) and 
data from 2004–07 are drawn from the MIR (MFI interest rates) survey, also 
conducted by the National Bank of Belgium (variable rentetarieven op leningen aan 
huishoudens voor andere doeleinden: initiele rentebepaling voor meer dan 5 jaar). The 
methodology used to calculate the weighted average of the interest rates charged 
by different credit institutions can differ slightly among the surveys, meaning that 
there is a small break in the series between 2003 and 2004. 88 | LAND SALES MARKETS IN THE EU 
 
and as a source of steady cash flows. Owing to the success of its sale–
leaseback business, Fortis Bank is currently one of the largest landowners 
in the Netherlands, owning about 30,000 hectares of agricultural land. 
Despite the positive effect that low financing costs have on land 
values, the experts interviewed do not see indications of a ‘wall of capital’ 
looking for investment opportunities and pushing up prices. They reported 
that financial investors do not acquire significant portfolios of land for 
speculative purposes. Demand for land comes mainly from farmers. 
In Spain, the key macroeconomic drivers are salaries, the consumer 
price index, return on debt and the unemployment rate. They all affect land 
prices but not rents. 
In Sweden, investment in property such as agricultural land is closely 
related to the price of borrowing money, i.e. the interest rate. Although the 
experts interviewed on the Swedish land market did not believe that 
interest rates had affected land prices as much as other factors, there seems 
to be a relationship between land prices and interest rates. Figure 69 shows 
the relationship between the repo rate of interest and land prices in Sweden 
from 1994 to 2006. 
Falling interest rates encourage investment in agricultural land. In 
fact, falling interest rates encourage investment in any property. Real estate 
indices show that the prices of other kinds of property are rising at similar 
rates as those for agricultural land. 
In the early 1990s, prices for agricultural land developed slowly 
compared with prices for other kinds of land. It is possible that this pattern 
was rooted in expectations of sector development after the 1990 reform. 
Still, during the last 15 years prices for agricultural property have grown at 
a somewhat faster rate than prices for private homes and summerhouses. 
Other factors 
In addition to the land price drivers analysed above, there are other factors 
that affect land prices but these are difficult to classify. For example, 
Finland opened negotiations about accession to the EU at the beginning of 
the 1990s, which provoked uncertainty about future farm policies. Because 
future profits are capitalised based on current expectations, agricultural 
land values dropped sharply in the first half of the 1990s, well before 
Finland’s actual entry into the EU (1995). Another factor in Finland is the 
recreational value of agricultural land – a common reason for owning it 
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In Germany, a significant factor that affects reservation prices of land 
on the part of buyers/tenants and thereby land value is the difference in 
the employment structures prevailing in West and East Germany. This 
underlying difference leads to disparate rental and sales prices in the two 
halves of the country. The average rental price for West Germany is 
€227/ha and the average sales price is around €16,000/ha, whereas in East 
Germany farmers pay on average €119 to rent a hectare land and around 
€4,000 to buy it. In East Germany, the vast majority of farms are large, 
corporate farms with hired labour. For those farms, the labour costs of 
employees are expenses that reduce farm liquidity. For small individual 
(family) farms in West Germany, the entrepreneurial profit and salaries of 
family members are not expenses but imputed costs. This implies that 
labour costs do not reduce the liquidity of small family farms, as is the case 
for corporative farms. Consequently, farmers in West Germany have a 
higher reservation price for land than farmers in East Germany. 
In Germany, the nationwide trend in the decreasing number of farms 
is accompanied by an increase in average farm size (see Figure 11). The 
influence of farm size on sales prices and rents differs across the regions. In 
Bavaria and Saxony, land sales prices are not correlated with farm size, 
because almost all farms are small. In Weser-Ems, the trend in farm size 
correlates with a slight rise in land sales prices for grassland, but no 
connection could be observed between land price development and farm 
size for livestock-intensive farming. 
In Greece, non-economic factors significantly affect the land market. 
For example, state-ownership of land, multiple uses by owners, Greek 
culture and mentality, and abandoned land are known factors that 
influence land prices. 90 | 
 
 
6.  LAND RENTAL MARKETS IN THE EU 
6.1  Rental market regulations 
The rental market regulations of specific interest to this study are those 
concerning rental prices, tenancy duration and other quantitative aspects of 
land rental. The key regulations that apply to rental markets for 
agricultural land in the EUSCs are summarised in Table 2. 
6.1.1  Rental price regulations 
As in sales markets, price restrictions include minimum and maximum 
rental prices for agricultural land. Here too minimum rental prices reduce 
land demand if the unregulated market price is lower than the regulated 
price. In contrast, maximum rental prices reduce land supply, if the 
unregulated market price is higher than the price ceiling imposed. In the 
EUSCs, only rent ceilings have been applied. 
Generally, rental prices for agricultural land are more regulated than 
land sales prices are. In one-third of the EUSCs, minimum or maximum 
rental prices (or both) are set by government agencies (in Belgium, France, 
Greece and the Netherlands). In countries with regulated rental prices, 
black markets for agricultural land tend to exist. The SPS has a tendency to 
increase rental prices on the black market (e.g. Belgium) and the size of the 
black market for agricultural land (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
Countries with regulated rental prices for agricultural land 
In Belgium, the rental price is regulated by government agencies – it cannot 
be higher than the maximum price determined by the tenancy law. In the 
case of a nine-year rental contract, the maximum price for agricultural land 
and buildings is equal to the (non-indexed) cadastral income of the plot or 
building multiplied by a certain ‘tenancy coefficient’ that depends on the 
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tenant can rely on the continuation of his/her farming activities for a 
significant period. The owner can ask a higher maximum price if the 
contract is made by a notary. The coefficient for agricultural plots is 
increased by 36% for a contract of 18 years and by 50% for a contract of 25 
years or a ‘career contract’. 
Given that the regulated rents are rather low, in most cases the 
maximum rent is paid. Depending on the agricultural value of the land and 
the willingness of the tenant to cultivate the plot, an additional (unofficial) 
amount is paid under the table. This amount can be paid each year, at the 
beginning of the period or at the end, depending on the agreement between 
the owner and tenant. The rigidity of the tenancy market (at least nine 
years of cultivation) enhances the additional payments: if a plot becomes 
available, farmers who want to enlarge their agricultural production will 
pay a high price because they fear that it will be some time before another 
plot becomes available. Alongside this practice, pensioners also offer an 
increasing number of seasonal contracts to young farmers – which is even 
worse for the farmers with respect to the additional black money, because 
they cannot appeal based on the tenancy legislation or rely on the 
continuation of farming activities (with only contracts of 10 months). 
In France, the rental prices for agricultural land are regulated. Each 
département (NUTS 3), through the local government representative (the 
préfet), sets a price index (indice des fermages). For non-built land, the index 
is calculated as the weighted sum of the average gross farm income in the 
département, the average gross farm income in France and the average gross 
farm income in specific productions in France, all averaged over the five 
previous years to smooth for the variability; it may also include prices of 
specific commodities. The weights applied are specific to each département 
and the index is re-evaluated each year, based on the changes in farm 
incomes. It should be noted that up to 1995, the index depended on the 
kind of crop cultivated and was based on the average national and local 
crop yields. For land with buildings, the index is based on the type, use and 
age of the buildings. The index is then used to set minimum and maximum 
prices outside of which rentals are not possible. The préfet may also issue 
different minimum and maximum prices for the various production areas 
within the département, and for land used for specific productions (e.g. 
permanent fruits). It is then up to the landlord to decide on a rental price 
within the given range based on the kind of land (soil quality, irrigation, 
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In the Netherlands, the government sets regional rent ceilings and it 
has allowed only very modest rent adjustments each year.  
In addition, measures were introduced earlier to give tenants a pre-
emptive right to buy the land if it was offered for sale. Ironically, these 
measures aimed at protecting tenants ultimately had the opposite effect 
(Swinnen, 2002). Landlords no longer preferred to lease out the land, since 
lease regulations locked them in at unfavourable terms for years. Land with 
lease contracts became significantly less valuable than that of ‘free’ areas. 
As a result, the supply of rental land dried up and the total area under 
rental agreements steadily declined. 
Market participants often simply circumvented the strict regulation. 
A so-called ‘grey’ rental sector evolved, in which farmers concluded rental 
contracts (or informal agreements with peers) outside the official system. In 
1995, grey rents accounted for 25% of all the rented area (Hoek and Luijt, 
1999). As was the case then, grey rents today are not reported to the 
authorities and they are on average 50% higher than officially registered 
rents.  
To stop the continuous meltdown of the formal rental sector, more 
liberal forms of rental contracts were introduced. As of 1 September 2007, 
rental agreements for less than 6 years are not subject to any of the 
historical constraints. Contracts of more than 6 years, however, are still 
subject to the constraints. 
Countries with unregulated rental prices for agricultural land 
The rental price for agricultural land can be freely negotiated between the 
farmer and landowner in all of the other countries of the study (see column 
2 in Table 2). Hence, if other things were equal, then we would expect that 
the SPS would affect farmland rental prices more in Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK than in Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands. 
6.1.2  Regulations on the duration of rental contracts 
The duration of rental contracts for agricultural land gives a first indication 
of the rental market possibility to adjust to changes in the external 
environment, such as implementation of the SPS, an increase in food prices 
or changes in opportunity profits of alternative land use. Ceteris paribus, 
long-term rental contracts for agricultural land will adjust less to external 
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Rental contract duration has been studied in order to obtain a cross-
country comparison of rental market possibilities to respond to policy 
changes. The two key determinants of rental contract duration are social 
norms (e.g. in Greece it is usually seasonal) and governmental regulations 
(e.g. there is a minimum of 9 years in Belgium and France, 6 years in the 
Netherlands and 5 in Spain). Moreover, in several countries (e.g. France) 
even the renewal/inheritance of rental contracts is regulated. In these 
countries, the formal rental markets are stickier and the time lag is longer 
for adjustment to policy changes. 
The FADN data for rental markets suggest that the longer the 
minimum duration of rental contracts, the more the difference between 
buying and renting agricultural land disappears. Belgium and France have 
the longest minimum durations of rental contracts (9 years) and the highest 
shares of rented area (77% and 75% in 2006, respectively) among all the EU 
countries studied. 
Countries in which rental contract durations are regulated 
In Belgium, the duration of a tenancy contract subject to the tenancy law is 
at least 9 years. In the case of recht van opstal and erfpacht, the farmer can 
have a very long-term contract. Recht van opstal implies that – in this case – 
a farmer has the property right to have some buildings and plantings on 
the plot of a third person. Such a property right can be determined for a 
maximum period of 50 years and needs to be confirmed by a notary. 
Erfpacht is similar to recht van opstal, but the duration of the contract differs: 
it should be at least 27 years and a maximum of 99 years. 
The most common duration of rental contracts is 9 years. There are an 
increasing number of ‘seasonal contracts’ and informal contracts, however, 
with a short duration (less than a year). Since the introduction of direct 
payments, this tendency has been exacerbated. 
The regular rental contracts (9 years) are agreements between the 
tenant and the owner of the plot, which can be written or oral, depending 
on the custom and the relationship between the tenant and the owner. 
Rental contracts for longer periods need to be registered by a notary. 
The rigidity of the tenancy market (at least 9 years of cultivation) 
enhances the market for additional payments under the table. If a plot 
becomes available, farmers who want to extend their agricultural 
production are willing to pay a higher price (than the regulated one) 
because they know it will be a long time before another rental plot becomes 
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In Finland, the legislation regulating the rental market for 
agricultural land has not changed since 1966. The standard land lease 
contract is a short-term contract with a fixed duration and a fixed cash lease 
payment per year. About 40% of all lease contracts have a duration of 5 
years. Contracts longer than 10 years are prohibited by law. 
Written contracts have become more and more popular in Finland. 
Written contracts are also supported by the government and the Farmers’ 
Federation. The Farmers’ Federation additionally provides a platform for 
rental contracts. This platform has recently become highly popular. Rents 
are typically paid at the end of the year. 
In France, the terms of the rental contracts are defined by law 
through the Statut du fermage. The original law of 1945 has been modified 
several times (in 1960–62, 1975 and 1984). Generally, the rental regulations 
have always tried to protect the tenant farmer. The following regulations 
apply to all rented land except for plots of less than 1 hectare (0.5 if there 
are several landlords for one plot). 
First, rental contracts for agricultural land are very rarely short term 
in France – usually they are for at least 9 years. There are three types of 
contracts. The baux ruraux are contracts for 9 years, the baux de long terme 
are for 18 years and the baux de carrière, i.e. over the tenant’s career, are 
concluded for 25 years. Landowners are given tax incentives to conclude 
long-term contracts (baux de long terme). Tenants do not have to pay the 
local tax, which is otherwise 0.6% of the rental prices estimated for the next 
20 years. Throughout the duration of the contract, landlords do not have 
the right to terminate the contract and rent the land to another tenant. 
Landowners have the possibility to terminate the contract anytime only in 
order to sell the land. Yet in this case, the current tenant benefits from a 
pre-emptive right to purchase the land (with the possibility to have the 
price reduced through the intervention of SAFER). 
The second element of the rental regulation is that contracts are 
automatically renewed at the end of the term. At the end of the term, the 
landlords have the possibility to withdraw their land only if they (or their 
heirs) farm the land themselves over the next 15 years at least (and satisfy 
the settlement rules, see below). 
The third element of the rental regulation is that, after the current 
tenant’s retirement or decease, contracts are inheritable. Only when exiting 
tenants have no successor are landlords free to designate the succeeding 
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Agricole or LOA) in place since 1 January 2006 introduces a new type of 
rental contract, the bail cessible, i.e. a transferable contract. The main idea 
behind this contract is that exiting tenants who do not have a successor in 
their family can now choose to transfer the contract to whomever they 
want. In the other types of contracts, only the landlord had this freedom. 
Tenants and landlords must both agree for their contract to be transformed 
into a bail cessible. As compensation for the reduction of the landlord’s room 
for manoeuvre, the latter has the possibility to ask for a price increase when 
the contract is transferred, up to a maximum limit of 50% of the rental 
contract. Such transferable contracts can only be for 18 years (and not 9 
years), and do not entail compulsory renewal. Such contracts have been 
implemented following the 2003 CAP reform. In the frame of this reform, 
the entitlements can likewise be transferred from an exiting farmer to 
his/her successor, regardless of whether the latter is a family member. 
Previously, exiting tenants with a successor outside the family were not 
able to link the rights to the rental contract, that is to say, to the land. In the 
case of a non-family successor, the choice of the beneficiary of the contract 
was at the discretion of the landlords, who may not have opted for the 
successor chosen by the exiting tenant. The new bail cessible is thus 
supposed to link the payments to the land, in the case of tenancy 
agreements. 
In France, rental contracts may be written or oral. Where they are 
written this may be simply on normal paper signed by both parties. But in 
order to be considered officially ‘valid’ (especially in the event of a court 
dispute), the contracts must be declared and registered at a tax revenue 
office (the Bureau des Hypothèques, part of the ministry of finance). If 
contracting parties want to have more secured terms, they may have their 
written contract registered with a notary. In any case, all contracts for 
which the duration is more than 12 years must be signed at a notary’s 
office. Following SPS implementation, more contracts are now written (but 
the number of notary contracts has not increased), in order to secure the 
transfer of entitlements with the rented land. 
The SPS does not affect the duration of rental contracts. When some 
entitlements are rented together with land, the contract duration should be 
the same for the SPS as for the land, in general 9 years. Rentals are usually 
paid on the day of Saint Michel, i.e. 29 September. There may be some 
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In the Netherlands, the tenure law introduced in 1958 heavily 
regulated lease contracts with the goal of strengthening the tenant’s 
position. Rental agreements needed to be registered at special rental courts 
and usually had very long durations of at least 12 years for farms and 6 
years for land. A contract was automatically extended for 6 more years at 
the end of each term, as long as none of the parties cancelled it. 
As noted earlier, more liberal rental contracts were introduced in 
1995. Certain freer forms of rental contracts were possible that were not 
subject to rent control, automatic renewal or the option to buy for the 
tenant. In 2007, the entire Tenure Law was updated and merged into the 
Dutch civil code. As of September 2007, rental agreements for less than 6 
years are not subject to any of the historical constraints. Contracts of more 
than 6 years, however, are still subject to the controls. 
In Spain, the minimum duration of rental contracts is 5 years. 
Existing legislation encourages drawing up written rental contracts, but 
presently, most contracts are still oral. 
Countries in which rental contract durations are unregulated 
In Germany, the usual form of rental contracts are written with a fixed 
price and limited duration, although oral contracts continue to exist as do 
contracts of an unlimited duration. When a contract with a limited duration 
ends and there are no other arrangements, the contract will change to a 
contract with an unlimited duration, which can be cancelled from year to 
year. Some contracts have a price conformation clause, which is normally a 
general stipulation that links the arrangement to broad rents in the area. 
The average duration of rental contracts varies significantly among 
regions. The average duration in Saxony and Weser-Ems is longer than in 
Bavaria. In Saxony, the average duration of rental contracts is 11.5 years. 
Variations are 7 and 18 years, with the long contracts linked to investment 
credits. In Weser-Ems, the average duration of a rental contract is 7 years 
with variations from 5 to 10 years. The longest contracts are in grassland 
areas or in livestock-intensive farming areas. In livestock-intensive areas, 
farmers need long-term contracts. In Bavaria, the average duration of rental 
contracts is 6 years. The duration of rental contracts for arable land and 
grassland are the same. Even if the average duration of rental contracts is 6 
years, there are many contracts solely for 1 year and others at 9 years. In 
Bavaria and Weser-Ems, the contracts are normally renewed without an 
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The average duration of rental contracts is not directly affected by the 
SPS. Indirectly, the duration of rental contracts is affected by the German 
pension law, according to which, if a farmer wants to retire and receive old-
age payments, (s)he has to lease the land for at least 9 years. Those farmers 
retiring at the time the SPS was introduced will weigh the old-age 
payments from retiring and renting out land against continuing to work 
and benefiting from the SPS. 
When and how often the rent is paid differs among regions. In 
Saxony, land rent is paid annually, if the land is rented from a private 
person. If the land is rented from the BVVG, then the land rent has to be 
paid every third month in advance. In Saxony, how often the rent is paid 
greatly depends on the landlord. In Weser-Ems, it depends on the total area 
of land rented and the amount of money to be paid. If one has more than 10 
hectares or has to pay more than a couple of thousand euros, it is paid 
monthly or a couple of times a year. Smaller amounts are normally paid 
yearly. In Weser-Ems, the timing and frequency of the payments depend 
on the total area of land rented or the amount of rent payable. Land rent is 
paid annually in Bavaria. There is no uniformity in the timing of rent 
payments, with some paying in advance and others after cultivation. 
In Greece, agricultural land is usually rented for just one farming 
period, but the period can extend up to 4 years. Rental contracts longer 
than 4 years are atypical in Greece. The rental agreements are either oral or 
written (a private informal contract), or (less frequently) based on an 
official contract. Rents are usually paid in advance, and they are not 
affected by the economic outcome of the year. 
In Ireland, there is no requirement to register leases and consequently 
official data on the share of agricultural land that is rented is not available. 
Estimates put the share of land rented at less than 20%. Short-term rental 
contracts (conacre) are a popular way of renting land. Often conacre prices 
are agreed orally whereas longer-term leases are more likely to be written. 
In Italy, the rental market was heavily regulated for many years and 
is still subject to certain rental price regulations. The equo canone is the rent 
that the tenant must pay to the landowner. The particularity of this rent is 
that the rental price is not negotiated between the parties but is defined by 
a technical commission. The commission determines the rent value through 
the prices of agricultural products, production costs and farmer income. 
Given that usually the equo canone value is underestimated and fixed for 
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The Italian land rental law was modified several times in order to 
equalise the contract positions between the tenant and landowner. The last 
law on agricultural contracts was enacted in 1982, and it mainly includes 
provisions for the duration and type of contract. It also states that any type 
of contract can be stipulated if the transaction is assisted by a representative 
of a farmers’ association. In all Italian regions, most rental contracts are 
written and registered without a notary, but with the help of farmer 
associations. This is because registration is needed to benefit from 
subsidies. Written contracts signed with the assistance of farmer 
associations are more often used because they are classified as official 
contracts. Oral contracts are still concluded, however, especially among 
members of the same family for the rental of land for fruit crops or 
grassland. 
The average duration of rental contracts in Italy is highly 
heterogeneous across crops and regions. For arable crops, it goes from 2 to 
5 years while for fruit crops rental can vary from 5 to 10 years but also up 
to 20 years. Usually the tenant pays the land rental at the beginning of the 
year but there are no regulations on this subject. 
In Sweden, both formal (written) contracts and informal land rental 
contracts are used. The former are always used for larger transactions. 
Informal contracts are most common in the forest districts in northern 
Sweden, where land rents are low or in many cases even zero. The 
introduction of the SPS implied an advantage for the tenant in relation to 
long-term rental contracts. In most cases, the contracts could not be 
terminated (because of rules on the termination of contracts) in time for the 
landowner to apply for SPS entitlements. Entitlements were allocated to 
those who cultivated the land. For short-term or informal rental contracts, 
SPS implementation incited many conflicts between tenants and 
landowners.  
It is possible that the SPS has affected the average duration of rental 
contracts, as contracts now tend to be shorter. Increased risk in crop 
production may be another reason, however. The trend is currently 
towards one-year contracts.  
Previously, rents were in general paid twice a year. The introduction 
of direct payments has changed this pattern. Now the rent is usually paid 
in December when the EU money arrives. 
In the UK, the tenancy regulations vary by region. In England and 
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departure from the preceding legislation dealing with agricultural 
tenancies. The ATA is much shorter, and does not attempt to provide an 
all-embracing safety net but allows greater flexibility for landowners and 
tenants to draw up tenancy agreements to suit their specific circumstances. 
The ATA applies to England and Wales but it does not apply to Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. The 2006 Regulatory Reform (Agricultural Tenancies) 
(England and Wales) Order amended the 1986 Agricultural Holdings Act 
and 1995 Agricultural Tenancies Act. This package of reforms was intended 
to i) encourage diversification by tenant farmers, ii) maintain and improve 
the viability of tenant farmers, iii) allow the restructuring of holdings 
without jeopardising valuable rights, iv) improve flexibility in the tenanted 
sector and v) maintain a balance between landlord and tenant interests.45  
The ATA created a new form of agricultural tenure known as the 
‘farm business tenancy’. For a farm business tenancy to be created, the land 
must be used at least in part for the purpose of an agricultural business. If 
the land is not used for an agricultural business then the Act is unlikely to 
apply, and the tenure may come under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act of 1954.  
The length of the term is entirely flexible and longer-term leases are 
more likely to encourage tenants to invest capital in the business while 
smaller parcels of land may be better suited to shorter terms.  
A farm business tenancy for a term of not more than 2 years 
terminates automatically on the expiry date. A fixed term of more than 2 
years will only terminate once a valid ‘notice to quit’ has been served. The 
2006 Regulatory Reform Order now means that landlords and tenants can 
agree whatever notice period they wish, providing the notice is given at 
least 12 months in advance. This means that landlords and tenants can 
agree, for example, on a 36-month notice period, in which the notice to quit 
could be served anytime between 36 and 12 months prior to the expiry 
date. If no notice is served, then the tenancy will continue from year to year 
until a valid notice is served.  
Following the death of a tenant, the landlord can only resume the 
tenancy if provision has been made for this in the original lease. Similarly, 
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the ATA does not allow the landlord to regain possession because of 
insolvency of the tenant or non-payment of rent. The agreement can 
specifically reserve this right. 
In Scotland, there are now four forms of agricultural lease permitted 
under the legislation of 2003. First, it is still possible to grant a ‘traditional’ 
agricultural tenancy under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act of 
1991.  
Second, there is a grazing or mowing lease for not more than 364 
days. Failure to ensure the land is vacated at the end of each grazing period 
means the lease becomes a 5-year, short, limited duration tenancy (SLDT).  
Third, the SLDTs are an agricultural lease for a term of not more than 
5 years and are aimed at validating cropping lets (e.g. potatoes and 
turnips). If the lease is for a period of less than 5 years and the tenant 
remains in occupation (with the express or implied consent of the 
landlord), the lease will default to 5 years. Should the same happen at the 
end of that 5-year period, the lease would default to a limited duration 
tenancy (LDT), with a term of a further 15 years. Successive leases of the 
same land to the same person are accumulative. Tenants who occupy land 
under an SLDT are not allowed to diversify nor are they able to exercise the 
pre-emptive right to buy their tenanted land.  
Fourth, the LDTs were introduced as the standard form of tenancy. 
They must be for a minimum period of 15 years but can be for longer by 
agreement. Termination of LDTs at the end of their term is by written 
notice from a minimum of 12 months minimum to a maximum of 24 
months. The landlord must serve two notices to the tenant: one 24-36 
months prior to the effective date and one 12-24 months prior to the 
effective date (at least 90 days apart). If the lease is not terminated by notice 
at its agreed termination date, it will continue for a further, initial 3-year 
period. If no notice is served terminating the lease, a second 3-year period 
will follow, which if not terminated will be followed by a further 15-year 
term. LDTs can be assigned with consent from the landlord. LDTs can also 
be sublet if expressly permitted in the lease or without express permission 
if the subletting is ancillary to an approved diversification scheme. An LDT 
may be bequeathed as with an SLDT under the provisions of the 1991 Act 
relating to bequests. A tenant with an LDT is not entitled to the right to 
buy, but (s)he is allowed to diversify and harvest trees planted by him/her 
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In Northern Ireland, most of the rented area is leased through the 
conacre system, without entering into a long-term commitment.46 Owing to 
the use of conacre rental agreements, farm businesses may have a number 
of plots of land but these are usually within five miles of a core farmstead. 
6.1.3  Other rental market regulations 
In this section, we summarise the remaining important, quantitative and 
other aspects of rental market regulations. A distinctive element of the 
rental market regulation in France is that, after the current tenant’s 
retirement or decease, contracts are inheritable. Only when exiting tenants 
have no successor are landlords free to designate the succeeding tenant.47 
In Ireland, stamp duty is liable on the execution of a lease at a rate of 
1% of the annual rent (a one-off payment). There is no requirement to 
register leases and consequently, official data on the share of agricultural 
land that is rented is not available. In the past, the general view would have 
been that most rentals are conacre, but that situation may be changing since 
some farms may now require ‘spreadlands’ for manure under the 
European Nitrates Directive and increased participation in the Rural 
Environmental Protection Scheme. Also, some income tax exemptions have 
been introduced for encouraging long-term leases, but again we are 
uncertain of the uptake of these exemptions. 
In Italy, the SPS has created an incentive to conclude written 
contracts, because in order to apply for the SPS entitlements official rental 
contracts are required. 
The rental market for agricultural land in Spain is regulated by Law 
26/2005 of 30 November, which amends Law 49/2003 of 26 November. 
Meanwhile, historical rural renting also takes place, which is regulated by 
Law 1/1992 governing land farmed by a family over several generations. 
Only the rural renting arrangements agreed before 1942 are considered 
historical rural renting. 
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State legislation on historical lettings of agricultural land is 
complemented by respective autonomic laws in the Valencian Community 
and Galicia on historical renting. 
These historical lettings of agricultural land are located in the 
outskirts of urban areas, which are under considerable urban pressure. 
Therefore, such rental agreements for farmland are gradually disappearing. 
Indeed, the Galician Law 3/1993 of 16 April established that historical rural 
renting and sharecropping had to end in 2005. But this law was modified 
by the regional government of Galicia through an emergency procedure in 
that same year to extend historical rural renting and sharecropping 
contracts until December 2010. 
Along with the historical lettings of agricultural land, Law 1/1992 
regulates sharecropping contracts, which are of special relevance in some 
areas of Spain. Sharecropping contracts are those in which the owner of a 
rural property leaves a natural person (a sharecropper) in charge of the 
property in exchange for a percentage of the production obtained. 
In the UK, the tenancy regulations differ among regions. In England 
and Wales, the ‘livelihood test’ is part of the eligibility criteria for statutory 
succession to a tenancy, as prescribed in the 1986 Act. Previously, this 
obliged successors to have earned their principal source of livelihood from 
agricultural work on the holding for 5 out of the last 7 years. Successors 
could risk their right to succession if they drew significant income from 
non-agricultural activities on the farm, thus inhibiting diversification 
activities. The Regulatory Reform Order allows successors, with landlord 
consent, to earn income from on-farm diversification or from activities off 
the farm, which count towards the livelihood test. The landlord’s 
agreement must be given in writing and it must have been given on or after 
19 October 2006. The changes do not affect a successor’s right to succeed to 
a tenancy where the principal source of income is from agricultural work 
on the holding. 
The level of rent can be fixed for the entire term of the lease, increased 
according to a specified formula based on pre-agreed criteria, or reviewed 
according to the ATA. The first two methods of review are agreed between 
the parties at the commencement of the lease. An example of an agreed 
formula may be a rent that changes in line with the price of wheat. The 
statutory review requires the service of a valid notice of intention to review 
rent at least 12 months and less than 24 months before the review date. 
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Statutory reviews can only take place every three years. The rent as set 
under the ATA requires that the open market rent be taken into account, 
along with certain other considerations.  
To claim compensation at the termination of the lease, a tenant’s 
improvements require the landlord’s written consent prior to 
commencement, unless the improvement is a routine improvement as 
defined by statute. The amount of compensation at the termination is set 
out in the ATA but the Regulatory Reform Order now allows landlords and 
tenants to agree an upper limit on the amount of compensation to be paid. 
This agreement must be made in writing. Any disputes regarding 
compensation may be resolved by reference to arbitration.  
Whitehead et al. (2002) identified three types of farm business 
tenancies being used in England: bare land only, land and buildings, and 
land buildings and house. Their analysis found that most lets of fewer than 
25 hectares were for bare land and the median length of such leases was 
only 2 years. This contrasted with the average length of leases for land and 
buildings (3 years) and entire holdings (10 years). They reported that the 
ATA had led to significant additional land being made available to let and 
that new landlords had entered the rental market using farm business 
tenancies, particularly those withdrawing from farming but wishing to 
retain ownership of the farm. 
The 2003 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act introduced changes 
for tenants holding ‘traditional’ leases under the 1991 Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act. Part 2 of the 2003 Act came into force on 15 
December 2004 and gives tenants with 1991 Act tenancies a pre-emptive 
right to buy the land they lease. A tenant can register an interest in 
acquiring the land comprised in the lease, and if the landowner intends to 
transfer the land, (s)he must notify the tenant and must not enter sale 
negotiations until (s)he has dealt with the tenant’s interest. The tenant may 
purchase at a value fixed by a valuer, likely to be the price a reasonable and 
willing seller would sell where the buyer is a sitting tenant. In addition, 
under the ‘traditional’ 1991 Act a tenant’s use of land for non-agricultural 
purposes was typically not permitted. These clauses no longer have any 
effect and if a tenant intends to diversify or plant and harvest woodland, 
(s)he must notify the landlord, who can seek further information or impose 
reasonable conditions relating to the proposed new use. The rent review 
process has also changed, and the economic conditions prevailing within 
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agriculture now have much greater importance; in all situations, the 
distortion of market rents owing to scarcity must be excluded when 
reviewing rents.  
The 2003 Land Reform (Scotland) Act (Part 2) introduced, for rural 
communities, a pre-emptive right to buy land with which the community 
has a connection. The right arises in relation to land in which the body has 
registered an interest when the land comes to be marketed or sold. Part 3 of 
the 2003 Act gives bodies representing crofting communities the absolute 
right to buy certain land.  
6.2  Evolution of the rental market 
In contrast to the sales market, the rental market for agricultural land is less 
subject to demand from non-agricultural investors. If the rental duration is 
relatively long and regulated by the state, rental markets may also reflect 
the opportunity profits in non-agricultural sectors to some extent. The 
development of the rental market for agricultural land is summarised in 
Table 4. 
6.2.1  Evolution of rental prices 
In this section, we analyse rental prices for agricultural land. The evolution 
of real rental prices for agricultural land in the EUSCs for the period 1992–
2006 is plotted in Figure 4. The figure offers a cross-country comparison of 
rental price levels, the direction of price changes (increasing/decreasing) 
and the degree of change. 
The FADN data for rental prices suggest that across the EUSCs, there 
is less heterogeneity in rental prices than in sales prices. Nevertheless, the 
cross-country variance has grown over time (from 600% between the 
lowest and highest countries in 1992 to over 700% in 2006). 
Annual rental price changes have been studied using the same FADN 
rental price data. Similar to the sales prices for agricultural land, rental 
price developments have been highly diverse across the EUSCs, ranging 
from a decline in Greece and the UK (-14%) to an increase in Spain (54.1%) 
compared with the base year 1992 (Figure 5). 
Looking at Figure 4, we can distinguish three distinct patterns in 
rental price developments in the period 1992–2006. Real rental prices for 
agricultural land decreased in Germany (-37.4%), the UK (-13.7%) and 
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land changed but insignificantly so (<5%). Meanwhile, real rental prices for 
agricultural land grew in Belgium (+16.8%), the Netherlands (+17.8%),48 
Italy (+24.4%), Sweden (+30.1%) and Spain (+54.1%). 
Countries with decreasing rental prices for agricultural land 
The most significant decline in real rental prices has been experienced in 
Germany. This trend can partially be traced to unification with East 
Germany. At the same time, real prices have also been dwindling in West 
Germany since 1992. Although we can observe a convergence of rental 
prices between West and East Germany, the ratio was still almost 2:1 in 
2005. 
There are a number of explanations for this rent gap between East 
and West Germany. For instance, Balmann (1999) points to the low 
livestock density in East Germany and unexploited returns to scale by 
family farms in West Germany. Another explanation lies in the way the 
BVVG awarded rental contracts after the reunification. The administrative 
prices by the BVVG served as a focal point for the rental market. Although 
this has changed in recent years (as we discuss later on), the effects are still 
present because of the frequently long duration of rental contracts. 
The continuing discrepancy between rental prices in West and East 
Germany are in part the result of differences in farm structure. While farms 
in East Germany face high opportunity costs for the factors used, this is 
often not the case for family farms in West Germany. Unused labour 
capacity, high shares of self-financing (which ease access to credit) and the 
high stocking densities determine the high rental prices in West Germany. 
At the regional level, substantial divergence in rental prices can still 
be found. The states with the highest rental prices are North Rhine-
Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, whereas the lowest 
prices can be found in Brandenburg, Saarland and Saxony. 
In Bavaria, the land rent for newly rented areas rose from €260/ha in 
1999 to €275 in 2005. In this study region, in the period 1999 to 2005 prices 
surged upwards (at a rate of 6%) as did rent shares (growing at 17%). In 
Lower Saxony, the land rent for newly rented areas grew from €339/ha to 
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€349/ha between 1999 and 2005 (a total growth rate 2.9%). In Saxony, in 
contrast to sales prices, rental prices have continually increased since 
reunification. In 1991, the average rental price for arable land was €72/ha, 
which by 2005 had shot up 71% to €123/ha. Moreover, farmers are actually 
willing to pay more than €200/ha to rent arable land.  
In Greece, the rental price depends on the demand for rental land, 
which is a function of land fertility, morphology, type of plantation, etc. 
Table 24 presents an index of agricultural rents in Greece. 
Rents are maintained at relatively low levels, as farmers expect higher 
revenues from the level of production and not from the land. Still, there are 
regions where rents are relatively high, affecting the cost of production. 
Occasionally tenants prefer to give owners a share of their production 
as payment in kind (up to 30-50%). No differences are observed in terms of 
rents paid to owners who have moved to urban areas or to those who 
remain in rural areas. 
In many regions, the real value of land also differs from its rental rate. 
The market value and rents of agricultural land in Greece are indicated in 
Table 25. It is often argued that rental prices are a better reflection of the 
real value of agricultural land, as sales prices usually do not correspond to 
the quality or fertility of the soil. 
In the UK, the farmland rental figures are not published on an annual 
basis. That being stated, Defra do publish an index of average rents in the 
UK. Since 2000, average rents in the UK have remained relatively stable, 
after moving upwards by 30% between 1989 and 2000. According to these 
figures, average rents in Scotland grew significantly during the 1990s, but 
then stagnated and even began falling after 2004 (the introduction of the 
SPS has perhaps had an effect on the market). Rents in Northern Ireland are 
reported to have decreased significantly since 1997, although that is not 
fully reflected in the conacre rents. 
Given that full agricultural tenancies are long-term (often 
intergenerational) leases, the average rents tend to remain relatively stable 
through time and the decrease from 1999 to 2002 is symptomatic of the 
returns to agriculture in those years. Those tenants with rent reviews 
during that period would have pleaded hardship and landlords would 
have had to consider this factor in agreeing the levels of rent set (if needed 
arbiters could be used). Since 2004, there has been a slight increase in the 
rents paid on full agricultural tenancies, in tandem with the recovery in the 
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from their peak of €220/ha in 1997, largely because they are shorter-term 
agreements and better represent the prevailing market for leased land (in 
terms of supply and demand), with farmers being shrewd when 
considering the economic benefits of taking on additional land. 
Rents for farm business tenancies have continued to fall even after the 
pick-up in farming returns from 2004 onwards, which could be interpreted 
as the result of the SPS area payment being taken by the landowner (in the 
case of short-term leases), with a corresponding reduction in rents to 
account for the loss of CAP support by the producer. Alternatively, this 
could be seen as the result of farmers not needing to take on additional 
land to meet CAP support requirements under the coupled regime (e.g. 
extensification), meaning that there is an oversupply in the market that is 
putting downward pressure on rents. It is evident that rents have been 
reduced in all sectors with the exception of dairy, which fluctuated at 
around €210/ha. This figure also shows the significant variance in the 
rental value of grazing and cropping land in less favoured areas, which 
fully reflects the earning potential of the different types of land. 
 ‘Average’ conacre rent values in Northern Ireland are closely tied to 
rents paid for grassland, and currently grassland is leased for around 
€255/ha, with potato rents more than 3.2 times that value at €832/ha. 
Average rents have remained relatively stable over the last 10 years, 
although grassland rents fell by 13% between 2004 and 2006, and rent for 
cereal and rough grazing land also fell by 17.7% over a similar timescale. 
Rental values of conacre land for potatoes increased by over 29% between 
2004 and 2006, perhaps as a result of allowing SPS entitlements to be 
activated for the first time for  land producing such crops (i.e. because of 
the area payment of the hybrid system). 
Countries with stable real rental prices for agricultural land 
In Finland, there are no official statistics on land rents. The level of land 
rental prices is estimated from national accounts. It is based on two data 
sources: i) rental charges paid by farmers and ii) the rented area. According 
to the experts interviewed, predictions related to profitability have had a 
significant impact on farmland prices in Finland. 
In France, rental prices have slightly increased from €112/ha in 1997 
to €122/ha in 2004. But these negligible changes are not representative of 
the land market trends in France, where rental (and sales) markets for 
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In Ireland, the rental rates for agricultural land have been in decline 
over the last 10 years. Figure 50 illustrates the evolution of agricultural 
rental rates since 1997. Average rents in 2006 had dropped by 33% 
compared with 1997. Figure 50 shows that farmland rents have changed 
significantly during the last 10 years. The largest yearly decline of land 
rents over the period 1997 to 2006 occurred in 1998. The key factor behind 
the slump (the average rent in 1998 was 30% lower than that in 1996) is not 
clear at this point. 
Countries with increasing rental prices for agricultural land 
In Belgium, in most cases the maximum rental price (as determined by the 
government) is paid. The additional amount paid under the table varies 
depending on the circumstances. Implementation of the SPS has boosted 
the additional amount paid through a supply reduction effect. Since 2005, 
farmers only need to keep their land in good agricultural condition to 
receive payments. Hence, instead of quitting and renting out their land, 
pensioners without successors hire labour to keep their land in good 
agricultural condition and thereby activate their entitlements on the land. 
Next to the factors influencing the additional payments, there is also 
the upward trend in seasonal and informal contracts, resulting from low 
official tenancy prices, the introduction of direct payments and uncertainty 
over zoning regulations.49 Because of data paucity, it is impossible to 
quantify the evolution of either additional payments or the number of 
seasonal contracts. 
Figure 33 reports the evolution of the reported average rental prices 
for arable land and permanent grassland in Belgium. The data are 
expressed in constant 1989 prices. Real rental prices in Belgium have been 
virtually stable over time, especially after 2000, and are evolving for the 
two types of land in a similar way. At the start of the 1990s, the largest 
increase in real prices was reported, i.e. approximately 10% between 1992 
and 1995.  
Given that the prices are determined per agricultural district, there 
are also regional price differences among provinces (Figure 34). Average 
prices in Flanders are 38% (for arable land) and 30% (for permanent 
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grassland) higher than in Wallonia. Prices also increased in Flanders at the 
end of the 1990s, but remained stable in Wallonia. These price differences 
can be explained by the differences in soil quality, which are reflected in 
the cadastral income and mainly in profitability, and are in turn reflected in 
the tenancy coefficients.  
In Italy, data on land rental prices are less systematic than are those 
concerning land prices. For this reason, aggregates from INEA data are not 
generally considered sufficiently accurate. Average values for arable 
cropland in the north plains are between €400 and €900/ha. Still, reported 
land rents in 2006 vary between €15/ha (for contracts for grazing land in 
the south) and above €15,000 for flower production in Liguria (north-west). 
Comparing farmland rental rates for assorted years, rental prices look more 
stable than land prices in the long term. Even so, there are more rapid and 
more evident fluctuations in the short run and across different areas. 
In the Netherlands, rental prices show a very high degree of 
autocorrelation (Figure 56). For the period 1993 through 2001, the Dutch 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) provides a time series for all rents, and a 
sub-series for grassland and arable land. Unfortunately, the CBS 
terminated the collection of rental information in 2001. We received the 
data for the missing years 2002–06 from country experts. 
In the heavily regulated first years, rent controls kept rents artificially 
low. After the introduction of more liberal contracts in 1995, rents 
immediately caught up to their economic levels. Whether higher rents 
boosted land prices in these years or whether higher land prices enabled 
landlords to require higher rents, or even whether both rents and land 
prices were driven by the same underlying factors still needs to be 
investigated in future research. Rents levelled off after the land price peak 
in 2001. 
Similar to land values, rents of grassland have lagged behind rents 
for arable land, indicating that the expected revenues from growing crops 
are higher than profits from grassland. It was especially rents for arable 
l a n d  t h a t  w e r e  h e l d  b a c k  b y  t h e  h i s t orical regulation, as the increasing 
spread after 1996 reveals. Again, converting grassland to arable land is 
favourable from a landlord’s perspective, where soil and topography allow. 
In Spain, average rental prices in 1998 were €120/ha in current 
values, and they managed to reach €165/ha in 2006. But once again, 
important discrepancies appear in terms of crops and communities. Per 
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and Andalucia (€370), while the lowest were in the Balearics (€91) and 
Aragon (€109). Land with irrigation crops was leased for an average of 
€487/ha in the same year, followed by olive groves at €410/ha; the lowest 
rental price was paid for pastureland (€52/ha). 
Therefore, while land prices have been characterised by a continuous 
increase at 6.86% a year in the period 1998–2006, it has been verified that 
rents in current euros have scarcely grown over the same period (4.09%), 
which in real terms means that they have practically been maintained. The 
highest average increase took place in 1999 (being 8.33%), owing to the 
spectacular increase (30.52%) in the rental of olive groves. Yet, in 2004, the 
average increase was only 0.65%. 
The highest annual increases in rent on average were for olive groves 
(9.44%) and pastureland (8.41%) over 1998–2006, but always at lower rates 
than land prices. In all of the ACs, rental rates grew over the same period, 
primarily in Cantabria and Murcia, where the annual averages were 7.55% 
and 5.85%, respectively, whereas in la Rioja it only increased by 0.98%. 
These trends correspond to the universal tendency of agriculture 
becoming less significant in developed countries, because of the lower 
profitability obtained from agriculture in comparison with other sectors. 
Thus, the average profitability of land has gone from 2.01% in 1998 to 1.25% 
in 2006. 
In Sweden, agricultural rental prices have risen since 1990 (Figure 66). 
Rental prices grew at a faster pace in the late 1990s than at the beginning of 
the 2000s. During the last two years of the period studied, i.e. after SPS 
implementation, there were only minor changes in rental prices. In 1994, 
rental prices were €87/ha on average compared with €118 on average in 
2006.  
Land rents surged upwards by 38% between 1994 and 2006. On 
average, rents have grown by approximately 3% per annum for several 
years. But the growth rate has slowed. Rents stagnated between 2004 and 
2005 and rose by 1.7% between 2005 and 2006. In recent years, rents have 
increased in areas with low rents and decreased in regions with high rents.  
Information about rental prices that distinguishes between arable 
land and grazing land is limited. In the year 2000, the average rental price 
for arable land was €128/ha compared with €45/ha for grazing land.  
As with land prices, the contrasts among different parts of the 
country are large. Renting land in the plains of southern Sweden costs 
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over the entire period in all regions except in the most northern part of the 
country. Indeed, during 2000–04, rental prices fell in northern Sweden. 
Then in 2005, when the SPS was implemented, rental prices in the north 
soared by as much as 76%. A similar effect in 2005 cannot be seen in other 
regions – in the western half of southern Sweden rental prices actually 
declined. Land rental prices have especially risen in regions where cattle 
payments have been redistributed from cattle to arable land as a result of 
decoupling.  
6.2.2  Share of the rented area 
In this section, we analyse the rented share of the total agricultural area as 
shown in Figure 6 for the EUSCs during 1992–2006. 
There are at least two possible ways to classify countries based on 
Figure 6, according to i) the share of the rented area and ii) changes in the 
share of the rented area. The FADN data for transactions on the farmland 
rental market suggest that the rented share of farmland is particularly high 
(>70%) in Belgium, France and Germany, with the share of the rented area 
in the latter two slowly, but continually increasing. According to the 
experts interviewed, a correlation between policy changes and the share of 
rented farmland could not be established in any of the sample countries. 
In terms of changes, developments in Belgium and the Netherlands 
seem to be different from the rest of the EUSCs: in the period 1992–2006, 
the share of the rented area fell slightly in Belgium (-1.7%) and the 
Netherlands (-2.9%). In three countries, there was a slight increase in the 
rented area, by 14.2% in France, 13.6% in Sweden and 12.7% in the UK. In 
the remaining countries, the share of owned farmland shrunk more 
significantly. In the period 1992–2006, the share of the rented area 
expanded by 47.8% in Finland, 47.8% in Germany, 44.9% in Greece, 49.2% 
in Ireland, 34.1% in Italy and 36.0% in Spain. 
Countries with a high share of rented farmland (>70%) 
As noted above, the share of rented farmland of the total UAA is especially 
high in Belgium, France and Germany. Moreover, the share is continuing to 
rise (although at a slower rate) in France and Germany. 
In Belgium, the share of rented farmland (all kinds) is relatively stable 
at approximately 68% of the total utilised agricultural land. There are some 
historical regional differences in the share of rented land, but in all 
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regions are rather small: in Flanders, approximately 66% of the land is 
rented, whereas in Wallonia it is 68%. 
Landowners acting as landlords are in most cases farmers 
themselves, who likewise tend to rent agricultural land. Belgian inheritance 
law and the zoning regulations have fragmented agricultural land – chiefly 
in Flanders (because of the high population density). Consequently, in the 
presence of positive transaction costs, it is possible that is more profitable to 
rent out plots that are far from the main farm buildings and rent in plots 
that are nearby. 
Agricultural organisations and experts report a notable, mounting 
trend in the number of seasonal tenancy contracts and informal tenancies 
between pensioners and young farmers. This trend relates to the low prices 
for legal tenancy, which has been reinforced by the introduction of direct 
payments. Since direct payments were launched, support has no longer 
been distributed through market prices to farmers, but has been linked to 
the hectares that a farmer or tenant had. In the case of a seasonal or 
informal tenancy contract, the support is received by the landowner and 
not the tenant. Pensioners thus prefer to rent out their land through the 
latter contracts to going through an official contract or selling it. 
Speculation on changes to zoning regulations also enhances the preference 
for such contracts. Where the zoning regulations change and the owner 
wants to sell the plot, the tenancy legislation determines that (s)he has to 
pay the tenant compensation. But this stipulation does not apply to 
seasonal tenancy or informal contracts. Agricultural organisations argue 
that an increase in the legal tenancy price could motivate farmers to rent 
out land to young farmers under the tenancy legislation (VILT, 2008). 
In France, 75.8% of the UAA of FADN farms was rented in 2006.50 
The share has shown robust growth since 1990, when it stood at 59.9%. In 
Bretagne, 72.5% of the UAA of FADN farms was rented in 2006 (up from 
56.4% in 1990). In the Centre region, the 2006 figure was 85.2% (up from 
72.2% in 1990). 
In Germany, the reallocation of agricultural land takes place mostly 
on the rental market. In 2007, the share of rented land of the total utilised 
area was 61.7% (10.4 million hectares), with regional differences ranging 
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from 44.6% in Bavaria to 89.9% in Saxony. In 2007, 46,500 farms 
(approximately 13%) operated solely on rented land. The average share of 
rented land has been regressing slightly, but this tendency is only owing to 
sales transactions by the BVVG in East Germany (see Box 3).  
 
Box 3. Specifics of the land market in East Germany 
An important characteristic of the land market in East Germany is the state 
trust-holding BVVG as an additional actor. The BVVG is an exclusive state-
run trust initiated in 1992 after the German reunification. Its tasks are to 
manage and privatise 1.4 million hectares of the agricultural land areas 
formerly owned by the state in East Germany. By the end of 2007, nearly half 
of those land areas had been privatised through reassignment or sales to 
private persons or corporate bodies. With the current volume of 909,000 
hectares of agricultural land, the BVVG is still the largest landowner in the 
new länder. The amount of land rented by 2008 represented 524,100 hectares 
– of which 415,100 hectares (or 79%) were rented in long-term agreements. 
The average rents for existing contracts were €127/ha. Rents for the newly 
rented 33,320 hectares rose by 33% (from €124 to €186/ha) against 2006. As 
an intermediate step towards final privatisation, long-term rental contracts 
between the BVVG and tenants have a stabilising effect on the land market 
in East Germany.  
By the end of 2007, 61% of the privatised land had been sold at a 
reduced price (65% of the current market value) because of the 
Compensation and Indemnity Act, which has kept land prices in the East 
German regions at a relatively low level. At the same time, the BVVG has 
expanded the use of invitation bids as its key instrument – a step that has 
stimulated an average rise in market prices by 22% (ranging from 42% in 
Saxony-Anhalt to 4% in Thuringia) in 2006–07. Since the rental contracts that 
are expiring cannot be renewed, there is an additional incentive to buy as 
much land as possible to enable farming activities to continue. 
A large share of the land under long-term rental contracts needs to be 
allocated for sales at reduced prices according to the Compensation and 
Indemnity Act. Buyer’s options are attached to long-term rental contracts, 
and therefore they will end on the expiry date of those contracts, which is 
between 2010 and 2014. The remaining land will be sold at market value, at a 
volume not exceeding 25,000 hectares annually. This implies that the BVVG 
will continue to have a direct influence on land market, 
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In West Germany, the share of rented land has continually expanded 
(from 42.5% in 1991 to 60% in 2007). In East Germany, the originally high 
share of rented land has been steadily shrinking. When the economic 
situation allows, purchasing land is considered a reasonable option 
compared with renting land. Despite this development, renting (over 60% 
nationwide and over 80% in East Germany) continues to play a primary 
role in the German land market. 
At the aggregate level, the share of the rented area in total 
agricultural land has remained almost unchanged in the last five years. 
With regard to the trend since 1991, the rented area dropped slightly for the 
first time in 2005. Changes in the share of rental agreements have continued 
in the opposite direction for the two parts of Germany, although the 
differences have not diminished over that time (Figure 46). 
In Bavaria, the share of rented land of the total UAA is the lowest of 
all the federal states. In 2005, about 83,100 farms rented 1,455,400 hectares 
of UAA, which equates to 44.6% of the total UAA. This total rent share 
breaks down to 40.2% of the area rented for full-time farming, a low 25% of 
the area rented for part-time farming and 52% of the area rented by legal 
entities. The rent share in the case study region of south-east Upper Bavaria 
was at the low level of 33.9%. The rent share rose from 35.7% in 1999 to the 
present value of 44.6% (BayStMLF, 2006) for all of Bavaria and from 28.9% 
to 33.9% for the regions studied. The reason for the small size of the land 
market in Bavaria is the farm structure that has naturally developed there, 
being primarily dominated by individual family farms. Farmers there tend 
to have traditional values and a desire to maintain family property. Thus, 
they prefer to run their farms on a part-time basis – even if it is not the most 
profitable way to exploit their labour – instead of renting or selling the 
land. If they quit the farm business, they will usually rent their land, but 
they will not sell it. 
In Lower Saxony, the share of rented land of the total UAA is the 
third lowest among all federal states in Germany. In 2005, about 35,818 
farms rented 1,089,050 hectares of UAA, which equates to 52.7% of the total 
UAA. The share in Lower Saxony has fluctuated – expanding from 52.2% in 
1999 to 55.7% in 2003 and then contracting to the present value of 52.7% 
(DBV,  1999–2008). The share of rented land in the case study region of 
Weser-Ems is at the low end (48.3%), although it has risen from 42.6%. 
The relatively high rental prices in Lower Saxony are not only linked 
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policy-induced. One reason for the rising rental prices is the fact that farms 
with high stocking densities increasingly need land in order to comply with 
the restrictions for organic nitrogen application of the European Nitrates 
Directive. With decoupling and cross-compliance, this restriction became 
financially relevant for intensive diary farms for the first time. Like farmers 
in Bavaria, those in Lower Saxony also see maintaining family property as 
a goal, preferring to rent rather than sell their land. 
Countries with a medium to low share of rented farmland (<50%) 
In Finland, the share of rented land has been steadily increasing since 1974. 
This increase can be partially explained by future expectations of 
transferring land ownership through inheritance and the tendency to rent it 
out in the meantime.  
In Greece, the share of rented land is rather small, because 
agricultural land is usually cultivated by landowners and to a lesser extent 
by tenants. When land is rented, is it generally for just one farming period 
(and although infrequent, the period can last for up to four years). 
State-owned land is also rented. In the past, farmers used to pay in 
kind (about 20-25% of total production), but there were some problems in 
practice. As a result, farmers now have to pay the value of the production 
that they would have given as rent. Cooperatives that redistributed or 
rented state-owned land to farmers who did own any property were 
created to facilitate the operation of this system. 
In Italy, the amount of land rented was about 25% of the total UAA in 
2005. The amount differs among regions, from above 45% (Val d’Aosta, 
Lombardia and Friuli Venezia Giulia) to under 15% (Trentino Alto Adige, 
Puglia, Calabria and Sicilia). 
The amount of land rented is increasing (up from 17.9% in 1990 to 
25% in 2005); however, the share varies from year to year and is highly 
responsive to policy and market prices. Renting land is now a key 
component in structural change within the farm sector. But even where 
land rental is less prevalent, it can be critical at the local level for specific 
crops. Renting land is especially practical in some instances, for example in 
the case of livestock production (spreading manure or ensuring the 
provision of adequate foraging, or both) or vegetable production (e.g. 
tomatoes), for which rotation is important. 
In the study region of Puglia, the share of rented land is rather small 
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In the Netherlands, the amount of newly rented farmland is declining 
each year, as landlords hesitate to lease land again after rental contracts 
expire. Figure 57 plots new rental contracts and the total area these entail. 
The large spike in 1996 was caused by many renegotiated rental contracts 
after the first round of rent liberalisation in 1995. 
In Spain, 30% of the UAA is rented or farmed as a sharecropping 
activity. This implies that depending on the contract specification, the SPS 
benefits may accrue to both landowners and land users (farmers). 
In Sweden, information on how much of the agricultural land is 
rented is only available for five years (see Table 33). The share of rented 
land of the total UAA is about 40-45%. This share has reduced somewhat 
since the 2003 reform. 
In the UK, the proportion of English farmland that is leased has 
remained relatively stable since 2000 (at about 36%) after a period of 
decline until 1995. This pattern suggests that the ATA was successful in 
stimulating more land for lease in England, as shown in Figure 73. The 
figure also shows the significant variance in the rental value of grazing and 
cropping land in less favoured areas, which fully reflects the earning 
potential of the different types of land. These trends are also shown for full 
agricultural tenancies in Figure 73. 
Most farms in Northern Ireland include some rented land, with only 
about 7% of farms entirely rented or leased, 48% having a mixture of 
owned and rented land and 45% being entirely owner-occupied.51 
Figure 74 illustrates that the amount of land leased (hectares) in 
Northern Ireland has remained relatively stable at around 70% since 1999. 
There was, however, a 4% fall between 2000 and 2003, before a slight 
recovery post-2004 to reach 69% in 2007. 
In Scotland, there has been a continuing downward trend in the 
proportion of leased farmland, from 40.6% in 1982 to 28.9% in 2007 (Figure 
76). This is a long-term trend and the introduction of new kinds of leases to 
stimulate the rental market has failed to bring more land forward. In 
particular, landowners do not like the fact that new leases are for a 
maximum of 5 years or a minimum of 15 years with no scope for 
arrangements between (10 years had been the average length under the 
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former Limited Partnership for renting land in Scotland). As such, coupled 
with the introduction of the SPS, many landowners have chosen (where 
possible) to take the land in and farm it themselves, gaining the benefits of 
the SPS. 
6.3  Drivers of rental prices 
The key drivers of rental prices in the agricultural land markets of the 
EUSCs are reported in Table 6. The first column lists the major 
determinants according to land market theory and national expert 
assessments. Columns 2-12 indicate the relative significance of the 
determinants in each country. 
6.3.1  Agricultural commodity prices 
Similar to the impact on agricultural land prices, agricultural commodity 
prices affect land rents in almost all the countries studied (Table 6). 
Nevertheless, on average, the impact is less pronounced on land rents than 
on land prices. 
Turning to country-specific results, we find that in Belgium, for 
example, one of the key determinants of the legal rental prices is the 
profitability of agricultural production. An often-used indicator for 
measuring farm profitability is income. Figure 35 reports the evolution of 
the deflated entrepreneurial income per AWU (€/AWU) in constant 1989 
prices. In the period 1983–85, the average deflated entrepreneurial income 
per AWU was €15,565, shrinking further to €12,157 in the period 2004–06. 
Maximum rental prices depend on the profitability of the agricultural 
sector during two successive periods of three years. The coefficients, 
determined in 1989, thus depend on the profitability of the periods 1983–85 
and 1986–88. The increase in the average profitability in the period 1989–91 
may explain the 10% increase in rental prices in the period 1992–95. In 1992, 
the tenancy coefficients rose on average by 11%. Still, there is wide 
variation in the increase, as in some agricultural districts the coefficients 
remained the same, whereas in other districts the coefficients grew by more 
than 20%. 
According to the experts interviewed in Germany, rising commodity 
prices led to rising rents for agricultural land. From a long-term historical 
perspective, however, trends in land rents diverge considerably from 
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commodity price developments. This tendency is mostly related to the high 
share of long-term rental contracts, which do not reflect contemporary 
price movements. 
In the German region of Bavaria, a steady incline in rental prices can 
be observed. The experts interviewed stated that in the long run, increases 
in agricultural productivity influence rental prices. Even so, the actual rises 
in commodity prices have led and will lead to additional upward pressures 
on rents. 
6.3.2 Agricultural  productivity 
The results reported in Table 6 suggest that on average the impact of 
agricultural productivity on agricultural land rents is similar to the impact 
of agricultural commodity prices. Generally, both drivers together 
determine more than 50% of agricultural land rents in the EUSCs. 
At the same time, there are some differences in the relative 
importance of the two drivers among countries. For example, in Spain the 
variables that influence greater land productivity are temperature, rainfall 
and irrigation (among others), all of which are linked to farming 
performance. How both irrigation and temperature positively affect land 
values has been verified in statistical terms, which reveal that values are 
higher in regions with higher temperatures and irrigated lands owing to 
the possibility of incorporating certain tree crops (citrus fruits and banana 
plantations) or protected crops (greenhouse production). On the other 
hand, land values in regions with greater rainfalls do not vary from those 
of dryer regions. Furthermore, the rental share is also higher in regions 
with higher average temperatures and for irrigated land than for 
unirrigated areas, as observed for land prices. Rainfalls have a negative 
effect on land rents. Therefore, the highest rents are observed in the driest 
regions thanks to the prevalence of irrigated land, which increases land 
productivity. The implication is that intensive crop-growing is linked to 
irrigated land and good temperatures (in the Balearics, the Valencian 
Community, the Canary Islands and Andalucia). 
6.3.3 The  CAP 
We find that both coupled and decoupled agricultural policies affect 
farmland rents in the EUSCs (Table 6). Comparing rows 5 and 7 in Table 6 
suggests that the impact of the SPS on agricultural land rents is greater than 
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suggesting that market imperfections and transaction costs may indeed 
play a significant role in decision behaviour as mentioned in chapter 5. In 
addition, the relatively small role of coupled payments in determining land 
values can be explained by the tiny share of coupled payments in the total 
subsidy value at the time of SPS implementation. 
Country-specific analysis suggests that in France, where the farmland 
rental market is highly regulated, the SPS has not significantly affected land 
rents or farmers’ preferences for renting or purchasing land. Hence, the SPS 
has had no direct impact on the rental market. 
In Germany, the effect of introducing the SPS on land values is 
estimated as low. As there is a shortage of eligible areas in relation to the 
number of entitlements, rental prices should increase if the earlier coupled 
payments have not already been capitalised into land rents. With the 
decoupling, average payment levels for marginal grassland increased. 
Since 2007, a rise in rental prices for grassland has also been apparent (see 
Figure 48, which plots farmland rents in Germany for 1991–2007). 
This change towards a market orientation has elevated rental prices. 
Nearly one-third of the experts interviewed supported this conclusion. Yet, 
the effect of decoupled payments on rental prices for grassland and arable 
land has not been the same. Statistical data show a significant increase in 
the average rental price per hectare for grassland by €4 from 2005 to 2007, 
which had been stable at the level of €121/ha from 2001 to 2005. This 
increase is attributable to the lack of direct payments for grassland before 
2005. The average rental price for arable land grew by €6/ha in the period 
2005–07, which is less than the average two-year growth value for the 
period 2003–05. A further reason for the recent upward trend in rental 
prices given by the experts surveyed is that rents are more determined by 
market factors than by regulatory measures.  
According to Figure 48, the positive trend in average rents for 
agricultural land is mostly determined by rising rents for arable land. Over 
the period 1991–2007, rents for arable land rose, while for grassland the 
upward trend started from 1999. After earlier gains, from 2003 onwards 
these positive trends for arable and grassland flattened. Since the 
implementation of the SPS in 2005, no change in the general trend has been 
observed. Based on this development in land rents, a correlation between 
the shift to the SPS and land rents is not evident. For the most part, this 
relates to the long-term rental contracts (with an average duration of 10-12 
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interviewed estimated that rents for recently rented areas are significantly 
higher than average rents for the existing rental contracts. Although these 
qualitative data suggest that expectations about rent rises have grown, 
there is still no evidence of any effect of the SPS on current or expected land 
values. 
In Bavaria, the experts interviewed agreed that if decoupling 
influences rental prices at all, it is for marginal grassland (especially in the 
mountain pastures). In these areas, rents may swell, as such areas hardly 
received any first-pillar payments prior to decoupling and the payments 
introduced will even rise from €89/ha to €340/ha by 2013 (DBV, 2007). 
In Saxony, only two out of eight experts said that decoupling had or 
will have an influence on rental prices. Again, rental prices for grassland 
seemed more likely to be affected, because payments for grassland had not 
existed prior to decoupling and the new payments are set to increase from 
€111/ha to €359/ha by 2013 (DBV, 2007). 
In Italy, the introduction of the SPS has had a moderate impact on 
rental prices for agricultural land, affecting the rental market more than 
sales. There has been some influence on land rents, which are increasing 
above all for land with entitlements.52 (An overview of the main drivers of 
the land market in Italy is given in Table 28.) Differences in the rental prices 
reported by the experts interviewed range between 10% and 30%. Table 30 
reports the impact of the SPS on land rental markets in Italy. 
The reform has touched other aspects connected with land rentals. 
One effect was the reduction of market activity to some extent, owing to 
uncertainty about policy, as evidenced in price stability. Still, according to 
the experts interviewed, this effect was not very substantial. As noted 
earlier, during the transition phase, the shift to the SPS induced other 
diverse reactions in terms of normative and institutional arrangements 
(including the formalisation of contracts), mostly aimed at maintaining 
previous commitments. 
Effects of the reform can also be seen in extensification in some areas 
or the reduction of cultivation in marginal areas (but with good practices); 
still more ramifications are felt from decoupling in livestock, tomato and 
fruit farming. 
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The adoption of the SPS in Italy has contributed to the emergence of 
two ‘separate’ rental markets, specialising in ineligible and eligible land, 
with the SPS having increased the rental prices of the latter. Unfortunately, 
no statistical figures on the two types of land values are available yet. 
Moreover, after evaluating the expert assessments, we conclude that the 
survey responses often mix higher land values stemming from eligibility 
with higher values owing to entitlements being sold with land. Given that 
the survey results suffer from an ‘identification problem’ in this respect, 
they are not sufficiently reliable for quantifying the price differences of 
eligible and ineligible land. 
In Emilia Romagna, the introduction of the SPS has contributed to a 
slight increase in rental prices, resulting from higher demand for eligible 
land to benefit from the payments. The national experts interviewed 
believed that the SPS had elevated land rents by 10-30% compared with 
land without entitlements. At the same time, causes other than the SPS 
could have also played a role (especially agricultural prices). 
The adoption of the SPS has not had large consequences for the 
number of land rental transactions in Emilia Romagna. Usually land rent 
includes land and entitlements for the eligible areas; land rents with 
entitlements were about 20-40% higher compared with those without (of 
which 60-70% is the price for the land). The variance of 20-40% depends on 
the zone in which the SPS applies and the value of the entitlements. 
In the Netherlands, there is no information available on how the SPS 
has affected land rents. But there is a court case on lease expiration, in 
which the tenant was requested to hand over the entitlements to the 
landowner. Such a request is in conflict with the current legislation and the 
outcome is unknown, as the tenants may appeal to the higher court (see 
Box 13 in chapter 8). 
In Spain, the value of entitlements per region increases the value of 
land, except for the average value of the special entitlements in the ACs, 
which do not affect land values because these entitlements are not directly 
linked to the owned land. 
In Sweden, the SPS is judged to have had a larger impact on land 
rents than on land prices, and the experts surveyed are more concordant in 
their view of how the SPS affects land rents than they are with respect to 
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6.3.4 Other  factors 
Among other drivers of rental prices, the most important are bio-energy, 
farm size and non-economic factors. 
In Germany, similar to land sales prices, the impact of bio-energy 
production on rents has been substantial in West Germany but very minor 
in East Germany. This disparity is mostly related to the different average 
farm size and to variations in land supply in the two parts of the country. 
Meanwhile, a overall slight increase in German rents in conjunction 
with farm size was reported in all of the case study regions. This positive 
correlation applies to arable land, grassland and livestock holdings. A 
further significant factor that affects the reservation prices of land on the 
part of tenants and thereby land rents is the difference in the employment 
structures prevailing in West and East Germany. This underlying 
difference leads to disparate rental prices in the two halves of the country 
(i.e. €227 per ha in West Germany and €119 per ha in East Germany).  
In East Germany, rental market dynamics are still largely influenced 
by the BVVG, i.e. by the way the BVVG awarded rental contracts after the 
reunification. The administrative prices set by the BVVG served as 
representative prices for the rest of the market participants. Although the 
system has changed in the last few years, the effects are still present on the 
rental markets mainly owing to the often long duration of rental contracts 
that were initially awarded. The experts interviewed agreed that this 
practice raises prices.  
Another notable characteristic in East Germany is worker migration 
to West Germany, where the labour market situation is better. 
Consequently, the degree of urban pressure is low. Only in the large 
centres in the Saxonian Loess region, such as Leipzig or Dresden, is the 
urban pressure measurable. 
In the East German region of Saxony, a steady rental price increase 
has been observable since the reunification in 1989. One reason for this is 
the initially low average rental price of €65/ha in 1991. The average rental 
price for West Germany was at that time €217/ha. High GDP growth rates 
and general wage rises have boosted rental prices for land in East 
Germany. The experts interviewed agreed that in the long run, the growth 
of inflation also influences rental prices. 
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In Greece, the same characteristics that influence sales markets hold 
for rental markets. Non-economic factors, such state-owned land, multiple 
uses by owners, culture and abandoned land significantly affect the land 
rental prices.  
In the Italian regions of Emilia Romagna and Puglia, farm size is 
among the key drivers that have contributed to rental price increases in 
recent years. In particular, the trend towards expansion by a limited 
number of large farms has enhanced the demand for land rentals. 
In Spain, land prices and land rents are higher in those regions where 
the surface area for farming is smaller and farms tend to be smaller on 
average. This might also be partly owing to the tendency of large farms to 
engage in less-intensive crop farming; in addition, areas with smallholdings 
tend to require more work. Furthermore, it is more common for individuals 
with additional financial resources to acquire small rural properties, as 
opposed to larger ones – a practice that leads to the price of land rising in 
areas with smallholdings.  
For Sweden, the relative impact of different factors on rental prices 
for agricultural land during 2003–07 is mapped out in Figure 68. The results 
for land rents differ to some extent from land prices. The three most critical 
determinants were the same, however. On average, the experts surveyed 
thought that the profitability of increasing farm size, farmer’s expectations 
about the future and rising commodity prices had the greatest positive 
impact on land rents (Figure 68). Among these, the experts singled out 
increasing farm size as having had the most positive effect on agricultural 
land rents during the period. Average farm size in Sweden has expanded 
over time – a pattern that seems to have begun in 1997. The decrease shown 
in 2005 is solely due to the emergence of small units that had previously 
not been registered. The introduction of the SPS changed the incentives to 
rent land, as small plots of grazing land also became eligible for the 
support. The long-term trend towards larger farm sizes resumed thereafter.  124 | 
 
 
7.  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPS 
The beginnings of the CAP date back to the period of formation of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The emphasis of the early 
CAP was on encouraging agricultural productivity, maintaining a stable 
supply of affordable food for consumers and ensuring a viable agricultural 
sector. The support to farmers was implemented predominantly through a 
price support system, by which farmers were guaranteed high prices. This 
early CAP had a major impact on agricultural markets. Most importantly, it 
led to a high rise in farm productivity and created large surpluses of the 
major farm commodities on the EU market, some of which were exported 
(with the help of subsidies), others of which had to be stored or disposed of 
within the EU. These measures had a high budgetary cost and distorted 
world markets. At the same time, there were increasing concerns about the 
environmental sustainability of agriculture.  
To circumvent these developments, some important changes were 
made to the CAP in the 1980s, but especially at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The first substantial reform of the CAP occurred in 1992, known as the 
MacSharry reform, followed by the Agenda 2000 reform. To reduce market 
imbalances, domestic prices were reduced and the income loss to farmers 
was redressed through compensatory direct payments. The amounts of 
these payments depended on historical rather than current production. 
These reforms thus cut the link between support to farmers and 
production. Yet, farmers were still obliged to produce certain agricultural 
commodities in order to obtain the direct payments. Simultaneously, a 
ceiling was put on subsidy expenditures to keep the costs of the CAP under 
control.  
In 2003, EU farm ministers adopted another substantial reform to the 
CAP. The 2003 CAP reform decoupled most of the direct payments by 
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introducing the SPS. At the same time, member states were allowed to 
maintain some specific subsidies coupled to production. The direct 
payments under the new system are linked to compliance with 
environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards, as well as the 
requirement to keep land in good agricultural and environmental condition 
(i.e. cross-compliance requirements). 
7.1  SPS implementation models 
The CAP reform of 2003 launched the policy by which farm subsidies are 
determined as a fixed set of payments per farm – the SPS. Under the SPS, 
the farmer is entitled to a yearly payment depending on the number of 
payment entitlements and eligible hectares (s)he possesses (see Table 18 for 
more details). 
As noted earlier, when it came to implementing the SPS, member 
states could choose among the historical, regional and hybrid models. 
Under the historical model, the SPS payment is farm-specific and equals the 
support the farm received in the reference period. This is the most common 
SPS model (Table 8). Under the regional model, an equal per-hectare 
payment is granted to all farms in the region. 
The hybrid model is a combination of the historical and regional 
models. Member states could also choose between a dynamic and a static 
version of the hybrid model. If a member state has implemented the 
dynamic hybrid model, there is a phased move towards a model that is 
fully regional. The historical component gradually decreases while the 
regional component gradually increases over time. For example, England, 
Finland and Germany have implemented the dynamic hybrid model. On 
the other hand, if a member state has applied the static hybrid model, 
neither the regional nor historical shares change over time (e.g. Northern 
Ireland and Sweden) (Table 8). 
7.2  Explaining the choice of SPS model 
According to the country studies, political economy factors explain the 
choice of SPS model implemented in the EUSCs. In most of the countries 
covered in this study, the model chosen represents the interests of farmers. 
Concern over the redistribution of subsidies was by far the most important 
factor that led most EUSCs to choose the historical model instead of the 
regional one (Table 19). It appears that countries with the hybrid model, 
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redistribution issue), but also the costs of implementation (the regional 
model is less costly). They further took into account the potential future 
costs of changing the current SPS model to the regional model, as the 
historical model was perceived not to be politically sustainable in the end, 
and hence the shift to a regional model would eventually be required. In 
addition, a key factor that motivated England, Finland and Germany to 
choose the dynamic hybrid model instead of directly implementing the 
regional model was the intention to smooth the adjustment of the 
agricultural sector at the start of SPS implementation (see Box 4). In 
Belgium, the choice was also influenced by the application of the historical 
model in neighbouring countries France and the Netherlands. Belgian farm 
unions contended that implementing a different model from France and the 
Netherlands would disadvantage farmers in Belgium. France is one of the 
most conservative EU countries in terms of implementation of the 2003 
CAP reform. France chose to retain the maximum coupling rates in order to 
minimise unpredictable adjustment costs in the farming sector (see Box 5).  
 
Box 4. The SPS model in Germany 
Germany has applied the dynamic hybrid model since 2005. Starting in 2010, 
the hybrid scheme will be transformed stepwise into a purely regional model 
by 2013. 
In addition, Germany implemented a regionalised version of the 
dynamic hybrid model, which is obligatory for a member state with more than 
3 million hectares. The regions are the same as the federal states, with the 
exception of Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen, which were assigned to the 
surrounding federal states, thus resulting in 13 premium regions. In 2005, a 
national ceiling for payment entitlements was set at €5.15 billion. From this 
amount, 1% was used to set up a national reserve. 
The distribution of the SPS ceiling among regions based on payments 
received in the reference period was expected to create large differences in the 
values of the entitlements. To avoid this imbalance, 35% of the payments were 
distributed according to the eligible area of a region and only 65% according to 
payments actually received during the reference period. This share was 
determined in a way that allows no region to lose more than 5% of its premium 
payments, and at the same time the payments per hectare do not differ more 
than €100 between two regions. 
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Box 5. The SPS model in France 
France is one of the most conservative EU countries with regard to applying 
the 2003 CAP reform. France chose the historical model, with the maximum 
allowed rates of coupling of direct payments. Moreover, France delayed the 
implementation of the reform until 2006.  
Analysis conducted by the French ministry of agriculture showed that 
more regionalised options would lead to important changes in incomes among 
farmers, with producers of field crops (cereals and oilseeds) being net losers. 
Before implementation of the SPS, the main farmers’ unions (i.e. the 
FNSEA and Coordination Rurale) pressed for a historical model to avoid a 
change in the distribution of support. Yet, the Confédération Paysanne (a left-
wing farmer’s union) was in favour of a regionalised implementation model, 
benefiting extensive agricultural systems.  
With the recent agricultural price increases, internal divisions within the 
FNSEA have appeared. More specifically, prices of cereals and oilseeds are 
very high; consequently, animal producers have sought a redistribution of 
first-pillar direct aids in their favour, but field crop farmers have resisted, 
arguing that the future of CAP direct support is not secure. There is also a 
division among regions within the FNSEA: regions where average subsidies 
are rather low are in favour of a more redistributive SPS model. 
Finally, it is interesting to note the position of the French administrative 
NUTS 2 regions on the SPS model. All NUTS 2 regional governments but one 
are now on the opposite political side of the French national government: 
regions are asking for an application of the SPS using the regional model, but 
here again, each region is playing its own card. 
As for landowners, they were unhappy about the reform in itself, 
claiming that giving the SPS to farmers and not landowners was a way of 
dispossessing landlords of their ownership titles. 
 
Northern Ireland adopted the static hybrid model because it was 
perceived to be the fairest, chiefly with respect to the relationship between 
beef suckler producers and finishers. If a historical model had been 
adopted, the finishers would have received the vast majority of the SPS 
benefits, while the hybrid approach offsets this to some extent.  
France along with Spain decided to keep coupled subsidies for a 
significant number of sectors. In contrast, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and 
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concerns of EUSCs regarding decoupling was land abandonment, change 
in production structures and a departure from extensive farming practices. 
In Spain, various coupled subsidies were maintained to avoid 
abandonment of farming as a result of the low productivity of dry crops 
and extensive cattle rearing. There were concerns that a full decoupling 
would lead to cultivation of monocultures (cereals), and that rice, protein 
crops and hard wheat production would likely be forsaken. Meanwhile, 
Greece took an opposite view. Decoupling was perceived as a way to 
eliminate the distortions arising out of coupled subsidies and enable 
farmers to produce the most profitable commodities – thus reducing the 
threat of land abandonment. In the case of Ireland, all subsidies were 
decoupled to ensure the full use of support payments. It was expected that 
production would decline even if payments were to remain coupled and 
this would have reduced the future level of support to Irish farmers.  
7.3  Empirical evidence on the implementation of the SPS 
The total value of the SPS ceiling was around €30 billion in the EU-15 in 
2006 (Table 9). The largest recipients of the total SPS payments among EU-
15 countries are France, Germany, the UK and Italy. The average value of 
the SPS ceiling is €226/ha in the EU-15, with Portugal having the lowest 
value (€97/ha) and Greece the highest (€513/ha). 
The decoupling rate for direct payments varies among member states. 
For the EUSCs for which data are available, the largest decoupling rates in 
2006 were in Ireland, Germany and the UK, followed by Sweden (see Table 
10 and Table 20). 
7.3.1  Activation of SPS entitlements 
Table 12 shows data on entitlements in the EUSCs (see Table 21 for study 
regions). In most countries, the number of activated entitlements and the 
eligible area is smaller than the total UAA. Only in Germany and Finland is 
the number of activated entitlements roughly the same as the UAA.53 
                                                      
53 One may not expect that the number of activated entitlements is higher than the 
UAA. A greater number of activated entitlements than the UAA may occur in cases 
where farms use fallow land to activate entitlements. For example, in 2006 total 
fallow land in the UAA in Finland and Germany was 11% and 4%, respectively. 
Yet this may also depend on the quality of data sources. In calculations provided in 
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Figure 23 shows that the share of activated entitlements in the UAA tends 
to be larger in countries that have implemented the hybrid model than in 
countries using the historical model. This is because with the historical 
model the total number of entitlements corresponds to the number of 
hectares that generated subsidies in the reference period. Under the hybrid 
model (or regional model), the total number of entitlements is equal to all 
land declared eligible at the time of SPS implementation. 
The total number of distributed entitlements compared with the total 
eligible area is quite high in all the EUSCs except in Greece and Spain. In 
Finland, the total number of distributed entitlements even exceeds the 
eligible area. Based on the theoretical results presented in the previous 
section, this may stimulate capitalisation of the SPS into land prices. 
Similarly, in Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Ireland and Scotland 
there may be pressure in the direction of capitalising the SPS into land 
values as the total distributed entitlements are almost equal to the total 
eligible area.54 
The share of non-activated entitlements among total distributed 
entitlements is relatively low. For most EUSCs, it is less than 3%. The 
exception is Belgium, where approximately 7% of entitlements were not 
activated in 2006. This outcome is linked to the declining livestock sector in 
Belgium. As a result, more special entitlements tend to remain non-
activated than regular entitlements. In 2005, 73% of special entitlements 
and 97% of regular entitlements of the total entitlements distributed were 
activated in Flanders. Similar developments have been observed in 
Wallonia, but no exact data are available. Table 11 shows non-activated 
entitlements by region in Germany in 2005. The variation ranges between 
0.2% and 3.4% of the total distributed entitlements. At the same time, the 
                                                                                                                                       
Table 12 and Table 21, we use the UAA from Eurostat, while for activated 
entitlements we draw from the country studies.  
54 Non-activated eligible land for which the SPS is not claimed represents ‘naked 
land’. The total amount of naked land tends to be smaller with the hybrid model 
(or regional model) than with the historical model. The explanation lies in the 
characteristic that the total number of entitlements in the hybrid model is equal to 
all eligible land at the time of SPS implementation, as noted earlier; by contrast, in 
the historical model entitlements are tied to the number of hectares that generated 
subsidies in the reference period. As a result, the hybrid model is expected to put 
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value of non-activated entitlements tends to be lower (by 25% on average) 
than the value of activated entitlements. The main reasons farms do not 
activate some of their entitlements in Germany are i) insufficient 
availability of eligible area and ii) although farmers can search for and 
trade entitlements, the related costs are not insignificant (especially when 
farms only want to trade a small number of entitlements), at least some of 
which are fixed regardless of the number of entitlements being traded. 
Similarly, the existence of mostly very low-value entitlements that are left 
non-activated in the Netherlands is rooted in the administrative burden as 
well as insufficient eligible area. 
The Spanish data show that overall the share of non-activated 
entitlements is relatively low. Even so, there is some regional variation in 
non-activated entitlements, with the highest in the region of Valencia – 
representing around 10% of the total available entitlements in 2006 and 
2007. More specifically, these entitlements relate to the olive sector and 
livestock (Cantabrian coast) and correspond to small farms (of less than 1 
hectare) that have not applied for SPS payments as farming is not their 
main source of income. 
In France, several factors lead to the non-activation of entitlements, 
among which the most common are i) a lack of land owing to a smaller 
utilised area today compared with the area in the reference period, ii) 
ineligible crops (or plant cultivation) on the area, and iii) discrepancies 
found in monitoring checks of the areas declared as eligible for subsidies. 
In Sweden, unused entitlements were not activated mainly because of 
landowners taking the land back, while their former tenants could not 
activate their entitlements. Another reason could be that some farmers have 
applied for land plots that have turned out to be too costly to keep in 
GAEC.  
In the UK, common reasons for not using entitlements are the loss of 
land or death without succession, the sale of land for horse paddocks (the 
land is split and the buyers do not want the SPS entitlements), the payment 
t h a t  w o u l d  b e  r e c e i v e d  i s  v e r y  s m a l l 55 and avoidance of set-aside 
regulations. 
                                                      
55 This situation was mainly the case of fruit/vegetable and potato farms in 
England because these farmers expected to receive smaller SPS subsidies in the 
early years of the hybrid scheme. Such farms did not receive subsidies in the 
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7.3.2  Value of SPS entitlements 
Table 12 shows that there is variation in the average value of entitlements 
among member states. This is determined by commodity structure as well 
as by productivity differences. There are also significant dissimilarities 
within member states. Two important factors lead to variation in the value 
of entitlements within member states. First, the SPS model creates large 
differences in entitlement values among farmers. The historical model leads 
to a greater range of values than the hybrid model does, because under the 
historical model the entitlement value depends on the subsidies farms 
received in the reference period and the area that generated these 
payments. This is illustrated in Figure 24 for the Netherlands and Sweden. 
The figure shows the distribution of the value of entitlements. The 
Netherlands implements the historical model and the divergence in the 
value of entitlements is higher than in Sweden, which implements the static 
hybrid model. In Sweden, the regional component is on average around 
82% of the entitlement value, and most land receives an average value of 
entitlement. More than 2% of land in the Netherlands has an entitlement 
with a value around five times larger than the average, while around 9% of 
land has an entitlement value of 20% of the average. 
Second, the variation in the value of entitlements within the EUSCs 
stems from farm and regional specialisation along with productivity 
differences. In general, land that is more fertile tends to have entitlements 
with a higher value. For example, in Sweden, the most valuable 
entitlements are in the most fertile region in southern Sweden (€299 per 
entitlement). The least fertile areas in northern Sweden have the lowest-
value entitlements (€191 per entitlement). In Finland, the hybrid model 
seems to reduce the variance. The regional component was around 80% of 
the total entitlement value at the start of SPS introduction. The regional 
variation of the value of entitlements is €50–100/ha in Finland. 
Cattle farms have the largest entitlement value (€318–333 per 
entitlement) in Ireland. Larger, more intensively operated farms in the 
south-east region have a higher SPS payment per holding than the smaller, 
more extensive farms in the west and border regions. The recipients of the 
largest SPS payments are mostly located in the Leinster region. Payments 
                                                                                                                                       
reference period; therefore, the historical component of the SPS payment was zero 
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per farm there range from €15,000 to €90,000 per farm. This reflects the 
intensive nature of farming in these regions as well as the larger than 
average farm size. 
There are marked differences in the value of entitlements in large 
countries, as there are significant distinctions among regions in terms of 
product specialisation, productivity and land fertility. For example, the 
value of entitlements among regions in Italy ranges from €58 per 
entitlement to €445 per entitlement. The plains have substantially more 
valuable entitlements than mountainous regions (Figure 25). Most of the 
payments in the study region Emilia Romagna derive from arable-crop area 
payments. For this reason, the differences are not as pronounced as in other 
regions. In contrast, entitlements in the study region Puglia are extremely 
diverse compared with other regions, ranging from €300 to €3,500 per 
entitlement. Differences are connected to the tendency of some farms to 
cumulate payments for cereals, olive and tomato production. 
Significant disparities in the value of entitlements similarly exist 
among regions in Spain. The values range from Andalucia at the top, with 
values of around 70% above average, to Madrid, where the value is 40% 
below average.  
In France, regional variations in SPS values mimic the product 
specialisation of the region, combined with the associated rate of 
decoupling. Thus, within regions, the variation among farms is high where 
production is especially heterogeneous (e.g. Indre in central France and 
Vaucluse in southern France), and low where production is homogenous 
(e.g. Marne around Paris). 
The standard deviation from the average value of entitlements 
among farms in Germany spans from €75 per entitlement in Sachsen-
Anhalt to €180 in Rhineland Palatine. Large differences are notable in 
regions with pastoral livestock owing to the impact of the farm-specific 
component in the entitlement value. 
In the UK, the SPS payments differ either because of disparities in the 
historical intensity of production or regulations concerning the 
implementation of the SPS (or both). For example, in Scotland and Wales 
the application of the historical model means that payments are determined 
by the intensity of production in the reference period. Meanwhile, although 
England is moving towards a regional model, current payment levels there 
are largely determined by the historical distribution of production. Even 
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because of the regionalisation of the SPS within England (between non- 
SDAs (severely disadvantaged areas), moorland SDAs and non-moorland 
SDAs).56 In Northern Ireland, use of the static hybrid model means that 
there are differences between the area-based entitlement and the historical 
entitlement. 
Some policy measures tend to reduce the variation of entitlements, 
particularly those with a low value. For example, in France farms owning 
low-value entitlements can upgrade them through the NUTS 3 reserve 
programmes. In Belgium, young farmers are also eligible to upgrade low-
value entitlements from the national reserve. 
7.4  The tradability of entitlements 
The tradability of entitlements can be constrained by two types of 
restrictions: regulatory limits and market imperfections.57 Both types of 
tradability constraints may have distributional implications for SPS 
benefits. 
In general, entitlements are tradable but certain limitations are 
imposed in the EU. In addition, each member state has some flexibility to 
introduce additional country-specific restrictions.  
SPS entitlements are tradable but only within the EU member states 
(not among them) and only under certain conditions. EU regulations 
specify that the transfer of entitlements by rent without land is not possible. 
The transfer by rent and similar market transactions concerning 
entitlements are allowed only if the transferred entitlements are 
accompanied by an equivalent number of eligible hectares of land. A 
farmer may transfer SPS entitlements without land by sale only after (s)he 
has used at least 80% of his/her entitlements for at least a year or after (s)he 
has voluntarily given up to the national reserve all the payment   
 
                                                      
56 In England in 2005, holdings classified as ‘mixed’ and ‘cereals’ received the 
greatest payment rates per hectare. ‘Pig, poultry and horticulture’, ‘LFA’ (less 
favoured area) ‘grazing livestock’ and ‘other’ farm types received the lowest SPS 
payments per hectare.  
57 The full tradability of entitlements implies that the trade is not hampered by 
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entitlements (s)he has not used in the first year of the SPS application. If 
more than 20% of the value of the SPS is allocated from the national reserve 
then the entitlement cannot be transferred for five years.  
EU member states can impose additional restrictions on the transfer 
of entitlements. For example, a member state may decide that entitlements 
may only be transferred or used within the region. Member states may also 
require that up to 50% of entitlements sold without land and up to 10% of 
those sold with land must revert to the national reserve. Where 
entitlements are sold with an entire farm, member states may call for up to 
5% to revert to the national reserve. Table 13 summarises the tradability of 
entitlements in the EUSCs. Spain, Italy and France are the most restrictive 
countries in this regard.  
In addition to regulatory constraints, the tradability of entitlements 
may also be hindered by market imperfections – for example, because of 
imperfectly functioning rural credit markets or transaction costs and 
imperfect information. Given that the SPS accords the right to a future 
stream of subsidies, in competitive markets a potential buyer would need 
to pay the net present value of the future stream of subsidies to the seller. If 
the buyer is credit-constrained then his/her ability to pay this price is 
reduced. The effect is a lower market price of entitlements, which reduces 
the owner’s willingness to sell them. Consequently, imperfect credit 
markets may affect trade in entitlements.  
Similarly, transaction costs and imperfect information in the 
entitlement market will also hamper entitlement trading. Transaction costs 
and imperfect information impose search costs (which make it more 
difficult to match the seller and buyer), negotiation costs, enforcement costs 
and uncertainty. In the presence of transaction costs and imperfect 
information, a participant in the entitlement market must search for other 
parties interested in a trade (i.e. must search for suitable land or entitlement 
owners), must negotiate the price and the quantity traded. In addition, it 
may be difficult to enforce the payment or the rental contract if the land 
used for the entitlement activation is rented. Moreover, with uncertainty 
about the future of the SPS, some market participants may be discouraged 
from participating in the land market. In general, transaction costs reduce 
the benefits from trading entitlements and hence lead to lower participation 
in the market. Sufficiently high transaction costs may even lead to failure of 
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7.5  Cross-compliance  
The granting of full support under the SPS is subject to cross-compliance. A 
farmer receiving SPS support must respect statutory management 
requirements (SMRs) (i.e. public, animal and plant health, environmental 
and animal welfare requirements) and maintain land in line with GAEC. 
The SMRs are based on pre-existing EU directives and regulations, such as 
the Nitrates Directive. Maintaining agricultural land according to GAEC is 
a new requirement, which aims at preventing abandonment and severe 
under-management of farmland. Member states must also ensure that the 
extent of permanent pasture (as at a specified reference year) is maintained 
and that a comprehensive advisory system to support cross-compliance is 
established. Farmer failure to respect these conditions can lead to 
reductions in or complete cancellation of the SPS.  
According to the European Commission, the cross-compliance 
requirements do not introduce substantive new obligations for farmers. Its 
main objective is to enforce existing EU and national legislation. Yet, before 
the 2003 CAP reform, farmers were expected to comply with 
environmental protection requirements as a condition for benefiting from 
CAP support. The 2003 CAP reform made cross-compliance compulsory 
and extended the coverage of requirements concerning public, animal and 
plant health, as well as environmental and animal welfare (European 
Commission; Alliance Environnement, 2007). 
Member states are required to set up a farm advisory system by 2007 
to advise farmers on land and farm management. It could entail a public or 
private body. The advisory activity must cover at least the SMRs and those 
pertaining to GAEC. Farmers may participate in the farm advisory system 
on a voluntary basis. Flanders and Sweden have established private entities 
to carry out these advisory functions, while Finland and Greece have set up 
public ones. France, Germany, Ireland and Wallonia have developed 
systems that combine public and private resources. In Spain, the farm 
advisory service is still in the process of being set up. In Italy, it has been 
designed and implemented at the regional level. 
7.6  National reserves 
Member states must create a national reserve by a linear percentage 
reduction (up to 3%) of their SPS national ceiling. There are additional, 
other financial sources that revert to the reserve. For example, entitlements 
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transferred to the national reserve. If member states impose taxes on the 
traded entitlements, these tax revenues revert to the national reserve (Table 
13). 
National reserves can be used to allocate entitlements to i) farms in a 
special situation, ii) new entrants and iii) farms in regions subject to 
restructuring or development programmes to prevent land abandonment 
or to compensate specific disadvantages. 
Based on available data for Finland, Germany and Spain, the volume 
of entitlements allocated from the reserve is small, at 0.02% 0% and 2.4% 
respectively of the total distributed entitlements. For instance, grants of the 
SPS to new entrants after 2005 are irrelevant in Germany: in 2006 and 2007, 
only 10 farms applied for SPS entitlements from the national reserve in 
Bavaria, of which only 2 applications were accepted. 
In Flanders, if the value of the entitlement is lower than 90% of the 
average value distributed in the region, young farmers aged no more than 
40 who activated all their entitlements the year before can from 2007 
onwards replace these entitlements with those from the national reserve 
with a value equal to the average in Flanders. The same holds in Wallonia 
from 2008. Moreover, in Wallonia farmers aged no more than 30 can do the 
same and all entitlements lower than the average are eligible for 
replacement with higher-value entitlements from the reserve. | 137 
 
 
8.  IMPACT OF THE SPS ON LAND 
MARKETS 
his chapter analyses the effects of the SPS on the respective markets 
for entitlements and land transactions, as well as on land values and 
structural change. Given that none of the countries in our sample 
implemented the regional model, the analysis concentrates on the historical 
and hybrid models. 
8.1  Market for SPS entitlements 
Table 15 shows the size of the entitlement market in the countries covered 
by this study. According to Table 15, the entitlement market is substantial 
in Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. Annual transactions range from 
0.1% of the total activated entitlements in Northern Ireland to around 12% 
in Sweden.  
The trade in entitlements is most often conducted directly among 
farmers or by using the services of market agents or farm organisations 
(Table 16). Spain appears to have set up a well-organised system for 
trading entitlements that is similar to an auction (see Box 6); however, the 
activity on this market is low. Information from Germany confirms that 
most entitlement trading takes place at the local level. There are not many 
transactions among regions (see also Box 7 in section 8.1.1 below). 
Most of the trade in entitlements takes place through sales 
transactions. Only a small number of entitlements are rented.58 Yet various 
                                                      
58 Evidence from Belgium shows that renting entitlements is not attractive for 
entitlement owners because of principal/agent problems. If the tenant does not 
activate the entitlements during a period of three successive years, the entitlement 
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other types of entitlement transfers are also important – which include 
inheritance, farm succession or additional circumstances. 
 
Box 6. Organisation of the SPS entitlement market in Spain 
The private company MercoPac, in collaboration with banks, administers the 
market for SPS entitlements in Spain. MercoPac facilitates information 
transmission between buyers and sellers and oversees the entire transaction 
process between the parties.  
Farmers who wish to sell entitlements must prepare a written warrant 
for sale with the collaborating banks. The seller temporarily makes his/her 
entitlements available to MercoPac until an offer is settled or the warrant of 
sale expires.  
Buyers draw up a written warrant of purchase with the collaborating 
banks, where among other things the bids are set for entitlements offered by 
sellers.  
Subsequently, before a notary, the entitlement is awarded to the 
highest bidder provided the price offered equals or exceeds the minimum 
price set by the seller. 
 
In general, there is no observed, unofficial entitlement market 
because entitlement holders need to be identified in order to receive 
payments. Nevertheless, unofficial ‘trade’ may occur among members of 
the same family (in the sense that money is transferred by the official 
beneficiary to another member). This practice is reportedly more common 
in Italy, Greece and Northern Ireland.  
                                                                                                                                       
goes back to the national reserve and is lost for both the tenant and the owner. 
Entitlement owners prefer to make a definitive transfer of entitlements to tenants 
and after the end of the tenancy contract, the entitlement transfers back to the 
original owner. This tendency is also explained by the rigidity of land tenancy 
markets in Belgium, which are highly regulated. Most rental contracts are for 
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Consistent with the theory, regional variations in the market price of 
entitlements follow the variations in the face value of entitlements. This is 
reported to be the case in most EUSCs.59  
8.1.1  Explaining transactions with entitlements 
Based on the theoretical results presented in chapter 2 and appendix 2, 
three main factors may lead to the trade of entitlements: i) a dynamic effect 
associated with structural change, ii) the situation in which farmers own 
more entitlements than they have eligible area and iii) decoupling.60  
There are critical differences between the historical model and the 
hybrid model. Especially at the start of SPS implementation, the trade of 
entitlements in countries that implemented the historical SPS model was 
likely to be driven by structural change, because entitlements were 
allocated based on land used in the reference period (2000–02) and the SPS 
was implemented several years later (2005–06). This may have been 
reinforced by the decoupling that accompanied the introduction of the SPS.  
Drawing from the theoretical results, in a static environment there is 
no incentive to trade entitlements because farms do not have an incentive 
to adjust land use. Entitlement trading may occur in a dynamic situation, 
however, which entails structural change. This point also holds for the 
circumstance in which the allocation of the SPS entitlements among farms 
is not based on land allocation at the time the SPS was introduced, but on a 
past equilibrium of land allocation. With the hybrid model, the allocation of 
entitlements was based on the total eligible area in the first year the SPS 
                                                      
59 In England, there is observed variation in the value of entitlements. Lower-value 
entitlements tend to trade at higher multipliers than the higher-value entitlements. 
This is partially because tenants who did a deal with their landlords to return land 
with entitlements are buying lower-value entitlements to give back to the landlord 
(keeping the higher-value entitlements for themselves). In addition, people appear 
to be willing to pay more for an entitlement that is rising in value (to the flat rate in 
2012) than one falling in value (where there is a significant historical element), but 
some commentators suggest this is often a false economy because of failure to 
adequately discount future SPS income streams. 
60 The decoupling of direct payments may lead to adjustments in the production 
structure and land allocation, and thus to entitlement trading. This effect is 
expected to be more prominent in countries with a higher rate of decoupling such 
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was applied. As a result, if structural changes occurred between the periods 
2000–02 and 2005–06, then one would expect more entitlement trading with 
the historical model than with the hybrid model in the first years of SPS 
implementation.  
Because under the hybrid model entitlements were allocated based 
on the land used when the SPS was launched, entitlement trading would 
not have occurred as a result of structural change. Under the hybrid model, 
trade may have emerged at the start of SPS implementation only as a result 
of decoupling. The decoupling of subsidies from production may have led 
farms to reallocate land and entitlements with it. Additionally, entitlement 
trading will likely have been affected by the fact that more entitlements 
were allocated with this model than with the historical model. Therefore, it 
is more likely that a situation would arise whereby reallocated land 
induced by the decoupling is used for activation of entitlements, which 
stimulates entitlement trading. In this case, the entitlement would 
accompany land. 
Given that under the hybrid model more entitlements were allocated 
than under the historical model, it is more probable that farms would own 
more entitlements than the eligible area under the hybrid model. Again, 
this may stimulate trade. Yet in this circumstance, the entitlement would 
not accompany land. But if farmers trade entitlements without land, under 
the hybrid model the size of the entitlement market depends on the 
availability of entitlement buyers having naked land. If there are few or no 
b u y e r s  w i t h  n a k e d  l a n d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  s e l l e r s  w i t h  e x t r a  
entitlements, then the volume traded will be small. Still, the pressure on 
entitlement sellers to trade entitlements will be reflected in higher land 
prices and lower market prices for entitlements (as later discussed).  
The evidence from country studies partially confirms this 
explanation. In Germany, which implements the hybrid model, the market 
for entitlements is smaller in relative terms than in countries with the 
historical model such as France, the Netherlands or Belgium (Table 15). 
Indeed, the main reason farmers trade entitlements in France and the 
Netherlands is to match area change since the reference period with the 
number of entitlements they receive. On the other hand, the entitlement 
market is large in Sweden, which like Germany applies the hybrid model – 
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the value reported in Table 15 is over-estimated because of double 
counting.61 The prevalence of entitlement trading in Sweden may be the 
result of decoupling, which could have induced land-use adjustments and 
hence entitlement trading. Finland, similarly applying the hybrid model, 
also has a relatively large volume of entitlement trading, which is again 
against theoretical predictions. 
Greece appears to confirm the static effect of the theoretical results. 
The land markets are rigid in Greece, particularly sales markets, because of 
the social value attached to land ownership. Not many land transactions 
take place. Hence, there is no reported, significant market for the trade of 
entitlements. Trade takes place mostly among family members. Transfers 
may occur through early retirement or unexpected circumstances (e.g. 
inheritance).  
The low level of entitlement trading in Spain, which implements the 
historical model, could be attributable to tighter constraints on entitlement 
trading (see Table 13) and the lower rate of decoupling. 
Furthermore, because the trade in entitlements stems from dynamic 
effects (structural changes and decoupling), sellers of entitlements are 
normally exiting farmers or farms in decline, while buyers are expanding 
or new farms.62 For example, in Sweden non-farming landowners who re-
enter agricultural activity and (mainly young) farmers who embark on it 
tend to be buyers of entitlements. The sellers are often retiring farmers and 
exiting tenants. In Italy, entitlements are generally sold by retiring farmers 
and bought by large farms, which also holds true for Germany, where 
purchasers tend to be farms larger than 25 hectares (see Box 7).  
 
                                                      
61 Since transferred entitlements in Sweden as reported in Table 15 include all 
different kinds of transfers, a single entitlement could be transferred twice. It 
could, for instance, be sold and then rented in the same year. Thus, it is not 
possible to estimate how many entitlements were traded. In other words, the 
number of entitlements that have been objects of exchange among the total number 
of activated entitlements is smaller than what is indicated in Table 15.  
62 These characteristics also imply that in general, the concentration of entitlement 
ownership follows structural changes. This was observed in most of the EUSCs, 
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Box 7. Transfers of entitlements in Germany 
In 2006–07, most of the entitlements were transferred in the course of farm 
successions (roughly 40%) or market transactions (40%). At least half of the 
m a r k e t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w e r e  i n d u c e d  b y  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e  f a r m e d  a r e a  o f  t h e  
respective farms. The rest of the transactions (around 20%) were rental 
exchanges. The trade in entitlements decreased from 2006 to 2007, especially 
after it became clear that set-aside and non-permanent fruits, vegetables and 
starch potatoes were being abandoned (Zentrale InVeKos Datenbank). 
Entitlement trading predominately takes place at the local level. The 
distance between the locations of the buyer and seller is less than 10 km for 
over 90% of the traded entitlements. Consequently, a significant reallocation 
of entitlements could not be observed across municipalities. Set-aside 
entitlements are traded slightly more often than normal entitlements. 
According to the expert survey conducted by Röder and Killian (2008) 
and by the German team for this study, the market value is mainly between 
1.0 and 1.5 times the face value of an entitlement (Table B1). This range is 
much lower than the net present value of an entitlement. Regarding regional 
variation, the survey shows that in general there is very little to speak of, 
whereas the market value is a little bit higher in East Germany compared 
with West Germany.  
Table B1. Market value of traded entitlements in Germany 
Region 
 
Market price of entitlements/ 
face value of entitlement 
(Face value of entitlement=1) 
Schleswig-Holstein 1.5 
Lower Saxony & Bremen  1.3 
North Rhine-Westphalia  1.3 
Hessen 1.3 
Rhineland -Palatinate  1.0 
Bavaria 1.4 
Saxony 1.8 
Sources: Röder and Killian (2008) and the country report for Germany for this study. 
 
At the same time, one would expect entitlement trading when 
farmers own more entitlements than they have eligible area. Figure 26 
shows the correlation between naked land and trade in entitlements. The 
higher the share of distributed entitlements relative to the total eligible area 
(the less there is naked land), the higher is the trade in entitlements. With EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 143 
 
less naked land, it is more likely that some farms may end up with more 
entitlements than eligible area. This circumstance may also be induced by 
structural changes or decoupling. It stimulates farms to sell entitlements in 
order to be able to benefit from the SPS.63  
Yet, restrictions on entitlement trading may constrain this process. 
Figure 27 shows that in countries with more restrictions (e.g. France and 
Spain), entitlement trading occurs less often compared with countries with 
fewer restrictions (e.g. Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands). In Germany, 
the volume of entitlement trading is low, owing to adoption of the hybrid 
model, which led to less entitlement trading at the start of SPS 
implementation. In the UK, selling fees charged by market agents for 
transfers appears to make the trade less viable.64  
In Northern Ireland, the trading volume is very low probably because 
of the possibility to consolidate entitlements. Farmers were permitted to 
consolidate the historical component of the entitlement value onto a 
smaller area to increase the unit value of their entitlements. This reduced 
farmers’ surplus entitlements. A similar development is expected in Ireland 
but data are not available to confirm this (see Box 9 in section 8.2.1.1 
below). 
When trade in entitlements is induced by structural change and 
decoupling, then entitlement transfers will always be accompanied by land. 
For example, if a farmer becomes less profitable as a result of structural 
change, the farmer is more likely to reallocate land and entitlements with it. 
In instances where farmers own more entitlements than they have eligible 
area, transferred entitlements normally will not be accompanied by land. A 
farmer with extra entitlements would be more willing to either sell 
                                                      
63 When analysing the data presented in Figure 26, caution should be applied 
owing to the quality and consistency of the data. Data on the trade of entitlements 
include various kinds of transactions and the data themselves come from diverse 
national sources – all of which poses problems of consistency and comparability 
among countries. Also, it is difficult to draw robust statistical conclusions from the 
few available observations. 
64 The ranking of restrictions presented in Figure 27 only takes into account 
regulatory restrictions. Other non-regulatory restrictions (e.g. credit constraints or 
an underdeveloped entitlement market) are not taken into consideration, as 
consistent information is not available. Such information could considerably 
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entitlements or acquire additional land without entitlements in order to 
activate all the subsidies. The evidence from country studies shows that 
entitlements are most often traded with land – when land is sold or rented 
by another farmer – in most EUSCs. Based on the available information, a 
significant difference cannot be identified between the hybrid and the 
historical models. This confirms that structural change and decoupling 
tend to be the major influences on the market for entitlements.65  
In Spain, where entitlements are traded both with and without land, 
the entitlements traded with land slightly exceed those transferred without 
land. In France, tight restrictions on entitlement trading have discouraged 
transfers without land (i.e. 50% of the entitlements traded without land 
revert to the national reserve). 
In contrast, in Belgium transfers without land are the most frequent 
because they are administratively the least costly. This pattern similarly 
holds in the study region Saxony. Unlike the rest of Germany, in Saxony 
land and SPS entitlements are bought and sold through different channels. 
In Scotland, the transfer of land and the SPS entitlements are also two 
separate transactions. The segregation could be explained by many farmers 
owning more entitlements than eligible area – a reason reinforced in Table 
12, which shows that there is no naked land available in Scotland. 
8.1.2  Explaining the market price of entitlements 
With perfect markets, one would expect that the price of an entitlement 
would equal the net present value of the future stream from that 
entitlement. For example, with a discount rate of 10% and if we assume that 
the SPS runs until 2013, the market value of an entitlement in 2007 should  
 
                                                      
65 Caution should be applied in interpreting these results. As noted earlier, in cases 
where farmers own more entitlements than they have eligible area, farmers are 
willing to either sell entitlements or acquire additional land without entitlements. 
More specifically, land transactions induced by farmers who own extra 
entitlements cannot be exactly quantified based on available data. There is some 
evidence that the hybrid model, where this problem most likely occurs, tends to 
stimulate land transactions (see the next sections for more details). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 145 
 
be 4.4 times higher than its face value, while if the SPS runs indefinitely 
then the market value of an entitlement in 2007 should be 10 times higher 
than its face value.66  
Table 16 shows that the market price of an entitlement in most EUSCs 
is between 1.0 and 3.0 times higher than the face value of that entitlement. 
These figures are significantly less than the theoretical expectations. Three 
factors may explain the observed gap in the entitlement price between 
theory and empirical evidence.  
First, there is uncertainty about the duration of the SPS. In general, 
farmers’ expectations are that the SPS will run until 2013. Additionally, 
there is hesitation associated with the possibility of further reforms to the 
historical model, which reduces the market price of entitlements. For 
example, according to expert estimates the market price of entitlements 
was up to 6.0 times the face value in France in 2006, but it declined to 
between 1.0 to 1.5 times mainly because of the uncertainty about the post-
2013 SPS. In England, because modulation rates were unknown in England 
until 2007, there was considerable vagueness in the market concerning the 
potential income streams from entitlements. Moreover, uncertainty in the 
market was also brought about by the euro–sterling exchange rate and the 
CAP health check. These uncertainties are among the reasons for the small 
size of the entitlement market in England.  
Second, imperfections in credit markets reduce the value of 
entitlements. If potential buyers face financial constraints, they cannot 
afford to pay the net present value of entitlements, even when they have 
perfect expectations. 
A third factor leading to lower market prices compared with 
theoretical expectations is the additional costs connected with receiving the 
                                                      
66 With a discount rate of 5%, the market price of an entitlement in 2007 should be 
5.1 times higher than its face value if the SPS runs until 2013, and 20 times higher 
than its face value if the SPS runs indefinitely. We note that these calculations do 
not take into account the impact of modulation (expectations of an increased rate of 
modulation) and farm administrative costs or other additional costs that the SPS 
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SPS subsidies, which may be induced by cross-compliance67 and 
administrative costs, as well as by taxes and fees imposed on entitlement 
transactions. Anecdotal evidence from the Netherlands indicates that in 
situations where both land and entitlements are rented in combination, 
approximately 5-10% of the nominal entitlement value is deducted from the 
rental price. This discount could be partially explained by a) the 
administrative costs of applying for the payment; or b) an implied interest 
rate as rental contracts are signed in November, but the related subsidies 
are paid out a few months later in the spring; or c) a risk discount.  
The retail price for entitlements in the study region of Emilia 
Romagna is in the range of 30-50% of the annual payment. Based on a 
survey of over 1,000 farms in five different regions in Germany, the rental 
price for entitlements is between 0% and 20% of the face value of the SPS. 
This may also indicate the presence of high additional costs, as rent is an 
annual payment and is affected to a lesser extent by traders’ expectations 
about the future continuation of the SPS. In Greece, there are still mistakes 
in the administration of the SPS system, which constrain the entitlement 
market. 
In summary, the low price of entitlements may indirectly indicate the 
existence of market imperfections and rigidities and hence its 
underdevelopment. With better functioning markets one would expect 
higher prices and larger traded volumes than reported in Table 15 and 
Table 16, respectively. 
                                                      
67 According to the EU regulations, all land utilised by farms must respect cross-
compliance criteria irrespective of whether it is used for the activation of 
entitlements. If a farm buys an entitlement without land and activates the 
entitlement using land that was already at a farm’s disposal before the purchase of 
the entitlement, it is not expected to incur additional costs for the farmer. This is 
because the cross-compliance requirements must be respected with or without 
using the land for activation of the purchased entitlement. But if the farmer buys 
an entitlement and land, then it may happen that cross-compliance leads to 
additional costs for the farmer. This situation is more likely to occur in relation to 
land of low fertility, which a farm may purchase together with the entitlement just 
to keep it in GAEC and thus benefit from the purchased SPS. Studies have shown 
that the burden of cross-compliance tends to be positive but relatively small (e.g. 
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On the other hand, the low price of entitlements may indicate their 
capitalisation into land values. Based on theoretical results, SPS land 
capitalisation may accrue with dynamic effects, with new entrants being 
eligible for entitlements and in scenarios where the total eligible area is 
smaller than the total number of entitlements (i.e. with a low level of naked 
land). 
Figure 28 shows the correlation between naked land and the market 
price of entitlements. The higher the share of distributed entitlements 
relative to the total eligible area (the less there is naked land), the higher is 
the market price of entitlements. This outcome goes against theoretical 
expectations. One would expect the opposite relationship between naked 
land and entitlement price. This could stem from the fact that as naked land 
is still substantial in most reported countries in Figure 28, there is no 
significant capitalisation of the SPS into land values, especially in countries 
applying the historical SPS model.68 The quality of data may also affect the 
results, given that many of the prices presented in Table 16 are expert 
estimates. At the same time, the eligibility of new farmers is not expected to 
be a key factor in SPS capitalisation, as a significant number of entitlements 
for entering farmers were not granted. Still, the low price of entitlements 
could indeed be the outcome of rigidities in the market for entitlements 
combined with dynamic effects, which may induce SPS capitalisation (as 
discussed in the next section).69 
 
 
                                                      
68 Fallow land could reduce the pressure of low levels of naked land on entitlement 
market prices. For example, in Italy there was extensive abandonment of land in 
some parts of Italy between 1982 and 2000. This land can easily be brought into 
cultivation or be used to activate entitlements. According to Eurostat data, the 
shares of fallow and green manure land in the UAA are broadly as follows: 0% in 
Ireland; 1-5% in Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and the Netherlands; 10% 
in Finland and Sweden; and 14% in Spain.  
69 When analysing the data presented in Table 16 and Figure 28, one must take in 
consideration the quality of data. In several countries, entitlement prices are based 
on market experts’ estimates. It is difficult to draw statistical conclusions from the 
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There is some evidence that in countries with the historical model, 
entitlement prices are higher than in countries with the hybrid model. For 
example, in the UK, entitlement prices are substantially higher in Scotland 
(historical model) than in England (hybrid model). Similarly, in Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands (historical model) it appears that entitlement 
prices are higher than in Germany (hybrid model) (Table 16). Theoretically, 
the historical model leads to lower capitalisation of the SPS than the hybrid 
model. As a result, entitlement buyers are willing to pay a higher price for 
entitlements in countries with a historical model than is the case in 
countries with a hybrid model. 
8.2  Impact of the SPS on land markets 
This section analyses the impact of the SPS on sales and rental markets for 
agricultural land. We separately examine the impact of the SPS on land 
transactions (trade) and the extent to which the SPS becomes capitalised 
into land values. This section also analyses the distribution of benefits from 
the SPS between farmers and landowners and the effect of shifting the SPS 
to a regional model. 
8.2.1  Impact of the SPS on land transactions 
In a static environment, the SPS does not affect land transactions (sales and 
rentals). The same holds in the dynamic context with structural change and 
the full tradability of entitlements. Theoretically, land transactions induce 
the trade of entitlements and not vice versa. Land transactions arise if there 
is structural change, decoupling and farm exit. These factors lead to land 
reallocation among farms. If the relocated land is used to activate 
entitlements and if entitlements are fully tradable, then entitlements will 
accompany land transactions.  
Yet, if the trade of entitlements is constrained, then land transactions 
may be affected. In this case, the SPS restricts land transactions. With 
constrained trade, farms that want to reallocate land and dispose of an 
equivalent number of entitlements cannot sell their entitlements for the 
desired price. For this reason, these farms may reduce the total amount of 
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Additionally, the SPS may stimulate land transactions when farms 
have a smaller eligible area than the total entitlements allocated. To be able 
to activate entitlements, farms search for land on either the sales or the 
rental markets. This effect increases the total number of land transactions.70 
Administrative regulations and details associated with implementing 
the SPS may affect land transactions as well as the kinds of sales and rental 
contracts used. For example, landowners interested in obtaining SPS 
entitlements may cancel their contracts with farmers and apply for the SPS 
entitlements themselves. If implementation of the SPS requires proof that 
the farm uses rented land, this stipulation may lead to more written rental 
contracts. These effects, however, depend on the extent to which land 
markets are developed and regulated, and on the SPS model. 
In summary, the overall effect of the SPS on land transactions (trade) 
is ambiguous. Constrained tradability of entitlements combined with 
structural change reduces land transactions while a smaller eligible area 
than the total entitlements allocated stimulates land transactions.71 
Administrative regulations can affect land transactions in either direction. 
With respect to the historical SPS model, one should expect that it decreases 
the total number of land transactions because one of the main drivers of 
land transactions is structural change. Under the historical model, 
entitlements are allocated based on the subsidies farms obtained in the 
reference period 2000–02, while the SPS was implemented in the period 
2005–06. If in this period structural change occurred (combined with 
decoupling), this may lead, for example, to the reallocation of land and 
farm exit, which could be limited by the SPS if entitlements are not fully 
tradable. Hence, in this case the SPS would reduce land transactions. In 
contrast, the hybrid model is expected to stimulate land transactions. 
                                                      
70 In this scenario, the SPS may affect the use of abandoned land, as farmers may 
use fallow land to activate entitlements. 
71 Nevertheless, this depends on the availability of naked land. If there is little or no 
naked land available relative to the number of farms with extra entitlements that 
want to buy or rent land, then the effect of the SPS on land transactions will be 
small. But the pressure will be reflected in higher land prices and lower market 
prices for entitlements (for more details, see the later section on the impact of the 
SPS on land values). Table 12 shows that in several countries, a substantial amount 
of naked land is available, chiefly in countries that apply the historical model. In 
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Compared with the historical model, there are more entitlements allocated 
under the hybrid model, while the effect of structural change on land 
reallocation is smaller at the beginning of SPS implementation. 
Next, the evidence on the impact of the SPS on land transactions is 
discussed. Sales and rental transactions are examined separately. Still, one 
should keep in mind the data limitations. More specifically, data on land 
transactions are scarce for the period following the launch of the SPS. 
Meanwhile, during this period agricultural prices rose, and this may have 
affected land transactions. This price effect reduces the possibility to single 
out the impact of the SPS on land transactions. 
8.2.1.1  Sales transactions 
In general, evidence from the study countries shows that the SPS has had 
little or no impact on land sales transactions. Survey data for France 
especially confirms this finding (see Table 12 and Box 8), which show that 
there has been no significant effect of the SPS on farmers’ preferences 
regarding land purchases. Nor is there evidence that the SPS has affected 
land transactions in Germany or Sweden. In the Netherlands and Northern 
Ireland, it is difficult to isolate the effect of the SPS on land sales 
transactions, as other factors are much stronger drivers. 
Consistent with the theoretical model, the SPS provides some 
incentives to own land in Finland, which implements the hybrid model. 
This could stem from the low level of naked land (Table 12), which 
motivates farmers to own land in order to activate all of their entitlements. 
Germany and Sweden likewise implement the hybrid model, and thus a 
positive effect of the SPS on land sales transactions should also be expected. 
But the level of naked land is higher in these two countries (especially in 
Germany) than in Finland, which mitigates the effect of the SPS on land 
transactions. The evidence shows a small or no impact of the SPS on land 
sales transactions in these two countries.  
There is some evidence that in countries that have implemented the 
historical model the SPS tends to dampen land sales transactions (e.g. 
Belgium). Exiting farmers prefer to keep land in order to receive the SPS 
payments. In addition, the low market price of entitlements reduces the 
incentive of exiting farmers to sell the entitlements. In Spain, many sales 
transactions were delayed until the exact entitlement transfer procedures 
were known. 
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Box 8. Impact of the SPS on land transactions in France 
There has been no significant impact of the SPS on farmers’ preferences 
regarding renting or purchasing land in France. This has been confirmed by 
the survey conducted under the European Commission’s FP6 research 
project IDEMA. The results are shown in Table B2, which indicate that the 
number of French farmers (among 281 respondents) intending to purchase 
or rent in land is similar under the three scenarios considered: i) continuing 
the policies of Agenda 2000, ii) real implementation of the 2003 reform and 
iii) full decoupling (Douarin et al., 2007). 
Table B2. Number of farmers intending to decrease or increase their current farm 
area (average number of hectares envisaged in brackets) 










 Decrease their current farm area by 
Selling land  0 (-)  0 (-)  0 (-) 
Reducing land rented in  0 (-)  0 (-)  0 (-) 
Increasing land rented out  0 (-)  0 (-)  0 (-) 
Passing on land to a successor  2 (60 ha)  2 (60 ha)  2 (60 ha) 
Converting land to 
  non-agricultural uses 
2 (5 ha)  3 (4 ha)  3 (4 ha) 
 Increase their current farm area by 
Purchasing land  28 (42 ha)  26 (44 ha)  26 (44 ha) 
Increasing land rented in  65 (33 ha)  66 (33 ha)  57 (33 ha) 
Decreasing land rented out  1 (60 ha)  1 (60 ha)  0 (-) 
Converting land from non- 
  agricultural uses 
1 (10 ha)  1 (10 ha)  1 (10 ha) 
Source: Douarin et al. (2007), Tables 8-26. 
Yet because of the complexity of the SPS, it seems that older farmers 
who were not eligible for the SPS exited the farming sector earlier than they 
would have done if Agenda 2000 had continued. This may have led to a 
greater amount of trade in land, shortly before and during the first years of 
SPS implementation. Some farmers may have postponed their exit, however, 
in order to benefit from subsidies that are certain for the next few years. 
Thus, the net overall impact of the SPS on the number of sales transactions is 
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In Italy, two effects have been observed. First, the uncertainty 
brought by the CAP reform has reduced land sales transactions, while the 
requirement to have land to activate entitlements has increased activity in 
the land sales market. This second effect appears to be temporary, 
however.72 In the study region Emilia Romagna, the impact of the SPS on 
agricultural land sales transactions is very low, although plots with 
entitlements are more commonly traded than plots without them. 
In Scotland, there was a significant decline in the traded area in 2004, 
perhaps stemming from uncertainty about the rules to be applied in SPS 
implementation.  
In Ireland, there is no clear indication of whether the SPS affects the 
incentive to own agricultural land. One can only speculate that the effect of 
the SPS may have led to a freezing of land ownership, at least at the start of 
SPS implementation. This conjecture could especially apply to farms that 
consolidated their SPS entitlements. Consolidation could not be carried out 
by farmers who disposed of their land by sale or lease (see Box 9).  
 
Box 9. Consolidation of entitlements in Ireland 
The requirement that individual farmers must have 100% of the average land 
area that they had in the reference period would have resulted in serious 
problems for those farmers who, for specific reasons, declared less land in 2005 
or in subsequent years than the average area of land they had cultivated in the 
reference period.  
Under the provisions of the EU regulations, a member state may make 
use of its national reserve to consolidate payment entitlements for certain 
categories of farmers on the actual number of hectares of land farmed in 2005. 
This process entails surrendering the original entitlements to the national 
reserve in exchange for a lower number of entitlements with a higher unit 
value. Note that the overall value of the payment is not affected. 
 
 
                                                      
72 Its temporary character is also indicated by the fact that in most cases 
entitlements and land are traded together. The volume of entitlement trading in 
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Box 9. cont’d 
The requirement that individual farmers must have 100% of the average 
land area that they had in the reference period would have resulted in 
serious problems for those farmers who, for specific reasons, declared less 
land in 2005 or in subsequent years than the average area of land they had 
cultivated in the reference period.  
Under the provisions of the EU regulations, a member state may make 
use of its national reserve to consolidate payment entitlements for certain 
categories of farmers on the actual number of hectares of land farmed in 
2005. This process entails surrendering the original entitlements to the 
national reserve in exchange for a lower number of entitlements with a 
higher unit value. Note that the overall value of the payment is not affected. 
The farmer must declare the entire agricultural land available to him 
in 2005 and the total area declared must be equal to at least 50% of the 
average area declared during the reference period. The farmer may apply for 
the concession in a particular year provided (s)he continues each year to 
declare at least 50% of the land area farmed during the reference period.  
The concessions relating to consolidating entitlements cannot be 
applied to farmers who declare fewer hectares than entitlements because the 
remaining land has been sold or rented out. One exception is where land is 
purchased by a public authority for non-agricultural use (e.g. for road 
construction). In such cases, the consolidation of entitlements is possible. 
According to the Irish Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
the entitlement consolidation provisions may be applied to farmers who 
•  afforested some of their land after the reference period began; 
•  disposed of their land to a public authority for non-agricultural use; 
•  had leased/rented in land during the reference period, for which the 
agreement has since expired; or 
•  declared land situated in Northern Ireland during the reference 
period. 
Where a farmer benefits from this concession, all of his/her 
consolidated payment entitlements will be regarded as having come from 
the national reserve. The entitlements concerned cannot be sold or leased out 
for at least five years from the year of allocation. Moreover, the farmer must 
use all of his/her entitlements him-/herself each year for a period of five 
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The SPS has also led to adjustments in land sales contracts. Clauses 
have been added in the sales contracts to regulate who receives 
entitlements that accompany land or to specify whether entitlements are 
sold together with land (e.g. France and Germany). Furthermore, the SPS 
has led to land market segmentation between land traded with and without 
entitlements, with price differences between them (e.g. France and Italy).  
8.2.1.2  Rental transactions 
The evidence from the EUSCs suggests that the impact of the SPS is 
stronger on land rental than sales transactions. Yet, there are also notable 
differences in terms of the SPS effects. In particular, there is a difference 
between the historical and hybrid models. The hybrid model has induced 
some marked effects on land rental markets. Specific features of the hybrid 
model allow non-farming landowners to access SPS subsidies in the hybrid 
model, while this is possible to a lesser extent under the historical model. 
With the hybrid model, the number of entitlements that farmers have 
received is equal to the total eligible area in the first year of SPS application. 
Landowners who rented out land prior to the introduction of the SPS could 
gain access to entitlements by either cancelling the rental contract and 
applying for entitlements themselves or by adjusting rental contracts in 
order to ensure that entitlements revert to the landowner after the contract 
expires. This aspect of the hybrid model has enabled some non-farming 
landowners to obtain entitlements. And in several countries that have 
implemented the hybrid model, non-farming landowners have indeed 
done so, thus benefiting from the SPS.  
For example, in Sweden, which implements the hybrid model, the 
total rented area decreased between 2003 and 2005 by around 10%.73 
Previously, renting had exhibited a long-term upward trend (although 
there was considerable regional variation). The reduction was much more 
pronounced in the southern, fertile regions than in the north. One possible 
explanation is that landowners in the south tend to live closer to their land 
                                                      
73 The introduction of the SPS initially brought turmoil to the rental market in 
Sweden but the market eventually adjusted to the new institutional framework. 
The turmoil ensued because entitlements were allocated to those who cultivated 
the land at the time the SPS was introduced, and some landowners wanted to 
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and could therefore return to farming or land management and obtain 
entitlements. In northern Sweden, absentee landowners are usually farmers 
who have quit farming and have moved south, as alternative income 
opportunities are scarce in the region.74 Furthermore, it appears that in 
another respect the ultimate beneficiaries of the SPS are landowners. The 
new land rental contracts that are being written nowadays always include a 
clause stating that the entitlements will go back to the landowner when the 
contract is terminated. 
Likewise in Finland (hybrid model), based on interviews with local 
officials, the common procedure is that the SPS entitlements are returned to 
the landowner when the rental contract expires. With the introduction of 
the SPS, most of the rental contracts have been renewed with this 
modification.75 The level of the rent has typically stayed the same. Some 
landowners did not renew contracts that expired in 2005, to ensure that 
they received the entitlements in 2006 when the SPS was introduced in 
Finland (see Box 12 in the section 8.2.2.2).  
In Northern Ireland (hybrid model), non-farming landowners could, 
in certain circumstances, apply to establish entitlements relating to the land 
they own (the regional component of €78.33/ha), even if they had never 
historically received direct support payments. To do so, they had to apply 
for a business reference number on or before 16 May 2005 and submit an 
application form by that same date. By establishing and claiming 
entitlements, non-producing landowners must assume the responsibility 
for meeting the cross-compliance obligations for their entire land holding, 
even if this land is cultivated by a tenant. 
In England (hybrid model), rental arrangements between farmers and 
landowners were made to return land with the associated entitlements. 
Data are not available to quantify the share of the area covered by such 
arrangements. Decoupling also had some effect on rental transactions in 
England. Under the old extensification scheme, land that was rented was 
                                                      
74 Consequently, the SPS has introduced distortions. Landowners who did not farm 
their land prior to SPS implementation began doing so and replaced incumbent 
farmers. 
75 This practice involved around 30% of entitlements, which is equivalent to the 
share of rented land in Finland. The rest of entitlements (around 70%) are owned 
by landowning farmers and thus no contractual adjustments were required.  156 | IMPACT OF THE SPS ON LAND MARKETS 
 
often not grazed as farmers sought to maximise subsidy payments under 
the old coupled, CAP support system. Under the SPS, less grazing land is 
rented, since there is no requirement under extensification rules. In 
England, there was additionally a significant swapping of land to ensure 
that the entitlements were not lost (e.g. potatoes and peas being ineligible 
meant that parcels of land needed to be swapped to ensure farmers renting 
land for these crops did not lose out under entitlements). This also had an 
impact on tenancies and specifically grazing agreements (i.e. people were 
effectively selling grass and not leasing land, in order to claim 
entitlements).  
In Germany, which also implements the dynamic hybrid model, such 
tendencies among landowners were not observed. The results of surveys 
conducted in three case study regions suggest that the number of non-
farming landowners who applied for the SPS entitlements is marginal. Two 
factors explain this outcome. First, this practice is constrained by the 
prevalence of long-term rental contracts with an average duration of 7-12 
years. Second, the existence of a clear regulation on the ownership of 
entitlements after rental contracts expire does not allow non-farming 
landowners to obtain entitlements. According to the decision of the Federal 
Court of Justice on 24 November 2006 (no. LwZR 3/06), tenants can retain 
entitlements even after the expiry of rental contracts. Still, there are 
indications that large landowners (e.g. the Protestant Church in Lower 
Saxony) use their strong bargaining position to obtain entitlements in 
Germany (e.g. by obliging farmers to accept the reassignment of 
entitlements after the expiry of rental contracts). Although not 
representative of all regions, such phenomena may be highly significant at 
the local level in some regions.  
In countries that have implemented the historical SPS model, the 
number of entitlements that farmers received depends on the subsidies and 
the eligible area in the reference period (2000–02). For this reason, only 
those who were farmers in the reference period and receive subsidies then 
could become owners of entitlements, cutting out non-farming landowners 
without a farming record or proof of subsidies received in the reference 
period. These conditions reduced the power of non-farming landowners to 
acquire entitlements through change or cancellation of rental contracts. 
Evidence from several study countries applying the historical model 
suggests that the SPS has had little or no effect on land rental transactions 
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In Belgium and Spain, which have likewise implemented the 
historical model, there is some evidence that the SPS constrains land rental 
transactions – similar to what has been observed for land sales markets. 
This effect can be traced to structural change and the imperfect tradability 
of entitlements, which results in a low market price for entitlements. The 
low market price in turn reduces the incentive of farmers to reallocate land 
if the respective land is used for the activation of payments. Farmers who 
want to reallocate land and entitlements with it (e.g. retiring or exiting 
farmers) prefer to continue using land and benefiting from the SPS rather 
than lose out in this respect. This is most evident in Belgium, where the SPS 
reduces land rental transactions and reinforces the effect induced by rigid 
rental-market regulations (see Box 10). 
 
Box 10. Impact of the SPS on land markets in Belgium 
Land rental markets are tightly regulated in Belgium. In general, there are 
two kinds of tenancy contracts: regular contracts and seasonal contracts. 
Regular contracts can be of a duration no shorter than nine years and the 
maximum rent that landowners can charge tenants is regulated. Seasonal 
contracts are for periods of less than a year and the rent can be set freely.  
On the one hand, regular contracts give farmers security. On the other 
hand, they constrain the restructuring process as a dynamic farmer (e.g. 
young farms) has more difficulty in accessing land (as land is locked in long-
term rental contracts). Seasonal contracts offer flexibility in terms of rental 
rate-setting but offer farmers little security. To side-step regulations, 
informal transactions take place (e.g. payment of an additional premium in 
excess of the official maximum rent allowed under regular contracts) as well 
as the seasonal contracts that are preferred by landowners.  
The SPS is an additional factor that may constrain restructuring. Upon 
retiring or exiting, landowning farmers prefer to keep their land to enable 
them to activate entitlements. The low market price of entitlements reduces 
the incentive for retiring or exiting farmers to sell them. To benefit from the 
SPS, it is sufficient to hire services just to keep their land in good agricultural 
condition. This custom further reduces the available land on the rental 
market. Expanding farms are therefore willing to bid more for rents to gain 
access to land. The effect is that farmers engage more in the seasonal and 
informal contracts, by which landowners can demand higher rent or 
additional premiums for regular contracts on top of the maximum rent 
allowed. 
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Box 10. cont’d  
Furthermore, given the long-term tenancy contracts, some farmers 
may have difficulty in finding available land to activate their entitlements. 
This situation puts upward pressure on escalating land rents for seasonal 
contracts and premiums for regular contracts. 
The SPS affects the sales market in a similar way as the rental market, 
but the effect is weaker because the sales market is less regulated and other 
factors influence land sales prices to a greater degree.  
In summary, the SPS is reinforcing the problem induced by a rigid 
rental market, which constrains restructuring. At the same time, the SPS is 
partially becoming capitalised into land rents.  
 
In Spain, exiting farmers prefer to continue renting land in order to 
receive the SPS payments. Low market prices for entitlements and high 
transfer taxes reduce the incentive to sell the entitlements. In some cases, 
farmers who are also landowners and own entitlements prefer to rent the 
land out through an unofficial market for free or at a very low rate in 
exchange for the tenant keeping the land in GAEC. Thus, the landowner 
uses land to activate the entitlement while the farmer uses the land for 
production. This allows the landowning farmers to benefit from the SPS. In 
Spain, the share of naked land is high (Table 12), thus ensuring that tenants 
can find sufficient eligible area for activation of their own entitlements.  
The effect of the SPS on land rental transactions is very small in 
Ireland. This result is mainly attributable to the possibility of consolidating 
entitlements on a smaller area than that used in the reference period, as 
noted above. This action reduced pressure on land markets in general. The 
possibility to consolidate entitlements on a smaller area eased pressures 
arising from structural changes that took place between the reference 
period (2000–02) and the time the SPS was introduced (2005) and from the 
low level of naked land. Instead of being forced to search for land in order 
to activate entitlements, farmers could reduce the number of entitlements 
without reducing the total value of subsidies. A similar situation has been 
observed in Northern Ireland, where the ‘stacking’ facility is also applied. 
An important consequence of the SPS is the spreading formalisation 
of rental contracts (e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden). For the most 
part, to benefit from the SPS, farmers are required to provide 
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of entitlements. This requirement induced many farmers to convert oral 
rental contracts into written ones. The shift is particularly notable in Spain. 
Concerning the duration of rental contracts, only a few country studies 
report that the SPS has had an effect, with most reporting no impact. 
In Sweden, tensions between the landowners and the tenants over the 
lengths of the contracts seem to have increased in recent years as reported 
in farmers’ professional magazines. There is a clear tendency towards 
shorter (one-year) contracts in the market for rented land. Most probably, 
this can be attributed to the introduction of the SPS. 
In England, because of the SPS (and tenants claiming entitlements), 
many tenants have been encouraged to prolong their leases to 2012 to 
ensure the entitlements are enabled, so everyone has some subsidy from 
land. 
8.2.2  Impact of the SPS on land values 
This section analyses the extent to which the SPS is capitalised into land 
sales prices and land rents. The evidence presented above showed that the 
price of entitlements is relatively low in the study countries (Table 16), 
which could be related to the presence of constraints in the tradability of 
entitlements (market imperfections and restrictions imposed on the trade of 
entitlements). The main objective of this section is to determine whether the 
low price of entitlements could also be connected to their capitalisation into 
land values. According to the theoretical results, if the SPS is capitalised 
into land values then the market price of entitlements declines. With full 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values, the market price of entitlements is 
zero.  
Based on the theoretical results, capitalisation of the SPS into land 
values occurs when 
•  the total number of entitlements allocated is larger than the total 
eligible area, 
•  new entrants are eligible for SPS entitlements, and 
•  asymmetric structural changes occur (including farm exit and 
decoupling) or there are non-tradable entitlements. 
The capitalisation of the SPS into land sales prices depends on the 
extent to which land rents correlate with sales prices. If sales prices fully 
incorporate the discounted sum of future rental values, then the effect of 
the SPS on sales prices is equal to the effect of the SPS on rents. But if land 160 | IMPACT OF THE SPS ON LAND MARKETS 
 
sales prices do not fully incorporate the discounted sum of future rental 
values, then there is less capitalisation of the SPS into sales prices than in 
the case of rents. 
Next, the evidence on the impact of the SPS on land sales prices and 
land rents is presented. The short time span since the implementation of the 
SPS, combined with the poor quality of the available data, prevent a 
consistent econometric analysis. At the same time, it is more difficult to 
identify the impact of the SPS on land sales prices than on land rents 
because sales prices are driven by several non-agricultural factors and 
market expectations are important drivers. For land rents, this is less of a 
problem. Yet, rental markets tend to be more regulated than sales markets 
(especially in Belgium and France), and in rigid markets the contracts tend 
t o  b e  o f  a  l o n g e r  d u r a t i o n .  T h e s e  factors may delay or mitigate the 
capitalisation of the SPS into higher land rents if the effect is present. 
Moreover, if previous area payments introduced by the 1992 CAP 
reform and by Agenda 2000 were capitalised into land values, then the 
impact of the SPS could be difficult to isolate.76 The literature estimating the 
impact of previous subsidies on land values is almost non-existent. To our 
knowledge, only three studies cover EU countries (Trail, 1980; Goodwin 
and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; Duvivier et al., 2005), with first two studies 
estimating the effect of the pre-1992 CAP policies. Duvivier et al. (2005) 
estimate the impact of the 1992 and subsequent CAP reforms on arable 
farmland prices in Belgium. Depending on the year and region considered, 
the elasticity of arable farmland prices to compensatory payments ranges 
from 0.12 to 0.47. 
8.2.2.1  Land sales prices 
Particularly for land sales prices, it is difficult to identify the effect of the 
SPS because other factors are more influential than the SPS (such as urban 
                                                      
76 For example, if one assumes that previous subsidies were capitalised into land 
values, then land prices should have declined with the introduction of the SPS. Yet, 
during the period of SPS implementation, agricultural prices increased – which 
could have offset the effect of the SPS. Hence, to identify the effect of the SPS on 
land values one needs to have, among others things, good knowledge of the effect 
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pressure, agricultural prices and farm productivity).77 Compared with the 
other drivers of land sales prices considered in this study, the impact of the 
SPS has also proven the most complicated to identify and market experts 
have varied widely in their estimates (among countries and among regions 
within a country). These factors make it difficult to draw a clear conclusion 
about what impact introducing the SPS has had on land sales prices. 
Taking into account these limitations, the evidence generally shows 
that the impact of the SPS on land sales prices has been relatively small: 
with few exceptions, there has been no significant change in land prices 
since SPS implementation.  
The main drivers of SPS land capitalisation appear to be the small 
amount of naked land and structural changes (including decoupling and 
farm exit). New entrants’ access to SPS entitlements was not identified in 
any of the study countries as an important determinant of SPS 
capitalisation into land prices. The underlying reason here is that 
significant numbers of entitlements were not allocated to new entrants in 
any of the study countries in the period covered by the study.  
There are notable differences between the SPS models. The evidence 
shows that the hybrid model tends to lead to greater capitalisation of the 
SPS into land prices than the historical model.78 Most of the countries with 
the hybrid model report land capitalisation of the SPS; yet, no significant 
effect of the SPS has been observed in several countries that have 
implemented the historical model. The evidence indicates that land 
capitalisation of the SPS is driven by the low amount of naked land in 
countries with the hybrid model and by structural changes in countries 
with the historical model. These results confirm theoretical expectations. 
The differential effect between the models could also be related to an 
under-representation of countries implementing the hybrid model.  
                                                      
77 On the other hand, this may suggest low capitalisation of the SPS into land prices 
or a low contribution of the SPS to the total price of land. Still, one should be 
cautious when interpreting these arguments, as they cannot be generalised. 
78 It should nonetheless be noted that only five countries covered by this study 
implement the hybrid model. Most countries and regions implement the historical 
model (Table 8). One should be careful about generalising these results for the 
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Still, if both the SPS and the previous subsidies are capitalised into 
land values at the same rate, then one should expect less change in land 
prices with the historical model than with the hybrid model, for several 
reasons. First, the historical model has not affected the subsidies each farm 
receives, while the hybrid model has redistributed subsidies among farms, 
sectors and regions, thus affecting land prices in some regions (above all for 
less fertile land). Second, agricultural commodity prices rose in parallel 
with the introduction of the SPS, which could have offset the potential 
decline in land sales prices caused by the SPS. Third, decoupling provides 
for flexibility on production, enabling farms to react to market signals, and 
hence increasing profitability and potentially land prices. This makes the 
impact of the SPS difficult to identify. 
Based on the survey of experts, the SPS had a slightly positive impact 
on the development of agricultural land prices between 2004 and 2007 in 
Sweden (hybrid model). The most visible impact of the introduction of the 
SPS is the increase of (semi-natural) grassland prices in Sweden. Prices 
grew substantially in 2005 and 2006. More importantly, grassland prices 
climbed faster than arable land prices in 2005 and 2006 (Figure 29). One 
might expect that non-agricultural drivers of prices for grazing land would 
have a weaker influence in this case because such land tends to be located 
in less accessible areas. Also, agricultural drivers may have a small impact 
on grassland prices because with decoupling, this land may become 
abandoned. In the case of arable land, both non-agricultural and 
agricultural factors affect the land prices and therefore it is difficult to 
identify what caused the changes in prices. If this holds, then the sharp 
increase in grazing land prices in recent years may be the effect of the SPS 
driven by farmers’ demands for land in order to activate entitlements. 
Indeed, the evidence shows that the value of the entitlement represents the 
lowest threshold of the market price, reduced by the costs for keeping land 
in GAEC. The same ramifications of the SPS hold for land rents. 
A similar effect is observed in Finland (hybrid model). Statistical 
evidence reveals that land sales prices were affected by the introduction of 
the SPS. In Germany (hybrid model), the effects of the SPS have been 
minor. The impact of the SPS on land sales prices has varied from low to 
medium. But compared with agricultural commodity prices and 
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In Northern Ireland, there is a complete lack of land for sale, which 
means that when land does come on the market it attracts a very high 
price.79 Therefore, factors other than the SPS are driving the market.  
In a number of countries that have implemented the historical SPS 
model, there has been little or no impact of the SPS on land sales prices (e.g. 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands).80  
Greece confirms the static effect of the theoretical model. With limited 
activity on the sales market, the SPS has had no effect on land sales prices. 
Thus, the SPS is not capitalised into land values. 
In Spain, statistical analysis reveals a positive correlation between 
land prices and the value of SPS entitlements. Yet this finding could be 
attributable to the historical model and the fact that previous subsidies 
were linked to productivity. This correlation may just reflect the policy 
bias, i.e. more productive land has a higher price and has received higher 
subsidies in the reference period, and thereby received SPS entitlements 
with a higher value.  
Probably the strongest effect of the SPS on land sales prices in a 
country with the historical model has been seen in Belgium. SPS land 
capitalisation there is driven by structural changes and the partial 
tradability of entitlements. The low market price of entitlements reduces 
the incentive for retiring or exiting farmers to sell entitlements. For this 
reason, exiting landowner farmers prefer to keep the land and activate the 
 
                                                      
79 Despite the high sale values of farmland in Northern Ireland in recent years, 
many landowners choose not to sell land because of their desire to carry on a 
family tradition, where land is passed down from generation to generation. 
80 Other drivers dominate land values in the Netherlands. The effect of the 
introduction of the SPS is difficult to quantify as other factors influence land prices 
much more. The real option to convert land to non-agricultural use, for instance, 
accounts for at least half of the (in a European comparison) extremely high Dutch 
land prices. Robust growth in the prices for agricultural outputs and the pressure 
caused by high revenues from receiving manure further reduce the share of land 
values depending on subsidies. Implementation of the European Nitrates Directive 
has probably had a higher impact on Dutch farmland prices than the move 
towards the SPS, as it created a new source of cash flows for both landowners and 
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entitlements. As discussed earlier in Box 10, this behaviour reduces the 
amount of land available on the market and leads to some capitalisation of 
the SPS into land values. 
In Scotland, the SPS is not expected to have had a large impact on 
land prices for two key reasons: i) it is widely believed that the historical 
values of the CAP subsidies, on which the SPS is based, are already 
capitalised within the existing land prices; and ii) the amount of the SPS 
payments will remain relatively constant and comparable to the historical 
subsidy levels until 2012.81 
The other extreme appears to be Ireland, where almost none of the 
SPS has been capitalised into land values (at least at the start of SPS 
implementation). Ireland also implements the historical SPS model. The 
possibility to consolidate entitlements has reduced the pressure of the SPS 
on land markets and the capitalisation of the SPS has been minimal.  
A prominent effect of the SPS, as already mentioned in the previous 
section, is land market segmentation. In Italy, the land market is segmented 
between land sold with and without entitlements. Evidence from Italy 
indicates that for land with entitlements, sales prices may increase as much 
as 10-30%. Depending on the region, prices for land with entitlements rose 
while remaining flat for land without entitlements, or prices for land with 
entitlements stabilised while declining for land without SPS benefits. But 
the observed higher prices for land sold with entitlements are not direct 
                                                      
81 SPS entitlements may have caused some changes in the regional prices of land. 
For example, farmers with SPS entitlements owning good quality agricultural land 
may transfer the entitlement. The movement of entitlements to poorer quality land 
could have increased demand for poor quality land, thereby elevating its value and 
decreasing the price differential across Scottish farmland. Despite witnessing larger 
(proportional) price rises for poorer quality farmland in Scotland in recent years, 
according to most of the experts interviewed, this trend is a result of greater 
demand for livestock-type land from lifestyle buyers and sporting (estates) 
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evidence of the capitalisation of the SPS.82 For example, the observed higher 
prices for land with entitlements may solely reflect the price of the 
entitlement associated with the land, with the benefits going to the 
entitlement owner (seller) – who happens to be a farmer simultaneously 
selling the land. 
A similar effect is observed in France. The evidence indicates that the 
SPS has created a distinction between two kinds of land on the market: 
eligible land and ineligible land. Based on experts’ opinions, ineligible land 
seems to be sold at lower prices than its eligible counterpart is (but of 
course, this depends on the kind of land – for example, vineyards are much 
more expensive than other kinds of land even though they are ineligible). 
Still, there is no empirical data to confirm this trend. Moreover, as 
progressively more land is becoming eligible, the distinction should 
diminish. This price difference between eligible and ineligible land reflects 
SPS land capitalisation, unlike the situation in Italy. In the case of France, 
the price difference does not pertain to the cost of purchasing the 
entitlement per se, but merely the eligibility to activate SPS benefits.  
8.2.2.2 Land  rents 
The evidence confirms that the impact of the SPS on land rents appears to 
be stronger than it is on land sales prices.83 Yet, this is mainly the case for 
countries that have implemented the hybrid model. In countries with the 
historical model, there is some evidence of the capitalisation of the SPS into 
land rents but it is not valid for all countries covered by this study. This 
result is consistent with the effect of the SPS on land rental transactions 
 
                                                      
82 The observed price differences between land with and without entitlements 
suggest that landowners do not expect a full capitalisation of entitlements into the 
price of agricultural land, because with full capitalisation it would not matter who 
owns the entitlements because the benefits would accrue to them anyway. If the 
SPS is fully capitalised into the land values, then the price of the entitlement would 
be zero and there would be no price difference between land traded with or 
without entitlements. 
83 This result could also be attributed to other drivers having a smaller impact on 
land rents compared with land sales prices, which makes it easier to identify the 
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presented in section 8.2.1.2. Nevertheless, we must note again that the 
differential effect could be owing to an identification problem, similar to 
the situation for land sales prices. 
The clearest evidence of capitalisation of the SPS into land rents 
appears to be in Sweden (hybrid model) (Box 11 gives the results of IDEMA 
modelling on the impact of the SPS on land rents). There it is most likely 
the effect of the low amount of naked land. Increased rents are particularly 
observed for less fertile land. The evidence shows that the value of the 
entitlement (reduced by the costs of keeping land in GAEC) represents the 
lower threshold for land rental prices. Land rental prices have increased 
especially where cattle payments have been redistributed from cattle to 
arable land due to decoupling. Land rental prices rose by 38% between 
1994 and 2006. Lately, however, the growth has slowed down. There is 
variation in terms of rental price changes. In recent years, rents have 
increased in areas with low rents and decreased in regions with high rents, 
which could be related to the reallocation of subsidies from more 
productive to less productive regions as induced by the hybrid model. Still, 
it is noteworthy that before the SPS was introduced, rents were not paid in 
some instances for marginal land in the northern regions – an arrangement 
that ceased after the SPS was launched.  
 
Box 11. Impact of the SPS on land rents using the IDEMA modelling tool: The 
case of regions in Sweden 
The AgriPoliS model from the IDEMA project was used to simulate the impact 
of the SPS on land rents in two Swedish regions (Jönköping county in the forest 
areas in southern Sweden (Götaland) and Västerbotten county in northern 
Sweden). The following three scenarios were simulated: i) the scenario 
‘AGENDA’ assuming no reform and coupled policies in place, ii) the scenario 
‘reform’ with the current SPS system in place and iii) the scenario ‘bond’ with a 
hypothetical bond scheme representing a phasing-out of the SPS. The 
simulations were performed for the period 2001–13. 
The AgriPoliS results illustrated in Figure B1 show that the introduction 
of the SPS (i.e. decoupling of support) leads to higher land rental prices, 
particularly for grazing land. 
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Box 11. cont’d 
 
Figure B1. Simulated results for the Jönköping and Västerbotten regions in Sweden 
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There are several reasons for this result. Profitability increases because 
decoupling gives farmers more freedom in the choice of production structure 
and of whether to cultivate land. In addition, product prices at the European 
level are expected to increase with decoupling. Land rental prices also increase 
owing to the redistribution of cattle payments from cattle to land with the 
introduction of the SPS. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the impact of 
decoupling on land prices might not be as pronounced in other regions. In 
regions with favourable conditions for crop production, the introduction of the 
SPS does not influence farmers’ decisions on whether to cultivate land. The 
impact is also lower in regions with little livestock that had been eligible for 
direct payments before decoupling. 
Phasing out the SPS would lead to reduced land rents. AgriPoliS results 
for many different regions indicate that land rents in many cases fall by 50% or 
even more in some regions, because SPS payments are capitalised into land 
prices and land rents. Apart from the lower land prices and land rents, the 
main effect of phasing out the SPS is that structural change in the agricultural 
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In Finland, when the SPS was introduced most of the rental contracts 
were renewed with the modification that entitlements return to the 
landowner when the rental contract expires. This adjustment to the contract 
does not affect the rent, which largely remains unchanged (see Box 12). 
Box 12. Frictions between farmers and landowners over entitlement ownership 
in Finland 
The ownership of entitlements in Finland has sparked significant media 
attention and intense discussion in the parliament as far back as 2002. A lot 
of uncertainty, extra work and fear accompanied the reform. Local officials 
underline that this reform instigated a great deal of concern (if not anger) 
among farmers and landowners and much effort has been expended to 
smooth things out. 
The critical point in the public debate was who should obtain 
entitlements for land that was rented out at the time of SPS implementation. 
Based on FADN data, around 30% of land was rented in Finland in 2005.  
Initially, based on the Finnish Act on the Implementation of the Single 
Payment Scheme, the SPS entitlement was granted for eligible hectares 
declared by farmers in 2006. A farmer is defined as a person who has a right 
of possession to land. Right of possession could be based on land ownership, 
leasing, inheritance or similar arrangements. This regulation essentially gave 
farmers the ownership rights to entitlements.  
Nonetheless, the Committee of the Constitution in the Finnish 
parliament ruled that entitlements granted based on area under a rental 
contract concluded before 2006 should be transferred to landowners after 
termination of the rental contract. This ruling ensured the landowner’s rights 
to entitlements.  
Thus, Finland currently finds itself in a situation in which national and 
EU legislation are in conflict. Despite this legal predicament, the common 
procedure is that the SPS entitlements are returned to the landowner after 
the expiration of the rental contract.  
Presently, most of the entitlements are owned by landowners. Around 
70% of entitlements were fixed to landowning farmers. The remaining 30% 
that had been linked to rented land and initially allocated to farmers were 
also returned to the landowners through the adjustment of rental contracts. 
Most of the rental contracts were renewed with the modification that 
entitlements return to the landowner when the rental contract expires (the 
adjustment does not affect the rent, which largely remains unchanged).  EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 169 
 
In England (hybrid model), the regional flat-rate component of the 
SPS appears to tie the subsidy to the land, which is particularly evident in 
the rental value of land. The SPS appears to have put a floor on rental 
values. At the introduction of the SPS, on average 80% of the rental value 
was set by the CAP subsidy, whereas now on average only 50% of the 
rental value is attributable to the SPS, as land market participants have 
adjusted their behaviour and uncertainty behind the SPS has disappeared. 
In addition, the rise in land rents has reduced the contribution of the SPS to 
total rental prices. Simultaneously, non-farming landowners could also 
benefit from the SPS to a certain extent by applying directly for SPS 
entitlements themselves. This was especially the case for land that was 
under short-term rental contracts or share-farming arrangements, or used 
in the production of fruit, vegetables and potatoes.84 
In Northern Ireland (hybrid model), it appears that landowners have 
obtained the regional component of the entitlement value (currently at €78 
per entitlement against an average value of €355). Northern Ireland has an 
unusual rental system within the UK (conacre),85 in that virtually all rents 
                                                      
84 In England, a farmer who was in occupation of land in 2005 held the right to SPS 
entitlements whether (s)he was the landowner or tenant. Where there were short-
term tenancies or licences (but for at least 10 months), the right to claim the SPS in 
2005 in England could have belonged to either the landlord or tenant depending 
on the agreement. Short-term cropping leases (contracts) made it harder for 
landowners to claim the SPS. The contractor in contract-farming agreements had 
no right to land in a proper agreement, so entitlements were established by the 
landowner/farmer. Share-farming agreements were more difficult since only one 
person could claim the rights to the entitlements and meet the conditions. 
Producers growing fruit, vegetables and potatoes were allowed to claim SPS 
entitlements despite not having received CAP support historically. They were 
broadly able to claim entitlements on the area they grew in 2003. But only a person 
responsible for growing these crops in 2003 (2004 or 2005 in some circumstances) 
would be eligible for claiming entitlements, which has led to some confusion and 
difficulties as the landowner may not have been the grower – meaning it may have 
been difficult for them to secure the entitlement claim. Defra later relaxed this rule 
so that landowners and growers could agree between themselves who was the 
‘grower’ for the purpose of the entitlements.  
85 Most of the rented area is leased through the conacre system in Northern Ireland, 
where land is let on a seasonal basis (nominally for 11 months or 364 days) without 
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are for a period of less than a year; the entitlements stay with the 
landowner and not with the person renting the land. The SPS has also led 
to an adjustment of rents to accommodate the value of the regional 
component of the entitlements.86 
In countries with the historical SPS model, the impact of the SPS 
appears to be significantly weaker. Only in a few countries is there 
evidence of some capitalisation of the SPS into land rents (e.g. Belgium and 
Italy). 
Clearer evidence of partial SPS capitalisation into land rents under 
the historical model is found in Belgium. As outlined above (Box 10), the 
SPS is reinforcing the problem induced by a rigid rental market, which 
limits restructuring. 
In Italy, there is some evidence of capitalisation of the SPS into land 
rents. The presence of the SPS has put upward pressure on the rental prices 
of eligible areas, leaving rent of ineligible areas unchanged. In the study 
region of Puglia, the SPS and farm size are the two main drivers that have 
contributed to rental price rises in recent years. More specifically, the trend 
towards the expansion of large farms has contributed to demand for rented 
land. This structural change combined with an imperfect entitlement 
market has slightly added to the growth in rental prices. Rental prices for 
land with entitlements are about 10-40% higher in comparison with land 
                                                      
86 In Northern Ireland, there was a problem with the conacre rental system when 
the SPS was first introduced. This was because thousands of farmers inadvertently 
claimed entitlements on the same field as their landlords. The introduction of a 
regional component (area reference amount) in the hybrid system encouraged 
landowners to submit claims for entitlements. Yet, because of the conacre system of 
short-term rents, many active producers also claimed on that land, without 
conferring with their landowners. 
Additionally, there were cases in which landowners owned land but no 
livestock. In such cases, the person who owned the livestock received the payment 
under the historical system but the landowner was able to activate a payment 
under the area-based part (thus duplicate registration occurred). Some landowners 
own the area-based component of the SPS while farmers own the historical SPS 
component – this is not standard, but is largely owing to individual owners. If the 
landowner receives the historical SPS payment, (s)he receives an extra €78 
compared with before. Land rents have already adjusted to consider this additional 
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not accompanied by entitlements. As explained earlier, this is not evidence 
of SPS capitalisation into land rents, but solely attributable to the price of 
the entitlements. 
In the Netherlands, there is no evidence of the SPS affecting land 
rents. That being stated, non-farming landowners may gain access to the 
SPS entitlements through the regulatory system. A recent court ruling 
decided that after the expiration of a rental agreement, the SPS entitlements 
should be split in equal parts between the farmer and the landowner (see 
Box 13).  
 
Box 13. Court ruling on the distribution of the SPS in the Netherlands  
In a recent Dutch court case, the District Court of Zwolle decided that after 
the expiration of a rental agreement the SPS entitlements should be split into 
equal parts between the farmer and the landowner. The verdict was 
motivated by the judge comparing the entitlements to historical production 
quotas, for example those pertaining to milk or sugar beets. In doing so, the 
Court partially linked farm subsidies to land. The Dutch government and 
the national farmers association LTO are of the opinion that this was 
incorrect and they have encouraged the tenant to appeal to a higher court. 
 
In Ireland, concerns were raised that the SPS would push up 
agricultural rents. But the possibility to consolidate entitlements referred to 
earlier has offset this expected development. Since the introduction of the 
SPS, agricultural land rents in Ireland have not increased. 
Also in France, there is no evidence of capitalisation of the SPS into 
land rents, because rental markets are strictly regulated in France. In Spain, 
the effect could not be identified due to missing data. In Greece, because of 
rigid rental markets the SPS does not affect land rents, which confirms the 
static effect of the SPS. 
8.2.3  Who benefits from the SPS? 
This subsection summarises the effect of the SPS on land values and 
discusses the extent to which landowners benefit from the SPS.  
First, in general the impact of the SPS on land markets is not 
substantial, although there is wide variation among countries. The 172 | IMPACT OF THE SPS ON LAND MARKETS 
 
variation could be explained by the smaller number of countries that have 
implemented the hybrid model compared with the historical model.  
Second, the evidence shows a larger impact of the SPS on land rents 
than on land sales prices. Yet this result is affected by the difficulty of 
isolating the effect of the SPS on land sales, because other factors have a 
greater influence on the sales market than the SPS. 
Third, landowners tend to benefit more with the hybrid model than 
with the historical model. Landowners benefit more with the hybrid model 
through two channels: i) capitalisation of the SPS into land values (mostly 
driven by the low amount of naked land, which pushes up land values); 
and ii) specific implementation features of this model. With the hybrid 
model, the number of entitlements that farmers receive is equal to the total 
eligible area in the first year of SPS application. This aspect of the hybrid 
model has allowed some non-farming landowners to obtain entitlements in 
various ways, e.g. by cancelling the rental contract and applying 
themselves for entitlements, by adjusting rental contracts (to ensure that 
entitlements are returned to the landowner upon expiry) or other, similar 
arrangements. 
Fourth, evidence shows that the historical model leads to low levels 
of SPS land capitalisation. Where this occurs, the drivers tend to be 
structural changes combined with constrained entitlement trading. 
This observed low level of capitalisation of the SPS into land values 
with the historical model could be because it is more difficult to identify the 
effect in countries that have implemented this model. If the previous 
subsidy system was already capitalised into land values87 and the shift to 
the SPS had a marginal or no impact on land values, then both subsidy 
systems may have led to the same land capitalisation. But, parallel with the 
launch of the SPS was a significant rise in agricultural commodity prices. If 
the SPS is indeed not capitalised into land values, and the expected 
reduction in land values following SPS implementation has not occurred, 
then the unchanged prices after SPS implementation could just stem from 
the offsetting effect of higher commodity prices.  
                                                      
87 The literature estimating the impact of CAP subsidies on land values in the EU is 
almost non-existent. For this reason, it is hard to quantify their impact on land 
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On the other hand, the hybrid model redistributed subsidies among 
farms, sectors and regions. This redistribution could explain why the 
impact of the SPS is easier to identify under this model, even though both 
models lead to the same capitalisation into land values. More specifically, 
the impact of the SPS is most visible in marginal, less fertile lands where 
other drivers are less relevant. The hybrid model tends to redistribute 
subsidies in favour of less productive lands, as the previous subsidies were 
highly correlated with productivity. 
Table 17 summarises the landowner’s benefits from the SPS in the 
EUSCs, based on the analysis provided in this section. Landowners tend to 
benefit most from the SPS in Finland and Sweden and least in Greece and 
Ireland.88 In the rest of the countries examined, landowners’ benefits from 
the SPS are in the low to medium range. 
Still, whether the SPS is channelled outside agriculture depends on 
whether landowners are farmers.89 Figure 31 shows the share of land 
renting in the UAA in EU member states in 2005. The prevalence of land 
renting varies significantly among EU countries. Comparing countries 
covered by this study, land rentals are highest in Belgium, France and 
Germany (more than 70% of the land used). In Sweden, farms rent 
approximately 50% of the land used. In Ireland, land renting is the lowest 
in the EU (17%). In the rest of the EUSCs, farms rent between 34% and 43% 
of the land used.90 
These rental shares imply that in Belgium, Germany, Northern 
Ireland and Sweden, a major proportion of the SPS benefits could be 
                                                      
88 Land values were not significantly affected by the introduction of the SPS in 
Scotland. Since owner-occupancy in Scotland is around 70%, the benefit lies with 
the producer because of its historical nature. As such, landowners who are not 
actively involved in production do not benefit. 
89 The effect of the SPS on the rural economy in general is contingent upon whether 
landowners live in rural or urban areas. As consistent data are not available, we are 
unable to address this issue.  
90 In England, Northern Ireland and Scotland, land renting represented 
respectively 36%, 69% and 30% of the UAA in 2007. 174 | IMPACT OF THE SPS ON LAND MARKETS 
 
channelled to non-farming landowners.91 This finding also holds for 
England and Finland, but to a lesser extent because farms rent around 30-
36% of land. In addition, in some cases non-faming landowners enter 
farming to benefit from the SPS. This tendency is especially clear in 
Sweden, where some landowners who did not farm prior to the 
introduction of the SPS began doing so when the SPS was launched. In the 
rest of the countries, fewer SPS benefits will go to non-farming landowners 
because either land renting is less prevalent or SPS land capitalisation is 
small (or both). In these countries, farmers gain the largest proportion of 
the SPS. 
8.3  Effects of the SPS on structural change 
This section analyses the effect of the SPS on structural change in 
agriculture. Among other things, structural change may be caused by 
alterations to productivity induced by technological or institutional 
innovations, or by the presence of imperfect rural credit markets. The SPS 
itself may reduce farm credit constraints and thereby increase productivity 
(see Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Adjustments in these areas can lead to the 
reallocation of land and farm exit and entry. Meanwhile, the decoupling 
introduced with the SPS may also have stimulated structural change in 
agriculture.  
Based on the theoretical results presented in chapter 2 and appendix 
2, if entitlements are fully tradable, then the SPS has no affect on structural 
change in agriculture – neither hampering nor inducing it. Structural 
change may be constrained by the SPS if entitlements are not fully tradable. 
In this instance, the SPS restricts land transactions and the reallocation of 
land from less productive to more productive farms. For example, with 
constrained entitlement trading, farmers in decline are less willing to 
reallocate land as they lose benefits from the SPS. If the SPS affects farms’ 
credit, the SPS directly induces change in agriculture. More farm credit 
stimulates investments and input use, which enhance productivity and 
boost land transactions (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009).  
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Next, we consider the evidence on the effect of the SPS on structural 
change in agriculture based on country studies. Structural change is a long-
term process. For this reason, it may be too early to assess the 
developments observed in the few years available since the start of SPS 
implementation. Furthermore, substantial other structural change 
unrelated to the SPS has occurred in agriculture in the last few years. In 
particular, there has been a sharp increase in agricultural output and input 
prices and expansion of bio-energy production. Together, these factors 
make it difficult to isolate the impact of the SPS on structural change in 
agriculture in the study countries and regions.  
The decoupling of previous subsidies with the introduction of the 
SPS was identified in most country studies as the factor most likely to have 
brought about structural change in agriculture. Decoupling led to changes 
in production structures and input use, and to a certain extent, it provoked 
farm exit. With the SPS, farmers’ decisions have predominantly been 
driven by market incentives, while previously they took into account direct 
payments.  
The SPS has a notable effect on farm exits. More specifically, evidence 
from several country studies (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
the UK) indicates that the SPS may constrain farm exit. This effect of the 
SPS works in combination with the imperfect tradability of entitlements. 
With the presence of imperfect tradability, entitlement prices are 
depressed, thereby reducing the advantages of selling them. This reduces 
farmers’ incentives to exit, which in turn diminishes the likelihood of land 
reallocation (because SPS benefits necessitate land to activate them). 
Farmers in this situation tend to have little opportunity for off-farm 
benefits or these are lower relative to the SPS.  
One of the strategies of farmers considering exit is a shift from full- to 
part-time farming (e.g. Belgium, Germany and Italy). This inclination 
appears to be more common in marginal areas. To obtain SPS payments, it 
is not necessary to produce, but land m u s t  b e  k e p t  i n  G A E C .  P a r t - t i m e 
farming allows farmers who would otherwise exit to trim down 
unprofitable farm activities, while ensuring that they continue to benefit 
from the SPS.  
In Belgium, the practice is that farmers rent out their plots, with some 
selling land after exiting. As a result of the SPS, exiting older farmers 
remain on their farms longer, often hiring labour to maintain their land in 
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In Greece, the SPS tends to be an incentive for the rural population 
(and especially new farmers) to stay in the countryside, as farmers can 
receive the payments with minimal obligations. 
In Germany, the evidence shows that the SPS affects the decision on 
whether a farm is operated on a full- or part-time basis. There was a 
significant increase in the number of part-time farmers in Germany in the 
period 2005–07 (Figure 32). There are two possible explanations. The first is 
that small businesses or hobby farms that did not apply for CAP payments 
before the introduction of the SPS, began to operate as part-time farms to 
facilitate applying for the SPS. The second explanation is that full-time 
farmers extended their land use to the meet minimum requirements and 
thus possibly switched to part-time farming on their entire holding. 
Because the area share has remained constant or even declined, the first 
line of reasoning seems more likely. This result is confirmed by the expert 
surveys in the case study regions.  
Furthermore, it is expected that structural changes in marginal 
grassland regions (e.g. mountain pastures) will be decelerated in Germany 
owing to the increasing entitlement payments in these regions induced by 
the gradual shift from the hybrid model to the regional one (i.e. Bavaria). 
In the UK, the exit decisions of many farmers appear to have been 
delayed until 2012, as they know the SPS will run at least until then.  
The impact of the SPS on hired labour is small. There is insufficient 
evidence to be able to identify patterns of SPS effects on agricultural labour 
developments. 
The hybrid model has had some impact on land rental markets. More 
precisely, it has stimulated farm entry and engendered uncertainty in rental 
markets. This development has been observed in all countries with the 
hybrid model (except Germany), while it has not been observed in any 
country implementing the historical model. With the hybrid model, the 
allocation of entitlements is based on current land use (i.e. land use at the 
time the SPS was introduced) and not on the land use in the reference 
period. This policy stimulated farm entry because non-farming landowners 
had the possibility to obtain entitlements if they had land at their disposal 
when the SPS was introduced. Non-farming landowners just need to obtain 
land back from the tenant. It has been common for landowners to cancel 
rental contracts, enter into short-term contracts, or just before the SPS was 
launched, not renew expiring contracts. This ensured that non-farming 
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was introduced. There is some evidence, especially in Sweden, that 
landowners entered farming (especially those with low non-farming 
opportunity costs) just to obtain entitlements. This trend exacerbates 
uncertainty, however, and hampers farm decision-making on the part of 
tenant farmers.  
In countries that have implemented the historical SPS model, the 
number of entitlements farmers receive depends on the subsidies and the 
eligible area in the reference period (2000–02). For this reason, the only 
owners of entitlements could be individuals who were farmers in the 
reference period and who received subsidies. This stipulation reduces the 
possibility for non-farming landowners to obtain entitlements.  
The effect of the SPS on farm credit 
The SPS has had a crucial impact on rural credit markets. Credit market 
imperfections are important for the rural economy (e.g. Blancard et al., 
2006; Färe et al., 1990). The main factors leading to credit constraints are 
missing markets, asymmetric information and incentive problems. 
Particularly in agriculture, credit problems arise for a variety of reasons:92  
•  There is a considerable time lag between the purchase of inputs and 
the sale of production.  
•  Farms are generally small.  
•  Farms face a complex management environment (lengthy, 
biologically-based production, complicated monitoring, a spatial 
dispersion of production, etc.). 
•  The value of farm collateral tends to be lower for the lender than for 
the farmer. 
•  Finally, the monitoring of farm activities is costly. 
The SPS may have substantial implications for farms’ access to credit 
by alleviating credit constraints. If farms receive the subsidies at the 
beginning of the season, they can use the SPS directly to pay for inputs. If 
farms receive SPS payments at the end of the season, the SPS can also 
improve their access to credit, as the subsidies can be used as collateral for 
bank credit (see also Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). 
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The SPS is not expected to lead to a significant change in farms’ 
access to credit compared with the previous (coupled) subsidy system. The 
coupled subsidies introduced by the 1992 CAP reform and Agenda 2000 
could also be used as collateral for obtaining bank credit or directly to 
finance farm inputs depending on the time when the coupled subsidies 
were received by farmers. There are some differences, however, explained 
by two main factors. First, when used as collateral for bank credit, the SPS 
and the previous subsidy system may pose differing risks for lenders. For 
example, animal payments were granted per head of animal. From the 
bank’s perspective, this creates some uncertainty, as the payments 
depended on the number of animals stocked and any damage to the stock 
(e.g. disease) may reduce the total payments. Under the SPS, if farms do not 
respect cross-compliance criteria, this may lead to lower SPS payments. 
This possibility creates specific uncertainty for banks and may reduce their 
willingness to provide farm credit. Second, the hybrid model has 
redistributed subsidies among farms, which in turn has affected access to 
credit. Pre-financing ability or access to credit has been reduced for those 
farms that receive fewer subsidies under the SPS than under the previous 
subsidy system. Conversely, farms that receive more subsidies under the 
SPS compared with the previous system have gained improved access to 
credit. 
Several country studies confirm that the SPS affects farms’ access to 
credit (e.g. France, Germany, Italy and Spain). The SPS increases farm 
income and hence alleviates farm credit constraints in a straightforward 
way. In addition, the SPS is seen to increase access to short-term credit from 
banks by use as collateral. Because of the uncertainty about the future of 
the SPS, it appears that the SPS does not have an impact on long-term 
credit. Lenders are not willing to provide long-term credit by accepting 
future SPS payments as collateral.  
In Germany, it is common practice for farms that activate the subsidy 
payments to receive short-term credit – which has not altered with the 
introduction of the SPS.93  
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Similarly, in Italy, the SPS helps farmers to finance farming activities 
and obtain credit. There is a trend towards the expansion of large farms 
and the abandonment of small ones in Italy. The SPS may have slightly 
encouraged this tendency, although the actual impact is unclear. The 
increase in liquidity and easier access to credit by farmers owning large 
amounts of entitlements may have been a contributing factor.  
In France, the SPS is paid later in the year compared with pre-reform 
direct payments. For this reason, farmers may need more short-term loans 
from banks with the SPS compared with the previous subsidy system. 
Moreover, the SPS does not represent better credit collateral than pre-
reform direct payments because of its uncertain future.  
In Spain, there is no great difference between the SPS and the 
previous subsidy system in terms of farms’ access to credit. The only 
notable difference is the higher risk farmers may pose because of cross-
compliance controls and possible reductions of payments if these 
requirements are not respected. Yet, in some regions, e.g. in the Valencian 
Community, where the SPS is paid at the end of the season, farmers have to 
rely on credit to finance their costs until they receive the SPS payment. In 
this situation, farms use the commitment of the regional ministry of 
agriculture to pay out the SPS as the collateral for credit. 
8.4  Influence of changes in the SPS models on land values 
In this section, we analyse the impact of a hypothetical policy change. We 
assume that the current SPS models used by the EUSCs are replaced by a 
regional model. We focus on how the level of payments, the share of naked 
land and the link between payments and land affect the capitalisation of 
the SPS into land values. The analysis in this section is based on the 
analysis and findings from the previous chapters. 
None of the countries investigated in this study initially implemented 
a purely regional model. Most of the countries selected the historical 
model. Northern Ireland and Sweden chose the static hybrid model, while 
Finland, Germany and England opted for the dynamic hybrid model, 
which is gradually being replaced by the regional model. The complete 
switch to the regional model will occur in 2016 in Finland, in 2013 in 
Germany and in 2012 in England (Table 8). 
The chief characteristic of the regional model is that it equalises the 
value of all entitlements. In a given region, all farms receive entitlements 
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determined by three key features: i) whether new entitlements are 
allocated, ii) the redistribution of subsidies among regions and iii) how 
landowners are treated with respect to access to the entitlements. 
The insights from the previous chapters suggest that a switch to the 
regional model may have consequences for land markets. The most 
important potential effects can be summarised as follows: 
•  The evidence found in this study indicates that the SPS leads to at 
least some land capitalisation with both the hybrid and historical 
models. As a result, a shift to the regional model may lead to changes 
in the relative land prices among regions. This stems from the 
regional model redistributing subsidies among regions, which leads 
to higher prices in less productive regions and lower prices in more 
productive ones. 
•  The effects are expected to be larger in those regions that currently 
apply the historical model, because they have already materialised to 
a certain extent in countries that use the hybrid model. Note that 
under the hybrid model, a share of payments has already been 
redistributed. In these countries, the policy shift to the regional model 
will reinforce this redistribution even further. 
•  Whether the shift to a regional model will lead to more widespread 
land capitalisation of the SPS compared with the current SPS models 
will depend on the implementation details of the regional model. 
Such details include, for example, whether the number of 
entitlements will increase or stay at the present level and the extent to 
which non-farming landowners’ access to entitlements will be 
regulated and enforced. Evidence from this study suggests that 
landowners tend to benefit more with the hybrid model than with the 
historical model for two reasons: i) more entitlements were allocated 
under the hybrid model and ii) the implementation features of the 
hybrid model allowed landowners to obtain entitlements or to ‘force’ 
farmers to return entitlements to them when rental contracts expired.  
•  Yet, if the total number of entitlements allocated is not affected by the 
policy changes (only the entitlement value is equalised), the upward 
pressure on land prices will continue to be stronger in countries that 
currently use the hybrid model. This is because in these countries 
there is less naked land than in countries using the historical model. 
•  Frictions between farmers and landowners are expected to increase 
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influenced by the implementation details of the regional model. If 
additional entitlements are allocated along with the policy shift, non-
farming landowners will be able to keep the entitlements, as has been 
observed in the EUSCs that apply the hybrid model. This is mainly 
because under the hybrid (or regional) model, the number of 
entitlements that each farm receives depends on the amount of 
eligible area when the SPS was introduced. In contrast, under the 
historical model it depends on the amount of land that generated 
support in the reference period. Hence, the key factors that will 
determine whether frictions between farmers and landowners 
intensify with the policy shift are the extent to which the access to 
entitlements of non-farming landowners is regulated and enforced, 
and the extent to which the number of newly allocated entitlements 
(if any) is based on current or past land use. 
•  The impact of the policy shift on land markets, especially on the 
capitalisation into land values, is contingent upon the clarity and 
transparency of the implementation process. If the shift creates 
uncertainty among farmers, this will affect land markets. More 
precisely, it will constrain entitlement markets – which in 
combination with the structural changes taking place in the 
agricultural sector, may enhance land capitalisation. 
•  In summary, uncertainty and the implementation specifics of the 
policy change will affect the entitlement market, which in turn will 
determine the capitalisation of the SPS into land values. For example, 
there is evidence from the Netherlands that the expected shift to the 
regional model in the future affects the trade in high-value 
entitlements. This expectation reduces the market price of high-value 
entitlements, as market participants believe that a shift to the regional 
model will likely cut the value of such entitlements. On the other 
hand, there is evidence from Belgium that the trade in low-value 
entitlements has been stimulated by the regulation that allows young 
farmers to replace low-value entitlements with those of higher value 
equal to the regional average.  
•  Still, the shift to the regional model will increase transparency in the 
entitlement market, as all entitlements will have the same value. 
Above all, it will stimulate transactions on the entitlement market 
and thus lead to lower capitalisation of the SPS. 
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9.   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
ur conclusions are organised under three themes: land markets in 
the EU study countries, CAP reform and its impact on land 
markets, and data limitations. In the section on land markets in the 
EUSCs, we summarise the main findings about the nature of the land 
markets, their development and the key drivers of land values. In the 
section on CAP reform and land markets, we discuss the principal findings 
on the effects of SPS implementation, the activation of entitlements along 
with their valuation and trade, the distribution of SPS benefits and the 
ramifications for structural change. In the final section, we outline the chief 
limitations of the present research. 
9.1  Land markets in the EU study countries 
9.1.1  Nature and developments 
The amount of rented land and the volumes of rental transactions differ greatly 
among the EUSCs. Farms in Belgium, France, Northern Ireland and 
Germany are more likely to rent land (more than 65% of the land used). In 
Sweden, farms rent approximately 50% of the agricultural land used. In 
contrast, the prevalence of land renting is lowest (17%) in Ireland. In the 
rest of the countries covered by this study, farms rent between 34% and 
43% of the land used. The share of rented farmland of the total UAA is 
increasing in most of the EUSCs.  
Agricultural land prices also vary widely across the EUSCs. In the peak 
years, differentials between the most and least expensive countries 
exceeded 2,000% – ranging from around €2,000/ha in parts of Sweden to 
over €40,000/ha in parts of the Netherlands. These figures imply that 
awarding the same amount of subsidy per hectare of agricultural land 
would have quite diverse impacts on land prices.  
O EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 183 
 
The variation in rental prices is somewhat lower than in sales prices but 
large differences are likewise apparent. The difference in rental prices between 
the lowest and highest countries was around 600% in 1992 and over 700% 
in 2006. 
Changes in agricultural land prices over the past decade have been diverse as 
well. Over the period from 1992 to the present, real farmland sales prices 
have decreased by around 25% in Greece, while increasing by around 250% 
in Ireland. Developments in rental prices since 1992 have ranged from a 
decline of around 25% in Finland to a rise of around 55% in Spain. 
This cross-country heterogeneity in agricultural land markets 
suggests that farmers and landowners in these different land markets may 
be affected by (changes in) the CAP in alternate ways. 
9.1.2  Drivers of land values 
Agricultural commodity prices and productivity, infrastructural expansion and 
urban pressures have marked influences on land markets, but their relative 
importance differs for rental and sales markets. First, agricultural commodity 
prices and productivity are significant drivers of agricultural land prices, 
but their effects seem to be more striking for rental markets than for sales 
markets. Second, urban pressures – such as growing housing demand – 
have pronounced effects on agricultural land prices, especially in densely 
populated EUSCs (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands) and faster growing 
economies (e.g. Ireland and Spain). The same applies to the role of 
infrastructural expansion in driving up land prices. The latter two factors in 
particular influence sales prices. 
Land market regulations affect land prices and exchanges – especially land 
rentals. Rental prices for agricultural land tend to be more regulated by 
governments than sales prices. In one-third of the EUSCs, the maximum 
rental prices are set by the government.  
The duration of rental contracts is regulated in some of the EUSCs, which 
influences the responsiveness of the rental market to agricultural policy changes. 
The length of rental contracts is regulated by the government in Belgium 
and France (with a contract duration of nine years minimum), the 
Netherlands (six years minimum) and Spain (five years minimum). In 
several EUSCs (e.g. France), the renewal/inheritance of rental contracts is 
also regulated. In these countries, formal rental markets are stickier and the 
time lag is longer in adjusting to policy changes. The prevalence of land 
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such as Belgium and France. These two countries have the highest 
minimum lengths of rental contracts (nine years) and the highest shares of 
rented area (77% and 75% in 2006, respectively) among all the EUSCs. 
Land taxes differ significantly across the EUSCs. Three kinds of tax 
regulations that affect market participants’ decisions to buy, own or sell 
agricultural land have been studied: sales taxes, purchase taxes and 
ownership taxes. Tax rates for land transactions are heterogeneous across 
the EUSCs, spanning from 1% for low-value land in the UK to 18% for 
high-value farmland in Italy. The same applies to ownership taxes, ranging 
from a 0% tax rate on farmland in Finland to over 15% in the southern EU 
countries. 
Neither low taxes for farmland ownership and transactions nor entitlements 
constrain structural change, but they do expose farmland to non-agricultural 
investors. Low transaction taxes for farmland and SPS entitlements facilitate 
structural change through the reallocation of agricultural land and 
entitlements from less productive to more productive farms (e.g. 
Germany). On the other hand, agricultural land markets in countries with 
low transaction taxes are more exposed to speculative farmland purchases 
(and sales) by non-agricultural investors (e.g. Finland). Differentiated 
farmland ownership taxes for farmers and non-farmers reduce the 
incentives for long-term, speculative farmland purchases (and sales) by 
non-agricultural investors, but hinder structural change (e.g. Greece). 
CAP subsidies have an impact on land values, but the impact varies 
substantially across countries and appears relatively modest compared with other 
factors, especially where land prices are high. CAP subsidies appear to affect 
land sales prices in the EUSCs. Still, their relative importance seems limited 
compared with other drivers. Generally, the lower the land price, the 
higher is the impact of CAP policies in this respect (e.g. in the Nordic 
regions in Finland and Sweden). In countries such as the Netherlands and 
Ireland, where land prices are very high or are rapidly increasing, factors 
other than CAP policies appear to have a greater bearing.  
9.2  CAP reform and land markets 
9.2.1  Implementation of the SPS 
The EU member states could choose among three SPS implementation 
models: the historical, regional and hybrid model. Under the historical 
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received in the reference period. This is the most common SPS model in the 
EUSCs. Under the regional model, an equal per-hectare payment is granted 
to all farms in the region. 
Concerns about the redistribution of subsidies were by far the most 
compelling factor for the EUSCs that selected the historical SPS model over 
the regional one. A major motivation for England, Finland and Germany in 
deciding to apply the dynamic hybrid model instead of directly 
implementing the regional one was to smooth the adjustment of the 
farming sector over time. In all cases, receipt of the full SPS support is 
conditioned on the fulfilment of cross-compliance requirements. More 
precisely, a farmer receiving SPS support must respect SMRs and maintain 
land in GAEC.  
None of the EUSCs implemented the purely regional model. The 
comparative insights are therefore based on contrasting the implications of 
the historical model with the hybrid model. 
9.2.2 Entitlements:  Activation, trade and valuation 
The share of non-activated entitlements of the total distributed entitlements is low. 
For most EUSCs, it is less than 3%. The value of non-activated entitlements 
tends to be lower than the value of activated ones. Non-activated 
entitlements mainly stem from the absence of eligible area and 
administrative burdens. 
The share of activated entitlements tends to be somewhat higher in countries 
using the hybrid model than in those using the historical one. We find that this 
might be owing to specific criteria relating to the implementation of the 
hybrid model. 
There is a wide variation in the face value of entitlements among and within 
the EUSCs. This variation seems to be determined by the commodity 
structure, the level of support provided in the reference period, the SPS 
model applied and implementation details. 
There are large differences among the EUSCs in the restrictions on trading 
entitlements. EU regulations allow entitlements to be tradable but certain 
constraints are imposed by the EU. Member states have some flexibility in 
introducing additional country-specific limitations on entitlement 
tradability. Spain, Italy and France have the tightest restrictions on 
entitlement trading.  
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The trade of entitlements is most often conducted directly among farmers, 
although sometimes market agents or farm organisations play a role. Spain 
appears to have the most developed entitlement trading system, similar to 
an auction. 
There is no informal trading in entitlements, except among family members. 
An informal entitlement market was not found in any of the EUSCs, 
because in order to receive payments, entitlement holders need to be 
identifiable. Unofficial ‘trade’ may occur among members of the same 
family, however. 
The entitlement market tends to be smaller in regions under the hybrid 
model compared with the historical model. Under the historical model, trade is 
likely to be driven by structural change – because the SPS was 
implemented in 2005–07, but the SPS entitlements were distributed based 
on land use in 2000–02. With the hybrid model, entitlement trading is 
driven by a combination of decoupling and the fact that relatively more 
entitlements were allocated than with the historical model. Structural 
change is less of an influential factor in the entitlement market under the 
hybrid model, as entitlements were distributed based on the area used in 
the first year of the SPS application. Differences in the implementation 
features of the two SPS models may explain the higher volume of trade 
with the historical model than with the hybrid one. This is chiefly evident 
in the short run, which is investigated in this study. 
Preliminary evidence suggests that the trade in entitlements is also 
affected by the functioning of land markets, restrictions on the tradability 
of entitlements, the availability of an opportunity to consolidate 
entitlements and the amount of naked land.  
Entitlements are most often traded with land. Evidence from the EUSCs 
shows that with few exceptions, entitlement trades are usually 
accompanied by land. 
Our data show that the market price for entitlements in most EUSCs is 
between one and three times the annual face value of the entitlement. A simple 
calculation would indicate that with perfect markets and without 
uncertainty, the entitlement price would  b e  i n  t h e  r a n g e  o f  f o u r  t o  f i v e  
times the face value if the SPS were to run until 2013 or in the range of ten 
to twenty if the SPS were to run indefinitely.  
Several factors may explain the observed gap in the entitlement price 
between theoretical expectations and empirical evidence: i) uncertainty 
about the future of the SPS (e.g. modulation and the health check), ii) the EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 187 
 
additional costs of the SPS (e.g. administrative costs), iii) the taxes and fees 
imposed on transactions and iv) credit market imperfections. The low 
market price of the entitlements may also reflect the capitalisation of the 
SPS into farmland values. 
9.2.3  Effects of SPS implementation 
Our theoretical framework and empirical evidence in the literature suggest that the 
impact of the SPS on land markets depends on several factors, including the SPS 
model applied and specific implementation features, market imperfections, 
transaction costs, market structure and other policies. 
On average, the impact on land markets of the switch to the SPS appears to 
have been weak and it has not led to lower capitalisation than under coupled 
policies, although there has been variation among the EUSCs and regions. 
Preliminary evidence presented in this study indicates that on average the 
impact has been limited. We do not observe major declines in land prices 
with the shift to decoupled policies, which implies that there are no 
significant reductions in the capitalisation of support.  
The introduction of the SPS appears to have had a larger impact on land 
rents than on farmland sales prices. The net effect on land values also depends 
on the rate of SPS capitalisation into land values and on the relative 
significance of the SPS compared with other drivers of land values. The 
empirical evidence from this study implies that the relative weight of the 
SPS in determining farmland prices against that of other drivers of land 
values is higher for rents than for sales prices. 
Preliminary evidence reveals that the historical model leads to lower 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values than the regional or hybrid models. In 
countries with the hybrid model, capitalisation appears to be driven by the 
low amount of naked land. In countries with the historical model, the 
impact of the SPS appears to be substantially weaker. Where SPS land 
capitalisation occurs, the most influential factor tends to be structural 
change combined with constrained entitlement trading (most notably in 
Belgium). In countries such as Greece, there is little activity on the land 
market and hence there is little capitalisation of the SPS. In Ireland, the 
possibility to consolidate entitlements has reduced the pressure of the SPS 
on land markets and SPS land capitalisation seems to be minimal. 
We also find that instead of reducing capitalisation, introduction of the SPS 
appears to have increased capitalisation in the least productive countries. The SPS 
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Sweden and parts of the UK). The clearest evidence of the influence of the 
SPS on land values is higher land values for less fertile land (e.g. 
grassland). But this finding could also be rooted in the redistribution that 
came with the hybrid model. 
In countries with regulated rental prices, implementation of the SPS seems 
mainly to affect unofficial markets. In these member states, there is little effect 
on official prices (since these are regulated), but where regulations lead to 
the existence of unofficial markets for agricultural land, the SPS tends to 
increase both rental prices (e.g. Belgium) and volumes on the unofficial 
market (e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands). 
9.2.4  Distribution of the SPS benefits 
Landowners tend to benefit more from the hybrid model than from the historical 
model. More specifically, landowners benefit more under the hybrid model 
through two channels. The first is the capitalisation of the SPS into land 
values. This is mostly the case where low amounts of naked land drive up 
land values. The second channel concerns the implementation features of 
the hybrid model. Under the hybrid model, the number of entitlements that 
farmers receive is equal to the total eligible area in the first year of the SPS 
application. This has enabled some non-farming landowners to obtain 
entitlements either by cancelling the existing rental contracts and applying 
for entitlements themselves or by adjusting rental contracts to ensure that 
entitlements return to them after the contract expires, or by undertaking 
other similar arrangements. 
The distribution of the SPS payments to landowners appears to differ 
markedly among the EUSCs. From our country studies, it seems that 
landowners benefit most from the SPS in Finland and Sweden (60-100% of 
the value of the entitlement) and least in Greece and Ireland (0-10%). In the 
rest of the countries, the benefits that accrue to landowners from the SPS 
are in the low to medium range (10-60%). 
The distribution of the SPS additionally depends on whether landowners are 
also farmers, which varies among the EUSCs. As mentioned above, the 
prevalence of renting land differs greatly among the EUSCs. The evidence 
in this study suggests that in Germany, Northern Ireland and Sweden, a 
substantial share of SPS benefits will be channelled to non-farming 
landowners. This finding also holds (but to a lesser extent) for England, 
Finland and Scotland. In the rest of the EUSCs, a lower share of the SPS will 
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or because there is little capitalisation of the SPS into land values (or both). 
In these countries, farmers appear to gain the largest proportion of the SPS. 
9.2.5  Effects on structural change 
It is too early to observe significant effects of the SPS on structural change in 
agriculture.  Structural change is a long-term process, and it is therefore 
premature to assess the developments observed one or two years since the 
SPS was introduced. Meanwhile, substantial structural changes related to 
factors other than the SPS have occurred in agriculture in the last few years. 
Still, the decoupling of subsidies with the introduction of the SPS has been 
identified by most country studies as having had a major impact on 
structural change in agriculture. 
The SPS seems to constrain farm exit and increase part-time farming. 
Evidence from several countries, e.g. Belgium, Finland, Sweden and the 
UK, suggests that the SPS constrains farm exit. The SPS also appears to 
increase part-time farming – an effect that seems more pronounced in 
marginal areas. Part-time farming allow s  f a r m e r s  t o  r e d u c e  u n p r o fit a b l e 
farm activities while still benefiting from the SPS. No significant difference 
can be identified between the hybrid and historical models in this respect. 
The impact of the SPS on hired labour appears small. There is 
insufficient evidence to identify the effects of the SPS on other agricultural 
labour developments.  
The hybrid model has stimulated (formal) farm entry, unlike the historical 
model, although it has also given rise to uncertainty on the rental markets. This is 
because under the hybrid model, the allocation of entitlements is based on 
land use when the SPS was introduced and not on land use in the reference 
period. We find some evidence that landowners have started farming in 
order to gain access to the entitlements. The long-term net impact of these 
rent-seeking activities on farm structures is unclear. Nevertheless, it has 
affected the distribution of SPS rents and the market in entitlements in 
ways that are different from the historical model, where such activities do 
not appear to have occurred.  
The introduction of the SPS has reduced farm credit constraints, especially 
for short-term credit. An interesting and potentially significant side effect of 
the SPS has emerged in rural credit markets. Several country studies (e.g. 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) confirm that the SPS affects farms’ 
access to credit. If farms receive the subsidies at the beginning of the 
season, they can use the SPS to pay for inputs directly. If farms receive SPS 190 | GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
payments at the end of the season, the SPS subsidies can be used as 
collateral for bank credit. Because of uncertainty about the future of the 
SPS, however, it appears that the SPS has no influence on long-term credit. 
Lenders are not willing to provide longer-term loans by accepting future 
SPS payments as collateral. 
9.2.6  Effects of changes in the SPS model on land values 
None of the EUSCs implemented a purely regional model. Most of the 
EUSCs have applied the historical model and some the dynamic hybrid 
model, which will gradually be replaced by the regional model. 
The key characteristic of the regional model is that it equalises the 
face value of all entitlements. The effect of the shift to the regional model 
will be determined by three critical features: i) whether new entitlements 
are allocated, ii) the redistribution of subsidies among regions and iii) how 
landowners are treated with respect to access to the entitlements. 
The  regional model may lead to changes in relative land prices among 
regions. The regional model redistributes subsidies among regions, which is 
expected to lead to higher prices in less productive regions and lower 
prices in more productive ones. The effect is expected to be more marked in 
those regions currently applying the historical model. Under the hybrid 
model, a share of the payments has already been redistributed. 
The implementation details of the regional model will largely determine 
whether the shift to the regional model will increase the capitalisation of the SPS 
compared with current SPS models. Among other things, this will depend on 
whether the number of entitlements increase or stay at the present level 
and how much non-farming landowners’ access to entitlements is 
regulated and the rules enforced.  
Yet if the total number of entitlements allocated is affected by the 
policy changes, the upward pressure on land prices will continue to be 
stronger in those countries that have implemented the hybrid model.  
Frictions between farmers and landowners are expected to intensify with the 
shift to the regional model. The chief factors in this regard will be the extent to 
which the access to entitlements of non-farming landowners is regulated 
and enforced, and the extent to which newly allocated entitlements (if any) 
are based on current or past land use. 
The change in models may have an impact on the levels of uncertainty and 
transparency in the entitlement market. If the shift to the regional model 
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and may induce more land capitalisation. On the other hand, the shift to 
the regional model may increase transparency in the entitlement market, as 
all entitlements will have the same face value. 
9.3  Limitations 
The results reported in the present study are subject to certain limitations. 
First, as in any empirical analysis, one should keep in mind data limitations 
when interpreting the results. In particular, data on land transactions are 
scarce for the period after the SPS was implemented. The rather short time 
span since the implementation of the SPS combined with the varying 
quality of the available data has not allowed us to perform a consistent 
econometric analysis. In addition, farmland markets are only marginally 
covered in national statistical data. For example, in several countries 
uniform databases for the land market are still to be established (e.g. the 
land cadastre in Greece). 
Second, the global food markets have simultaneously undergone 
major changes, such as a rise in world prices for agricultural commodities. 
Rising energy prices have increased competition for farmland from the bio-
energy sector. These factors reduce the ability to isolate the impact of the 
SPS on agricultural land markets. 
Third, the qualitative analysis performed in the present study does 
not enable us to assess confidence intervals nor does it allow us to perform 
sensitivity analysis on the results or checks on statistical robustness. 
Although we have attempted to systematically verify all the input data and 
prove our findings using several alternative sources of information, this 
cannot replace statistical robustness checks. This is a promising avenue for 
future work, when more and better quality data become available. 
Fourth, the results for farmland sales prices are not directly 
comparable with the results for farmland rental prices. On the one hand, it 
is rather difficult to identify the impact of the SPS on land sales prices, 
because these are more strongly driven by non-agricultural factors and 
market expectations are more important. For land rents, this problem is less 
acute. On the other hand, rental markets for agricultural land are more 
regulated than sales markets are and in rigid markets, the contracts tend to 
be of a longer duration. Rental contract regulations may delay or mitigate 
the capitalisation of the SPS into higher land rents than observed in rental 
market data. 192 | GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Moreover, if the previous area payments introduced under the 1992 
CAP reform and under Agenda 2000 were already capitalised into land 
values, then the capitalisation of the SPS may be difficult to observe 
because of biased counterfactual data. The empirical literature estimating 
the impact of previous subsidies on land values is scarce but it tends to find 
that the previous area payments have had an affect on land values 
(Duvivier et al., 2005; Patton et al., 2008). This finding implies that the SPS 
may be capitalised into land values even where land prices remain stable 
after the introduction of the SPS. Yet, to be able to quantify the precise rate 
of SPS capitalisation, other factors that may influence land values also need 
to be taken into account along with the previous area payments. Further 
work is needed on these aspects, to determine the unbiased effect of the 
SPS.  | 193 
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Figure 1. Evolution of real sales prices for agricultural land in the EUSCs,  
1992–2007 (€/ha) 
 
Notes:  For 1992–96, GDP deflator for Germany, OECD; for 1997–2007, harmonised indices of consumer 
prices, euro area, Eurostat.  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2008). 
Figure 2. Evolution of sales price indices for agricultural land in the EUSCs, 
1992–2007 (%, 1992=100) 
 
Notes:  For 1992–96, GDP deflator for Germany, OECD; for 1997–2007, harmonised indices of consumer 
prices, euro area, Eurostat.  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat (2008). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 205 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of agricultural land sales as a percentage of total UAA in the 
EUSCs, 1992–2007 
 
Source: Own calculations based on country reports for this study. 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of real rental prices for agricultural land in the EUSCs, 1992–
2006 (€/ha) 
 
* Not in the figure 
Notes: For 1992–96, GDP deflator for Germany, OECD; for 1997–2007, harmonised indices of 
consumer prices, euro area, Eurostat. 
Source: Own calculations based on FADN (2008).  206 | FIGURES 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of rental price indices for agricultural land in the EUSCs, 
1992–2007 (€/ha) 
 
Notes: For 19792–96, GDP deflator for Germany, OECD; for 1997–2007, harmonised indices 
of consumer prices, euro area, Eurostat. 
Source: Own calculations based on FADN (2008).  
 
Figure 6. Evolution of the rented share of the total agricultural area in the EUSCs, 
1992–2006 (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on FADN (2008). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 207 
 






























































































































































































































Real GDP in PPS, 2006 Change in real GDP per capita 2006/2000 (%)
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.  208 | FIGURES 
 






























































































Note: For Belgium and the Netherlands, the values are for 2006 and 2000, respectively. 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 10. Share of gross value added of agriculture, fishing and hunting in total 




























































































Note: For Ireland, the values are for 2006 and 2000, respectively. 
Source: Eurostat. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 209 
 











































































































Source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat data. Data for France, Sweden and Finland for 
1990 were not available. 
 




















































Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 210 | FIGURES 
 



























































































































































Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 





































































































































Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 212 | FIGURES 
 


























Wheat (Germany) Barley (Germany)
Maize (Germany) Rapeseed (Germany)
Sunflower (Spain)
 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 








































































































































Grains Milk Potatoes Sugar beet  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 214 | FIGURES 
 





































































































Note: The EU-6 includes Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and the UK. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 




































































































































Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 215 
 







































































































































Notes: The data are for 2006 or 2007 depending on the country; see Table 13. 
Source: Country reports for this study.  
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Netherlands (H) Sweden (SH)
 
Notes: H refers to the historical model; SH refers to the static hybrid model. 
Source: Country reports for this study. 
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Source: Country reports for this study. 
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Source: Country reports for this study. 
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Source: Country reports for this study. 
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Source: Country report on Sweden for this study. 
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Source: Own calculations based on FADN data. 
 



























Source: Country report on Germany for this study. 220 | FIGURES 
 
















































































Arable land Permanent grassland
 
Source: FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie (2008). 
 



















































































































Source: FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie (2008). 
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Source: Eurostat (2008). 
 
Figure 36. Evolution of the number of land sales in Belgium 
 
Source: Stadim (2008). 222 | FIGURES 
 
Figure 37. Average real prices of arable land and permanent grassland in Flanders 
and Wallonia: All plots 
 
Source: Stadim (2008). 
 




















































































Agricultural input price index Agricultural output price index
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Source: National Bank of Belgium (2008). 
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Source: National Land Survey (2008). 224 | FIGURES 
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Source: SAFER data from the European Commission’s FP6 IDEMA project. 
 













Source: SAFER data from the European Commission’s FP6 IDEMA project. 
 
Figure 43. Evolution of the average sales price of farmland in France, Bretagne and 
























Source: SAFER data from the European Commission’s FP6 IDEMA project. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 225 
 



































Sources: Based on SAFER data from the European Commission’s FP6 IDEMA project for 
sales prices, and other data from Eurostat and Agreste (ministry of agriculture). 
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Source: Chatellier et al. (2007). 226 | FIGURES 
 






































Western Germany Eastern Germany Germany
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1999–2007). 
 
Figure 47. Average land rents in Germany, 1991–2007 








1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
€/ha
Germany East Germany West Germany
 
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt (2007) values for 2007 are projected based on data from the 
agricultural census for the case study regions. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 227 
 
Figure 48. Trends in land rents in Germany, 1991–2007 
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average rent arable land grass land
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2007). 
 
Figure 49. Land sales prices and the total number of sales transactions in 
Germany, 1991–2006 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2007). 
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Source: Eurostat, NewCronos database. 
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Veenkoloniën en Oldambt Zuidwestelijk Akkerbouwgebied
Westelijk Holland Oostelijk Veehouderijgebied  
Sources: CBS and Eurostat. 
 










































































Notes: The shaded area represents the range between the 10th and 90th percentiles; the solid 
line is the median. 
Source: Kadaster (Dutch Land Registry Office). 
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Figure 54. Average transaction size per province in the Netherlands 
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Notes:  DR = Drenthe, FL = Flevoland, FR = Friesland, GE = Gelderland, GR = Groningen, LI 
= Limburg, NB = Noord Brabant, NH = Noord Holland, OV = Overijssel, UT = 
Utrecht, ZE = Zeeland, ZH = Zuid Holland 
Source: Kadaster (Dutch Land Registry Office). 
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Sources: CBS (1993–2001); Eurostat (2002–07). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 231 
 


















































































Agricultural land Arable land Meadows
 
Sources: CBS (1990–2001) and Eurostat (2002–06). 
 























































Newly rented area ('000 ha) New rental contracts ('000)
 
Notes: In general, the area newly rented out is declining. The peak in 1996 was caused by 
reforms to rental market regulations in 1995. Especially larger plots were newly 
rented out under less regulated terms. 
Source:  CBS. 232 | FIGURES 
 











































































Cereals Land Crops (general)
 
Sources: Kadaster (Dutch Land Registry Office) for land; Eurostat for cereals and crops. 
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Figure 60. Long-term interest rates in the Netherlands are falling, reducing the 















































10 year Dutch government bonds
 
Source: Dutch Central Bank. 
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Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 234 | FIGURES 
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Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 
 




























Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 235 
 















Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 
 








































Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 
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Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 
 
Figure 67. Impacts of the various drivers on Swedish agricultural land prices 
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Notes: The impact on land prices is measured on the scale as 7 = strong increase, 
6 = medium increase, 5 = weak increase and 4 = no change. 
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Figure 68. Impacts of the various drivers on Swedish agricultural land rents 
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Notes: The impact on land prices is measured on the scale as 7 = strong increase, 
6 = medium increase, 5 = weak increase and 4 = no change. 
 













* Interest rates in December of each year.  238 | FIGURES 
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Source: Defra (2008). 
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Source: Savills (L&P) Limited (2008). 
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Rented Owned  
Source: Department of Environment and Rural Affairs (2008), June Agricultural and 
Horticultural Census (2000 and various years). 
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Owner-occupied Rented  
Sources: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development of Northern Ireland (various); 
Statistical Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture (various editions). 
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Sources: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development of Northern Ireland (various); 
Statistical Review of Northern Ireland Agriculture (various editions). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 241 
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http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/02/06131043/5  
Note: The total excludes bare fallow and set-aside land. 
Source: Scottish government (2008), Abstract of Scottish Agricultural Statistics 1982 to 2007. 
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Figure 80. Effect of the regional SPS model on the land market where the number 
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Figure 84. Effect of symmetric productivity changes and the regional SPS model on 
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Figure 85. Effect of asymmetric productivity changes and the regional SPS model 
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Table 1. Sales market regulations in the EUSCs  
  Min./max. 
sales price 
Registration tax & 
real estate tax* 
Land use and other regulations & 
norms 
    (% of land value)   




Finland  None  4* 
0 on farmland 
 
France  None  5.09 
CI 
Some transactions subject to state 
approval (through SAFER); 
farmland-reducing zoning 
regulations 








Subject to state agency approval 
Greece  Min. price  7-9* 
0 on farmland 
– 
Ireland  None  9 
0 
– 
Italy  None  11-18** 
0.4-0.7 
– 
Netherlands  None  0 on farmland 
6 sales tax* 
– 
Spain  None  6-7 
6-15 
– 
Sweden  None  30 on two-thirds of 
sales value 
0 
Purchase permits for sparsely 
populated areas & legal entity 
buyers 
UK  None  0-4 
0 
Tenant and community rights to 
buy in Scotland; strict development 
control in the UK 
* Exemptions for farmers 
** Usually calculated on standard values rather than on the price of the transaction 
Note: CI refers to differentiated cadastral income.  
Source: Own compilation based on the country reports for this study.  EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 251 
 
Table 2. Rental market regulations in the EUSCs 
  Min./max. 
rental price 
Min./max. & 
average tenancy duration 
Other rental market 
regulations & norms 
    (Years)   
Belgium  Max. rent  Min. 9/max. 27 (99) 
Avg. 9 
– 
Finland  No  Max. 10 
Avg. 5-6 
– 
France  Min. & max. 
rent 
Min. 1/max. 25 




Germany  No  No 
Avg. 6-11.5 
Subject to state 
approval 
Greece  Min. rent  No 
<4 years 
– 
Ireland  No  No 
Avg. 11 months 
Conacre rental 
agreements 
Italy  No  No 
Avg. arable crops: 2-5  
Avg. fruit crops: 5-10 
Possibility of 
contracting with the 
assistance of farmer 
associations 
Netherlands  Max. rent  Min. 6 (until 2007) 
24 in the past; <10 now 
– 
Spain  No  Min. 5  – 
Sweden  No  No 
Avg. declining towards 1 
– 
UK  No  In Scotland, for new 
tenancies under the 2003 
Act, a max. of 5 and a  






duration tenancies  
England:  
Traditional tenancies 
& farm business 
tenancies 
Source: Own compilation based on the country reports for this study. 252 | TABLES 
 
Table 3. Sales markets for agricultural land in the EUSCs 




Average size of 
transacted plots 
  (€/ha)  (Number/%)  (ha) 
Belgium  Increasing since 1996 – 




since the 1980s 
Total decreasing; avg. 
stable (0.9-1.0 ha) 
Finland  Large price 
fluctuations between 
years (±300%); real 
land price 1998≈2007 
Yearly avg. 5,800; 
fluctuations ±10%; 
since 2005, a decreasing 
trend 
Until 1993 decreasing; 
since 1993 fluctuating 
at 4.6-6.3 ha 
France  Continuous increase 
since 1995; in 2004, the 
avg. price was €9,341 
Stagnating 1994–2004; 
in 2004, 0.93% of the 
total UAA sold 
Fluctuations ±12%; 
avg. plot size 
transacted is 3.3 ha 
Germany  Constant German avg., 
↑ East, ↓ West 
Decreasing, in 2006 
38,400; in 2005, only 
0.6% of the UAA sold; 
avg. plot size 
transacted is 2.5 ha 
Stable over the last five 
years at 2.2-2.8 ha (4.5-
6 ha in East and 1.5 ha 
in West Germany) 
Greece  Stable for irrigated, but 
decreasing (-16%) in 
1991–2006 for 
unirrigated land 
Small  Small 
Ireland  Increasing very sharply 
since 1990; in 2005, 
214% higher than in 
1990 
Decreasing, from 
31,210 ha in 1991 to 
6,115 ha in 2004 
Fluctuating, 11 ha in 
1991, 9 ha in 2004 
(+50% in 1993, 1994 
and 1998) 
Italy  Increasing in current 
values, stable in real 




Yearly 1-2% of total 
UAA 
– 
Netherlands  Increasing from 
€17,000 in 1993 to 
€36,500 in 2001 (+10% 
pa); in 2001–05, 
decreasing by 17%; 
since 2006, an 
increasing trend 
Sizable fluctuations, 
which depend on land 
prices; 5% in 2000; 
2.5% in 2003 
Avg. size 4.0-4.5 ha; 
50% of all sales <27 ha EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 253 
 
Table 3. cont’d 
Spain  Increasing nominal 
prices (€14,340 in 
1990, €28,000 in 2006); 
irrigated land four 
times more expensive 
than unirrigated 
Small  – 
Sweden  Increasing – real prices 
doubled from €1,874 
in 1990 to €3,706 in 
2006 
Decreasing, from 
27,106 ha in 1990 to 
19,439 ha in 2006 
Decreasing, from 13.7 
ha in 1990 to 7.5 ha in 
2006 
UK  Increasing, with a 
decrease in 2002–03 
Decreasing, from 4.3% 
in 1997 to 1.6% in 2004 
– 
Source: Own calculations based on the country reports for this study. 
 
Table 4. Rental markets for agricultural land in the EUSCs 
  Land rent 
development 




  (€/ha)  (Number/%)   
Belgium  Increasing, +16.8% 
over 1992–2006 
Stable, at -1.7% over 
1992–2006; 62-73% of the 
UAA; landowner 
eligibility for the SPS 
reduces land supply 
Significant 
fragmentation – 
farmers are both 
renting the land out 
and renting from 
other landowners 
Finland  Stable  Increasing, +42% 1990–
2007 (from 13% to 33% 
of the UAA) 





France  Stable, 1% yearly 
decrease since 2000  
Increasing, from  
59.9% of the UAA in 
1990 to 75.8% in 2006 
– 
Germany  Decreasing, -37.4% 
over 1992–2006 
West > East 
In 2007, 61.7% of the 
UAA, decreasing in the 
East >80%, 
increasing in the West 
– 
Greece  Decreasing, -13.6% 
over 1992–2006 
Increasing, +49.2% over 
1992–2006 
Extensive 
fragmentation 254 | TABLES 
 
Table 4. cont’d 
Ireland  Stable  Increasing, +34.1% over 
1992–2006 
– 
Italy  Increasing, +24.4% 
over 1992–2006 
€400–900 in 2006 
Increasing from 17.9% in 




Netherlands  Low until 1994 
(regulated); increasing 
since 1995, +17.8% 
over 1992–2006 
Fluctuating–decreasing 
since 1990 at 2-10,000; in 
2002, 10% of the UAA 




Spain  Increasing, +54.1% 
over 1992–2006 
Increasing, +36.0% over 
1992–2006; 70% of the 
UAA 
– 
Sweden  Increasing, +30.1% 
over 1995–2006 
Increasing until 2002, 
declining since 2003; 
40-45% of the UAA 
– 
UK  Decreasing, -13.7% 
over 1992–2006 
Increasing until 1997–99; 
stable since 2000 
– 
Source: Own compilation based on the country reports for this study. 
Table 5. Drivers of agricultural land prices in the EUSCs 




+++ + ++ + +  --  ++ +++  + ++ ++ 
Infrastructural 
expansion 
++ 0  ++
+ 
+ +  +++  ++ ++ +++  na 0 
Urban pressures  +++  0  ++
+ 
0 -  +++  + +++  +++  + + 
SPS +  ++  +  0  ++  +  +  0  +  +  0 
Farm  size  ++ + +  +/0  0 +  + +++ -- ++  +/0 
Coupled 
subsidies 
++ - + 0  + + 0  0  ++  na 0 
Informal 
institutions 
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Table 5. cont’d 
Interest  rates  +  0 + 0 + 0 +  na  -- +  0 
Agricultural 
productivity 
0  + + + 0 + 0  +  ++ +  0 
Bio-energy 0  0  ++  +/0  0  0  0  +++  +  +  0 




0 ++  0 0 0 + 0  0  0  0  0 
Taxes  +  0 0 + 0 + 0  0  0  0  +/++ 
Inflation  0  + 0 0 0 0 +    ++  na  0 
Land sales 
regulations 
0  0 - 0 0 0 0  0  0 na  0 
Other  factors +++  +++  ++      0     +  ++/+ 
Notes: +++ = strong increase; + = weak increase; 0 = no change; --- = strong decrease; -- = medium 
decrease; – = weak decrease 
Source: Own compilation based on the country reports for this study. 
 
Table 6. Drivers of agricultural land rents in the EUSCs 




++  ++ 0 ++ 0  - ++  +++  0 ++  ++ 
Infrastructural 
expansion 
+  +  0 ++ 0 ++ 0 ++  ++ 0  + 
Urban  pressures + ++ 0  +  0  0 ++  +++  ++ 0  0 
SPS  +  +  0  + ++  ++ +  0  + ++ + 
Farm  size  + + 0 0 0 0 0  +++  --  +++  0 
Coupled 
subsidies 
+ 0 0 + 0 + 0  +++  0  na  0 
Informal 
institutions 
0  +++  0 0 0  +++  0 0 0 + 0 
Interest  rates  0  ++  0 0 0  +++  0 0 0 + 0 
Agricultural 
productivity 
++ 0  0  +++
/+ 
0 0 0  +++  ++  ++  0 
Bio-energy  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  +++  0 + 0 256 | TABLES 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0  ++  0 + + 
Taxes  0 0 0 0 + 0 0    0 0 0 
Inflation  0 + 0 + + 0 0 0 0  na  0 
Land rental 
regulations 
++  0 - 0 0 0 0    0  na  0 
Other  factors    +++         0  +  0 
Notes: +++ = strong increase; + = weak increase; 0 = no change; --- = strong decrease; -- = medium 
decrease; – = weak decrease 
Source: Own compilation based on the country reports for this study. 
 
Table 7. Output and input price changes in the key EU markets 
        
Change in real prices in 
2007 relative to 2004 (%) 
Crop prices  Barley (Germany)  63 
 Sunflower  (Spain)  61 
   Wheat (Germany)  53 
   Maize (Germany)  51 
   Rape (Germany)  17 
Animal prices  Raw cows’ milk (Germany)  12 
   Pigs (Netherlands)  -6 
   Young cattle (Ireland)  -13 
Input prices  Diesel oil (UK)  40 
   Sulphate of potash (France)  10 
   Sulphate of ammonia (France)  7 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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Table 8. SPS model by member state 






Flanders  2005  Historical  –  Belgium 
Wallonia  2005  Historical  – 
Finland  2006  Dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to a 
flat rate 
In 2011–13 and 2014–15, the historical 
farm-specific component will reduce to 
70% and 30%, respectively, of the 
original value; from 2016 onwards, it 
will reduce to 0. 
France  2006  Historical  – 
Germany  2005  Dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to a 
flat rate 
Starting in 2010, the hybrid scheme will 
gradually transform into a purely 
regional model by 2013 (see Box 4). 
Greece  2006  Historical  – 
Ireland  2005  Historical  Farmers can consolidate entitlements 
(see Box 9). 
Italy  2005  Historical  – 
Netherlands  2006  Historical  – 
Spain  2006  Historical  – 




UK  England  2005  Dynamic 
hybrid 
moving to a 
flat rate  
The scheme is gradually transforming 
into a purely regional model by 2012. In 
2005, the regional and historical 
components were 10% and 90%, 
respectively. The SPS is categorised by 
three regional headings: 1) moorland 
within SDAs, 2) non-moorland within 
SDAs, and 3) non-SDAs. 
  Scotland  2005  Historical  To activate entitlements it was 
necessary first to enable them and then 
to claim them. All the entitlements 
allocated had to be enabled in 2005 and 
thereafter claimed within three years. 
Unclaimed entitlements or those not 
enabled reverted to the national 
reserve. 258 | TABLES 
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2005  Static hybrid  Of the entitlement, 20% is the regional 
component (€78 per entitlement) and 
80% is the historical component. 
Farmers were permitted to consolidate 
the historical component of the 
entitlement value onto a smaller area to 
increase the unit value of their 
entitlements. 
Note: SDAs refers to severely disadvantaged areas. 
Sources: European Commission (2007a) and the country reports for this study. 
Table 9. Budgetary ceilings for the SPS in member states, 2006 
  SPS ceiling  Percentage of total 
SPS  
SPS per ha of UAA 
  (€1,000)  (%)  (€) 
Austria  540,441  2  167 
Belgium  475,642  2  344 
Denmark  981,540  3  362 
Finland  519,629  2  226 
France  6,060,556  20  187 
Germany  5,644,899  19  333 
Greece  2,041,888  7  513 
Ireland  1,335,312  4  313 
Italy  3,593,133  12  244 
Luxembourg  36,603  0.1  284 
Netherlands  325,104  1  171 
Portugal  365,646  1  97 
Spain  3,529,454  12  139 
Sweden  630,452  2  200 
UK  3,914,946  13  234 
          
EU-15  29,995,245  100  226 
Sources: Own calculations based on European Commission (2007a) and Eurostat data. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 259 
 
Table 10. Share of decoupled direct payments of total direct payments in the 
EUSCs, 2006 
  
Share of decoupled direct payments  
of total direct payments (%) 
Belgium  62 
Finland  – 
France  – 
Germany  97 
Greece  – 
Ireland  98 
Italy  56 
Netherlands  – 
Spain  - 
Sweden  86 
UK  98 
Source: Own calculations based on data from European Commission (2007b). 
 





Average value of 
distributed 
entitlements 
Average value of  
non-activated  
entitlements  Region 
(% of distributed 
entitlements) 
(€ per entitlement)  (€ per entitlement) 
Schleswig-Holstein & 
Hamburg 1.2  356  189 
Lower Saxony & 
Bremen  0.6 347  325 
North Rhine-
Westphalia  0.5 352  184 
Hessen 3.4  295  269 
Rhineland–Palatinate 1.7  289  255 
Baden-Württemberg 1.2  307  234 
Bavaria 0.2  351  198 
Saarland 1.2  259  180 
Berlin & Brandenburg  0.3  299  145 
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania  2.3 327  264 
Saxony 0.7  356  362 
Saxony-Anhalt 1.0  348 253 
Thuringia 0.3  344  216 
Total 0.9  335  253 
Source: Country report for Germany for this study. 260 | TABLES 
 
Table 12. Activated and non-activated entitlements and average value of 
entitlements 

































Belgium  Flanders  2006  456  73  85  92  6.8  485 
  Wallonia  2006  649  86  95  97  6.8  345 
Finland  2007  2,327  101  101  102  0.9  209 
France  2007  24,202  88  95  95  2.2  246 
Germany  2007  16,749  99  110  90  1.1  332 
Greece  2006  n.a.  n.a.  54  60  n.a.  n.a. 
Ireland  2007  4,219  99  108  95  3.6  309 
Italy  2006  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  between 
58 and 445 
Netherlands  2007  1,569  83  105  80  1.5  500 
Spain  2007  15,624  62  80.2  78  1.2  223 
Sweden  2007  3,109  98  n.a.  n.a.  2.7  211 
UK  England   2006–
07 
8,126  87  91  n.a.  n.a.  268 
   Scotland   2007  4,270  70  72  100  2.4  131 
   Northern 
Ireland  
2007  992  98  100  100  2.5  360 
* Estimate 
Sources: Own calculations based on the country reports for this study and Eurostat data. 
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Table 13. Tradability of entitlements: Country-specific restrictions  
  Tradability of entitlements 
Belgium  Entitlements became tradable from 2006. Entitlements can be transferred 
temporarily* or permanently. Entitlements can be transferred between 
Flanders and Wallonia; however, entitlements can only be activated on a 
plot in the same region where it was activated the first time. 
France  There are no restrictions on trade, but entitlements can only be activated 
within the département (NUTS 3) where they were first created. There are 
various specific restrictions (see Table 14). The renting of entitlements 
with land is not subject to restrictions (but the rental length of the 
entitlement should equal the rental length of the attached land).  
Finland  No specific restrictions. 
Germany  Entitlements are tradable within regions. 
Greece  Only farmers with agriculture as a secondary activity are subject to 
restrictions on entitlement transfers. A share of entitlements reverts to 
the national reserve in transfers: 5% of the transferred entitlements if 
transferred with the entire holding; 10% if transferred with land or if the 
transferred entitlements are subject to special conditions; and 30% if 
transferred without land. 
Ireland   No specific restrictions. 
Italy  A share of entitlements revert to the national reserve in transfers: 
In the sale of entitlements with land: 10% reverts to the national 
reserve; this is reduced to 5% if the entire farm is sold or reduced to 
0% if the sale concerns ‘set-aside entitlements’ or new farmers. 
In the sale of entitlements without land: 50% in 2005–07 and 30% in 
2008 reverted to the national reserve; if the sale concerns a new farmer, 
the rate is 0%.  
In 2008, new regulations removed the restrictions applying to the sale of 
entitlements with or without land. 
Netherlands  No specific restrictions. 
Spain  A share of entitlements revert to the national reserve in transfers: 
For professional farmers without land: 15% in 2006–07 and 10% from 
2008, but for new farmers the rate is 0%. 
For non-professional farmers without land: 50% in 2006–07 and 30% 
from 2008. 262 | TABLES 
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  With land: 5% in 2006–07 and 3% from 2008; for new farmers 0%. 
With the entire farm: 3% from 2008. 
Sale of all special entitlements: 5% in 2006–07 and 3% from 2008. 
Sale of entitlements when the land is returned to the owner: 5% in 
2006–07 and 3% from 2008. 
Sweden  Entitlements are tradable within regions. 
UK  Trade is not allowed among countries (or regions within England such 
as between moorland and other regions). 
* Concerning the temporary transfer of entitlements in Belgium, only landowners can temporarily 
transfer them in the event of a simultaneous rental of the equivalent number of hectares. The 
transfer of entitlements is limited to the duration of the tenancy. When the rental agreement ends, 
the entitlements go back to their owner (the landowner). If the tenant does not activate the 
entitlement in a period of three successive years, the entitlement goes to the national reserve and 
is lost for both tenant and owner. This link with the tenancy legislation limits the popularity of 
the temporary transfers, and thus farmers sometimes make a definitive transfer to the tenant and 
then afterwards the entitlement is transferred back to the original owner. In 2006 and 2007, there 
were no temporary transfers of entitlements in Wallonia; in 2006, there were 155 transfers in 
Flanders. 
Source: Country reports for this study. 
Table 14. Retention of entitlement transfers through purchase in France 
Transfer with land  Transfer 
without land 
Farm UAA < 
specific threshold 
defined at NUTS 3 
level 
Farm UAA > specific 
threshold defined at 




















0  0 0 0  0  0  Transfer of 
entitlements 




0 0  10  0  0  50 
Transfer of entitlements to 
a relative 
0 0  10  0  0  50 
Transfer of entitlements to 
any other farmer 
3 3  10  3  3  50 
Change of farm legal 
status 
– 0  –  0  0  – 
Source: Country report for France for this study. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 263 
 




Share of traded entitlements 







2006  2007 
Belgium**  Flanders  All types  7*  – 
   Wallonia  All types  6*  6.6 
Finland    Market –  5.1 
France    All types  –  5.4 
Germany    Market  1.9  1.3 
Greece    Market  Small 
Ireland    –  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy    –  n.a.  n.a. 
Netherlands    Market 3.1  8.1 
Spain    Market 3.39  – 
Sweden    All types  6.2  11.7 
England  Market  Small 
Scotland  –  n.a.  n.a.  UK 
Northern 
Ireland  All types  Small 
* Estimate 
** As of 2008, young farmers in Wallonia have been able to obtain higher-value entitlements 
from the national reserve if their own entitlements have a value lower than the average in 
the region. To certain extent, this option may increase the trade of entitlements with low 
values as one may expect that rational young farmers would have incentives to purchase 
entitlements with a low value and exchange them for higher-value entitlements from the 
national reserve. Notably, in Flanders, agricultural consultancy organisations have already 
spotted an increase in the purchases of low-value entitlements by young farmers, as they 
could replace them with higher-value entitlements from 2007. 
Source: Country reports for this study. 264 | TABLES 
 
Table 16. Market sales price of entitlements and organisation of the SPS 
entitlement market  




   Year 
(Average value 
of entitlement 
 = 1) 
Organisation of the SPS entitlement 
market 
Belgium  2006–08  2-3*  Trade occurs directly among farmers; in 
many cases, the agricultural consultancy 
organisations assist farmers. 
Finland  –  n.a.  Trade occurs directly among farmers; agents 
or traders do not play a role. 
France  2006–07  1-6**  There is no official institution for trading 
entitlements, but the ministry of agriculture 
must be notified of a change in owner. 
Germany  2007  1.3  Entitlements are traded directly among 
farmers. 
Greece  –  n.a.  The volume of trade is small, mostly taking 
place among family members. 
Ireland  2007  2.5**  Entitlements are traded independently or 
through agents, who usually charge a fee of 
3–5% of the value of the entitlement. The 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food must be informed when entitlements 
are traded,  rented or gifted (e.g. through 
inheritance). 
Italy  2007–08  1-3**  The market is not regimented. Often 
farmers’ professional organisations or farm 
advisers help to match entitlement sellers 
and buyers. Some support is also given by 
the Centre of Agricultural Assistance. 
Netherlands  2007–08  2.5  Entitlements are mostly traded through 
agents. No official institution offers a 
specific market for entitlements. Private 
marketplaces play a negligible role. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 265 
 
Table 16. cont’d 
Spain  2006  n.a.  Trade occurs directly among farmers. There 
is no official institution for trading 
entitlements. Farmers inform the ministry of 
agriculture about the entitlement record. 
Some private societies have been founded 
but have low levels of activity (see Box 6). 
Sweden  2006–07  0.8-2.5**  Entitlement trading occurs on the Internet 
through agricultural societies, private real 
estate agents and advertisements in farming 
publications. There is no official market for 
trading SPS entitlements. 
  England  2005–07  0.8-1.5 
UK 






In England and Scotland, entitlements are 
traded on the open market, often conducted 





–  n.a.  No official institution is involved in the 
trading of entitlements. The market is very 
small. The majority of transfers are not on 
the  open market but tend to be transfers 
within a business (e.g. father to son). 
* In Belgium, agricultural consultancy organisations advise setting a price that is two to 
three times the value of the entitlement – guidance that is followed by most farmers.  
** Estimate. 
Source: Country reports for this study.  
Table 17. Extent to which landowners benefit from the SPS 
Extent to which 
landowners benefit  
from the SPS* 
Historical SPS model  Hybrid SPS model 
Zero or marginal  Greece, Ireland, Scotland   – 
Small 
Belgium, Italy, France,  
the Netherlands,  Spain 
Northern Ireland 
Medium  –  England** and Germany  
Significant  –  Finland and Sweden  
* Zero or marginal: 0-10% of the value of the entitlement; small: 10-30%; medium: 30-60%; 
significant: 60-100% 
** While medium at present, this will change to significant in 2012 – as all of the SPS will be 
area-based and tied to land, meaning that landowners will accrue the benefits through the 
payment or rent of the SPS. 
Source: Country reports for this study. 266 | TABLES 
 
Table 18. Some facts about the SPS  
 





2000–02  First year of SPS 
application 







the farm level) 
Direct payments to farms in 




the first year of 
SPS application 
Mix of the 
historical and 
regional models 
Eligible area  Eligible area includes arable land and permanent pasture except 




SPS entitlements are activated if accompanied by an equal 
number of eligible hectares. 
Beneficiaries of 
the SPS 
Active farmers with a 
historical reference (or with 
inherited entitlements or 
those from the national 
reserve) when the SPS was 
applied by member states  
All active 
farmers using 
land in the 
region in the 




land in the 
region in the 




The number of hectares that 
generated support in the 
reference period 
Total eligible 
area in the first 
year of SPS 
application 
Total eligible 
area in the first 
year of SPS 
application 
Unit value of 
entitlements 
Individual reference 
amount divided by the 
average number of hectares 
in the reference period (by 






declared in the 
region in the 
first year of the 
SPS 
Mix of the 
historical and 
regional models EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 267 
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Use of eligible 
area 
Originally, the eligible area could be used for any agricultural 
activity except for permanent crops, fruit and vegetables and non-
starch potatoes. The 2007 reform included fruit and vegetables in 
the SPS, and as of 2008, land covered by fruit and vegetables is 
eligible for entitlements. 
Unused 
entitlements 




In general, entitlements are tradable but certain constraints are 
imposed by the EU; additionally, each member state has some 
flexibility to introduce further country-specific restrictions. The 
rent of entitlements without land is not possible. 
Set-aside 
entitlements 
Set-aside entitlements are based 
on the reference period. Set-
aside entitlements can be 
activated by designating 
eligible hectares as set-aside. 
Set-aside land may be subject to 
rotation and may be used for 
non-food production. In 2008, 
the set-aside rate was set at 0%, 
i.e. any eligible area can activate 
the entitlement. 
Set-aside obligations are 
spread across all arable land. 
The total set-aside area per 
region remains the same but 
the set-aside area may differ 




If farmers do not have land in 
the reference period but 
received direct payments for 
livestock, they are eligible for 
special entitlements. The 
entitlements can be activated 
with or without the equivalent 
number eligible hectares. 
Activation without land 
requires the farmer to maintain 
at least 50% of the agricultural 
activity exercised in the 
reference period expressed in 
livestock units. 
 
Dairy payments  Dairy payments could be included in the SPS from the start of SPS 
implementation but no later than 2007. 
Source: European Commission. 268 | TABLES 
 
Table 19. Reasons for selecting a particular SPS model  
   Reasons   Expected changes in the SPS model  
Belgium  The model was chosen to avoid a 
redistribution of subsidies, 
mainly owing to pressure by 
farm organisations. Also, 
neighbouring France and the 
Netherlands had implemented 
the historical model. With a flat 
rate, most of the farmers would 
gain; however, those who would 
lose would do so relatively more 
per farm.  
There are incentives for both farm 
unions and the government to keep 
the current system as long as possible. 
There is no strong impetus to 
decouple the remaining coupled 
payments because of the possible 
reallocation and concentration of 
animal production. 
Finland  A purely historical model was 
not selected in order to avoid 
constraining structural change. 
On the other hand, the regional 
model was not an optimal choice 
because it would have led to a 
redistribution of subsidies, 
especially in the livestock sector. 
The hybrid model is moving to a flat 
rate. There is some support for 
maintaining coupled payments 
especially in less productive areas in 
the eastern and northern parts of 
Finland. 
France  The model was selected to 
minimise the adjustment costs for 
the farming sector and to avoid a 
redistribution of subsidies. 
There is no pressure to shift to a 
regional model, but rather to adjust 
the current historical model. There is a 
split among farm unions on the SPS 
model (see also Box 5). 
Germany  The model chosen was a 
compromise of three factors: 
implementation transaction costs, 
adjustment costs and the 
potential redistribution effects of 
subsidies. 
The government prefers the regional 
model because it is simpler, easier to 
justify and fosters regions with a high 
share of permanent pasture and 
extensive land management. The 
largest farmer’s union (Deutscher 
Bauernverband) prefers to maintain 
the hybrid model, because the 
redistribution of payments would 
come very much at the expense of 
animal-producing farms. The 
government has generally signalled 
that the payments will be moderately 
reduced in the medium run and 
phased out or drastically reduced in 
the long run. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 269 
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Greece  The model was chosen to avoid 
a redistribution of subsidies. 
Greece was not 
administratively prepared to 
use a regional model. 
At present, neither the government 
nor Greek farmers are willing to 
change the current system. The main 
farm union prefers the historical 
model. Still, farmers in less productive 
regions prefer the regional model, as 
does the government. 
Ireland  The model was chosen to avoid 
a redistribution of subsidies. 
Full decoupling occurred to 
ensure the full use of support 
payments. 
There is almost no political support 
for a shift to a flat rate model in 
Ireland. The government prefers to 
maintain the current payments. 
Italy  The model was chosen to avoid 
a redistribution of subsidies. 
Sensitive sectors such as 
livestock, fruits and vegetables, 
grapes and olives are more 
difficult to reform than those 
involving arable land. 
Farms perceive disadvantages in 
further decoupling. In regions where 
the values of entitlements differ, there 
are concerns about the redistributional 
effects of a shift to the regional model. 
Netherlands  The model was chosen to avoid 
the sectoral and territorial 
redistribution of subsidies.  
The government has signalled that its 
historical system will evolve towards 
a flat(ter) system in a few years. 
Spain  The model was chosen to avoid 
a redistribution of subsidies 
among farms, regions and 
sectors. The regional model 
would have led to significant 
redistribution among regions: 
e.g. from irrigated lands to dry 
lands, from dry lands to fruit 
and vegetable production and 
hence between Andalucia and 
the east coast. 
There is little interest from farmers or 
the government to switch to a flat rate, 
and there is much opposition by 
farmers to further reforms and 
decoupling. There is a need to balance 
the coupling/decoupling of subsidies 
and a variety of crops. Yet, there is a 
split among farmer unions: the 
Spanish Coordinator of Farming 
Organisations defends coupling and 
modulation, while others, such as the 
Young Farmers Association, seek a 
complete decoupling in all sectors. 
Sweden  The model chosen was a 
compromise of three factors: 
the preservation of grazing 
lands, the competitiveness of 
Swedish agriculture and the 
potential redistribution effects 
of subsidies. 
Among the expected changes are 
liberalisation and reduction. 270 | TABLES 
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UK 
England. The National Farmers 
Union sought a historical model, 
while the Country Landowners 
Association wanted a hybrid 
model. Defra saw the distribution 
of the SPS more of an economic 
issue and aimed at a regional 
model. A dynamic model was 
chosen to smooth the adjustment 
for farms. 
Scotland. There was considerable 
industry pressure on the 
government to introduce a 
historical model in an attempt to 
‘minimise losers and maximise 
winners’. 
Northern Ireland. The model was 
chosen to avoid a redistribution 
of subsidies. 
UK. There does appear to be a trend 
towards trying to re-couple CAP 
support further for environmental 
reasons. Moreover, there are growing 
calls to re-couple support from 
livestock producers and farming 
pressure groups in some regions with 
declining numbers of livestock.  
Source: Country reports for this study. 
 
Table 20. Coupled direct payments by member state 
  Sectors still coupled and extent 
Flanders  Suckler cow premium, 100% 
Slaughter premium calves, 100% 
Seeds (some types), 100%  Belgium 
Wallonia  Suckler cow premium, 100% 
Seeds (some types), 100% 
Finland  Sheep and goat payments, 50% 
Special male bovine premium, 75% 
Article 69 application:  
2.1% of the ceiling for arable crops,  
10% of the ceiling for the bovine sector,  
seed (timothy seed) 
 EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 271 
 
Table 20. cont’d 
France  Arable crops, 25% 
Sheep and goat premium, 50% 
Suckler cow premium, 100% 
Slaughter premium calves, 100% 
Slaughter premium bovine adults, 40% 
Seeds (some species) 
Outermost regions, 100% 
Deduction of 10% in the olive sector to fund working 
programmes set up by producer organisations 
Hops payments, 25% 
Olive oil coefficient for decoupling: 1 
Tobacco coefficient for decoupling: 0.4 
Germany  Hops payments, 25% 
Tobacco coefficient for decoupling: 0.4 
Greece  Seeds 
Article 69 application:  
10% of the ceiling for arable crops; 10% of the 
ceiling for the beef sector; 5% of the ceiling for 
sheep and goats; 2% of the ceiling for tobacco; 4% 
of the ceiling for olive oil; 10% of the ceiling for 
sugar;  
Deduction of 2% in the olive oil sector to fund 
working programmes set up by producer 
organisations (Art 110(i) of 1782/2003 and Art. 8 
of Reg. 865/2003);  
Tobacco and olive oil coefficient for decoupling: 1 
Ireland  None 
Italy  Seeds, 100% 
Article 69 for quality production:  
8% of the ceiling for the arable sector; 7% of the 
ceiling for the bovine sector; 5% of the ceiling for 
sheep and goats; 8% of the ceiling for sugar 
Deduction of 5% in the olive oil sector to fund 
working programmes set up by producer 
organisations (Art 110(i) of 1782/2003 and Art. 8 
of Reg. 865/2003) 
Olive oil coefficient for decoupling: increased to 1 
Tobacco coefficient for decoupling: 0.4 
In Puglia, decoupling coefficient for tobacco: 100 272 | TABLES 
 
Table 20. cont’d 
Netherlands  Slaughter premium calves, 100% 
Slaughter premium bovine adults, 100% 
Seeds for fibre flax, 100% 
Spain  Seeds, 100% 
Arable crops, 25% 
Sheep and goat premiums, 50% 
Suckler cow premium, 100% 
Slaughter premium calves, 100% 
Slaughter premium bovine adults, 40% 
Article 69 application:  
7% of the ceiling for the bovine sector;  
10% of the ceiling for dairy payments;  
5% of the ceiling for the tobacco sector;  
10% of the ceiling for the cotton sector;  
10% of the ceiling for sugar 
Outermost regions, 100% 
Tobacco coefficient for decoupling: 0.4 
Olive oil coefficient for decoupling: 0.936 
Sweden  Special male bovine premium, 74.55% 
Article 69 application: 0.45% of the total ceiling 
England  None 
Scotland  Article 69 application:  
10% of the ceiling for the bovine sector 





Source: European Commission (2007a). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 273 
 
Table 21. Activated and non-activated entitlements and average value of 
entitlements in the study regions 



















France  –  –  –  –  – 
Centre   –  na  4.8  na  na 
Bretagne  All  –  7.6  –  – 
Germany  –  –  –  –  – 
Saxonian Loess 
area (Saxony) 
Market  –  1.4  700  2.0 
Weser-Ems 
(Lower Saxony) 




Market  –  1.4  400  1.1 
Italy  –  –  –  –  – 
Emilia 
Romagna  
–  135  –  – 
1.5-2 
Puglia   –  –  –  –  1-2.5 
Spain  –  –  –  –  – 
Andalucía  –  –  –  –  – 
Aragon  –  –  –  –  – 
UK  –  –  –  –  – 
England   Market  –  Small  –  0.8-1.5 








Note: In France, set-aside entitlements were excluded when calculating the average value of 
entitlements. 
Source: Country reports for this study. 
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Average price for UAA (€/ha)  8,909  15,941  4,040 
Total transacted area (1,000 ha)  98.63  39.79  57.48 
Total number of land sales 
transactions (1,000) 
38.4  26.37  12.01 
Average plot size transacted 
(ha) 
2.53  1.51  4.79 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2008). 
 







1990 6,357  105  0.017 
1991 5,327  94  0.018 
1992 3,300  95  0.029 
1993 2,499  107  0.043 
1994 2,739  125  0.046 
1995 3,011  132  0.044 
1996 2,709  125  0.046 
1997 2,820  132  0.047 
1998 3,122  132  0.042 
1999 3,426  140  0.041 
2000 3,933  137  0.035 
2001 4,039  139  0.034 
2002 4,246  141  0.033 
2003 4,700  150  0.032 
2004 5,197  151  0.029 
2005 5,377  152  0.028 
2006 5,979  156  0.026 
2007 6,250  160  0.026 
Source: Country report for Finland for this study. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 275 
 
Table 24. Index of agricultural rents in Greece (2000=100) 
 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Rents  87.2 91.0 92.5 93.3 100 103.2  108.3  113.8  117.2 116.8 113.9 115.3 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece. 
 
Table 25. Market value and rents of agricultural land in Greece (€/ha) 
Market value of agricultural land (parcels) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Irrigated 
land 
11,339 11,852 12,147 12,163 11,870 11,930 12,050 11,950 11,420 12,600 12,100
Unirrigated 
land 
4,505 4,660 4,777 4,896 5,010 5,040 5,080 5,000 4,800 4,930 4,950
Rents for agricultural land 
Arable land  389 407 413 417 441 455 477 502 517 515 502
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Table 26. Prices of agricultural land by location in Italy, 2006 (€1,000) 
 Altimetrical  area 
 
Total 
 Mountain  Mountain  Hill  Hill  Plains  
 Interior  Littoral  Interior  Littoral    
North-west 5.6  14.4  18.4  37.2  32.7 22.1 
North-east 18.5  –  27.1  25.1  35.7 29.7 
Centre 7.1  11.6  10.8  16.4  20.0 11.8 
South 6.5  10.5  10.3  15.5  14.3 11.1 
Isles 5.8  9.4  7.3  9.3  12.5 8.4 
Total 8.8  10.2  11.9  13.8  26.8 15.9 
Source: Country report for Italy for this study. 
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Agricultural commodity prices = = ‐ +++ + +‐‐
Agricultural productivity = ‐ =+ = ‐/+ = ‐‐ =
SPS ‐ ===‐ =+ / =‐ ‐‐‐+ ‐‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Coupled subsidies = +
Rural development p o l i c e s + + ++=+ + ++ + / ‐ +==+




Farm size + + + +
Bio‐energy =
Urban pressures  ++ + +
Infrastructural e x p a n s i o n + ++ + + ++
Interest rate =
Inflation + =
Other factors  ++ ++ +++ ++  
Notes: += increases land price; – = decreases land price; = no change to land price 
Source: INEA (2006). 























































































































































































Agricultural commodity prices  =  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Agricultural productivity  +  +
SPS  +  +  +  +  +  ‐  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Coupled subsidies  +  +  + +  +  +
Rural development polices   +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +




Farm size  +  +  +  +  +   + +  +
Bio‐energy  +





Notes: += increases rental price; – = decreases rental price; =  no change to rental price 
Source: INEA (2006). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 277 
 























































































































































































Land price = = +/‐ +/‐ =+ + / ‐ + ‐/+ +/= + +  +=
Number of transactions + + = ‐ += +=+ = / +   += / ‐ == / ‐ ==‐
S u p p l i e r ++ + ++++++ ++ +
Land supplied + = + + + + + + + +
Buyers + = + + ‐
Land s o u g h t == ++   + ‐
Link land/entitlements + = = ‐ += / + + +
Formalisation
Conflicts
Crop productions ‐ == ‐
Land use = = = +  
Notes: += increases land price; – = decreases land price; = does not change land price 
Source: INEA regional reports (2006). 
 























































































































































































Rental price  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  =  +  =  ‐  +  ‐  +  +  =  +  +  +  ‐
Number of transactions  =  +  +  =  +  +  =  +  =  +  ‐  =  =  =  =  +  +  ‐
Supplier (for rental contracts)  =  =  =  +  ‐  =  +  +  =  =
Rental land supplied  =  ‐    +  =  =  =  =  ‐  =  +  =  +  =  ‐
Tenant  =  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  ‐  +  ‐
Rental land sought  =  +  +  +  +  +  =  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  ‐
Link land/entitlements
Formalisation  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  =  +  +  +  =/+  +  +
Conflicts
Crop productions  =  =  +  =  +  =
Land use  =  +  =  =  +  ‐  
Notes: += increases land price; – = decreases land price; = does not change land price 
Source: INEA regional reports (2006). 
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Table 31. Regional distribution of land prices per group of agricultural areas in the 
Netherlands 
Region 
Median price index 
for agricultural land 
 




IJsselmeerpolders 1.58  2.48  4.9  4.45  182 
Westelijk Holland  1.94  4.14  5  5.41  179 
Zuidwestelijk Akkerbouwgebied  1.27  3.25  3.17  3.45  172 
Centraal Veehouderijgebied  1.95  3.85  4.07  4.47  129 
Rivierengebied 1.93  4.57  4.44  4.38  127 
Veenkoloniën en Oldambt  1.01  2.54  2.3  2.25  123 
Bouwhoek en Hogeland  1.25  3.37  2.26  2.72  118 
Waterland en Droogmakerijen  1.24  3.05  2.1  2.61  110 
Noordelijk Weidegebied  1.25  2.93  2.33  2.54  103 
Zuidwest-Brabant 2.04  4.49  4  4  96 
Hollands/Utrechts Weidegebied  1.81  3.75  3.36  3.5  93 
Zuidelijk Veehouderijgebied  2.31  4.08  3.86  4.14  79 
Zuid-Limburg 2.07  3.84  3.8  3.61  74 
Oostelijk Veehouderijgebied  2.21  3.74  3.4  3.4  54 
Source: Kadaster (Dutch Land Registry Office). 
 
Table 32. Agricultural land sales prices in Sweden, 2005 and 2006 (€/ha) 
   2005  2006 
Agricultural land (arable and grazing land)  3,350  3,706 
Arable land  3,868  4,247 
Grazing land  1,616  1,934 
Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). 
 
Table 33. Share of rented land of the total UAA in Sweden (%) 
1990 1995  1999  2003  2005 
43 45  46  45  40 
Sources: Statistics Sweden (2008) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2008). EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 279 
 
Table 34. Increase in English land values between 2004 and 2007 
Type of land  (%) 
Prime arable  91 
Average arable  97 
Average livestock  104 
Prime dairy  82 
Poor arable  117 
Poor livestock  127 
All types of land   95 
Source: Thomson and Renwick (2008). 
 

















$1/€1  of 
subsidy on 
increase in 
land value  
r=5% r=10% 
Market return          






0.18-0.24 –  –  – 





– 6.4-7.2  0.32-0.36  0.64-0.72 





0.16-0.32 3.85-7.58 0.19-0.38 0.39-0.76 
Coupled subsidies          





– 6.6  0.33  0.66 







0.12-0.47 –  –  – 280 | TABLES 
 
Table 35. cont’d 




– 8.3-27.4  0.42-1.37  0.83-2.74 







0.13 –  –  – 







– 4.7  0.24  0.47 
Decoupled 
subsidies 
        







– 4.9  0.25  0.49 





– 3.7-4.9  0.19-0.25  0.37-0.49 
All subsidies          






0.12-0.69 –  –  – 
Notes: The values in these columns are calculated by dividing the estimated effect of 
subsidies/market return on land price by the net present value of subsidies/market return. 
If the number is equal to one it implies full capitalisation of subsidies into land prices. A 
value lower than one implies partial capitalisation of subsidies into land prices.  
NPV refers to net present value; LDP refers to loan deficiency payments; PFC refers to 
production flexibility contracts; AMTA refers to agricultural market transition assistance. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the respective study data. 
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Estimated effect of $1 of 
subsidy on land value 
increase 
 
Market return    
Goodwin, Mishra and 
Ortalo-Magné (2005) 
Land rent/market return 
(US) 
0.35 
Lence and Mishra (2003)  Land rent/market return 
(corn revenues and 
soybean revenues) (US) 
0.30-0.38 
Coupled subsidies    
Goodwin, Mishra and 
Ortalo-Magné (2005) 
Land rent/LDP (US)  0.83 
Lence and Mishra (2003)  Land rent/LDP (US)  -0.24 
Decoupled subsidies    
Goodwin, Mishra and 
Ortalo-Magné (2005) 
Land rent/AMTA (PFC) 
(US) 
0.29 
Lence and Mishra (2003)  Land rent/PFC (US)  0.71-0.86 
Lence and Mishra (2003)  Land rent/MLA (US)  0.84-0.90 
All subsidies    
Roberts, Kirwan and 
Hopkins (2003) 
Land rents/all government 




Kirwan (2005)  Land rents/all 
government payments 
(PFCs + conservation 
programmes) (US) 
0.20-0.40 
Notes: LDP refers to loan deficiency payments; PFC refers to production flexibility contracts; 
MLA refers to market loss assistance; AMTA refers to agricultural market transition 
assistance. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on the respective study data. 282 | TABLES 
 
Table 37. SPS capitalisation into land values 
   SPS  model 
 





r α  




h α α ≤  




































m α  
Notes: 
j
i α  measures capitalisation of the SPS into land values. If  % 100 =
f
r α , this implies 
full capitalisation of the SPS into land values. Subscripts i = r,  h  and  m denote the 
implementation model: r stands for regional model, h stands for historical model and m 
stands for hybrid model. Superscripts j = f,  p  and  n denote new-entrant eligibility for 
entitlements:  f stands for full new-entrant eligibility, p stands for partial new-entrant 
eligibility and n stands for no new-entrant eligibility for entitlements. 
Source: Model results. 
 
Table 38. SPS capitalisation into land values and effects on restructuring with 
asymmetric productivity changes 
     SPS model 
 
     Regional  Historical  Hybrid 
Restructuring 






the historical and 
hybrid models 








None  Tradable 
entitlement 
Zero Zero Zero  Not  constrained 
Source: Model results. 
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APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Various studies have the analysed agricultural policy measures that have 
been implemented to support farmer income in developed countries, such 
as market price support, production subsidies, factor subsidies, coupled 
and decoupled payments (see e.g. Hertel, 1989; Salhofer, 1996; Dewbre et 
al., 2001; Alston and James, 2002; Guyomard et al., 2004; Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2006 and 2007). 
The common conclusion of these studies is that the agricultural 
policies implemented affect (increase) farmer income, although to a varying 
degree depending on the policy. In addition to this direct first-order effect, 
most of the agricultural policies also induce further, second-order 
adjustments. For example, farm subsidies influence not only the employed 
factor reward but also, through altered farmer incentives, factor demand, 
inter-sectoral factor allocation and factor ownership. While the number of 
studies looking at these issues has grown in the last decade, the impact of 
the second-order effects has been investigated insufficiently in the 
empirical literature (Bullock and Salhofer, 2003; OECD, 2007; Alston, 2007). 
One strand of the literature assessing second-order impacts considers 
the consequences of policy for land prices and land rents. These insights are 
crucial as they may help answer some politically important questions 
concerning subsidies: Who benefits from the subsidies and how much – 
landowners or farmers renting the land? How is agricultural productivity 
affected? How do the subsidies and their consequences affect future policy 
design?  
If agricultural subsidies benefit landowners instead of farmers, 
negative side effects may arise. For example, policy-induced growth in land 
values might reduce efficiency in the agriculture sector. Given that farmers 
must finance a higher initial investment (entry cost) and face the risk that 
policy changes may affect the return on that investment, the entry barrier 
for potential new farmers increases. The expansion costs for existing 
farmers also rise. Consequently, the transfer among different owners is 
reduced, pushing up the average costs of production in the agricultural 
sector.  284 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Moreover, depending on the exact implementation mechanism, the 
benefits of support might accrue only to those who are landowners at the 
time the support was introduced. Later entrants, who have purchased land 
at higher prices, may benefit less from the policy support. This implies that 
many active farmers do not receive any or receive only a fraction of the 
benefits from subsidy support. Therefore, if the policy goal were 
intergenerational equity, support levels would have to be augmented in the 
future, further inflating land values and engendering a spiral of subsidy 
support that could not likely be continued forever. 
Finally, future efforts to reduce support might be rendered more 
difficult because of the possible impact on land values. Expectations about 
the level of subsidy support in the future play a critical role in the 
determination of land values. Once agricultural support policies become 
capitalised into land values, existing landowners may resist future policy 
reform because of vested interest. 
Hence, to understand the effects of the common agricultural policy 
(CAP) on land markets, a profound and detailed knowledge about the 
policies and about the underlying mechanism according to which 
agricultural subsidies are capitalised into land values and farmland rents is 
required. 
To analyse the influence of the CAP on the functioning of EU land 
markets, it is useful to draw upon existing studies in the literature for both 
gaining insight and developing a theory and methodology. In this 
appendix, we summarise the key finding s  o f  p r e v i o u s  s t u d i e s .  W e  f i r s t  
review findings from traditional models that investigate the impact of 
coupled subsidies, such as market price-support measures; then we look at 
findings from analyses that explicitly consider the impact of decoupled 
subsidies. Lastly, we summarise the conditions under which the theoretical 
predictions hold empirically and identify factors that may cause 
discrepancies between the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. 
Capitalisation of coupled subsidies 
Although the above-mentioned questions concerning subsidies and their 
capitalisation into land values and farmland rental rates are both politically 
important and academically interesting, the existing literature on these 
issues is not vast. 
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The classical model for analysing income distributional consequences 
of agricultural support policies is Floyd (1956). Floyd proposed a model 
with two factors used to produce one agricultural output. He assumed one 
land and one non-land (labour and capital) input, which are combined in a 
constant returns-to-scale production function. In his model, output market 
clearing and input market clearing determined the output and input prices. 
The elasticities of factor supply and the elasticity of demand were assumed 
constant. 
According to Floyd’s canonical model of two inputs and a single 
output, price support increases the price of a factor if its supply is not 
perfectly elastic. A given percentage increase in product price will result in 
the same percentage rise in all factor prices if inputs are perfect substitutes 
in production or if the supply elasticities of the two factors are the same. If 
the factor supply elasticities are not equal, the price of the input with the 
least elastic supply will rise most. 
In Floyd’s model, the income distribution of agricultural support 
policies depends largely on the input supply and input substitution 
elasticities. For policy purposes, we can distinguish between two situations: 
i) factor supply is either perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic and there is 
zero elasticity of substitution between factors (the corner solution of the 
model); and ii) factor supply is partially elastic and there is positive 
elasticity of substitution between factors (the interior solution of the 
model). 
First, consider the corner solution w h e n  f a c t o r  s u p p l y  i s  e n t i r e l y  
inelastic and the elasticity of substitution between factors is zero. According 
to the corner solution of Floyd’s (1956) model, output price support simply 
inflates input costs, and the value of output support becomes captured in 
the value of the factor with inelastic supply. If the inelastic factor is land, 
then the value of subsidies is fully captured into land rental rates, and 
therefore capitalised into land prices. If the factor owner is a farmer, then 
the agricultural support policy increases the farmer’s income. Otherwise, 
the benefit of the agricultural support policy leaves the agricultural sector 
and it is captured by the non-farming landowner. 
Moreover, on an intergenerational basis, by increasing the cost 
structure of production, the agricultural support policy increases the set-up 
cost for future farmers as they have to ‘buy’ the value of the policy support 286 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
as a condition for entry into the sector.94 This in turn implies that to the 
extent to which price support is capitalised, it will benefit active farmers at 
the time the policy support is introduced more than ex-post start-ups. 
Second, consider the interior solution when factor supply is inelastic 
but the elasticity of substitution between factors is positive. According the 
interior solution of Floyd’s (1956) model, the effects of output price support 
on output and factor markets depend on the factor supply elasticity. In 
other words, the more inelastic is the factor supply, i) the more the output 
price increase is translated into a higher price of that factor, ii) the more the 
price support indirectly increases the production cost of the output and iii) 
the smaller is the induced increase in the farmer’s profit, as the value of 
support provided through the output price is transferred to the owner of 
the factor. 
The main findings of the theoretical literature on coupled policy 
impacts can be summarised as follows (with area payments being coupled 
payments as they were in the EU before the introduction of the single 
payment scheme (SPS)): 
•  If land supply is fixed, then area payments are fully capitalised into 
land value. 
•  Coupled production subsidies are fully capitalised into land values if 
in addition to a land supply elasticity of zero either the supply 
elasticity of non-land inputs is perfectly elastic or the factor 
proportions are fixed. 
•  In other situations, the benefits from coupled subsidies are shared 
between land and other production factors, and if demand elasticity 
is not perfectly elastic, the consumers as well. 
•  The impact of agricultural policy on land values may be very large 
(e.g. fully capturing the subsidies). 
 
                                                      
94 In a legal business environment – where farms are more or less inherited free of 
taxes, charges and compensatory payments by family members not staying in the 
farm business – the intergenerational equality argument applies only to those 
farms that want to expand in acreage or newly enter the system. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 287 
 
Capitalisation of decoupled subsidies 
More recently, a new generation of partial and general equilibrium models 
has been developed to analyse explicitly the impact of decoupled subsidies. 
Most of this literature, which is still at an early stage of development, is 
based on behavioural models of profit maximisation. The two most 
prominent representatives of this class of models are Guyomard et al. 
(2004) and Ciaian and Swinnen (2006 and 2007). 
By their definition, fully decoupled policies should not affect 
agricultural markets generally or land markets specifically (Cahill, 1997; 
OECD, 2001). Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) proposed a partial equilibrium 
model for analysing the income distributional effects of area payments and 
the SPS. In this model, they assume two heterogeneous farms competing 
for land. Each of the two heterogeneous farms maximises profits. Ciaian 
and Swinnen assume one input (land) and one output, and that the total 
land supply is fixed. 
Ciaian and Swinnen find that a decoupled subsidy that is not linked 
to the output market or input market does not affect marginal output or 
marginal input profitability. Thus, a fully decoupled payment does not 
influence farmers’ behaviour and has no income distributional effects. 
Furthermore, a truly decoupled policy does not shape long-term 
adjustments in the agricultural sector. Ciaian and Swinnen also show that 
the SPS does not affect land values. These results hold even if the SPS is not 
fully decoupled because, for example, farmers need to have eligible land to 
activate SPS entitlements. 
The main findings of the theoretical literature on decoupled policy 
impacts can be summarised as follows: 
•  Fully decoupled farm policies have no impact on land values if 
markets are perfect. 
•  Decoupled policies may affect land values only in the presence of 
(some) market imperfections (such as land-market transaction costs 
or credit constraints). 
•  The exact impact depends on many factors, such as policy type, 
supply and demand elasticities, accompanying policy measures, 
market imperfections, land-use opportunity costs, institutions and 
expectations. 
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Determinants of subsidy capitalisation 
The exact outcome of the policies implemented in terms of income 
distribution, inter-sectoral factor allocation and factor productivity is 
affected by many things. As noted above, the determinants related to policy 
are the policy type, implementation details and associated measures. The 
principal determinants related to exogenous comparative advantage 
(endowment and technology) are factor supply and substitution elasticities, 
and possibilities for inter-sectoral production substitution (land-use 
alternatives). The determinants connected with the land market include 
market imperfections, land market institutions and regulations, and 
transaction costs. Finally, the outcomes of farm support policies depend on 
the timescales policy-makers are looking at and on the responsiveness 
dynamics of those policies. 
In this section, we review the most important of these factors, which 
in mutual interaction, determine the direction and extent of effects induced 
by coupled and decoupled agricultural policies with respect to factor 
income in general, and land rents and prices in particular. 
Policy type 
For the most part, various policies can be implemented to address the 
policy objective of supporting farmer income, such as subsidies for inputs, 
outputs and exports; decoupled payments; and quotas on inputs and 
outputs. A conclusion from the theoretical literature is that one of the key 
factors that determine the extent to which subsidies are captured in land 
values is the type of policy implemented. This result holds for not only 
decoupled versus coupled policies, but also for the significant differences 
among the diverse coupled policies. 
For example, consider the impacts of an output subsidy and an area 
payment. An area payment is targeted directly at land while an output 
subsidy is linked to agricultural output. Because an area subsidy is directly 
linked to the land market, it is expected to have a stronger impact on land 
values than an output subsidy. It decreases farms’ land costs, which in turn 
increases the demand for land. A land subsidy solely decreases land costs, 
leaving the rest of the input costs unaffected. Higher land demand in turn 
exerts upward pressure on land prices. In contrast, an output subsidy 
affects land prices indirectly through a higher profitability of agricultural 
production. It has a direct influence on the output market and consequently 
the welfare of consumers. Indirectly, an output subsidy stimulates demand EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 289 
 
not only for land but also for all farm inputs. Therefore, it affects the 
marginal profitability of all farm inputs equally. As a result, the effect of the 
subsidy is shared equally among all the inputs (OECD, 2007). 
Policy implementation details 
The capitalisation rate of subsidies is also contingent upon policy 
implementation details. For example, depending on whether the subsidies 
are available for a certain period or are ‘open-ended’, their capitalisation 
into land values may be different. Benefits may flow to landowners but 
may not be capitalised into land values if they are not expected to continue 
into the future. On the other hand, benefits may be capitalised effectively 
into land values even if the benefits themselves do not flow to land per se. 
From the SPS perspective, a critical aspect is the mechanism used for 
the allocation of entitlements. If the right to a stream of income is freely 
transferable separately from land or other assets, then the value of that 
stream will be capitalised into the entitlement (Alston, 2007). But if 
entitlements are attached to land and cannot be used or transferred 
separately from that land, then the subsidy is likely to be capitalised 
effectively into the value of the land or the farm as a whole. Alternatively, if 
a right to entitlements is assigned to an individual, separately from land or 
any other assets and not in any way transferable, it will not be capitalised 
into any physical assets. 
The degree to which the SPS entitlements are capitalised into land 
values additionally depends on the SPS model chosen (historical, regional 
or hybrid) and the ratio of entitlements to land (Kilian and Salhofer, 2008). 
If the number of hectares exceeds the number of entitlements, the 
single payments are not capitalised into land prices. This is true for all three 
SPS models. Ultimately, it is the number of suppliers and demanders on the 
entitlement market that will determine the outcome. If there is a surplus of 
demand, entitlements will have their own value decoupled from land. 
If the number of entitlements exceeds the number of hectares, the 
outcome is different for all three models. In the case of the historical model, 
a portion of the single payments is capitalised into land values. The degree 
of capitalisation depends on the proportion of single payment entitlements 
to land and the variability of single payments. In the extreme case of 
identical single payments for each hectare, the result is the same as in the 
regional model with all rents from entitlements capitalised into land values. 290 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the case of the hybrid model, the level of capitalisation lies somewhere 
between the other two models (given the same overall single payments). 
Thus, based on the policy implementation details, decoupled 
subsidies may be fully capitalised into land or not capitalised into land at 
all. Depending on the rules determining eligibility to receive the future 
stream of policy transfers, they may also be only partially capitalised into 
the land values (Sumner and Wolf, 1996; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006; Ciaian 
et al., 2008; Kilian and Salhofer, 2008). 
Accompanying policy measures 
In the real world, agricultural support policies are combined in policy 
programmes involving multiple instruments working at the same time, 
none of which can be considered isolated from the others. Hence, even 
when farm payments are fully decoupled (as in the case of the SPS), 
whether the payments are fully reflected in land rents or capitalised into 
land values may be dependent upon other policy instruments. 
Given that the vast majority of decoupled policies are combined with 
coupled policy instruments in one way or another, they are not fully 
decoupled. As such, their ultimate effects will also be conditioned by the 
extent to which the effects shift through changes in input use and output, 
which in turn depends on the details of the policies and parameters of 
supply and demand and so on.95 For example, decoupled payments and 
area payments may be subject to cross-compliance, set-aside or other 
requirements. If area payments are subject to cross-compliance, then their 
                                                      
95 According to Alston (2007), in the presence of other policies, the results of 
econometric studies might be affected by the mechanism of how policies are 
represented in the models. Econometric studies often require some aggregation 
across different types of subsidies in ways that may cause problems if the nature of 
the subsidies varies across the observations (for example, the mixture of forms of 
subsidies varies in a cross-section or the details of the instruments change over 
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effect on land values is mitigated because the eligibility for subsidies 
requires farmers to incur certain costs.96 
Factor supply elasticity 
As outlined above, the exact influence of subsidies on land values is linked 
to the factor supply elasticity.97 In an extreme case, the factor supply 
elasticity may even reverse the original effect of subsidies on land values. 
In the case of small substitution elasticities, any subsidy will have a 
substantial impact on land values. With the introduction of subsidies, most 
of the adjustments take place through price changes while adjustments in 
quantity are small. In the case of area payments, a large proportion of 
subsidies will be capitalised into the land price. In an extreme scenario, 
when the supply elasticity of land is zero, then area payments are fully 
capitalised into land values. 
When land supply elasticity is positive, area payments will likewise 
affect the prices of other inputs as well as prices of agricultural 
commodities. Concerning supply-elastic inputs, markets respond to 
policies by a sharp adjustment in quantity and a small adjustment in price. 
Output subsidies lead to a higher increase in the price of supply-inelastic 
inputs than the price of supply-elastic inputs. Output subsidies are fully 
capitalised into land values only when the supply elasticity of land is zero 
and when the supply elasticity of non-land inputs is perfectly elastic 
(Floyd, 1965; Gardner, 1983; Alston and James, 2002). 
In empirical studies, the land supply elasticity is usually found to be 
rather low, mostly owing to natural constraints. For example, based on an 
extensive literature review, Salhofer (2001) concludes that a plausible range 
 
                                                      
96 Ciaian and Swinnen (2006) show in the case of the SPS that when an entitlement 
providing a right to an area subsidy is owned by a farm and is allocated to a fixed 
quantity of land, then the subsidy is not capitalised into the land value. Instead, the 
subsidy benefits the farmer. In this situation, the subsidy does not affect the 
marginal return of the rented land. This is contrary to the effect of an area subsidy 
granted per hectare, which becomes capitalised into the land value. 
97 The supply elasticity measures how factor supply responds to price changes. If 
an input is supply-inelastic, then policies will have a large impact on the price and 
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of land supply elasticity for the EU is between 0.1 and 0.4. Similarly, Abler 
(2001) finds a plausible range between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US, Canada and 
Mexico. 
Land-use alternatives 
Usually, land can be used not only by agriculture but also by other sectors 
of the economy. If there is such an opportunity, land values will reflect this 
potential, alternative land use. In a competitive market, land values reflect 
returns from the most profitable use of land. If the most profitable use of 
land is non-agricultural (e.g. urban housing), then land values will be 
determined by the profitability of urban housing. But if the non-
agricultural use of land is expected to be profitable in the future, then the 
current land price will reflect the sum of the discounted stream of rents 
from agriculture up to the time of conversion plus the discounted stream of 
expected rents from non-agricultural use from that time onward (Plantinga 
et al., 2002). 
Factor substitution elasticity 
Substitution elasticity is a further crucial factor determining the 
distributional consequences of policies.98 With area payments, farms have 
an incentive to substitute land for other inputs, which expands land 
demand and leads to significant capitalisation of subsidies into land values. 
Subsidies that are not targeted at land have the opposite effect. 
Where there is a high elasticity of substitution between land and 
other inputs, the impact of the area subsidy on land values that is induced 
will be large, as a high elasticity of substitution allows easy substitution 
between land and other farm inputs in the production process. In general, a 
high elasticity of substitution between land and other farm inputs reduces 
the impact on land values in the case of subsidies not tied to land (Floyd, 
1965; Gardner, 1983; Alston and James, 2002). 
Based on 32 studies, Salhofer (2001) reports average elasticities of 
substitution between land and labour of 0.5, between land and capital of 
0.2, and between land and variable inputs of 1.4 for Europe. Similar values 
are reported in Abler (2001) for the US and Canada. 
                                                      
98 Substitution elasticity measures how easy it is to substitute one input for another 
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Market imperfections and transaction costs 
In the presence of market imperfections, the policy impact realised might 
vary from that predicted by models with perfect competition. Indeed, 
several studies show that decoupled payments affect farm behaviour 
differently in the presence of market imperfections from a situation with 
perfect competition (e.g. Chau and de Gorter, 2005; Hennessy, 1998). 
Generally, land transaction costs related to land withdrawal from 
corporate farms in transition countries do not affect the overall result that 
area payments increase land rents and benefit landowners instead of 
farmers (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). Yet, transaction costs depress land 
prices both with and without area payments. Transaction costs and area 
payments have the opposite effect on land rents. Transaction costs reduce 
land rents, while area payments are capitalised into land rents. If the effects 
are equal then they cancel each other out. 
Also, credit market imperfections have important implications for the 
distribution of area payments (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2007). In a model with 
land as a fixed factor and credit market imperfections, area payments 
increase land rents more than subsidies do. On aggregate, farms may 
actually lose rather than benefit from the subsidy – only the most credit-
constrained farms may gain from the subsidy. 
Land market institutions and regulations 
The effect of subsidies on land values in competitive markets can be 
influenced by land market regulations. The most obvious one that will 
affect the land market is the regulation of land prices (e.g. fixed) by the 
government (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2006). 
Various formal and informal institutions in land markets will 
similarly affect the subsidy–land value relationship. For example, if a rental 
agreement is for a purely ‘cash’ rental arrangement, then the farm 
programme payments must go entirely to the farm operator; the landowner 
is not eligible to receive any payments. Otherwise, under a share rental 
arrangement, the same subsidy payments may have to be divided between 
the landowner and the tenant. With crop-sharing contracts, the issue is 
more complicated in that production flexibility contracts (PFCs) are 294 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
supposed to be shared in proportion to crop shares.99 If the terms of such 
leases are not adjusted, the landowner will not reap the full benefits. Thus, 
if subsidy payments increase unexpectedly in the presence of pre-existing 
leases, tenants holding a cash rental arrangement will capture all of the 
benefits (and their landowners will receive none), whereas tenants holding 
a share rental arrangement will divide these same benefits with their 
landowners. 
Obviously, these regulations govern only the initial distribution of 
subsidy payments between landowners and tenants, which is almost 
certainly different from the outcome after markets have adjusted to the new 
equilibrium with subsidies. Other things being equal, one would expect 
that the rates of cash rentals would adjust to equivalence with the 
corresponding share rental rates, reflecting the subsidies and other 
determinants of income. 
Social capital 
Farmers are working and living not only in an economic but also in a social 
and cultural context. Therefore, the actual decisions of a farmer in a given 
market are influenced by the intensity and kinds of social relationships of 
the parties involved in a transaction and by the societal norms and cultural 
context (Robinson and Flora, 2003). Studies for the US show that social 
capital is a pivotal factor for the land market, influencing the type of 
transaction (e.g. Rainey et al., 2005), the price of the land (Robison et al., 
2002) and the parties involved in the transaction (Siles et al., 2000). Thus, 
the extent to which subsidies are incorporated in farmland values and 
therefore transferred from the farmer to the landowner also depends on the 
local cultural and social setting. 
Land transactions occur mainly between relatives or friendly 
neighbours (Siles et al., 2000). These groups receive a rebate on the land 
price ranging from 10% (Robison et al., 2002) to 43% (Tsoodle et al., 2006) 
compared with total strangers. According to Tsoodle et al. (2006), the 
influence of social capital has grown over the last few years. With respect to 
rental contracts, social capital influences the type of the contract while the 
                                                      
99 Barnard et al. (2001) report the testimony of a panel of farm managers that with 
cash rentals, the terms of leases are negotiated with “lease rates being bid up until 
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rental price is inversely correlated to the duration of the relationship 
between the landowner and tenant (Rainey et al., 2005). 
Time scale and dynamics 
The impact of both coupled and decoupled policies varies over time. For 
example, formal and informal land rental contracts imply that the 
transmission of changes in policy into rental prices and asset prices for land 
is not instantaneous. The sluggish adjustment of rental rates suggests that 
the short- and intermediate-term results of policies will be different from 
the long-term outcome with complete adjustment. Moreover, even without 
contracting, land markets involve lags and dynamics, uncertainty and 
expectations. For example, rental arrangements are typically multiyear in 
their nature and often reflect long-term personal relationships or family 
members. Competitive pressures might not take full and immediate effect 
in such a setting (Gardner, 2002).  
Furthermore, data on land rents and land values are often based on 
expert assessments rather than direct evidence from market transactions. 
These assessments are likely to understate the true movements in rental 
prices associated with yearly variations in income stemming from the 
market or from transfers. Because contracts are established well in advance 
of market realisations, they do not precisely correspond to the observed 
realisation. For instance, land rents are set ex ante whereas subsidy 
payments can only be observed ex post. 
All of these factors imply that short-term movements in rental prices 
will be different (lower) than the long-term impact of permanent changes in 
subsidies. 
Simulation studies 
The theoretical models discussed in the previous section have been applied 
in two kinds of empirical studies: i) ex ante simulations of policy impacts 
and ii) econometric estimations, in terms of providing the functional 
relationship and hypothesis. In this section, we summarise the findings of 
key simulation studies. More precisely, we review the three most 
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important questions investigate the impact of agricultural subsidies on land 
values and farmland rental rates: SCENAR 2020, GENEDEC and IDEMA.100 
The SCENAR 2020 study simulates the major trends that will form 
the framework for the European agricultural and rural economy by 2020. 
Among the main driving forces, SCENAR 2020 identifies rural 
demographic patterns, agricultural technology, agricultural markets and 
the natural and social constraints on land use that are likely to exist in 2020. 
By comparing the reference scenario with two alternative scenarios 
(‘liberalisation’ and ‘regionalisation’), the SCENAR 2020 project 
investigates and compares the effects of three different policies. In the 
baseline (reference) scenario, all current policies are considered to continue 
into the future, with modifications over time that are reasonably certain to 
happen according to the present political situation. In the regionalisation 
scenario, there is a sustained policy preference to promote regional 
economic strength and social welfare; to some extent, this is also an 
emphasis on the maximum degree of support for agricultural supply that is 
possible under the current, and likely, WTO framework. In the third 
(liberalisation) scenario, policy intervention in the economy and in social 
welfare, including environmental protection, is reduced to a socially 
acceptable minimum. 
The simulation results of SCENAR 2020 suggest that factor markets 
have general trends that are rather independent of policy, except for 
agricultural land prices, which decrease significantly because of market 
liberalisation. The simulated development of factor prices shows that 
especially land prices are very dependent on the policy instruments 
implemented. The direct payments and profitability of agriculture accrue 
partly in the price of the fixed factor of land. In the regionalisation scenario, 
direct payments remain highest and agriculture is more profitable relative 
to other scenarios, and land prices are the highest. In the liberalisation 
scenario, land prices decline considerably, because all direct payments are 
abolished and profitability in agriculture falls. Declining prices of 
agricultural land imply lower asset values for the landowners. This might 
affect the viability of landowners who are heavily indebted. Depending on 
                                                      
100 The GENEDEC and IDEMA studies were financed by the 6th EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development. SCENAR 2020 was 
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whether landowners are farmers and whether they live in urban areas, this 
could lead to adjustment costs in rural areas, which could in turn justify 
adjustment policies. 
GENEDEC performs socio-economic and environmental assessments 
of decoupling measures, by using a set of simulation models for various 
regional levels. More precisely, it provides insights into the workability, the 
efficiency and the impacts of various scenarios of decoupling; it undertakes 
quantitative assessments of the impact of a decoupled support scheme on 
production, land use and land prices. Thanks to a complete set of databases 
(including the FADN farm-level data), GENEDEC covers the entire EU. 
The GENEDEC project adopts a simplified approach to assessing the 
effects of subsidy decoupling on land values (dual values of land 
equations) for i) single farm groups and ii) land trade constraints for all 
farms within regions. GENEDEC compares the total shadow price with the 
rental land value, taking note of the fact that here labour is not accounted 
for (the difference between the shadow price and the rent could be 
considered a proxy of the average marginal value of the labour time spent 
on one hectare). 
GENEDEC relates different compounds of the land shadow prices to 
the prices and to the constraints existing in the model for which the total 
utilised agricultural area (UAA) is explicitly used. GENEDEC relates the 
‘land’ compound to the availability of the land fixed factor (‘UAA’), and the 
shadow price implicitly takes account of all payments connected with 
agricultural activities. 
In a case study for Italy, GENEDEC simulates the percentage changes 
in factor prices. They find that only the price of land varies regionally. In 
the total decoupling scenario, the simulated regional land price increases 
are as follows: 16.28% nationally, 20.39% in the north, 12.30% in the centre 
and 14.86% in the south. These simulation results suggest that higher land 
prices, especially in the north of Italy, are expected to curb transactions of 
land properties, but may activate the rental market for land. 
The IDEMA study provides a comprehensive socio-economic 
assessment of the impact of decoupling on the EU farming sector. The 
project assesses the consequences of decoupling for market demand and 
supply, trade, localisation of production, land use, the environment, land 
markets, structural change, farm income and farmers’ entry/exit 
behaviour. The IDEMA project is organised around three complementary, 
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decisions, dynamic, farm-based regional modelling and sector-level and 
general equilibrium modelling. 
By performing numerical simulations, IDEMA analyses the socio-
economic impacts of decoupling EU agricultural support in three distinct 
decoupling scenarios: i) actual implementation of the 2003 CAP reform (as 
implemented in each member state); ii) full decoupling with fully 
decoupled direct payments and top-ups; and iii) a bond scheme, whereby 
the SPS is linked to the farmer and not to land. 
IDEMA’s results reveal that the impacts of the 2003 CAP reform are 
moderate, compared with a continuation of Agenda 2000. According to the 
IDEMA’s simulation results, there is no significant evidence that farmers 
would drastically change their strategic decision to exit agriculture. In fact, 
IDEMA’s results indicate that structural change slows down when direct 
payments are decoupled. One reason for this effect is that grassland 
management becomes an additional income source for farmers. Another 
key finding of IDEMA is that the decoupled payments may reduce farmers’ 
off-farm labour supply. In the new member states, the impact of accession 
dominates the effects of decoupling. IDEMA’s simulation results show that 
the introduction of CAP payments results in a greater willingness to stay in 
farming and more competition for land. Increased payments are capitalised 
into higher land (rental) prices. 
IDEMA’s simulation results suggest that the bond-type decoupled 
payment would lead to a sharp increase in average farm size compared 
with the 2003 CAP reform. Many farmers would leave the sector if off-farm 
jobs were available, as the decoupled payment is granted to a farmer 
independent of land or any farming activity (it is only based on historical 
production). But in most cases, profits per hectare do not change or even 
increase under the bond scheme, owing to significantly lower land (rental) 
prices and structural change. 
Findings from the EU simulation studies suggest that agricultural 
policies do affect land prices and land rental rates. In line with the 
theoretical literature on subsidy capitalisation, the scenario analyses 
performed suggest that subsidy capitalisation into land values and land 
prices depends on both policy and non-policy assumptions, which were 
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Empirical studies on land (sales) prices 
The empirical attempts to estimate the impact of agricultural support 
policies on land rents and land prices can be grouped into two broad 
categories: land value/price studies and land rent studies. Whereas the 
former examine the effects of policies on farmland prices, the latter 
investigate the policy impacts on farmland rental rates. The main reason 
authors use one approach over another is usually data: the availability of 
either land value (typically from regional datasets) or rental data (typically 
from farm-level surveys) commonly determines the choice of model. 
It is important to point out that virtually all of the existing studies are 
on North America (the US and Canada). To our knowledge, only three 
cover EU countries (Traill, 1980; Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné, 1992; 
Duvivier et al., 2005). Moreover, none of these measures the impact of the 
SPS (Table 35).101 
Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné (1992) estimate an empirical model 
relating land values to the expected level of producer support, expected 
yield and expected producer prices net of subsidy support in six wheat 
producing regions in France, the US and Canada between 1979 and 1989.102 
The subsidy support is proxied by the producer subsidy equivalent. 
Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné estimate that a 50% reduction in 
producer support for wheat growers would lead to a $60–120 land price 
decrease in France and a $50–60 decrease in the US and Canada. This 
means that, on average, a 1% increase in the producer subsidy equivalent 
would increase the land value by 0.38%. Goodwin and Ortalo-Magné also 
find that land prices are more responsive to government-based returns than 
to market-based returns. 
                                                      
101 The large majority of empirical studies performed to date have estimated the 
present value of land as a function of government payments and other explanatory 
variables. The main reason for the relative dominance of land price studies is given 
by the data availability – usually regional data are more broadly available 
(typically used in land price studies) than farm-level data (typically used in land 
rent studies). 
102 These were Kansas and North Dakota in the US, Manitoba and Saskatchewan in 
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Barnard et al. (1997) undertake a separate approach using pooled 
cross-sections in order to assess the degree of capitalisation. For 
investigating the consequences of public support on farmland prices, they 
adopt an alternative framework to the present value models. Relying on a 
hedonic price model, Barnard et al. regress the cropland values against 
government subsidies.103 They measure government payments by the 
county-level averages of the annual amount of direct payments received 
per acre for 20 US regions. To account for possible land conversion, they 
include proxies for alternative uses of land in their regression. The other 
explanatory variables they include are agricultural productivity, non-
agricultural influence and state-specific institutional environments and 
others. 
Barnard et al. find that, depending on the region, the elasticity of 
cropland values to the government subsidies ranges from 0 to 0.69. Based 
on these results they conclude that the sensitivity of farmland values to 
government support is spatially variable. Two elements can explain this 
spatial variability: i) whether the dominant crops in a given region are 
eligible for the support and ii) the level of agronomic flexibility of a given 
region, which determines the ability to adjust output in response to 
changing government policy. Yet, Barnard et al. fail to account for omitted 
variables that might determine both subsidies and land values, thereby 
likely failing to identify a causal relationship. 
In a follow-up study, Barnard et al. (2001) analyse county-level 
farmland value data from the 2000 Agricultural Resource Management 
Study (ARMS). As in the 1997 study, Barnard et al. ran hedonic land price 
regressions to estimate the effect of the commodity programme payments 
on farmland value, while controlling for soil quality, urban influence, 
availability of irrigation and other factors.104 Thus, their regressions include 
 
                                                      
103 This approach relies on the idea that the land price is determined by the meeting 
of sellers’ and buyers’ bids, based on their respective maximised profit. Yet, in the 
hedonic price framework, determinants of land price are often chosen in an ad hoc 
way. 
104 They explain the value of farmland per acre at the county level, as reported by 
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land value per acre as a function of the commodity programme payments 
received, soil quality, the availability of irrigation, urban influence and 
other factors. 
The results of the hedonic pricing model in Barnard et al. (2001) 
suggest substantial effects of government payments on land values. They 
estimate that $61.6 billion of the $312.3 billion value of land harvested for 
eight programme crops (wheat, corn, soybeans, sorghum, cotton, rice, 
barley and oats) was attributable to programme payments. Since payments 
received in 2000 for these programmes amounted to about $21 billion, it 
appears that each $1.00 of payments generates about $3.00 of land value. 
Their results suggest that payments have the highest proportional effect in 
the heartland region, accounting for 24% of farmland value. The effect is 
similar in the Prairie Gateway region (23%) and the Northern Great Plains 
region (22%). 
Barnard et al. note that the very high land-value counties are 
urbanised areas where their prices are unlikely to be caused by commodity 
programmes. To account for the effects of urbanisation, they estimate 
separate regressions for different regions of the country and include 
additional right-hand side variables. Barnard et al. also realise that the 
current level of payments is not the source of all programme effects on land 
values. For example, Barnard et al. note that in 2000, a larger payment 
proportion than usual was made up of loan deficiency payments (LDPs), 
and these would be expected to have a smaller effect on land values than 
production flexibility contracts (PFCs) because LDPs have the additional 
effect of reducing commodity prices. More broadly, land values are 
expected to reflect not only the current year’s level of payments, but also all 
discounted, expected future benefits. The observational basis for farmers’ 
expectations about these benefits is current payments as well as recent past 
payments and the commodity market conditions underlying the forecasts 
of future payments. 
Gardner (2002) uses pooled cross-sections to estimate farm subsidy 
impacts. Gardner finds that an additional $1.00 per acre in programme 
payments would have increased the average growth rate in US land values 
from 1950 to 1992 by 0.017%. Given that the mean value of 1992 payments 
per acre in the counties studied was $15.00, the elimination of the 
programmes would have caused the rate of increase of farmland values to 
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decline by 0.26%; in other words, instead of growing by 1.76% annually 
during 1950–92, without the programmes the rate of growth would have 
been 1.5%. 
Overall, Gardner finds the evidence from county data that farm 
programmes have increased farmland values to be weak and inconclusive. 
Gardner also admits that the coefficient of government payments is not 
robust to alternative specifications that include other right-hand side 
variables. 
Goodwin et al. (2003) use farm-level data for 1998–2001 drawn 
primarily from ARMS to estimate the determinants of farmland values. 
They estimate the capitalisation rate of government payments (PFC 
payments and disaster-relief payments, which include market loss 
assistance (MLA) payments) into farmland values. They rely on the fact 
that the formation of land values is based upon expectations about the 
long-term stream of returns attached to land. To represent the expected 
payment, Goodwin et al. use a four-year average value of the realised 
payments at the county level. In addition, they augment the canonical 
framework of net present value to account for possible land conversion. 
Goodwin et al. first consider the aggregation of all support 
programmes into a single category. They show that using the actual 
realised payment of each farm as a proxy of the expected rent gives a 
coefficient of 5.40. With the county average, they obtain a coefficient of 6.09. 
In addition, Goodwin et al. estimate programme-specific marginal 
impacts of per acre subsidies on land values that range from $2.59 to $7.78, 
depending on the source of the programme payment. Assuming a discount 
rate of 5% (10%), their results suggest that landowners capture between 
$0.13 and $0.39 ($0.26 and $0.78) of the marginal subsidy dollar in the form 
of higher land rents, and that this incidence varies by programme, i.e. they 
show that the rate of capitalisation of $1.00 of payment is programme-
specific. 
Breaking down the overall measure of government payments into 
their individual components, they quantify the capitalisation rate for each 
type of support programme. 
Goodwin et al. find that the impact of an additional $1.00 of PFC 
payments is $4.90 per acre, which is statistically significant. They also find 
that disaster-relief payments have a statistically significant effect on 
farmland values, with the impact of an additional $1.00 of payments being 
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payments are captured at least partially by landowners, and that 
landowners were anticipating a continuation of payments beyond the life 
of the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.105 
Similar to Barnard et al. (1997), Goodwin et al. find that the extent to 
which support policies affect land values is spatially variable. They also 
point out that the implied effect of a support instrument on land values 
differs from year to year. As the authors note, one caveat to their results is 
that annual fluctuations in government payments may not capture the 
changes in long-term expectations of cash flows that drive land values. 
When the authors modified their model to allow the influence of 
government payments on land values to differ from one year to another, 
they found substantial differences in the effects of payments across years.106 
Duvivier et al. (2005) estimate the impact of the 1992 and subsequent 
CAP reforms on arable farmland prices in Belgium. Using a panel of 42 
Belgian districts from 1980 to 2001, they observe that the sales prices of 
arable farmland are affected by the compensatory payments. 
The estimation results of Duvivier et al. indicate that, besides the time 
dummies and other control variables, the expected land rents from market 
sales exert a pronounced effect on arable farmland prices. Depending on 
the year and region considered, the elasticity of arable farmland prices to 
compensatory payments ranges from 0.12 to 0.47. These results suggest 
that, by creating a rent that capitalises into land values, the new CAP 
instruments also benefit landowners. Because around two-thirds of Belgian 
agricultural land is rented by farmers, non-operators capture an important 
                                                      
105 Goodwin et al. (2003) also included LDPs in their model. The impact of an 
additional $1.00 of LDP payments on land values is about $6.60 (2003) per acre. 
The effects of LDPs are somewhat larger than those estimated for PFC or MLA 
payments, but the authors do not indicate whether these differences are 
statistically significant. 
106 Goodwin et al. (2003) realise several econometric issues are associated with their 
estimations. An assumption that the realisation of a particular source of return 
correctly reflects the long-term expectations could lead to an error-in-variable 
problem. Error-in-variable problems result in inconsistent estimators. They also 
note that the use of the farm-observed payments may result in an attenuation bias 
that forces the implied capitalisation rates towards zero. Because of the four-year 
county average, payments are more representative of the long-term benefits, and 
hence a larger coefficient is obtained. 304 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
share of agricultural subsidies. The results of Duvivier et al. also indicate 
that a temporal variability exists in the elasticity of arable farmland values 
to compensatory payments. They show that the sensitivity of arable 
farmland values to compensatory payments increased during the 1993–
2001 period. 
The main results of the principal studies on the impact of subsidies 
on farmland values are summarised in Table 35. Based on the estimates 
reported in Table 35, we conclude that depending on the data used and 
regression technique adopted, the estimated effect of subsidy payments on 
farmland values varies markedly across different studies. A general finding 
of land price studies is that the estimated elasticities of land prices with 
respect to coupled programme payments are rather small. The total share 
of land values determined by support payments can be sizeable, 
however.107 On the other hand, the estimated elasticities of land prices with 
respect to decoupled programme payments are surprisingly comparable 
with the estimated elasticities of market returns or coupled subsidies. The 
capitalisation of decoupled subsidies varies between 0.2 and 0.5, while that 
of market returns varies between 0.2 and 0.8, and that of coupled subsidies 
varies between 0.24 and 2.74. 
Empirical studies on land rents 
Land rent studies typically use farm-level variation in subsidy payments 
and farm revenues to explain variation in farmland rental rates, controlling 
for observable covariates and fixed effects when panel data are available.108 
                                                      
107 For example, Shaik et al. (2005) estimate the share of land value generated by 
programme payments between 1940 and 2002 at 30%, although this share fell from 
a peak of 40% in the 1960s and 1970s to between 15% and 20% in recent years. 
Weersink et al. (1999) find that agricultural support payments and farm revenues 
are discounted at different rates, with the latter being discounted more steeply. 
108 Whitaker (2006) points out that land rents may be empirically superior for 
investigating the effects of domestic support on land values for at least two 
reasons. First, rental rates are observed in the market while the land value is often 
given by the owner and is therefore subjective. Second, rental rates are less affected 
by urban pressures and other non-agricultural factors when contracts are for short 
periods of time, and may therefore reflect the value of agricultural activity on the 
land (when contracts are for longer periods, the impact of support on the land 
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As mentioned earlier, usually the availability of data and not the theoretical 
considerations determine the choice between land rents and prices. The 
primary results of the main studies on the impact of subsidies on 
agricultural land rents are summarised in Table 36. 
Lence and Mishra (2003) use a behavioural model of profit 
maximisation to investigate the effect of agricultural policy on land rents. 
More precisely, they examine the impact of PFC, MLA and other 
government payments on cash rents using county-level panel data from the 
state of Iowa for 1996–2000. Using panel data, they are able to control for 
additional heterogeneity. 
Their statistical tests for spatial autocorrelation suggest that it is 
present and significant (i.e. a correlation across space in the random factors 
outside their model that influence cash rents). Unlike most other studies on 
land values and rents, Lence and Mishra control for spatial autocorrelation. 
For comparison purposes, when they run their model assuming no spatial 
autocorrelation, the impact of an additional $1.00 of MLA payments on 
cash rents drops to about $0.50 while the point estimate of the impact of an 
additional $1.00 of PFC payments becomes greater than $1.00, which is 
implausible. 
Lence and Mishra find positive marginal effects of support payments 
per acre that range from $0.25 to $0.86 in additional rent per acre. On 
average, an additional $1.00 of PFC or MLA payments leads to an 
estimated increase in cash rents of approximately $0.85. These results 
indicate that landowners capture most of the benefits from PFC and MLA 
payments. In one specification, however, the estimated impact of LDPs on 
cash rents was negative and statistically significant, which raises concerns 
of misspecification or data problems. 
Roberts et al. (2003) use 1992 and 1997 farm-level panel data from the 
US Census of Agriculture with a sample size of about 60,000 farmers. 
Similar to Lence and Mishra (2003), as a conceptual framework Roberts et 
al. use a behavioural model of profit maximisation. In their model, they 
divide land rent into two components: variable profits (revenues net of 
variable costs) and government payments.109 
                                                      
109 According to Kirwan (2005), using the former component as a proxy for market-
based income to land is not unproblematic – since it treats land as the residual 
claimant of agricultural income, which is inappropriate in general but perhaps 
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In their estimations, Roberts et al. lump all government payments 
together into a single variable. Their calculations for 1997 suggest that 
approximately $6.1 billion of the total payments to farmers were derived 
from PFCs and the balance of $1.7 billion was associated with conservation 
programmes. The most statistically robust estimates of Roberts et al. 
suggest an increase in cash land rents of between $0.34 and $0.41 per acre 
for each additional $1.00 of government payments. 
In a related study, Kirwan (2005) uses the same 1992 and 1997 farm-
level panel data from the US Census of Agriculture for a sample of over 
113,000 farmers who reported paying cash rent in both years to analyse 
how government payments were divided between landlords and renters. 
Similar to Roberts et al., Kirwan lumps all government payments together 
and does not break out PFC or MLA payments from other payments. 
Controlling for farm, county and time fixed effects that may influence 
cash rents, Kirwan (2005) found that about 25% of each additional $1.00 of 
government payments was reflected in increased rental rates.110 The 
                                                                                                                                       
especially so in a model designed to test whether it is so. Using variable profits as a 
proxy for market-based income to land may result in a biased estimate of the 
coefficient on the latter land-rent component in the regression. 
110 The sizeable sample and repeated programme data allows Kirwan to address 
several important econometric issues through a government-programme 
instrumentation strategy. For example, he points out that production decisions are 
based upon expectations of future farm revenues and support payments. These 
expectations will not be completely accurate, thus creating a measurement error 
problem if observed realisations of these variables are used in estimations. As a 
result of expectation errors, estimated coefficients will be biased. To address this 
issue, Kirwan exploits the fact that programme payments made in 1997, after the 
1996 FAIR Act had been introduced, had been known more than a year in advance, 
making it highly unlikely that farmers would have made any expectation errors 
with respect to support payments. Furthermore, the 1997 payments would be 
highly correlated with earlier programme payments, given that the former were a 
deterministic function of previous programme acreage, but the 1997 payments 
should not have been correlated with any expectation errors made with respect to 
support in 1992. Recognising this, Kirwan predicts 1997 payments using 1992 
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remaining 75% represented a net gain to the renter.111 According to 
Kirwan’s estimates, on average landowners capture between $0.20 and 
$0.40 of the marginal per-acre subsidy $1.00, depending on the region and 
farm size. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn for land sales prices. The estimated 
elasticities of land rents with respect to decoupled subsidies are 
surprisingly comparable with the estimated elasticities of market returns or 
coupled subsidies. The capitalisation of decoupled subsidies in land rents 
varies between 0.3 and 0.9, while that of market returns varies between 0.3 
and 0.4 and that of coupled subsidies varies between (-0.24) and (0.8). 
Summary 
Based on findings from the theoretical models, the discussed simulation 
studies and the reviewed empirical analysis, we summarise our 
conclusions in four principal results. 
1. Coupled support policies do increase land rents and land prices, although less 
than the theory predicts.112 
Land rents/prices do not appear to capture the full value of coupled 
subsidies, at least in the short to medium run, but they do capture a 
substantive amount of subsidy payments (20-80%). The reviewed literature 
on land values and the determination of rental rates suggests that land 
prices and land rental rates are guided by a large number of factors, such as 
policy support, land-use alternatives, competition on the land market and 
inflation, which may explain these discrepancies between theory and 
empirical evidence. 
                                                      
111 As noted by the author, a caveat of these estimates is that rental rates may adjust 
slowly in the presence of long-term rental contracts. Landowners might capture all 
or nearly all gains from government payments in the long run, but a five-year 
period could be too short to capture this. 
112 The ‘coupled subsidy’ literature predicts that output subsidies are fully 
capitalised into land values when either land supply is inelastic and the supply 
elasticity of non-land inputs is infinite or factor proportions are fixed. Floyd’s 
model also predicts that if land supply is inelastic then area payments are fully 
capitalised into land values. 308 | APPENDIX 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2. Decoupled policy payments also affect land rents and land prices, although the 
theory predicts they do not if markets are perfect.113 
One way to interpret these results is that in the real world there are no truly 
decoupled subsidies. All decoupled subsidies applied in the EU or US 
impose certain restrictions on farms or are accompanied by other measures 
(e.g. cross-compliance). Therefore, it is rather difficult to compare the 
empirically estimated impact of decoupled and coupled policies. Perhaps 
the subsidy that most closely resembles the decoupled subsidy definition is 
the PFC payments introduced in 1996 by the FAIR Act in the US. The Act 
decoupled subsidies from contemporaneous production and removed all 
planting restrictions, including set-aside requirements. With the exception 
of certain fruits and vegetables, producers were given complete planting 
flexibility, while they still received subsidies based on their 1985 
programme yield and their 1995 acreage base.114 
3. Landowners benefit from all support programmes, both coupled and decoupled. 
All reviewed studies find that one additional unit of payment results in an 
increase of less than one land price unit. While these findings are not 
surprising in relation to decoupled subsidies, most of the above-discussed 
econometric work relates to coupled subsidies, which would be expected to 
have most (if not all) of their final effect on land. Nevertheless, the 
reviewed studies have found a surprisingly small share of coupled subsidy 
benefits going to landowners. 
                                                      
113 The theoretical literature on decoupled subsidies shows that fully decoupled 
s u p p o r t  p o l i c i e s  h a v e  n o  e f f e c t  o n  l a n d  values if markets are competitive and 
transaction costs are not prohibitive. It also shows that decoupled policies may 
affect land values only in the presence of some market imperfections. 
114 In addition to PFC payments, MLA payments were decoupled in the US. MLA 
payments were introduced as part of the ‘emergency assistance’ provided to US 
agriculture in 1999. As part of an appropriations act signed into law in October 
1998, $2.86 billion in additional payments were made to farmers to compensate 
them for the loss of markets for 1998 crops. Subsequent acts provided additional 
MLA payments of $5.5 billion for 1999 crops, $5.47 billion for 2000 crops and $4.6 
billion for 2001 crops. For those crops eligible for PFC payments, the MLA 
payments were proportional to the PFC payments made in that year, with a 
maximum payment per person of $19,888. Therefore, the MLA payments can be 
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4. The difference of the estimated impact of coupled and decoupled subsidies is not 
statistically significant. 
Comparing the empirical results from various studies, we find evidence 
that coupled payments do not have a significantly different impact on land 
values from that of decoupled payments. For example, Duvivier et al. 
(2005) find that the elasticity of land value with respect to partially coupled 
support (compensatory payments) is between 0.17 and 0.34. Kirwan (2005) 
estimates that the marginal effect of all government subsidies in the US on 
farmland rental rates is between 0.2 and 0.4. In contrast, Taylor and Brester 
(2005) find that the elasticity of land value with respect to market price 
support is between 0.16 and 0.32. 
There are only a few studies that compare how the subsidy 
capitalisation differs between decoupled and coupled support. Goodwin et 
al. (2003) find that, as predicted by the theory, coupled subsidies (LDPs)115 
have a higher impact on land values than decoupled subsidies (PFC 
payments). The estimated marginal effect on land value is 6.6 for LDPs and 
4.9 for PFC payments. In contrast, the results of Lence and Mishra (2003) 
suggest that decoupled payments (PFC and MLA) have a stronger bearing 
on rents than coupled ones (LDPs). Moreover, the coupled subsidies are 
found to decrease rents. These estimates suggest that rents rise by about 
$0.85 for each $1.00 paid per hectare under the PFC and MLA programmes. 
In the case of LDPs, land rent is estimated to fall by around $0.24 per $1.00 
of subsidy. 
 
                                                      
115 The 1996 FAIR Act initiated a programme for non-recourse marketing assistance 
loans and LDPs for 16 crops, including corn and soybeans. The purpose of the 
programme was to provide producers with a financial tool to help farmers market 
their crops throughout the year. The non-recourse loans allow farmers to store 
production and sell it when market conditions are favourable. The crop is 
employed as collateral for the loan. The loans are non-recourse in that the farmer 
has the option of repaying the loan by delivering the crop to the Commodity 
Credit Corporation at loan maturity. 310 | 
APPENDIX 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction 
This appendix sets out the theoretical/conceptual model developed to 
enable us to 
•  identify the theoretical effects of agricultural support on land 
markets; 
•  distinguish the mechanisms through which other factors (including 
policy, institutional and economic variables) interact with the effects 
of agricultural support; 
•  derive testable hypotheses and identify ways of measuring the 
impact of the various effects related to the relevant EU policies, land 
markets and rural conditions in the member states; 
•  determine the need for a pragmatic methodological approach. 
To meet these conceptual framework requirements, we adopt a profit 
maximisation model of Ciaian and Swinnen (2006 and 2007), which will 
allow us to analyse the impact of area payments and the single payment 
scheme (SPS) on income distribution effects. 
The canonical model of Ciaian and Swinnen (2006 and 2007) 
considers an agricultural economy with two heterogeneous farms.116 The 
output of each farm is assumed to be a function of the amount of rented 
land ( A). The output price is assumed to be exogenous to farms and fixed. 
We assume that only land can be rented. Land is supplied by landowners, 
who are not farmers. Farms are assumed to maximise their profits (revenue 
from output sales plus subsidies minus rental costs). The total agricultural 
land (AT) is assumed to be fixed. Farms compete for land and choose a land 
quantity that maximises their profits. (Marginal) profits from land 
determine the rent that farms are willing to pay for each rented hectare. 117 
                                                      
116 Alternatively, one may assume that the type 1 farm represents n farms of the 
same type and that the type 2 farm represents m farms of the same type. 
117 Similarly, Kilian and Salhofer (2008) analyse the effect of the SPS on land prices.  EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 311 
 
Figure 78 shows the land market. The horizontal axis represents the 
amount of land. Land rented by farm 1 (A1) is shown from the left to right 
on the horizontal axis. Land rented by farm 2 (A2) is shown from the right 
to left on the horizontal axis with A2 = AT – A1. The vertical axis measures 
the rental price. The land demand of farm 1 is D1.118 It represents the rent 
that farm 1 is willing to pay for each rented hectare. The more land it rents, 
the less it is willing to pay per hectare. Farmland demand is given by D2. 
Similarly, it represents the rent that farm 2 is willing to pay for each rented 
hectare and it decreases with the amount of rented land. The land market 
equilibrium is at the intersection of the land demand of farm 1 and the land 
demand of farm 2. The equilibrium rent is r* and the equilibrium land 
allocation is A*. Farm 1 rents A* hectares of land (A1 = A*) and farm 2 rents 
A2 = AT – A* hectares of land.  
Static effects of the SPS 
In this section, we analyse the impact of the SPS from a static perspective 
with respect to the tradability, conditionality and size of entitlements. First, 
we briefly introduce the model we use for the analysis. 
The model 
Consider an agricultural economy with two farms.119 We assume that farm 
1 represents n farms of the same type and farm 2 represents m farms of the 
same type. The output of each farm is assumed to be a continuous and 
increasing function of the amount of land used (
i A  with i = 1, 2). The 
output price (p) is assumed to be fixed and the same for all farms. All of the 
land is owned by landowners, who rent it to farmers.120 Farms maximise 
their profit (
i ∏ ), which is the difference between sales revenue and land 
rent: 
i i i i rA A pf − = ∏ ) (    (A2.1) 
                                                      
118 If the type 1 farm represents n homogenous farms, then the land demand D1 is 
an aggregation of land demand across all type 1 farms. The same holds for type 2 
farms. 
119 The model is based on Ciaian and Swinnen (2006 and 2007). 
120 This distinction between landowners and farmers is convenient for our 
explanation but is not essential for the analysis and the derived results. 312 | APPENDIX 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
where r is the rental rate and  ) (
i i A f  is a well-behaved production function 
with  0 >
i
A f ,  0 <
i
AA f , for i = 1, 2. Farms compete for land by renting the 
amount of land that maximises their profits: 
r pf
i
A = with i = 1, 2.  (A2.2) 
The regional SPS model is illustrated in Figure 78. We define 
1 E  (area 
FH) as the total SPS payment for farm 1, and 
1
E A  as the maximum amount 
of eligible area for the SPS payments.121 The payment per eligible hectare 
(the entitlement), e1, is equal to 
1 1 1
E A E e = . Analogously,
2 2 2
E A E e = , 
where 
2 E  is the total SPS payment for farm 2 (area GK in Figure 78), 
2
E A  is 
the eligible area for payments,122 and e2 is the entitlement. Under the 
regional model, the per-hectare value of the entitlement is the same for all 
farms,  e e e = =
2 1 .  
Under the historical SPS model, the variation in the entitlement value 
among farms depends on the variation of subsidies that farmers received in 
the reference period. The historical model is shown in Figure 79, where we 
assume that the per-hectare entitlement value of farm 1 is higher than that 
of farm 2, 
2 1 e e > . 
Proposition 1: In a static framework and with all land eligible for the SPS, 
the SPS benefits farms with and without tradability of entitlements and under the 
historical, regional or hybrid models. In other words, the SPS is not capitalised into 
land values. 
First, we consider that all of the land that farms used before the 
introduction of the SPS is eligible for the SPS. Figure 78 illustrates this 
situation.123 Before the introduction of the SPS, the equilibrium set of land 
allocation and rent is (A*, r*). This implies that the eligible area of farm 1 is 
equal to A* (AE1 = A*) and the eligible area of farm 2 is equal to AT – A* (AE2 
                                                      
121 
1




E A  corresponds to the maximum number of entitlements that farm 2 can 
receive. 
123 For the sake of brevity, we report the graphical analysis results. The formal 
proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 313 
 
= AT – A*). Next, we examine the case in which entitlements are non-
tradable and afterwards we analyse what changes when there is trade in 
entitlements.124 
Non-tradable entitlements  
Under the regional model, the value of the entitlement is equal for both 
farms,  e e e = =
2 1 . Farms do not receive payments for land that they rent 
in addition to the eligible area, AE1 and AE2 in Figure 78 respectively. 
Suppose farm 1 wants to rent more land than the eligible area (AEI). Given 
that the total land supply is fixed, in equilibrium farm 2 has to rent less 
land than its eligible area (AE2). In this case, i.e. over the domain 
T A A −
* , 
the respective land demand functions are determined by  
  r pf A =
1    (A2.3) 
  r e pf A = +
2 . (A2.4) 
For the additional land without entitlements, farm 1 cannot pay more 
than the marginal profitability of land. In contrast, farm 2 is willing to pay a 
higher rent – up to e. 
Next, consider the inverse situation, whereby farm 2 wants to rent 
more land than its eligible area (AE2). Here the corresponding demand 
functions over the domain 
* 0 A −  are defined by 
  r e pf A = +
1  (A2.5) 
  r pf A =
2 . (A2.6) 
In this case, the reverse logic holds. The SPS payments increase the 
land demanded by farm 1. The rent that farm 1 is willing to pay is 
increased by e.  
                                                      
124 In reality, entitlements may not be fully tradable because of regulatory 
constraints. Yet partial tradability of entitlements does not change the equilibrium 
distribution of land or rental prices compared with fully tradable entitlements or 
non-tradable entitlements, and thus partial tradability is not analysed separately.  
In this section, we show that in the static framework in the two extreme cases 
regarding the tradability of entitlements (i.e. with non-tradable entitlements and 
with fully tradable entitlements) the SPS benefits farms. The same holds with 
partial tradability of entitlements, which is a more realistic assumption. 314 | APPENDIX 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Equations (A2.3) and (A2.5) for farm 1 and equations (A2.4) and 
(A2.6) for farm 2 imply kinked land demand functions with the SPS. This is 
illustrated in Figure 78. Starting from the right-hand side in Figure 78 and 
following the thick lines, the land demand of farm 1 is given by De1 D 1, 
whereas the land demand of farm 2 is given by D2 D e2. At A* the land 
demand for both farms coincide, which is represented by the thick vertical 
line.  
The land market equilibrium with the SPS is (Ae*, r*). Compared with 
the equilibrium situation before SPS implementation, land allocation A* = 
Ae* and equilibrium rent are the same. If farm 1 wants to rent marginally 
more land than A*, it is willing to pay only r* (determined by D1). Similarly, 
if farm 2 wants to rent marginally more than AT – A*, then the rent that 
farm 2 is willing to pay is r* (given by D2). Hence, the equilibrium land rent 
is  r*. Given that no farm is willing to pay more than its marginal 
profitability for additional land, farmers gain all the SPS subsidies, equal to 
area FGHK in Figure 78, which represents the total value of the SPS. The 
gains of farm 1 are equal to area FH and the gains of farm 2 are equal to 
area GK.  
Under the historical SPS model, the value of entitlements may differ 
among farms. In Figure 79, the per-hectare entitlement value of farm 1 is 
larger than the per-hectare entitlement value of farm 2, 
2 1 e e > . As above, 
assume that all of the land that farms used before the introduction of the 
SPS is eligible for subsidies. Similar to the regional model, in equilibrium, 
the marginal willingness to rent additional land is not affected by e. Given 
that farms are not eligible for more entitlements than their eligible area (AE1 
= A* for farm 1 and AE2 = AT – A* for farm 2), the equilibrium is at (Ae*, r*), 
which is equal to the regional model and equilibrium before SPS 
implementation. All SPS benefits accrue to farms (area FGH in Figure 79), 
which is equal to the total SPS value. The gains of farm 1 are equal to area 
FG and the gains of farm 2 are equal to area H. The only difference from the 
regional model is that farm 1 gains more from the SPS than farm 2.  
Tradable entitlements 
The tradability of entitlements does not affect these static results. Also with 
tradable entitlements, farms will retain the entire benefit from the SPS. In 
other words, the SPS will not be capitalised into land values. First, we 
explain the impact of entitlement tradability for the regional model and 
then that pertaining to the historical model. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 315 
 
As shown in Figure 78, when farms want to rent more land than the 
eligible area, in equilibrium they are willing to pay a rent equal to land 
productivity. Their marginal willingness to pay for rented land is not 
affected by e. This is because farms are not eligible for additional 
entitlements for rented land exceeding the eligible area. But if the 
entitlement price (say pe1) is lower than the value of the entitlement (pe1 < e), 
the marginal gains of buying additional entitlements are positive (equal to e 
– pe1 > 0), implying that farms want to rent more land and buy additional 
entitlements. Competition for land driven by competition for entitlements 
will bid the market price of entitlements up to pe* = e. In equilibrium, 
neither land allocation nor equilibrium rent will be affected (Ae*, r*) and the 
equilibrium price of entitlements will be pe* = e. The entire SPS benefits will 
accrue to the owners of entitlements. Nevertheless, given that farms do not 
have incentives to adjust their amount of rented land, there will be no trade 
in entitlements even though the entitlement price will be pe* = e.125 
As in the regional model, the SPS does not affect the equilibrium 
marginal profitability of land under the historical model. Therefore, 
allowing for tradability in the historical model will not change the above 
results that all benefits accrue to farms. In equilibrium, the market price of 
entitlements (pe*) will be equal to the entitlement value. Yet, the market 
price will not be the same for all entitlements, because the per-hectare value 
of the entitlement differs among farms ( 2 1 e e >  in Figure 79). Potential 
buyers of entitlements will be willing to pay a price up to the value of the 
entitlement. The equilibrium price of the entitlement of farm 1 (pe1*) will be 
equal to e1 (pe1* = e1) and the equilibrium price of the entitlement of farm 2 
(pe2*) will be equal to e2 (pe2* = e2). As above, entitlement trading will not take 
place in this static case. 
Conditional SPS payments 
Depending on the nature of the conditions, farm gains from the SPS may be 
reduced. If the additional requirements imposed by the SPS were not 
present before implementation of the SPS and are not required for non-
                                                      
125 Note that in a multi-period model, a perfect credit market may be required to 
allow tradability. The farmer can activate the purchased entitlement on a yearly 
basis. In competitive markets, the value of the entitlements will be equal to the net 
present value. The farm must have access to capital (equal to the price of the 
entitlement) in order to be able to finance the purchase of entitlements.  316 | APPENDIX 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
participating farms, then net benefits from the SPS may be squeezed by the 
cross-compliance implementation costs. 
Proposition 2: Conditional SPS payments may reduce farm benefits from 
the SPS, depending on the nature of the conditions, but they do not affect land 
capitalisation (which is equal to zero). 
If cross-compliance does not lead to additional costs for farms (c=0), 
then farm benefits from the SPS are not affected. Still, evidence from the 
study by Alliance Environnement (2007), which is based on an expert 
survey on cross-compliance in the EU member states, indicates that in most 
cases cross-compliance is expected to have an effect on compliance with 
statutory management requirements and the obligations to maintain land 
in good agricultural and environmental condition. Evidence further 
suggests that cross-compliance tends to result in additional costs for both 
farmers and the public administration in most member states. The cross-
compliance costs vary among the EU member states, regions and the cross-
compliance instruments.126 
To show the impact of cross-compliance on farm benefits, we model 
cross-compliance as an additional cost (c) that farms face to be eligible for 
the SPS.127 First, let us take the regional model with positive compliance 
costs for each eligible hectare, c>0. The effect of positive compliance costs is 
illustrated in Figure 78. As shown above, the rented area and the rental 
price equilibrium with and without the SPS is (Ae*, r *). Yet, because of 
compliance costs c for each hectare, the net benefit per entitlement reduces 
to e – c. Compared with the case with zero cross-compliance costs, the net 
farm benefits from the SPS are reduced by area HK. The net farm gains 
from the SPS with compliance costs are equal to area FG in Figure 78: farm 
1 gains area F and farm 2 gains area G.  
                                                      
126 According to the European Commission (2007), farmer’s administrative costs of 
the SPS in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Ireland were calculated in the 
range of €5-29/ha. This represents 3-9% of the total CAP payments. 
127 Alternatively, one can endogenise the compliance costs. For example, Bartolini 
et al. (2008) develop a principal–agent approach under moral hazard where 
farmers can choose the degree of compliance. In equilibrium, the optimal level of 
compliance (hence compliance cost) depends on monitoring, the degree of sanction 
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If entitlement trading is allowed, then the SPS compliance costs also 
affect the market price of entitlements. Buyers are willing to pay a reduced 
price because of the compliance costs. In the case of the regional model, the 
equilibrium price of tradable entitlements is pe* = e – c. 
In addition, the enforcement of cross-compliance is an important 
issue (Bartolini et al., 2008). The net effect of cross-compliance requirements 
on farm gains from the SPS depends on how strictly they are enforced. If 
the enforcement is weak, then the effective compliance costs (c) might be 
lower and gains from the SPS higher for the deviating farms. In the extreme 
case, when there is no enforcement (c=0), the SPS gains are unaffected. 
Relative number of the entitlements allocated 
In this section, we relax the assumption that the number of entitlements 
allocated is equal to the total eligible land area. As above, we analyse how 
the number of entitlements allocated affects equilibrium rent distribution 
under different SPS implementation models and tradability assumptions. 
Proposition 3: If the total number of the entitlements allocated is larger 
than the eligible area, then the SPS is capitalised into land values. Under the 
regional model, the SPS becomes fully capitalised into land values. Under the 
hybrid and historical models, the SPS becomes partially capitalised into land 
values. 
Non-tradable entitlements 
Assume that farms receive entitlements such that 
* 1 A AE >  and 
* 2 A A A
T
E − > . The effect of the excess supply of entitlements under the 
regional model is illustrated in Figure 80. Given that the total number of 
entitlements is larger than the total eligible area 
T
E E A A A > +
2 1 , and farms 
need land to activate their entitlements, farms will not be able to activate all 
of their entitlements. Profit-maximising farms will compete for land in 
order to activate their unused entitlements. Competing farms will underbid 
the market price for land until they reach its marginal profitability. As a 
result, the entire SPS will be capitalised into land rents. The equilibrium 
rented area and rental rate are Ae*, r *+e. This result is driven by the 
assumption of competitive markets in which a large number of farms 
compete for land, implying that if some farms are not willing to pay rent 
r*+e, then landowners can always find other farms with unused 
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entitlements willing to pay this rent. Consequently, under an excess supply 
of entitlements all of the benefits from the SPS (area FG in Figure 80) accrue 
to landowners. 
Under the historical model, the entitlements may be distributed 
differently among farms. First, assume that farms receive entitlements such 
that 
* 1 A AE =  and 
* 2 A A A
T
E − > . Hence, the total number of entitlements is 
larger than the total eligible area 
T
E E A A A > +
2 1 . In Figure 81, the 
equilibrium set is (Ae*, reh*). Farm 2 cannot use all of its entitlements, and as 
a result, will bid the rent up to reh* (=
2 * e r + ). As above, if some farms do 
not pay this rent, then landowners can always find other farms with 
unused entitlements that are willing to pay rent reh*. Some of the benefits 
from the SPS (area GH in Figure 81) accrue to the landowners. The gains of 
farm 1 are equal to area F. Farm 2 does not benefit from the SPS. 
Next, assume that farms receive entitlements such that 
* 1 A AE >  and 
* 2 A A A
T
E − ≥ . Land allocation will change compared with the equilibrium 
land allocation without the SPS, which is given by A* in Figure 82. Because 
farm 1 has an entitlement with a higher value than farm 2 (
2 1 e e > ), it can 
offer higher rent for additional land than farm 2. As a result, the amount of 
rented land by farm 1 increases whereas the land rented by farm 2 declines. 
In Figure 82, the equilibrium set is (Ae*, reh*). Some of the benefits from the 
SPS (area FMHKL) accrue to landowners. The gains of farm 1 are equal to 
area BG. Farm 2 loses (does not gain) area KL. Thus, the SPS is partially 
capitalised into land values. 
Tradable entitlements 
We analyse how entitlement tradability affects the distributional impacts if 
the total number of entitlements is larger than the eligible area under the 
regional model. If farms own more entitlements than the total area 
T A , 
then entitlement trading will not emerge. Given that farms have unused 
entitlements, they are willing to sell them. But farms are not willing to buy 
additional entitlements because they cannot be activated. Thus, the 
distributional effects with tradable entitlements are the same as in the case 
with non-tradable entitlements. 
Under the historical model, we examine two different entitlement 
distribution schemes. When 
* 1 A AE =  and 
* 2 A A A
T
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equal to the regional model and non-tradable entitlements: entitlement 
trading will not emerge, as there are no buyers of entitlements. 
When 
* 1 A AE >  and 
* 2 A A A
T
E − ≥ , the equilibrium will shift from 
(Ae*, reh*) to (A*, ret*) in Figure 82. Yet the set (Ae*, reh*) cannot be a long-term 
equilibrium. Given that at rent reh*  the marginal benefit of additional 
entitlements for farm 2 is positive (it gains  0
* 1 * > − + et r e r ), farm 2 is 
willing to bid for entitlement 
1 e  from farm 1 up to price 
* 1 *
et r e r − + . The 
marginal entitlement benefit of farm 1 is zero at 
*
e A . Because there are 
mutual gains from trade in entitlements, farm 2 will buy entitlements from 
farm 1 that exceed 
* A , i.e. (
* 1 A AE − ). Therefore, farm 2 will exchange its 
lower-value entitlements for higher-value entitlements from farm 1. 
Competition for entitlement 
1 e  will drive the equilibrium price of the 
entitlement to 
* 1 * *
et e r e r p − + = . Also, farm 1 will benefit from the trade in 
entitlements. Compared with a situation without the SPS, the land 
allocation is not affected while the land rent is higher. The land market 
equilibrium is at (A*, ret*). 
Dynamic effects of the SPS 
In this section, we investigate how distributional effects change if SPS 
implementation induces structural adjustments in the economy. We look at 
two dynamic effects: the effect of a change in the productivity of incumbent 
farms and the effect of a change in farm population through farm entry and 
exit. 
Distribution of SPS benefits with productivity change128 
                                                      
128 In this section, we consider a situation in which the SPS entitlements are 
allocated based on land allocation equilibrium at the time the SPS was introduced 
and then analyse the SPS effect with productivity changes. Similar results hold for 
the situation where the allocation of the SPS entitlements among farms is not based 
on the land allocation equilibrium at the time the SPS was introduced, but on a 
previous land-allocation equilibrium. Indeed, the SPS allocation began in 2005, but 
the allocation of entitlements was based on land distribution in the reference 
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Up to now, we have assumed that the introduction of the SPS does not 
induce a change in farms’ productivity. Productivity is likely to change, 
however, because of technological or institutional innovations, or in the 
presence of imperfect rural credit markets, the SPS itself may reduce farms’ 
credit constraints and thereby increase productivity129 (see Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2009). We now analyse how the SPS in combination with 
productivity changes affects land values and the distribution of SPS 
benefits. The analysis concentrates on two key dimensions: symmetry in 
the productivity changes and tradability of entitlements.  
Symmetric productivity change and the SPS 
Productivity changes cause a shift in farmland demand. When productivity 
change causes the same shift in the demand for all farms – which we refer 
to as a ‘symmetric change’ – the effect is shown in Figure 83. The initial 
land demand of farm 1 is D1 and the initial land demand of farm 2 is given 
by D2. The equilibrium rented area and rental price are (A*, r*). A symmetric 
productivity change implies an equal shift in land demand of both farms. 
Assuming a symmetric technological improvement, the land demand of 
farm 1 shifts to D11 and of farm 2 to D12. The new equilibrium set is (A*, r1*). 
Land allocation is not affected. Land rent increases from r* to r1*. The rent 
increase is driven by a productivity increase. 
Proposition 4: With symmetric productivity changes, the SPS only benefits 
farms, with or without the tradability of entitlements and under all SPS models. 
To show this, consider first the regional model with non-tradable 
entitlements. As shown above, farms’ land demand is kinked with the SPS. 
This is illustrated in Figure 84. Without a productivity change, farm 1’s 
land demand is given by De1 D1 and farm 2’s demand is given by D2 De2. At 
A* the land demand of both farms is represented by thick vertical lines, 
which coincide. The equilibrium with the SPS without productivity change 
is (Ae*, r*). A productivity change shifts land demand up to De11 D11 for farm 
1 and to D12 De12 for farm 2. Again, at A* the land demands of both farms 
are represented by vertical lines, which coincide.  
The SPS does not affect farm profitability at the margin with 
symmetric productivity change. The new equilibrium (Ae*, re1*) is equal to 
                                                      
129 We focus on positive productivity change. The derived results are analogous for 
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the equilibrium without the SPS and with a productivity change. Land 
allocation is not affected and the rent increase is driven solely by the 
productivity increase. The SPS does not affect the equilibrium land rent. 
Farmers gain all of the SPS subsidies, which are equal to area FG in Figure 
84. The gains of farm 1 are equal to area F and the gains of farm 2 are equal 
to area G. 
This result is general. It is not affected by the tradability of 
entitlements or by the SPS implementation model.130 
Asymmetric productivity change and the SPS 
If a change in productivity affects individual farms in different ways, the 
demand for land shifts asymmetrically between the farms. For simplicity, 
we assume that only farm 1 experiences a productivity increase. In Figure 
83, the land demand of farm 1 shifts from D1 to D11. The land demand of 
farm 2 is not affected and stays at D2. The new equilibrium set is (A1*, r2*). 
Because of higher productivity, farm 1 expands its rented area in detriment 
of farm 2. 
Proposition 5:  With asymmetric productivity changes and with non-
tradable entitlements it holds that 
1.  some of the SPS benefits landowners (i.e. the SPS is partially capitalised into 
land values); 
2.  the SPS constrains restructuring; and 
3.  the historical and hybrid models may or may not have a stronger influence 
than the regional model on the capitalisation of the SPS and restructuring. 
Again, let us take the regional model. The effect of asymmetric 
productivity change is illustrated in Figure 85. The benchmark equilibrium 
with the SPS and no productivity change is (Ae*, r *). For simplicity, we 
consider the extreme case, when only farm 1 experiences a productivity 
change.131 With asymmetric productivity, the increase in the land demand 
o f  f a r m  1  s h i f t s  u p  f r o m  De1 D 1 to De11 D 11. The upward shift in land 
demand results in a significant increase in the rental rate, but does not 
                                                      
130 For the sake of brevity, we do not include proofs of this result, although both the 
graphical analysis and the formal proofs can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
131 Nevertheless, the derived results are more general and hold for any asymmetric 
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change land allocation. The new equilibrium set is (Ae*, re*). The increase in 
the rental price (re* – r*) is identical to the increase in land demand of farm 1 
owing to higher productivity. Because the increase in productivity is 
insufficient to overcome the gap in subsidies between farm 1 and farm 2 for 
renting additional land beyond Ae*, there is no land reallocation. Even with 
increased productivity, the marginal value of additional land for farm 1 at 
Ae* is equal to re*, which is less than r*+e, the marginal value of land for farm 
2 at Ae*.132  
Without the SPS and with asymmetric productivity change, the 
equilibrium rented area and rental rate would be (A1*, r1*). Hence, the SPS 
constrains land reallocation (restructuring) from farm 2 to farm 1 (A1* > Ae*), 
and some of the SPS is capitalised into land values. The equilibrium land 
rent with asymmetric productivity change and with the SPS is re*, while the 
equilibrium land rent with asymmetric productivity change and without 
the SPS is r1*, where re* > r1*. The total value of the SPS is given by area FGK 
in Figure 85. Landowners’ gains are equal to area HK. Area H is 
productivity gain and area K is gain from the SPS. The total gains to farms 
are equal to area FG. Farm 1 gains the full SPS (area F) while farm 2 gains 
less than the total allocated SPS (area G). Farm 2 uses some of the SPS (area 
K) to compete for land with farm 1.  
In contrast to the symmetric case, both the non-tradability of 
entitlements and the SPS implementation model can change the results 
with asymmetric productivity change. The mechanisms of the effect under 
the historical and hybrid models are similar to the regional model, but the 
magnitude of the effects is different. The variation in the value of 
entitlements among farms may cause a larger or smaller effect on the 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values and on agricultural restructuring. 
The net effect depends on the kinds of farms that have higher-value of 
entitlements. If farms whose productivity increases to a lesser degree own 
entitlements with a higher value compared with farms whose productivity 
increases more, then there will be a greater capitalisation of the SPS into 
land values and the SPS will constrain restructuring more. Otherwise, if 
farms whose productivity increases to a lesser extent own entitlements 
with a lower value than farms experiencing a stronger productivity 
                                                      
132 Only if the increase in productivity is larger than the per-unit subsidies (e) will 
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increase, the impact on the capitalisation of the SPS into land values and on 
restructuring will be smaller. 
Proposition 6: With asymmetric productivity changes and with tradable 
entitlements it holds that  
1.  all SPS implementation models benefit farms, 
2.  the SPS does not constrain restructuring, and 
3.  there is no difference between the SPS models. 
Looking at the regional model, in the previous analysis it was shown 
that when entitlements are tradable, the equilibrium price of the 
entitlement is pe* = e (Figure 85). Yet with asymmetric productivity changes, 
tradable entitlements and the SPS, the set (Ae*, r e*) cannot be a long-term 
equilibrium. Both farms would profit from land market transactions. At 
land allocation Ae*, the net benefit per hectare of farm 2 is r*+ e – r1*. If farm 
2 sells one entitlement and reduces the rented area by one hectare, its net 
gain per hectare is e obtained from the entitlement sale, where r*+ e – r1* < e 
(Figure 85). Thus, for farm 2 it is profitable to reduce the rented area by A1* 
– Ae* and to sell the equivalent number of entitlements. Farm 1 will have an 
incentive to rent more land (to take over land A1* – Ae* from farm 2) because 
with asymmetric productivity change its land profitability has increased 
compared with farm 2. Consequently, the equilibrium with tradable 
entitlements, with the SPS and with asymmetric productivity change is (A1*, 
r1*), which corresponds to the equilibrium without the SPS and with 
asymmetric productivity change. Restructuring is not affected and the 
entire SPS benefits accrue to farms (area FGK in Figure 85). Landowner 
gains are given by HK, which are driven solely by a productivity increase 
and not by the SPS. 
This result holds in general, for all SPS models.133 
Distribution of SPS benefits with farm entry 
The results derived in the above analysis are conditional upon support 
linked to the current farms.134 The entrants (who are potentially more 
                                                      
133 For the sake of brevity, we do not include proofs; however, both the graphical 
analysis and the formal proofs can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
134 In the static analyses, only the incumbent farm 1 could use e to bid up the rent to 
the land area AE1 (=A*), while for the rest of the area, AE2 (=AT – A *), only the 
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dynamic and productive and therefore a source of productivity growth) are 
excluded from the SPS support system. To address this exclusion, it was 
decided to create a ‘reserve’ of subsidy entitlements for entrants.135 In this 
section, we analyse how these reserve entitlements affect the SPS rent 
distribution.  
Proposition 7: With new farms entering the sector, it holds that:136 
1.  If entrants are not eligible for entitlements, then the SPS benefits incumbent 
farmers in both static and dynamic frameworks and with tradable and non-
tradable entitlements. Only with asymmetric productivity change and non-
tradable entitlements does some of the SPS also benefit landowners.137 
2.  If entrants are eligible for entitlements, then the SPS benefits will shift to 
landowners with and without tradability of entitlements. The extent of 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values depends on the implementation 
model and on the extent to which entrants are eligible for entitlements. 
Non-tradable entitlements 
In this section, we illustrate the effect of entitlement non-tradability in a 
static framework. The results presented are general, but they hold for both 
the static and dynamic frameworks. The effect of non-tradable entitlements 
under the regional model is illustrated in Figure 78. Granting the SPS 
entitlement to entering farms will induce a rise in land rent from r* to rer*.138 
The increase in land rent is equivalent to the per-hectare payment e. 
Because of higher demand for land at the margin, a landowner may rent 
land to an entering farm if the incumbent farm does not pay this rent. If 
new farms are eligible for the SPS, then their marginal benefit of cultivating 
                                                      
135 There are also other cases in which entitlements can be allocated from the 
reserve. For example, entitlements from the reserve can be granted to farmers 
located in areas subject to restructuring to avoid farms abandoning land. 
136 Here we consider the scenario whereby the total number of the allocated 
entitlements is smaller than or equal to the eligible area.  
137 This was shown in propositions 1, 4, 5, and 6, where it was assumed that 
entrants were not eligible for SPS. 
138 It is assumed that new farms enter the sector if their profits from farming are 
higher than the opportunity costs. A marginal farm that does not enter the sector 
with the SPS earns just less in farming than the opportunity costs. If the SPS 
increases farm profits, then this farm will have an incentive to enter farming. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 325 
 
land equals the marginal value product of land plus the per-hectare 
payment e. As a result, they can offer a higher rental price for land. The 
incumbent farms are willing to bid the rent up to r* + e (Figure 78). Thus, 
farms will bid for land until the rental rate reaches rer* = r* + e. The reserve 
entitlements granted to entering farms makes the effects of the SPS very 
similar to the effects of the area payments (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). 
Hence, under the regional model with entrant eligibility for entitlements, 
the SPS is fully capitalised into land rents and all subsidies accrue to 
landowners. Landowner gains are equal to area FGHK in Figure 78. 
Next, we examine the historical SPS model. In this case, the impact of 
the SPS on land capitalisation depends on the value of the entitlement (eR) 
that an entering farm receives from the reserve. The SPS may be partially or 
fully capitalised into land values. Under the historical SPS model, the value 
of the entitlement may differ among farms, e.g. 
2 1 e e > . If 
1 e e
R ≤ , then the 
SPS is partially capitalised into land values. In this case, the entrant can bid 
the rent up to reh* (= r* + eR). This is illustrated in Figure 79, where it is 
assumed that 
2 e e
R = . Landowners’ gains are equal to area GH in Figure 
79. Only farm 1 with high-value entitlements is able to benefit from the SPS 
– it gains area F. Farm 2 does not benefit from the SPS.139 
If 
1 e e
R = , then the SPS is fully capitalised into land values. In this 
case, farms that own entitlements with a value smaller than eR (farms of 
type 2) will be out-competed by the entrants. Given that the entering farms 
can obtain an entitlement with a higher value 
2 e e
R > , they will out 
compete the incumbent farms for land. Entrants will bid the rent up to r* + 
eR and the SPS will be fully capitalised into land rents.  
Tradable entitlements  
The tradability of entitlements will not affect the results obtained above, as 
tradability does not change farms’ marginal conditions. Thus, it does not 
affect farm willingness to pay for land use. The market price of tradable 
entitlements (pe*) will be zero, pe*= 0, under the regional model, because the 
SPS is fully capitalised into land values. Given that farms do not benefit 
from the SPS, they are not willing to pay for entitlements. Moreover, the 
entrants can obtain entitlements for free. A farm buying the entitlement 
                                                      
139 If 
2 e e
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would therefore be unable to compete for land with the entrant. As a result, 
making entitlements available for free from the reserve eliminates the 
market for entitlements and makes the issue of tradability irrelevant.  
Under the historical SPS model, the price of entitlements will be 
positive only when the SPS is partially capitalised into land values (i.e. 
when 
1 e e
R < ) and only entitlements with a value larger than 
R e  will have 
a positive market price (i.e. entitlements of farm 1 in Figure 79). Only those 
entitlements with a value larger than 
R e  benefit farms.140 The rest of the 
entitlements will have a zero market price.141 Nevertheless, tradability does 
not change farms’ marginal conditions. Therefore, the tradability of 
entitlements does not affect the results obtained for the case where 
entitlements from the reserve are allocated to the entrants. 
Full versus partial eligibility for entitlements 
In reality, new entrants may not be eligible for entitlements for the entire 
area they want to rent. If only a portion of the entrant’s land is eligible for 
entitlements, the SPS benefits both farmers and landowners, i.e. the SPS 
rents will be shared between landowners and farmers. The more 
constrained is the entitlement acquisition for entering farms, the more the 
SPS benefits farms. 
On the other hand, the more constrained is the acquisition for later 
entering farms, the more unequal is the rent distribution from the 
intergenerational perspective. Hence, the optimal policy of entrant 
eligibility for entitlements faces a trade-off between benefiting resource 
owners versus users on the one side and intergenerational equity on the 
other. 
 
                                                      
140 In the equilibrium shown in Figure 79, the benefits of farm 1 per entitlement are 
equal to 
* 1
eh r e − . 
141 Even though the price of the entitlements with the highest value (
1 e ) will be 
positive under the historical model, the entitlements will not be traded in the static 
framework with symmetric productivity change, because the land rented by farm 1 
with the entitlements 
1 e  will not change. Only the entrants may acquire 
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Table 37 summarises the key results of the capitalisation of the SPS 
into land values in a static framework, for full, partial and zero entrant 
eligibility for entitlements and under different SPS implementation models. 
The SPS is fully capitalised into land values with full entrant eligibility for 
entitlements under the regional model (Table 37). The SPS may be fully 
capitalised into land values either under the historical model or the hybrid 
model when the value of the entitlement that new entrants receive from the 
reserve equals the highest value of the incumbent farms’ entitlements. 
Otherwise, the SPS is partially capitalised into land values under the 
historical and hybrid models with full entrant eligibility. At the other 
extreme, when no entrants have access to entitlements, there is no 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values and the SPS benefits farms. 
In all other cases, there is partial capitalisation of the SPS into land 
values. Everything else being equal, for a given value of entitlement that 
entrants receive from the reserve, the capitalisation is stronger under the 
regional model than under the historical or hybrid models. Between the 
two latter models, capitalisation is higher under the hybrid model than 
under the historical one. This result stems from a greater variation in the 
value of entitlements under the historical model than under the two other 
models. 
Table 38 summarises the effect of the SPS on land capitalisation with 
asymmetric productivity change for full, partial and zero entitlement 
eligibility for entrants under different SPS implementation models. The 
effects with asymmetric productivity change are similar to the effects 
shown in Table 37 for the static framework. But with asymmetric 
productivity change, the tradability of entitlements does not affect the 
results. Given that productivity change triggers land reallocation and 
adjustment in land rents, this was less important in the static framework. If 
entitlements are non-tradable, then less productive farms will use the SPS 
to compete for land and induce distortions in the land markets including 
capitalisation of the SPS into land values. With fully tradable entitlements, 
less productive farms would choose to sell entitlements because of higher 
benefits from selling compared with making use of entitlements and 
continuing to rent the equivalent amount of land.  
Figure 81 reports zero capitalisation of the SPS into land values in the 
case of tradable entitlements and with no new entrant eligibility for 
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entitlements. Full capitalisation occurs with full entrant eligibility for 
entitlements. In other cases, there is partial capitalisation of the SPS into 
land values.  
Additionally, with asymmetric productivity change and constrained 
tradability of entitlements, the SPS may constrain restructuring. The 
entrants’ eligibility for entitlements has an opposite effect on restructuring. 
Given that entrants can use the entitlements they receive from the reserve 
and out compete less productive farms that use the SPS to compete for 
land, entrant eligibility for entitlements will stimulate restructuring. 
Consequently, with non-tradable entitlements, the restructuring is more 
constrained the more entrants are constrained in obtaining entitlements. 
Yet, with full tradability, restructuring is not hindered irrespective of 
whether the entering farms are eligible for entitlements.  
Distribution of benefits from the SPS with farm exits 
T h e  e f f e c t  o f  f a r m  e x i t s  f r o m  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  
effect of a negative productivity change. With farm exits, there is a 
downward shift in the aggregate demand for land rather than an upward 
shift with productivity growth. If this effect is symmetric (i.e. if farm exit is 
equal among farms of type 1 and type 2), then the SPS will benefit farms 
both with and without the tradability of entitlements. The effect is similar 
to a symmetric productivity change. 
The SPS will affect land values only if there is an asymmetric shift in 
land demand, which takes place for instance when farms of one type exit 
more than farms of the other type. This asymmetric shift leads to changes 
in the relative willingness to pay for the rented land among farms, which 
triggers land reallocation and adjustments in land rent. The relative 
willingness to bid for land of those farms more likely to exit will decrease 
compared with those less likely to exit. Hence, without the SPS, the land 
demand of those farms more likely to exit will decrease and the 
equilibrium land rent will decline. The SPS payments may hamper these 
adjustments, however, and the SPS may be capitalised into land values. 
Similar to asymmetric productivity change (proposition 5), this will be the 
case with non-tradable entitlements and with an asymmetric shift in land 
demand induced by farm exit. Some of the SPS will benefit landowners and 
the restructuring will be constrained. With tradable entitlements, the SPS 
will benefit farms and restructuring will not be hampered, which is 
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Summary 
In this analysis, we have studied the distributional effects of decoupled 
single farm payments in the EU. The main findings can be summarised in 
the following results: 
•  In a static world, the SPS only benefits farmers, irrespective of the SPS 
model implemented and irrespective of whether entitlements are 
tradable. In other words, the SPS is not capitalised into land values.  
•  Still, if the total number of the entitlements allocated is larger than the 
eligible area, then the SPS is capitalised into land values and benefits 
landowners.  
•  Conditional SPS payments may reduce farm benefits from the SPS, 
depending on the nature of the conditions. 
•  If new entrants are eligible for the SPS, then under the regional 
(historical and hybrid) model, the SPS is fully (partially) capitalised 
into land values. 
•  With symmetric productivity change, the SPS benefits farms with or 
without entitlement tradability under all three SPS models. 
•  With asymmetric productivity change and with non-tradable 
entitlements, we find that some of the SPS benefits landowners, the 
SPS constrains restructuring, and the historical and hybrid models 
may or may not have a stronger effect than the regional model.  
•  With asymmetric productivity change and with tradable 
entitlements, the results show that all SPS models benefit farms, the 
SPS does not constrain restructuring, and in terms of land rents there 
are no differences between the historical, hybrid or regional models. 
•  With asymmetric productivity change and with new entrant 
eligibility for entitlements, we find that all the SPS models benefit 
landowners and that the SPS may constrain restructuring but only 
under the historical and hybrid models. In this case, the historical 
model is fully capitalised into land values, while the hybrid and 
regional models are partially capitalised into land values. 
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APPENDIX 3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Introduction 
The findings presented in the chapters of this book suggest a number of 
factors that may determine the price and rental rates of farmland. Drawing 
on these insights, this appendix derives an econometric model and outlines 
possible empirical strategies for estimating the policy influence on 
farmland rental rates and farmland prices. More specifically, we  
•  set out data requirements that satisfy both the objectives of this study 
and empirical methodologies;  
•  identify empirical methodologies that are needed to test the proposed 
hypotheses within the constraints of the project; and 
•  identify potential econometric problems and suggest solutions for 
addressing the issues. 
This appendix is organised in two main parts – estimating the impact 
of policy on land rents and that on land prices. 
The prior acknowledgement of estimation issues is extremely 
important because, if they are thoughtfully addressed, statistically 
significant and theory-consistent results can be obtained. Consistent and 
significant estimation results can in turn provide additional evidence about 
the relationship between subsidies and land rents/prices suggested by the 
theoretical models. 
To estimate the policy effects on farmland rental rates and farmland 
prices, two kinds of data can be used: farm- and regional-level data. The 
empirical studies on the land-market implications of decoupled subsidy 
payments involve either aggregate time s e r i e s  d a t a  ( w h e r e  t h e  u n i t  o f  
analysis is a region) or disaggregated cross-sectional data (where the unit of 
analysis is a farm). Both approaches involve serious statistical problems.  
In aggregate time series studies, the fundamental problem may 
simply be a lack of data, which compounds a lack of confidence over 
whether the model structure is right or whether the empirical proxies for 
theoretical constructs are reasonable, and thus how to interpret the 
estimated model.  
In cross-sectional studies, the primary econometric issues appear to 
be related to dealing with the roles of unobserved factors (such as farm-EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 331 
 
specific weather and soil fertility, which determine the farm’s history and 
thus its eligibility for subsidies as well as its current production mix and 
productivity) in jointly influencing land rents and land prices, along with 
agricultural subsidies (identification problems). 
Given that time series data are rarely available (while farm-specific 
time series are the most preferred kind of data, these are undoubtedly the 
least available data in Europe) and one period cross-sectional data is little 
appropriate for statistical inference of subsidy payments (see Alston, 2007), 
in the following discussion we assume that at least a repeated cross-section 
(two-period panel data) is available: 
•  panel data/repeated cross-section with n regions and at least two 
periods, t=2, and  
•  panel data/repeated cross-section with n farms and at least two 
periods, t=2. 
Estimating the impact of subsidies on land rents 
Theoretically, one could look for the effects of commodity policies on land 
rents/values cross-sectionally using data on land prices on different farms, 
where the policies affecting those farms vary. The analysis would be like 
estimating the land price effects of irrigation by observing the values of 
irrigated and unirrigated land, which can be expressed as follows: 
 LRit = b0 + b1GSit + b2Xit + eit   (A3.1) 
where LRit is the land rental rate per hectare, GSit is the subsidy payments 
per hectare in year t, and Xit is a vector of observable covariates such as 
yield, selection and production of crops, occurrence of irrigation, farm size, 
revenue and expenditures. Further important explanatory variables, which 
need to be considered when estimating equation (A3.1), are land market 
institutions, details of policy implementation, the duration of rental 
contracts, etc. (see the literature review). As usual, eit is the residual 
capturing all other effects on farmland rental rates. Subsidy payments, GSit, 
can be further split into specific agricultural policies, such as market price 
support, output/input subsidies and decoupled single farm payments, the 
incidence of which can be estimated separately. 
The theoretical analysis shows that subsidies in interaction with 
market imperfections, structural changes and policy details affect land 
rents. Therefore, compared with estimating the land price effects of 
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are several land market and policy-related issues that considerably 
complicate the estimation of the impact of agricultural policies on land 
rents. The most significant of these are measurement error, the endogeneity 
of explanatory variables, unobserved heterogeneity, unobservable 
explanatory variables, simultaneity bias, expectation error and omitted 
variable bias. 
Measurement error 
If the per-hectare rental rate is calculated by dividing the total cash rent by 
total hectares rented, and a portion of the rent is paid in the form of share 
corps, the calculated rental rate will be too small (as it does not include the 
share crop rent). The resulting measurement error is not a classical 
measurement error. Given that the calculated rental rate is less than or 
equal to the true cash rental rate, the expected value of the measurement 
error must be greater than zero. As long as the non-classical measurement 
error is uncorrelated with the regressors, only the intercept will be 
confounded. But if the measurement error is positively correlated with the 
magnitude of subsidy payments, the estimated effect of subsidy payments 
on rental rates will be biased downward. 
This type of non-classical measurement error can be addressed with 
instrumental variables. Good instruments for subsidy payments in the 
period prior to reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP)142 could be, 
for example, the farm-specific subsidy parameters: programme yield and 
base hectares. These parameters are known in advance, they are highly 
correlated with actual subsidy payments, and they are uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic shocks to prices that ultimately determine subsidy 
payments. Thus, programme yield and base hectares could serve as good 
instruments, because they are correlated with the realised subsidy payment 
and uncorrelated with shocks that contribute to the expectation error. 
Still, farm-level data on programme yields and base hectares are 
usually unavailable. In view of the data availability constraints, an 
alternative set of feasible instruments could be, for example, subsidy 
payments in the post-CAP reform period. Because they are highly 
correlated with the pre-CAP reform subsidies, but uncorrelated with the 
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idiosyncratic shocks to prices, they c o u l d  b e  u s e d  a s  i n s t r u m e n t s  f o r  
subsidy payments in the pre-CAP reform period. 
Endogeneity 
Given that subsidies (at least coupled ones) are a function of yield and crop 
choice, they are endogenous variables reflecting the characteristics of the 
land and the producer’s behaviour. Hence, subsidies are not assigned 
randomly, which implies that subsidy payments, GSit, are correlated with 
the error term, eit. As a result, the resulting OLS estimate of b1 will be 
biased. 
To control for endogeneity-caused problems, three issues need to be 
addressed: unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and farmer’s 
expectation error due to the time lag between rental contracts and subsidy 
payments. Given that these problems are rooted in alternative factors, each 
of them needs to be addressed differently. For example, using farm fixed 
effects, such as diverse land characteristics and entrepreneurial skill, the 
unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for. Simultaneity can be 
controlled for through exogenous change in the subsidy rate, which allows 
producer behaviour to be divorced from subsidy payments. The 
expectation error can be overcome, for example, by using an 
instrumentation variables strategy. 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
Usually, the empirical analyses performed at the regional level assume 
farm homogeneity within the geographical unit of observation. Yet, 
variances in farm size, structure and productivity within a region serve to 
confound the conventional analysis. Many of the farm characteristics that 
differ across farms cannot be directly observed in the data, but they affect 
both subsidies and farmland rental rates. Among these are farm-level soil 
properties, and farms’ human capital and entrepreneurial skill. Transient 
shocks, such as drought or pests, also may affect rental rates and subsidies. 
The unobserved characteristics, such as farm productivity, that 
positively influence both subsidies and rental rates are a usual source of 
bias in empirical analyses performed at the regional level and assuming 
farm homogeneity. The bias emerges because the positive correlation 
between payments and the unobserved factors that influence productivity 
will result in an upward bias for incidence estimates and confound b1 as a 
measure of the effect of subsidies on rental rates. By controlling for 
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being inconsistent. To address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity, farm 
and time-varying regional fixed effects need to be included in the estimable 
equation. Expanding equation (A3.1) to include both yields,  
 LRit = b0 + b1GSit + b2Xit + fi + Rt + eit   (A3.2) 
where fi is the fixed effect for farm i and Rt is the time-varying regional 
effect capturing shocks (such as weather or pests) that affect all farms 
within the region. 
Simultaneity bias (especially for coupled payments) 
Prior to the single payment scheme (SPS), output prices played a role in 
determining both subsidies and rental rates. Market price support was 
counter-cyclical: high prices meant low subsidies. This feature of 
agricultural subsidies induced a negative relationship between the subsidy 
and the rental rate. When expected prices were high, rental rates were high 
and expected subsidies were low. In the case of coupled payments, the 
explanatory variable of contemporary payments per hectare of land is 
likely to be endogenous, leading to specification error and bias. A region 
whose commodities face weak market conditions (not captured in market 
income variables) will tend to have both lower farmland prices and higher 
commodity subsidy payments than a region selling into stronger markets. 
Therefore, the contemporary subsidy-payment variable will tend to be 
biased downward. 
A further source of endogeneity through simultaneity bias arises 
from adjustments in farmer behaviour owing to subsidy payments. Given 
that all observations are of the same year, cross-sectional regressions hold 
national-level market conditions constant by construction. But support 
programmes typically encourage more input use and production of 
supported commodities than would be the case in the absence of the 
programmes. If the programmes were removed, the market prices of the 
supported commodities would rise. In the cross-sectional observations, 
prices received by farmers would rise more in the heavily supported 
regions than in those that relied less on the programmes. Therefore, the 
cross-sectional regressions that hold commodity prices constant overstate 
the programme effects. 
To address this endogeneity issue, one can make use of two cross-
sections of regional data for two different years. The underlying intuition is 
to explain the growth of farmland values between the base year and end 
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dealt with through the use of changes between the base year and end year. 
If programmes reduced market prices, the relevant effects of that decline 
would appear as a corresponding reduction in the base-to-end-year 
increase in farmland value. The 2003 CAP reform divorced farm subsidies 
from commodity prices, eliminating commodity prices as a source of bias in 
the post-CAP reform period.143 Hence, the CAP policy reform might 
provide an exogenous change in subsidy rates, and its structure eliminates 
the obstacle to identification caused by simultaneity bias. 
Expectation error (especially for coupled payments) 
Usually, rental rates are set according to expected receipts, including 
expected subsidy payments. Prior to the 2003 CAP reform, market price 
support was conditioned on the market price and thus was unknown until 
after the harvest, while rental rates were agreed upon before planting in the 
spring.144 The difference between the actual subsidies and the expected 
subsidies is expectation error, which is part of the composite error term in 
the estimable equation. Assuming that the expected subsidy and the 
expectation error are uncorrelated, i.e. their covariance is equal to zero, 
implies that the realised payments, GSit, are correlated with the error term. 
The effect on the coefficient of interest, b1, is the same as classical errors in 
variables, namely attenuation bias. 
The instrumental variables strategy can overcome the attenuation 
bias induced by the expectation error. An adequate instrument should be 
correlated with subsidies and uncorrelated with the composite error term. 
For example, the decoupled subsidy level in the post-CAP reform period 
meets these requirements. Given that in 2003 the subsidy rates were 
exogenously predetermined for the subsequent years according to one of 
the three SPS implementation models, there is no expectation error in the 
subsidies of the post-CAP reform period. 
                                                      
143 SPS payments were implemented in the period 2005–07 in the EU-15. The exact 
implementation date of the SPS varies across the EU member states. 
144 Similarly, to a certain extent coupled livestock and crop area payments were 
also determined by the market price, because the total level of subsidy payments 
depended on the behaviour of all farms and the regional constraints on total 
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On the one side, post-CAP reform subsidies can be assumed as 
strictly exogenous. Because of the absence of expectation error in the post-
CAP reform subsidies, this variable is uncorrelated with the error term. 
This condition holds if the subsidy shock in the pre-CAP reform period 
contained no information for the expected subsidy in the post-CAP reform 
period, according to Pokrivcak et al. (2004), which is a reasonable 
assumption. 
On the other side, depending on the SPS implementation model, as 
the entitlements to decoupled payments in the post-CAP reform period are 
based on past subsidy payments from the pre-CAP reform period, they are 
likely to be strongly correlated with the subsidies of the pre-CAP reform 
period, and as such may serve as a good instrumental variable.145 
If the panel data contains longer time series (t>2), an alternative way 
to address the expectation error can be used. To approach the expected 
market rent, Goodwin et al. (2003) propose to construct a four-year average 
of the land rent realised during the current and past three years. 
Unobservable explanatory variables 
Equation (A3.2) cannot be estimated in its current form, as not all farm 
fixed effects, fi, are observable in the data. To absorb fi, one can take the first 
differences of equation (A3.2), which in a two-period panel results in 
  ∆LRi = ∆b1GSi + ∆b2Xi + ∆ei   (A3.3) 
where operator ∆ denotes first differences. If the level of the observable 
covariates for the post-CAP reform period, Xit, is influenced by the 
exogenous subsidy change, the first differencing of the control variables 
might not be recommended. Instead, values of these variables for the pre-
CAP reform period, Xit-1, can be included in the estimable equation. In a 
panel with t=2, the estimated coefficients from first difference data will be 
identical to those obtained by including the individual fixed effects 
(Kirwan, 2005). 
Omitted variable bias 
Given that agricultural areas across the EU differ substantially in the crops 
grown, one might be concerned that the obtained results mask variation in 
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the following: ∆GSi = bGSit-1 + R + ui. EU LAND MARKETS AND THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY | 337 
 
response across region. Since each crop is subsidised separately, one might 
worry that the incidence differs according to crop and subsidy regime. This 
issue might be addressed by estimating the impact of subsidies on land 
rents separately for different regions. 
Regions with lower benefits from commodity programmes may have 
lower land values for reasons other than support programmes or other 
variables included in the regressions. If support programmes were to end, 
land prices in the regions that are now heavily supported would not fall to 
the levels of the less supported regions as the regressions would predict. 
To address the heterogeneity issue, one can make use of two cross-
sections of regional data for two years. The idea is to explain the growth of 
farmland values between the base year and the end year as a function of 
support provided during that period. By including the base value of each 
region’s farmland as a right-hand side variable, the characteristics of a 
region’s farmland that affect its value but which are not captured by the 
other variables in the regression, are held constant. 
Farm size could also have a bearing on the degree to which subsidies 
affect land rents. For example, large farms may be better able to negotiate 
lower rental rates, which could drive the relatively low incidence. 
Alternatively, small farm operators may be better acquainted with the 
landlord and therefore receive a more favourable rental rate. The farm size 
issue might be addressed by estimating the impact of subsidies on land 
rents separately for various farm sizes. 
Correlation between explanatory variables 
A further complication may arise if the errors applying to observed policy 
benefits are correlated, which is the case of assorted coupled subsidies, as 
well as coupled and decoupled policy instruments. According to Goodwin 
et al. (2003), this correlation may assume two different forms: a correlation 
of the errors across diverse programmes or a correlation of errors across 
regions in a sample. Although both circumstances are likely to coexist, in a 
pooled cross-section of regions, most probably the latter will be more 
important. 
If there are several coupled policies or coupled and decoupled 
policies, they may be correlated with each other. Consider a case of two 
programmes – output subsidy and market loss assistance payments. The 
extent of support is likely to vary considerably from year to year according 
to market conditions. Low-price years realise larger payments for both 338 | APPENDIX 3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
programmes. Therefore, the errors associated with using realised benefits 
are likely to be highly correlated across the programmes. The correlation 
could also be negative. Consider the case of yield disaster relief and price 
supports. In low-yield years, market prices are high and consequently price 
support payments will be low, although disaster benefits will be higher to 
compensate for the production shortfalls. 
Estimating the impact of subsidies on land values/(sales) prices 
The effect of subsidies on the asset value of farmland provides another 
dimension for assessing the distributional impacts of agricultural subsidies. 
Unlike the rental rate incidence, which reflects the incidence of the 
contemporaneous, marginal subsidies, the land value incidence reflects 
both the incidence of the contemporaneous subsidies and information 
about future subsidies. If the estimated incidence on the rental rate is a 
permanent feature of the farmland market, a reasonable discount rate 
should reconcile the rental rate incidence with the incidence on land values. 
Given that the relationship between the rental rate incidence and the 
farmland value incidence provides additional insight into the interaction 
between agricultural subsidies and the farmland market, in this section we 
outline key issues that should be addressed when estimating the impact of 
subsidies on land prices. 
To investigate the effect of the subsidy on land values, the per-hectare 
land value needs to be introduced as the dependent variable instead of the 
farmland rental rate. Using a traditional present value model (see the 
literature review), one can calculate the implied discount rate from the 
estimated incidence on rental rates and on land values. More precisely, the 
land value, LP, equals the ratio of the rental rate, LR, divided by the 
discount rate, δ: 
 LPt-1 = E(LRt) / δ    (A3.4) 
 where  LRit = b0 + b1GSit + b2Xit + fi + Rt + eit.   (A3.5) 
Generally, the discount rate, δ, attached to each source of return can 
vary reflecting differences in the uncertainty associated with diverse 
sources of future net returns. Yet, without the loss of generality, we can 
assume the same discount rate for all cash flows from the same source, and 
that each cash flow stream grows at a constant rate. As a result, the above 
formulation of the land price model simplifies to 
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where  E(GSit) represents the expected subsidies and E(Xit) captures the 
expected market returns. If the available subsidy data are detailed enough, 
then the variable GSit can be further split into specific agricultural policies, 
such as market price support, output/input subsidies and decoupled single 
farm payments. As above, the individual farm fixed effect, fi, continues to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in land productivity. 
The time-varying regional effect, Rt, however, is different from land 
rent estimations. Here it captures non-agricultural opportunity income, as 
several studies have shown that the influences of urbanisation and non-
agricultural conversion pressure play a large role in the value of farmland, 
e.g. Plantinga et al. (2002). Thus, the time-varying regional fixed effect now 
controls for urbanisation and other non-agricultural pressures experienced 
by all farms in a region. 
In spite of the progression of the empirical literature (see Alston, 2007 
for a state-of-the-art discussion), fundamental shortcomings remain for 
models that attempt to quantify the determinants of farmland values. This 
implies that similar to the land rental models, the estimation of equation 
(A3.6) is associated with several econometric issues, the most important of 
which we briefly discuss in the following section. 
Expectation error 
According to the underlying framework (equations A3.4 and A3.5), land 
values are based upon expectations about the long-term stream of net 
returns to production and subsidies tied to the land. Nevertheless, expected 
future cash flows are unobservable. We can only observe certain market 
and payment realisations for a sample of farms under a fixed set of policy 
instruments and market conditions. Both the market and subsidies in any 
given year represent realisations drawn from distributions that are 
determined by random prices, yields and policy shocks. 
These considerations raise a critical issue: To what extent do 
observations about payments in any given year reflect the long-term 
expected stream of cash flows that determine land values? What one 
observes in any given year for a farm may not be a valid indicator of what 
is expected in the long run and therefore what is actually driving land 
values – implying a standard errors-in-variables problem. 
There are several possibilities regarding the link between observed 
policy and market outcomes in any given year and the determination of 
farmland prices. For example, it is possible that a farmer correctly assesses 340 | APPENDIX 3. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
the true determinants of land values, but these determinants are 
unobservable. Relating the observable annual realisations of market and 
policy outcomes to land prices results in the classical problem of errors in 
the explanatory variables. Errors in variables result in an attenuation bias 
that forces the estimated coefficients towards zero and thus yields 
inconsistent estimates. As outlined earlier, it is also possible that farmers do 
not correctly assess the true determinants of land values, implying another 
source of the expectation error. 
Spatial correlation 
Spatial correlation is likely to be relevant when a pooled sample of 
individual farms is considered. Since the programme benefits realised are 
dependent upon aggregate market conditions, the errors are likely to be 
highly correlated across observational units (farms) in a given year. In a 
sample consisting of only a few years of data, the correlation across farms 
increases the estimation error and may further exaggerate the bias; year-to-
year shocks may not average out when only a few years are observed. 
Furthermore, if realisations are highly correlated across units within a year, 
parameter estimates may shift considerably from year to year. If only a few 
years are observed, the estimates from a pooled sample may be sensitive to 
events in the years observed and thus may vary substantially across years 
and be more variable in a pooled analysis. 
The problem of spatial correlation can be addressed, for example, by 
using farm-specific time series, but these are very rare for Europe as yet. 
Unobservable counterfactual 
For policies that support market prices (such as commodity subsidies), all 
land that grows the supported commodity, which is likely to be all the 
comparable land in any particular region, will be affected in the same way, 
at least to a first approximation. So we do not have the necessary contrast 
between the policy and its absence. Of course, we will always find some 
landowners not enrolled in a programme, but if the market price is 
supported, that land will reap the benefits anyway. Moreover, even if an 
individual farm does not grow the supported commodity, but could if the 
owner chose to, the market value of the land will reflect that option and so 
be affected by the subsidies. 
For policies that do not support market prices, such as production-
flexibility contract payments, market-loss assistance payments and loan 
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deficiency payments in the US and the SPS in the EU, land values in an area 
will be affected even for non-participating farms if they could choose to 
participate. 
One econometric approach to these problems could be to attempt to 
hold the non-programme factors that make land at two different locations 
differently valuable using a standard regression model, and see how much 
of the residual differences can be explained by variables pertaining to 
commodity programmes. As usual, the difficulties may involve obtaining 
appropriate observations, data that measure both policies and the relevant 
non-policy variables that influence land values, and estimating the effects 
of policies on land values rather than the effects of other variables (omitted 
variables correlated with land values) on policies. 
Summary 
The insights from this appendix suggest that coupled and decoupled 
policies require an alternative econometric approach, as they affect land 
rents and land values differently. Moreover, the appropriate empirical 
methodology also depends on whether land rent or land price data are 
available, as well as data availability at the regional or farm level. 
From a statistical perspective, the most valuable data would be farm-
specific time series. Yet, in view of the poor quality of the available policy 
and land market data as well as the project constraints, it has not been 
possible to collect the full range of the required data within the present 
study. 
Therefore, a more pragmatic approach, which allows us to combine 
both qualitative and quantitative information, has been applied in the 
empirical analysis of the present study. For instance, where the required 
statistical data are not available, the analysis draws on qualitative data.  342 | 
APPENDIX 4. DETERMINATION OF LAND 
VALUE 
t least three conceptually different theories have contributed to the 
theoretical discussion of land value determination: the net present 
value (NPV) model, the asset pricing model and the hedonic land 
price model. Although they provide alternative micro-foundations of the 
mechanism by which land values and rents are determined, as discussed 
below, their predictions are rather similar. 
The NPV model. Most research attempting to identify and quantify the 
determinants of farmland price relies on the NPV approach.146 This 
approach assumes that the price of farmland equals the present value of all 
future expected cash flows attached to the use of land for productive 
purposes. In this context, an increasing farmland price should be explained 
by an increasing land rent. Indeed, in the US, agricultural economists 
observed that the evolutions of the real land value and agricultural income 
went in the same direction from 1910 to 1950. Those trends convinced 
agricultural economists to rely on the NPV approach.147 
The asset-pricing model. The classical NPV approach drew criticism 
because of the observed decreasing agricultural income and increasing land 
prices in the 1950s. Several alternative models were proposed to explain the 
evolution of farmland price. Feldstein (1980) points out that the increasing 
                                                      
146 According to the NPV framework, land prices are thought to be determined by 
the current and expected future streams of benefits derived from land use. These 
benefits can be distinguished into two broad categories. The first is the stream of 
benefits from productive use, which include returns from the market for the 
production of agricultural output (alongside the stream of benefits that are directly 
or indirectly a result of government support policies). The second relates to 
anticipation of future capital gains, for example, if prices increase because of urban 
pressure. 
147 Today, the NPV is a standard method for the financial appraisal of long-term 
projects. Used for capital budgeting and widely throughout economics, it measures 
the excess or shortfall of cash flows, in present value terms, once financing charges 
are met. 
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farmland prices observed in the 1970s took place during a period 
characterised by a strong inflation. As an alternative to the NPV approach, 
Feldstein proposes a portfolio choice model with two assets: a classical 
financial asset and land.148 He shows that anticipated inflation could lead to 
a decrease in the actualisation rate applied to land and explain an increase 
in farmland price. Other authors explain that as a real asset with fixed 
supply, land tends to hold its real value during inflationary periods. 
Consequently, there is an inflationary hedging motive to buy land during 
an inflationary period (Castle and Hoch, 1982). The asset-pricing model 
was first applied to agricultural land values in the late 1980s.149  
                                                      
148 The general model of asset pricing was introduced by Jack Treynor, William 
Sharpe, John Lintner and Jan Mossin (in 1990, Sharpe received the Nobel Memorial 
Prize in Economics for his contributions to the capital asset pricing theory). The 
asset pricing model is used to determine a theoretically appropriate, required rate 
of return (and thus the price if expected cash flows can be estimated) of an asset 
(e.g. agricultural land value), if that asset is to be added to an already well-
diversified portfolio, given that asset’s non-diversifiable risk. The asset pricing 
model takes into account the asset’s sensitivity to non-diversifiable risk (also 
known as systematic risk or market risk), as well as the expected return of the 
market and the expected return of a theoretical risk-free asset. 
149 Featherstone and Baker (1987), Clark et al. (1993), and Chavas and Thomas 
(1999) are good examples of applications using the capital asset pricing theory. 